
PCA CASE No. 2021-26

PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION

BETWEEN:

WINDSTREAM ENERGY LLC

Claimant

- vs -

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

Respondent

TRANSCRIPT OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Held at the offices of Arbitration Place
333 Bay Street, Suite 900, Toronto, Ontario
on Wednesday, February 7, 2024, at 9:00 a.m.

VOLUME 3
FURTHER REVISED TRANSCRIPT
CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT WITH INDEX

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Prof. John Gotanda

Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin

PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION REGISTRY

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Chris Milburn
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1 Toronto, Ontario
 2 --- Upon resuming on Wednesday, February 7, 2024
 3 at 9:00 a.m.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 It's 9 o'clock. So are we all set?
 6 Welcome back, everybody.
 7 Welcome to -- gosh, it's like three little birds
 8 on a wire; isn't it? Welcome to the experts.
 9 Mr. Terry, any housekeeping
 10 before we start?
 11 MR. TERRY: Nothing from us.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 And I understand from Mr. Aragón the arrangements
 14 here this morning, so thank you for that.
 15 Any housekeeping from
 16 Respondent?
 17 MS. SQUIRES: No, none.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 No. Thank you so much.
 20 Okay. Perfect. Please
 21 proceed.
 22 Actually, no, don't. I need
 23 all three of you, please, to make the affirmation.
 24 Mr. Milburn, should we start
 25 with you. It should be in front of you, the

1 expert affirmation, please.
 2 MR. MILBURN: I solemnly
 3 declare upon my honour and conscience that my
 4 statement will be in accordance with my sincere
 5 belief.
 6 MR. TOBIS: I solemnly declare
 7 upon my honour and conscience that my statement
 8 will be in accordance with my sincere belief.
 9 MR. TETARD: I solemnly
 10 declare upon my honour and conscience that my
 11 statement will be in accordance with my sincere
 12 belief.
 13 AFFIRMED: CHRIS MILBURN, EDWARD TOBIS AND
 14 PIERRE-ANTOINE TETARD
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Wonderful. Thank you, all.
 17 I didn't introduce us. I
 18 think you have been in the room so you know who we
 19 are, Wendy Miles, Professor Gotanda and Justice
 20 McLachlin. Thank you for coming today.
 21 If you get uncomfortable, you
 22 are quite crowded, there.
 23 Mr. Tetard, it's fine for you
 24 to sort of move aside if it's not dealing with
 25 your bits, so just be comfortable.

1 And if there's a point at
 2 which you can move back down to the back to make
 3 more room, that's fine. Just as you wish.
 4 But don't, now that you are
 5 all three, collectively, in witness questioning
 6 mode, not to discuss anything with the team.
 7 So, if you peel away, please
 8 don't discuss anything about the case with anybody
 9 else on the counsel team, the client team or
 10 anybody.
 11 Have you come to an
 12 arrangement as to whether the experts can speak to
 13 one another?
 14 MR. TERRY: We haven't
 15 discussed that. I guess the question is whether
 16 Canada has any objection to that.
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 It's probably going to be more pragmatic and
 19 sensible for them to be able to speak to one
 20 another because it is a collective report, but
 21 tell me if you have any objection to that.
 22 MS. SQUIRES: I don't think in
 23 principle. I think that makes sense.
 24 The report is divided up
 25 between what everybody is supposed to speak to, so

1 I guess if everyone is staying kind of within
 2 their lane and someone is not veering out, that's
 3 fine.
 4 Maybe proceed and see how it
 5 goes and, if there is any issue, I will speak up.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 It was more during the breaks I was talking about.
 8 MS. SQUIRES: Oh, yes, by all
 9 means.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 Thanks. No, I don't want them having a
 12 tete-a-tete during cross, no. No.
 13 MS. SQUIRES: Sorry.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 But thank you for your patience for that. You are
 16 more patient than I am, no.
 17 Mr. Terry, please proceed.
 18 MR. TERRY: Thank you very
 19 much. And I don't have any questions to start
 20 off.
 21 I will note, however, as
 22 Ms. Squires mentioned, that we have a protocol
 23 that we discussed with Canada so that Canada knows
 24 which questions to put to which witnesses.
 25 But I will turn things over to

1 Mr. Tetard, Mr. Milburn and Mr. Tobis to make
 2 their presentation.
 3 EXPERT PRESENTATION BY MR. TETARD, MR. MILBURN AND
 4 MR. TOBIS:
 5 A. [MILBURN] Thank you and
 6 good morning, everyone.
 7 So we have a slide
 8 presentation for you this morning and we will just
 9 jump right in and start with some introductions.
 10 My name is Chris Milburn. I
 11 am a Professional Accountant and a Chartered
 12 Business Valuator. I have over 25 years of
 13 experience in valuation and the quantification of
 14 economic damages. And I have testified a number
 15 of times in investor-state disputes involving
 16 natural resource projects.
 17 A. [TOBIS] Good morning,
 18 members of the Tribunal. My name is Edward Tobis.
 19 I am a managing director at Secretariat. I am a
 20 Chartered Professional Accountant and a Chartered
 21 Business Valuator. I have nearly 15 years of
 22 experience working in a financial capacity with a
 23 variety of industry groups around the globe,
 24 including with large energy and infrastructure
 25 projects such as this one. I have acted as an

1 expert witness in international arbitrations and
 2 commercial litigations on multiple occasions.
 3 A. [TETARD] Good morning,
 4 members of the Tribunal. My name is
 5 Pierre-Antoine Tetard. I am a chief commercial
 6 officer at BlueFloat Energy.
 7 I have 18 years of
 8 experience in the investments in the energy
 9 industry. I have a background in investment
 10 banking, private equity and project development,
 11 initially on onshore wind, moving to offshore wind
 12 in 2014, working with Jérôme Guillet for about a
 13 year in 2014, 2015.
 14 In 2016, I joined Ørsted where
 15 I stayed just under four years working on
 16 international projects, M&A, project financing,
 17 market industry standards.
 18 A notable transaction I worked
 19 on is the acquisition of Deepwater by Ørsted.
 20 I left Ørsted in 2020 and
 21 joined BlueFloat Energy later that year.
 22 BlueFloat Energy is a global
 23 developer of offshore wind projects. BlueFloat is
 24 developing over 30 projects, representing more
 25 than 30 gigawatts of gross capacity.

1 And over half of our 30
 2 gigawatt pipeline have site control.
 3 I am an observer to the board
 4 of BlueFloat Energy. Thank you.
 5 A. [MILBURN] So our agenda
 6 today, we are going to have a brief background.
 7 We are going to discuss a little bit about NAFTA 1
 8 and then we will talk about the market approach,
 9 the income approach to value and then finish off
 10 with our damages conclusions.
 11 Slide 4.
 12 So starting off with the
 13 background. Slide 5.
 14 So I think our mandate is
 15 probably pretty clear. We are here as independent
 16 experts on valuation and damages and we have
 17 issued two reports in this matter.
 18 Slide 6.
 19 So, on the next two slides, we
 20 will review a number of key valuation and damages
 21 concepts.
 22 The first is full reparations.
 23 So the objective of our
 24 damages analysis is to restore the Claimant to the
 25 financial position they would have occupied absent

1 the alleged breaches, so this is known as the full
 2 reparation standard.
 3 And, under this standard,
 4 risks that are related to the alleged breaches are
 5 properly excluded.
 6 Dr. Guillet did not apply a
 7 full reparation standard and he continually
 8 referred to political risks that are related to
 9 the alleged breaches.
 10 The main element of our
 11 damages assessment is a valuation of the project,
 12 absent the alleged breaches. And we performed
 13 that in compliance with our professional practice
 14 standards and international valuation standards.
 15 The value term we used in our
 16 valuation is fair market value, and we provide the
 17 definition here.
 18 Dr. Guillet did not state the
 19 value term that he used in his reports. But, in
 20 our view, his valuation does not meet the
 21 definition of fair market value in a number of
 22 respects.
 23 Slide 7.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 Mr. Milburn, I don't understand what you mean when

1 you say Mr. Guillet did not follow a full
 2 reparation standard.
 3 First of all, the application
 4 for standard is our job, not Mr. Guillet's job or
 5 yours, respectfully.
 6 A. [MILBURN] Yes,
 7 absolutely.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 But what do you mean, he valued the investment to
 10 put the wronged party in the position had it
 11 not -- it would have been in had it not been for
 12 the breach.
 13 How is that not applying a
 14 full reparation standard?
 15 A. [MILBURN] Well, what I am
 16 referring to is that he refers to a number of
 17 risks that we think should properly be excluded.
 18 So he refers to political
 19 risks such as the risk that, when the moratorium
 20 was lifted, market participants would still attach
 21 risk to it and would value the project at a lower
 22 amount because there was a moratorium in the past.
 23 He, he refers to risks that,
 24 for example, the project could be expropriated in
 25 future, which we think that should be excluded

1 because that's related to the alleged breaches
 2 that are being complained of in this case.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 So the issue between you is what risk should we
 5 eliminate in the valuation approach that we apply.
 6 And, ultimately, that's a
 7 question for us as to what the position would be
 8 had the alleged breaches not occurred.
 9 A. [MILBURN] Precisely.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 And the difference between you is whether
 12 construction risk, for example, going forward is
 13 still a risk.
 14 A. [MILBURN] Yes, that is a
 15 risk, yes.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Okay. I understand what you're saying.
 18 He would say, of course, and
 19 he will have his opportunity to say that he is
 20 applying a full reparation standard. He is just
 21 applying it appropriately to the loss that is
 22 alleged to have occurred here and you're not.
 23 A. [MILBURN] I am not sure
 24 he addressed the issue of full reparation. I am
 25 not sure how he will address that.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 Right. We can ask him if he was applying
 3 something that wasn't full compensation. Thanks.
 4 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Moving on to
 6 Slide 7 where we continue our discussion of some
 7 key valuation damages concepts.
 8 In Dr. Guillet's reports, in
 9 our view, he has misapplied some fundamental
 10 business valuation principles which really should
 11 not be contentious issues for any professional
 12 valuator.
 13 First, value is primarily a
 14 function of two key components: Expected amount
 15 and timing of future cash flows, and the risk of
 16 achieving those cash flows.
 17 The greater the expected
 18 future cash flows, the higher the value and the
 19 greater the risk, the lower the value.
 20 Second, value is at a point in
 21 time. This means that information that was not
 22 known or knowable, as at the valuation date,
 23 referred to as hindsight, cannot be used to derive
 24 the value of an asset as of a valuation date.
 25 However, hindsight can be

1 considered, in limited circumstances, simply to
 2 confirm the reasonability of assumptions that were
 3 known or knowable as at the valuation date.
 4 In contrast, in Dr. Guillet's
 5 report, he has inappropriately, one, included
 6 hindsight transactions in his actual valuation
 7 assessments at as the valuation date, which should
 8 be disregarded.
 9 And, two, referred to
 10 impairments in certain offshore wind projects in
 11 mid-2023.
 12 What Dr. Guillet fails to note
 13 is that these 2023 impairments were due to the
 14 post-COVID economy which caused drastic increases
 15 in inflation rates, interest rates, as well as
 16 supply chain disruptions. These were factors that
 17 were not known or knowable as of February 2020,
 18 prior to the COVID pandemic.
 19 When negotiating an open
 20 market transaction as at the valuation date,
 21 neither the buyer or the seller would have the
 22 benefit of such hindsight events that will take
 23 place at a future date.
 24 Third, contingent
 25 consideration must be considered in a fair market

1 value assessment.
 2 For example, if a buyer were
 3 to acquire an asset for a \$50 million payment up
 4 front today, plus a \$100 million contingent
 5 payment in one year from now, Dr. Guillet would
 6 incorrectly argue that the value of this
 7 transaction is simply the first \$50 million
 8 payment and would completely exclude the value of
 9 the second payment.
 10 Just because a contingent
 11 payment is sometimes difficult to value does not
 12 mean it should not be valued.
 13 Failing to consider the value
 14 of contingent consideration significantly
 15 understates the value of a transaction.
 16 Slide 8.
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 Mr. Tobis, can we just stay on Slide 7.
 19 So, the first row in the
 20 table, you say Mr. Guillet misapplied fundamental
 21 business valuation principles which should not be
 22 contentious for any potential valuator. And you
 23 say it's a primary -- primarily a function of cash
 24 flows and timing.
 25 That's if one is applying the

1 income assessment methodology.
 2 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, these
 3 principles would apply in any valuation
 4 methodology.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 Well, if I am applying investment costs
 7 methodology, then what is the expected cash flow
 8 relevance to that?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Even when
 10 applying an expected cost methodology, the
 11 assumption is yet, you are assuming those costs
 12 are representative of the amounts, the present
 13 value of the amounts you would receive back from
 14 this asset in the future.
 15 It's still, ultimately, a
 16 function of the cash flows you expect to receive
 17 just expressed in a different way.
 18 So the cost approach is
 19 typically used in situations where you don't have
 20 sufficient information to run a DCF model.
 21 And, in those cases, use the
 22 best objective information you have as the costs
 23 and you assume that a notional buyer would not be
 24 willing to pay any more than the costs that have
 25 already been incurred since, if someone else has

1 spent those amounts, that must mean that they
 2 considered the value of this project to be at
 3 least the present value of those costs.
 4 So it's a roundabout way to
 5 ultimately getting back to that same fundamental
 6 valuation principle which is listed in Chapter 1
 7 of any valuation textbook, under any valuation
 8 method.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 For any valuation.
 11 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 Of any business, even if it's not an income
 14 generating business.
 15 A. [TOBIS] Of any financial
 16 asset.
 17 So, for example, if you're
 18 valuing art, someone purchasing art might be
 19 purchasing it for their own preference or benefits
 20 but not from a financial perspective.
 21 We are specifically talking
 22 about valuing financial assets or businesses where
 23 the goal of the purchaser is to generate profits
 24 and make money.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 So I ask you even if it's not an income generating
 2 business and you said yes, but then you seem to
 3 say no.
 4 A. [TOBIS] So for a business
 5 that's not currently income generating but --
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 No, never. For an asset, an investment that
 8 doesn't generate income.
 9 A. [TOBIS] Any financial
 10 asset, even today, then if someone is paying money
 11 for it, they anticipate to eventually generate
 12 cash from those assets.
 13 There's been a lot of early
 14 stage startups in the tech space that weren't
 15 generating profits that their market
 16 capitalizations were in the billions of dollars.
 17 The logic of that is because
 18 investors in those shares were anticipating that
 19 those companies will eventually generate income
 20 and turn a profit.
 21 The fact that, today, they are
 22 not income generating does not mean that you
 23 wouldn't value them on the expected future cash
 24 flows.
 25 The only time this would not

1 apply is an asset such as art or, you know, an
 2 instrument, let's say, or some collectible,
 3 trading cards, that there is literally someone is
 4 buying it just for their personal preference, not
 5 that they anticipate financial gains.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 In your second row, you talk about hindsight
 8 cannot be used in a valuation analysis; can I not
 9 do an ex post valuation analysis.
 10 A. [TOBIS] If you were to do
 11 an ex post valuation date analysis, that would
 12 mean moving the valuation dates to a current date
 13 and that would require a whole set of new
 14 assumptions and forecasts and economic inputs.
 15 Effectively, what that would
 16 mean is today, you know, February of 2024, we
 17 would use -- we would be doing ex post analysis in
 18 using today's inputs. You can't --
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 So would hindsight be used?
 21 A. [TOBIS] It wouldn't be
 22 called hindsight because we would be moving the
 23 valuation date.
 24 If we are doing a
 25 February 1st, 2024, valuation date, that's our

1 valuation date. And there's no such thing as
 2 hindsight because we are using information today.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 You have applied an ex ante analysis; haven't you?
 5 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 6 Sorry, and if I may add.
 7 If you refer in an ex post
 8 situation where you are looking at a past lost
 9 profits and future lost profits, in those
 10 circumstances, then you'd be using hindsight for
 11 past losses but that wouldn't be a valuation.
 12 That would be damages.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 All right, Slide 8.
 15 A. [MILBURN] An important
 16 component of the damages analysis, under a full
 17 reparation standard, is the but-for scenario that
 18 would likely have prevailed, absent the alleged
 19 breaches.
 20 The but-for scenario we have
 21 been instructed to assume is listed here on this
 22 slide, along with the key assumptions that we use
 23 which are based on opinions of the technical
 24 experts.
 25 Slide 9.

1 A. [TETARD] Key areas of
 2 agreement between the experts.
 3 We agree on the following
 4 assumptions or inputs:
 5 That the capital costs have
 6 decreased between NAFTA 1 and valuation date.
 7 That the project PPA price is
 8 above PPA prices observed in the market as of
 9 valuation date.
 10 That capital available to
 11 offshore wind has increased significantly.
 12 Project development stage, we
 13 do not fully agree on it but we agree on the
 14 following:
 15 That the project has secured
 16 revenue that was not fully permitted; the four
 17 milestones impacting value preFID are revenue
 18 grid, site control and permits; and the market
 19 approach or comparable transactions, we agree it
 20 is a useful approach to be used to value the
 21 project and transactions that are close to reach
 22 or have reached FID at financial close are not
 23 comparable.
 24 Slide 10.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Just on Slide 9, you don't conduct any sensitivity
 2 analysis on a change in the PPA price; do you?
 3 A. [TETARD] I am not sure we
 4 do. I will have to check the report.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 6 don't think it's actually your area of expertise.
 7 Mr. Milburn, do you conduct a
 8 sensitivity analysis on the price?
 9 A. [MILBURN] No, we don't.
 10 The basis of our but-for
 11 scenario is that the FIT contract would have been
 12 unfrozen and so the PPA revenue terms in that
 13 contract would have remained so there would have
 14 been no change --
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Well, there was a change. They go up for
 17 inflation.
 18 A. [MILBURN] Right --
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 Starting, from every year, incremental inflation
 21 rise even to the start date for the gap and then
 22 they drop off after 20 years to what you forecast
 23 as the actual price.
 24 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 So those are the only changes up, except for the
 2 fall off at the end of the tariff; yes.
 3 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 So no sensitivity analysis.
 6 A. [MILBURN] No.
 7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 8 For a lower renegotiating tariff price.
 9 A. [MILBURN] No.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 Okay. Thanks.
 12 And those were your
 13 instructions, presumably.
 14 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 15 A. [TETARD] Slide 10.
 16 Key areas of differences,
 17 disagreements between the experts.
 18 On the valuation methodology,
 19 we believe both market approach and income
 20 approach or DCF should be used. This is based on
 21 years of experience evaluating similar projects.
 22 Definition of site control.
 23 We believe that an exclusive
 24 and/or priority position to develop the site would
 25 be considered effective site control from a risk

1 and value perspective.
 2 The fundamental question is
 3 can any other developer take over the project's
 4 position it has on the same site.
 5 This is in line with how other
 6 offshore wind developers see site control. No
 7 other party could develop the same site.
 8 Dr. Guillet's definition seeks
 9 to be overly strict and disconnect with industry
 10 reality.
 11 And I am going to read the
 12 block on the right:
 13 "The 48,000 acres of
 14 Crown land that wind
 15 stream applied for AOR
 16 status on covered all
 17 areas required for the
 18 project and more."[as
 19 read]
 20 On project milestones. Grid
 21 access milestone is achieved in accordance with
 22 conclusions of NAFTA 1.
 23 Site control is achieved in
 24 accordance with the definition just listed.
 25 According to Dr. Guillet, none

1 of these two milestones are achieved.
 2 Relevance of the PPA price.
 3 In our view, the PPA price
 4 known is relevant as soon as it is known. It
 5 creates the economic value envelope the project
 6 can work with.
 7 Without a PPA price known, the
 8 project progress is in a relative stage of
 9 darkness, not knowing whether it will have an
 10 economic rationale.
 11 Dr. Guillet insist it isn't
 12 relevant until close to FID or financial close or
 13 past full permitting.
 14 Floating wind farms.
 15 Floating wind farms are not
 16 comparable to bottom-fixed projects. They are two
 17 different technologies at different stages of
 18 technological maturity that are on two different
 19 cost trajectories, but while fixed reach critical
 20 mass in the mid-2010s, floating as of today
 21 hasn't. Dr. Guillet insists they are comparable.
 22 US offshore wind lease
 23 transactions.
 24 These transactions involve
 25 lease only i.e. site control. No PPA, no grid,

1 no permitting.
 2 From that standpoint, we
 3 believe they could be used as a floor to project
 4 value.
 5 Slide 11.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Mr. Tetard, Slide 10, site control.
 8 Have you read the award?
 9 A. [TETARD] I have read the
 10 award.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Do you understand that the Tribunal has found that
 13 the Claimant did not yet have site control?
 14 A. [TETARD] I have read and
 15 respect the decision of the Tribunal.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 So what is your opinion based on that? The
 18 Tribunal is wrong?
 19 A. [TETARD] My
 20 interpretation of the decision is that the
 21 definition of site control might have been used or
 22 interpreted by the Tribunal, might have -- is
 23 different from how site control is evaluated by
 24 the industry, particularly when it comes to
 25 defining a milestone in a project development

1 stage of a project.
 2 I think it's a question of
 3 definition, Madam President.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 Might the same be said for the Tribunal's
 6 interpretation of grid connection?
 7 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 Okay.
 10 A. [TOBIS] Slide 11.
 11 On the next two slides, we
 12 will discuss a couple key aspects from the NAFTA 1
 13 award.
 14 So, as we just heard from
 15 Mr. Tetard, the NAFTA 1 Tribunal concluded that
 16 the project had a grid connection.
 17 We note that having guaranteed
 18 grid access upon the receipt of an NTP meets the
 19 definition in the industry of having grid
 20 connection from the perspective of assessing a
 21 project's development stage.
 22 Second, in NAFTA 1,
 23 Dr. Guillet and Canada argued that the project was
 24 not feasible and had no material value.
 25 The NAFTA 1 Tribunal rejected

1 these arguments and, as we now know, they assessed
 2 the value of the project in NAFTA 1 to be
 3 \$31 million.
 4 Dr. Guillet continues to make
 5 these same previously rejected arguments despite
 6 the thousands of pages of additional technical
 7 expert evidence filed in this arbitration, which
 8 confirms the even greater feasibility of the
 9 project as of February 2020, due to the
 10 advancements in the offshore wind industry and
 11 technology since NAFTA 1 which we will discuss
 12 shortly.
 13 Slide 13.
 14 On this slide --
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Just can I come back to Mr. Tetard.
 17 What do you understand, from
 18 the face of the award, that the Tribunal
 19 interpreted to mean by grid connection?
 20 Because, plainly, it wasn't a
 21 connection in the electrical sense.
 22 So what do you understand them
 23 to have meant?
 24 A. [TETARD] I think the
 25 Tribunal understood that, of course, the project

1 had not a physical connection yet, didn't have a
 2 grid connection fully negotiated yet.
 3 But that the project had
 4 secured a priority position in the process of
 5 being granted in the future when the project is
 6 more advanced, this grid connection agreement,
 7 which seals the contractual obligations between
 8 the parties.
 9 That the Tribunal was, in my
 10 view, well educated about the process, the
 11 regulatory process in Ontario as to how a project
 12 obtained a grid access.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 What about the construction process? I have
 15 checked the Wood report again this morning to see
 16 if I can find an answer to this.
 17 Were there to be converters
 18 and transformers or just transformers? What was
 19 required, physically, for the connection; do you
 20 know?
 21 A. [TETARD] I did not go
 22 into that level of detail, technical detail.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Did you read the expert reports?
 25 A. [TETARD] Yes, but -- yes,

1 but I don't remember that level of detail.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Okay.
 4 But for offshore wind, there
 5 is the additional feature that doesn't exist for
 6 onshore wind where you have your underwater --
 7 your underground cable, underwater, and then your
 8 transformers at the wind farm which you would have
 9 onshore. But, if it's far enough offshore, you
 10 need a converter as well.
 11 You don't know if that was the
 12 case here?
 13 A. [TETARD] I don't know if
 14 that was the case here.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 And you don't know whose cost that would have
 17 been, the TSO or the -- or the developer?
 18 A. [TETARD] My understanding
 19 was that it was the developer. At least the
 20 transmission asset from the project, all the way
 21 to the grid connection points was the cost of the
 22 developer, including, actually, the substation at
 23 the point of connection was the cost of the
 24 developer.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Okay.
 2 A. [TETARD] That's my
 3 understanding because we included them in our
 4 CAPEX, in our construction costs. So I believe it
 5 was the scope of the developer.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Okay. So that all sits also, therefore, at the
 8 risk of the developer?
 9 A. [TETARD] The costing and
 10 the scheduling of these assets will be the risk of
 11 the developer.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 But also the delay risk or the obstruction risk,
 14 if, for example, a cable had to run through a
 15 marine site that was protected that wasn't
 16 otherwise anticipated, all of that would sit with
 17 the risk of the developer?
 18 A. [TETARD] In the
 19 circumstances, my understanding is yes.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 And have you factored that into your risk
 22 discount, Mr. Milburn?
 23 A. [MILBURN] Yes, I believe
 24 that would have all been looked at by the
 25 technical experts and I think they were satisfied

1 that there was no significant risk there.
 2 The Wolfe Island project had a
 3 very similar underground -- underwater cable that
 4 was on the lake bed and so they would have
 5 followed the same process that they had used.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Is it -- I am sorry, I am not that close to the
 8 expert reports. You may not be either. I think
 9 it's in the Wood report.
 10 Could they connect to the same
 11 cable or did they have to run their own cable
 12 entirely?
 13 A. [MILBURN] I believe they
 14 would have had to run their own cable but it would
 15 have been along, perhaps, a similar route.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 17 understand.
 18 A. [MILBURN] As to the same
 19 I think the Lennoxville station onshore there.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 21 understand.
 22 Do you remember how far it
 23 was?
 24 A. [MILBURN] Not -- I am
 25 going to say like 15 kilometres or somewhere in

1 that range.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Yeah, 10 is what I was thinking but someone may
 4 clarify.
 5 Okay. Thank you.
 6 A. [TOBIS] Slide 13.
 7 On this slide, we show a
 8 summary of how the Tribunal came up with the
 9 quantum of the NAFTA 1 award.
 10 It is important to recognize,
 11 in the NAFTA 1 arbitration, Dr. Guillet used the
 12 valuation date of February 2011.
 13 The Tribunal then relied on
 14 transactions from 2009 to 2013 to derive what they
 15 considered to be a value of the project as of the
 16 date of the award, September 2016.
 17 As you'll note from this
 18 slide, the NAFTA 1 Tribunal did not consider any
 19 transactions from 2014 to 2016 in their
 20 assessment.
 21 One of the key questions on
 22 valuation is, in this case, did the value of the
 23 project increase between NAFTA 1 and
 24 February 2020, and, if so, by how much?
 25 We heard several comments from

1 the Tribunal on Monday about how the value of a
 2 project can potentially increase over time, even
 3 in the absence of significant development
 4 activities, but simply due to industry factors.
 5 For example, we heard how a
 6 development stage gold mine could potentially
 7 significantly increase in value over a given time
 8 period, based on changes in the price of gold
 9 alone.
 10 We agree with this analogy.
 11 And, in the following slides, we will discuss the
 12 various factors that contributed to the increase
 13 in the value of the project since NAFTA 1.
 14 A. [MILBURN] Slide 14 --
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Just before you do that.
 17 You accept that Dr. Guillet
 18 disagrees with you that -- and I'm sure he will
 19 disagree that gold is the right analogy for a
 20 market comparables analysis for an early stage
 21 development.
 22 Because, as I understand his
 23 report, he says the price paid on the market
 24 comparables, when divided by the multiplier for
 25 capacity, is largely the same. It hasn't moved

1 very much at all. Perhaps 3 percent. But it
 2 hasn't moved very much at all.
 3 So the transaction price, on
 4 an early stage development project, doesn't, in
 5 fact, shift on the market comparables he's
 6 provided us with. Doesn't shift at all to take
 7 into account all the factors I am sure you are
 8 about to discuss which is lower construction
 9 prices, improved technology, improved efficiency.
 10 So do you have anything -- I
 11 mean, first of all, if you think I am interpreting
 12 Dr. Guillet's report wrong, say so. But I
 13 understand that's his analysis. He will speak to
 14 that himself.
 15 If you think he is wrong, why
 16 is he wrong when his numbers say what they say,
 17 other than you say he has chosen the wrong
 18 numbers?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Excellent
 20 question. And I can't speak for Dr. Guillet. I
 21 could only speak for what's written in his report
 22 and my understanding of that.
 23 As we will get into in our
 24 presentation, as you alluded to, we strongly
 25 disagree with the numbers that he has used to draw

1 these conclusions and his implied assessment that
 2 the value of what he refers to as early stage
 3 projects haven't changed.
 4 This industry analysis, we
 5 will deal with the smell test on that analysis, is
 6 one reasonability check to help demonstrate why
 7 his numbers are wrong, in addition to various
 8 other issues which we will be discussing later,
 9 but including floating wind projects, including
 10 transactions with many math errors, transactions
 11 that he hasn't provided any information on, et
 12 cetera.
 13 So we think that he has
 14 artificially created this pattern to make it look
 15 like early stage projects have not moved in value
 16 over this ten-year period. But it just does not
 17 pass the smell test and it's just simply not
 18 credible, for all the reasons we will get into.
 19 And that pattern would just not be evident in any
 20 other industry.
 21 The example of gold, which I
 22 believe was Professor Gotanda said on Monday, we
 23 value a lot of gold mines as well and other
 24 resource based sectors where projects similarly go
 25 through a development trajectory from very early

1 stage through and as they mitigate risk and can go
 2 onwards.
 3 But we have seen several
 4 times, in all other industries, as business
 5 valuers, that the value of an asset is
 6 definitely impacted by the expected revenues, no
 7 matter what stage that asset is in.
 8 And even if an asset has not
 9 moved significantly through development, if the
 10 underlying revenue or commodity has increased or
 11 the industry has improved, that asset just
 12 reasonably increases in value over time.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Professor Gotanda has got a question but can I
 15 just cut in on there just for a moment.
 16 You mentioned commodities and
 17 if you were to compare gold with electricity as
 18 the commodity, the gold price has appreciated over
 19 the years, the, the -- you're assuming electricity
 20 will appreciate over the years, and that would
 21 then make the commodity comparable like for like,
 22 gold/electricity.
 23 But that's not what we have
 24 got here; right? We have got a tariff agreement.
 25 You say you know what the price is and it will

1 never change and it will increase inflation.
 2 But that's, that's -- I don't
 3 think the example of the gold commodity actually
 4 works at all here.
 5 First of all, we are not
 6 talking about -- as an early stage development
 7 project, we are not talking about sale of
 8 electricity. We are talking about the sale of an
 9 early-stage development project.
 10 So we are not talking about
 11 the sale of gold. If anything, we are talking
 12 about the sale of an exploration license for a
 13 piece of dirt that may or may not have gold under
 14 it.
 15 That's what we are talking
 16 about, if we are comparing exact comparables.
 17 So Professor Gotanda raised
 18 the gold so I will -- now that I have probably
 19 confused the commodities comparables a little bit,
 20 I might leave him to try and dig me out of it.
 21 But is -- gold does not feel,
 22 to me, to be the correct comparable here because
 23 we are not selling gold. We are not even selling
 24 electricity. We are selling an early-stage
 25 development project.

1 A. [TOBIS] Should I respond
 2 now or wait for Professor Gotanda.
 3 You made a lot of excellent
 4 points. Obviously, we are valuing an offshore
 5 wind project and not a gold mine.
 6 Our point was just the analogy
 7 of how market factors can impact the value of a --
 8 what we are calling development stage asset.
 9 If anything, in our case, the
 10 risk is even less than in a gold mine.
 11 When you are valuing a gold
 12 mine, unless you have contractually sold forward
 13 all your future productions, you know exactly how
 14 much gold is there. There is still risk around
 15 the price that you will sell that gold at.
 16 In this case, we have a
 17 contract that guarantees a price that
 18 contractually increases inflation by full
 19 inflation up to COD and then by partial inflation
 20 for the remainder of the contract.
 21 So, if anything, it's even
 22 less risky than a gold mine. Obviously, we are
 23 not drawing any direct comparables from a gold
 24 mine. There is a lot of differences in industry
 25 function.

1 But what we are -- even in the
 2 case of a gold mine, you would have to incur
 3 capital costs to construct the mine. And that's a
 4 big input. There is a lot of costs up front
 5 similar to offshore wind and the revenues come
 6 after that.
 7 If your expected cost of
 8 construction have come down but your projected
 9 revenues have gone up, basic valuation principles
 10 tell you the value of that asset has gone up, even
 11 if it's at an early stage, even if it's just an
 12 exploration property.
 13 An exploration property where
 14 you have sufficient certainty that there is some
 15 gold actually in that ground.
 16 Here, we have a contract that
 17 knows there is electricity to be sold in a
 18 contractual amount for that electricity.
 19 So the analogies -- which,
 20 again, wasn't in our report but is something that
 21 we keyed into an opening, the analogy of why the
 22 industry impacts the value in asset was reasonable
 23 to us, just to help demonstrate the point of the
 24 unreasonability of Dr. Guillet's conclusions on
 25 this.

1 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA:
 2 Getting back, though, to the market.
 3 If I read both reports -- many
 4 reports, in this case, there is agreement that the
 5 market price can affect the value in the end.
 6 In fact, if I read
 7 Dr. Guillet's report correctly, he says that it
 8 actually increased it a minute sort of amount and
 9 the factors that the price, he agrees the price
 10 did go down on, at some point.
 11 The one question, though --
 12 and I am sure he will have a chance to speak to
 13 that.
 14 But the one point where I
 15 think you disagree, and this is where I want a
 16 little clarification on is.
 17 In the dates that you're
 18 choosing for the market comparables are much
 19 different.
 20 In other words, he uses a
 21 backward looking -- I think it might have been
 22 from 2015, 2016. I think, if I remember
 23 correctly, you are looking more at the 2018, the
 24 more recent sort of transactions.
 25 Could you help provide a

1 little information on that and why that is right?
 2 Because that makes a huge difference, I think, in
 3 this case; right. It's.
 4 A. [TETARD] May I take this
 5 one.
 6 Absolutely. The period that
 7 you choose to select your comparables makes a big
 8 difference.
 9 And we actually have a comment
 10 on this later on the slide.
 11 I think Dr. Guillet goes back
 12 12 years in his sampling and we limited it to
 13 three years from 2017 to February 2020.
 14 Why we believe that sample of
 15 years is relevant and reasonable and justifiable
 16 is because the offshore wind industry has
 17 experienced its inflection point in the years
 18 2016, '17 and '18.
 19 It's from those years that
 20 offshore wind was set on its new trajectory, on
 21 its new -- it was a new market from that, from
 22 those years.
 23 In 2016 and '17, the offshore
 24 wind market observed with the listing of DONG
 25 Energy at the time.

1 It observed the first tenders
2 of PPAs in Europe under \$100 -- sorry, 100 euros
3 per megawatt hour.

4 And this result surprised the
5 industry. The industry was not expecting that
6 prices of offshore wind had gone lower so fast.

7 It was a very important moment
8 because it made understood the decision makers,
9 the industry, that offshore wind was on a
10 trajectory to become cost competitive, maybe not
11 exactly, but cost competitive to other renewable
12 technologies.

13 Before that, offshore wind was
14 looked at as an expensive renewable energy
15 technology.

16 A very important point.

17 And the other marker in those
18 years was -- I think it was 2018 -- is when
19 another tender in Europe produced a zero bid.

20 A zero bid meaning that the
21 developer was asking a revenue contract of zero to
22 the government. It was only asking for access to
23 the grid and the rights to build their project.

24 They were not asking for subsidies.

25 They were considering that

1 their project could, by themselves, source other
2 forms of PPAs to corporate or even directly on the
3 wholesale market and secure their contract.

4 So, from those years, this is
5 when you see, you know, an increase of the market.
6 The market becomes attractive to new investors.
7 New forms of capital arrive in the sector. The
8 market grows.

9 And so we are looking at the
10 valuation date of 2020.

11 What we wanted to make sure
12 was that we would select years that were not too
13 recent, that were big enough so that we could find
14 some transactions, but not too distant to make
15 sure that the market context of February 2020 was,
16 to some extent, reflected in the precedent
17 transactions to make them comparable.

18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
19 Mr. Tobis, I just wanted to check something you
20 said in your answer before.

21 That you said the value in the
22 smell test, that if the value doesn't go up, it
23 doesn't meet the smell test, I think, was
24 generally your point.

25 When you talk about value in

1 that context, here, the revenue doesn't go up
2 because the tariff is the tariff is the tariff,
3 other than inflation, which is then backed out
4 with your discount rate to your net present value;
5 right?

6 So leave that aside.

7 The value doesn't change. The
8 revenue doesn't change. If anything, the
9 operating costs or the construction costs or the
10 efficiency may improve on the costs side.

11 So when you say the value
12 doesn't go up, it doesn't get past the spell test,
13 is that on the basis of profit rather than
14 revenue?

15 A. [TOBIS] It's on the basis
16 of multiple components.

17 So, first, the fact that the
18 price increases by inflation would still increase
19 the value.

20 Another component, which we
21 will be getting into in the next few slides, as
22 you mentioned, is the capital and OPEX.

23 Another component is financial
24 risk. So did the actual discount rates or IOR
25 rates you use if you are doing income approach are

1 lower because there is less capital raising risk
2 in a newer valuation date.

3 So your revenues are higher,
4 your costs are lower and there is lower risk. All
5 those components combine -- and there's the
6 technology is better known so there's less risk
7 about, you know, construction overrun, being over
8 budget or over time.

9 I believe Dr. Guillet has
10 referred to, in some of his presentations, that
11 the offshore wind industry has an enviable track
12 record of building on time and on budget.

13 That kind of statement would
14 not have existed in 2015 which was prior to when
15 even there's any operating offshore wind farms in
16 North America.

17 So the combination of all the
18 factors that we will be getting into shortly in
19 our slides, all those would be combined to
20 contribute to increased value.

21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
22 So in the net present value calculation applying
23 the weighted average cost of capital, you say that
24 doesn't back out inflation?

25 A. [TOBIS] It's converting

1 all the future cash flows into a -- as I am sure
2 you are quite familiar, into your present value,
3 S-curve valuation date so it's converting
4 everything into 2020 dollars.

5 If you had some FIT prices
6 don't have inflationary increases, so if the FIT
7 price was fixed, which it does happen in other
8 jurisdictions, then you would see that downward
9 adjustment on value.

10 The fact that this one does
11 have a full inflation increase to COD, and
12 especially given the inflation rates since the FIT
13 contract was signed, that would, I guess, you
14 could view it as maintain the value of the project
15 at this increased FIT contract price.

16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
17 But if it were a FIT price with no inflation and
18 the effect of the net present value would be to
19 reduce it.

20 A. [TOBIS] Yes, yes.

21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
22 Then a FIT price with inflation, the effect of the
23 net present value is to create a nil sum game so
24 there is no benefit to inflation in the net
25 present value.

1 A. [TOBIS] It depends on the
2 relationship between the risk free rate used in
3 the discount factor and the assumed inflation,
4 actual historical inflation rate applied to the
5 contract.

6 So the discount rate we are
7 using to calculate the net present value, the
8 first component of a discount rate -- which
9 Mr. Milburn can get into. It's more in his
10 sections of the report, but I am happy to explain
11 the risk free rate.

12 Which represents, as of our
13 valuation date, what the expected risk free rate
14 is going forward. The FIT contract was increased
15 by actual inflation rates from 2010 to 2020 which
16 do not necessarily align with what our risk free
17 rate is as at our valuation date.

18 So it isn't necessarily a
19 complete offset the way, when we have run the
20 math, it actually results in a value increase due
21 to that slight disconnect between actual inflation
22 rates and what -- in February 2020, risk free
23 rates were quite low. You know, this was prior to
24 pandemic, prior to the inflation jump.

25 So because there is a

1 disconnect between the inflation rates that were
2 used to increase the FIT contract and,
3 effectively, the impact of inflation in our net
4 present value calculation, the combined impact of
5 that is an overall increase in value --

6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
7 So I hadn't fully appreciated that Mr. Milburn
8 will come to it.

9 So your weighted average cost
10 of capital calculation does not account for the
11 inflation in its entirety.

12 A. [TOBIS] It accounts for
13 expected inflation as of February of 2020.

14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
15 But it doesn't account for the full inflation in
16 the model across the non-market risk.

17 A. [TOBIS] It accounts -- it
18 accounts for inflation over the projected period.
19 The expected inflation as of February 2020.

20 That inflation rate, just the
21 specific rate of inflation isn't the same as the
22 actual rate of inflation from 2010 to 2020.

23 So I am just saying that we
24 are both accounting for inflation but, especially
25 as we have seen in the last few years, inflation

1 rates can jump all over the place.

2 So I am just saying there is
3 slightly different inflation so it wouldn't be
4 correct to say it does not account for inflation.
5 I am just saying there are different rates being
6 used.

7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
8 see it doesn't account entirely?

9 The inflation that you're
10 putting in the benefit of is not backed out fully
11 in the application of your discount rate. Your
12 discount rate is too low to back it out entirely.

13 A. [TOBIS] Yes --

14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
15 understand you said why that is but just,
16 mathematically, that is what your model does.

17 A. [TOBIS] Right.

18 It doesn't account entirely
19 for the growth in inflation from 2010 to 2020 --
20 the benefit of the growth in inflation since the
21 FIT contract outweighs the impact of inflation in
22 our model. So the net impact outweighs the
23 increase in value.

24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
25 Yes, that is what I was asking. Thank you.

1 A. [MILBURN] Slide 14.
 2 So now we are going to get
 3 into some of the developments between NAFTA 1 and
 4 the valuation date.
 5 Next slide.
 6 And the first development is
 7 with respect to the PPA price. So we have had a
 8 lot of discussion on it already.
 9 But.
 10 The first development is that
 11 the project's PPA price increased due to inflation
 12 by 17 percent over the period from NAFTA 1 to
 13 today, so that's based on actual changes in the
 14 inflation rate.
 15 And that results in a direct
 16 increase in the project's value, since an increase
 17 in price increases the project's revenues and
 18 profits over the 20-year life of the FIT contract.
 19 Secondly, since NAFTA 1, the
 20 PPA prices that you will receive by other onshore
 21 wind projects, as shown in the chart here, they
 22 decreased over the period.
 23 So this chart shows that --
 24 and this is US projects, PPA prices decreased from
 25 2016 to 2019.

1 And, all else equal, a project
 2 with a higher PPA price would attract a premium
 3 relevant to projects that had a lower PPA price.
 4 And this principle was
 5 recognized by Dr. Guillet in his reports.
 6 Slide 16.
 7 A. [TETARD] On Slide 16, as
 8 we see on the graph, construction cost of offshore
 9 wind, expressed in million per megawatt, have
 10 decreased. Dr. Guillet acknowledges, through the
 11 quotes, 40 percent decrease between 2015 and 2020.
 12 Noting that Canada,
 13 Dr. Guillet mentioned that costs dramatically
 14 increased, leading to major developers announcing
 15 large impairments and losses in 2023.
 16 As Mr. Tobis said, this is
 17 hindsight information. As of valuation date in
 18 February 2020, there was no sign of CAPEX increase
 19 coming.
 20 Slide 17.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 22 am sorry to go back.
 23 Slide 15, you said Dr. Guillet
 24 acknowledged that increased PPA price corresponded
 25 with an increase in project value.

1 Does he accept that in respect
 2 of early stage projects?
 3 A. [MILBURN] I am not sure.
 4 I mean, he would have to answer that.
 5 I think this is a quote on
 6 this chart is from his report and he is
 7 recognizing the concept that a higher tariff, if
 8 all else equal, a project with a higher tariff is
 9 comparably more valuable than a project with a
 10 lower tariff, as it would command a premium in the
 11 market because of the higher tariff.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 Paragraph 29 of his first statement.
 14 You keep going. I will read
 15 it.
 16 A. [TETARD] We are on Slide
 17 17.
 18 As you can see on the graph
 19 showing both onshore and offshore investments, if
 20 we move to the next slide, 18, where we only show
 21 the relevant data which is offshore wind --
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 23 am sorry. I have just answered my own question.
 24 At the end of his paragraph,
 25 he says "these projects were mostly at fully

1 permitted stage or close so, in his opinion, not
 2 relevant.
 3 So to -- so just so I am
 4 understanding the difference between the two
 5 approaches to methodology, I think he is fairly
 6 consistent that early stage development projects,
 7 he says -- I am not saying it's right -- should be
 8 valued on market comparables, PPA price. Tariff
 9 is irrelevant to that market comparable valuation
 10 exercise, he says.
 11 And I just had understood your
 12 point on Slide 15 as saying that's not what he
 13 says. And I have checked the paragraph. It is
 14 what he says because he is referring to fully
 15 permitted so financial close or financial
 16 investment decision stage of the project.
 17 So he would call that
 18 late-stage development.
 19 So, sorry, I am just trying to
 20 keep that clear in my head.
 21 As I said, I am not saying he
 22 is right. But where you're in common ground and
 23 different ground, I want to keep clear.
 24 Sorry about that. You were on
 25 17.

1 A. [TETARD] On Slide 17.
 2 Thank you.
 3 Slide 18 --
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 No dispute on the cost decreasing. Great news for
 6 wind.
 7 A. [TETARD] We agree.
 8 We can see larger amounts of
 9 capital have been deployed in offshore wind
 10 projects in the second half of the decade versus
 11 the first half.
 12 About three times more on
 13 average per year during the more recent period,
 14 giving strong indications that availability of
 15 capital was growing in the industry. Meaning more
 16 developers, more equity investors, more lenders
 17 joining the market and increasing their investment
 18 amount.
 19 I am sure that Dr. Guillet
 20 will be pleased to read so many quotes from his
 21 reports, and also from the public presentations
 22 that he made.
 23 On the slide, as a consequence
 24 of the market growth, bullet 2, there has been
 25 decent, if regularly shrinking, premium for

1 construction risk and early development permitting
 2 risk.
 3 This means that the market
 4 risk reception for permitting risk was going down.
 5 Bullet 3, there are buyers for
 6 almost every profile of risk.
 7 Yes, this is real. Other
 8 market participants, including the sponsors, have
 9 shown significant interest in this project.
 10 Bullet 4, benchmark IR has
 11 gently gone down over time and that the returns
 12 expected for riskier assets in the sector has also
 13 shrunk gently over time. The lower cost of
 14 capital naturally given to the growth -- given the
 15 growth of the industry.
 16 Slide 19.
 17 A. [MILBURN] So another
 18 development was that the global offshore wind
 19 industry grew significantly since NAFTA 1.
 20 As shown in this chart here,
 21 the amount of new installed capacity increased
 22 significantly in the three years from 2017 to
 23 2019, as compared to the prior years. And growth
 24 in the industry is a positive factor for the
 25 project value.

1 And Slide --
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Does it not potentially create tension, though, on
 4 the supply chain?
 5 So turbines are tricky and
 6 there's a limited number of suppliers and these
 7 are pretty large turbines.
 8 So, stress on the supply
 9 chain; is that not a factor that one would need to
 10 discount for, at least in terms of delay?
 11 A. [MILBURN] Well --
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 And price.
 14 A. [MILBURN] Well, there's
 15 many, obviously, many factors. That would be one
 16 factor that might be, you know, a concern.
 17 But with the growth in the
 18 industry, the technology is improving, there is
 19 more capital coming in, they are getting better at
 20 manufacturing the turbines and so on, and
 21 streamlining their development schedules.
 22 So, obviously, there's factors
 23 that go positive and negative.
 24 But, in general, as the field
 25 is growing, that leads to opportunity and an

1 increase in value, generally, within the industry
 2 of these projects.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Does the Wood report talk about supply chain
 5 pressure?
 6 A. [MILBURN] I believe so.
 7 I think he -- I thought he concluded that there
 8 was no significant supply chain issues because all
 9 of the technologies are used across many different
 10 well-established industries.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Yes.
 13 But turbines, right, are not
 14 commoditized like a photovoltaic panel. They are
 15 highly technical engineering feats. And there's
 16 only really three main manufacturers of large wind
 17 turbines -- of the actual turbine.
 18 Siemens being one of them
 19 whose name comes up repeatedly in the reports.
 20 They can only produce based on their capacity.
 21 So the growth in the industry
 22 may create a bottleneck in the supply chain for
 23 the turbines, in particular. I'm less worried
 24 about the blades and foundations and cabling, but
 25 turbines, you don't recall that coming up?

1 Mr. Tetard, you are waving
2 your hand at me so you have clearly got something
3 to say.

4 A. [TETARD] Yes. Thank you,
5 Madam President.

6 Just a sidenote that the turbine
7 that is considered for this project is a, is a 4.3
8 or 4.5 megawatt turbine which is a turbine that is
9 not used in -- so call it deep offshore wind
10 project such as in the North Sea.

11 It's a turbine model that has
12 just been used on a project in the Netherlands, on
13 a lake called Lake IJsselmeer, which has a similar
14 model.

15 So we are talking about an
16 onshore turbine actually here.

17 And the -- yeah, the supply
18 chain, while it -- there are also only three names
19 but the market is a bit bigger.

20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
21 Thank you. I had not realized that. So that is
22 helpful.

23 Okay. Thank you very much.
24 Not quite commoditized yet but more along the
25 spectrum.

1 A. [TETARD] Some people
2 already call these turbines, selling turbines is
3 like selling fridges.

4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
5 Which is probably why there is such financial
6 pressure on the three names.

7 A. [TETARD] Slide 20.
8 So significant developments in
9 the North American market.

10 In December 2016, the first
11 offshore wind farm in North America is built,
12 Block Island.

13 On the same month, Equinor
14 pays 42.5 million US dollars to acquire these
15 rights. It is the first time ever that such
16 amounts of these first lease rights in the county.
17 It doesn't come with PPA, nor grid, nor permits.

18 In October 2018, Ørsted buys
19 Deepwater for 110 million cash consideration.

20 Deepwater was the pioneering
21 and arguably leading offshore wind developer in
22 the US by then.

23 In December 2018, several of
24 these rights are released or sold by BOEM to
25 several developers for double the price paid on a

1 dollar per acre by Equinor two years earlier. No
2 revenue, no grid, no permits either.

3 In February 2019, Eversource
4 acquires 50 percent of New England's Deepwater's
5 asset, as previously acquired by Ørsted.

6 The market is or was
7 aggressively expanding and more lease standards
8 were in the making.

9 Slide 21.

10 So --

11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
12 Are these all lease -- would all of the examples
13 in your Slide 20 fall within the category that
14 Dr. Guillet, rightly or wrongly, criticizes as the
15 projects that you had to have leased the land
16 before you could bid for the project?

17 A. [TETARD] I am not sure I
18 understand the question, Madam President.

19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
20 So I understand that he says those leased land
21 related projects were particularly price sensitive
22 because you weren't able to participate in the
23 auction unless you had already leased the land.

24 So, therefore, you could sit
25 on the land, a bit like supermarkets do in the UK.

1 You could sit on the land -- perhaps I shouldn't
2 say that.

3 You can sit on the land and
4 not develop it because nobody else can bid if they
5 don't have the land.

6 Have I understood him right?
7 And, if I have understood him right, do you agree?

8 A. [TETARD] But I am not
9 sure I have understood him myself. So. In his
10 approach to this.

11 There is -- every market has
12 its own regulatory framework and the order in
13 which you can secure the four key milestones that
14 we talk about differ from a market to another.

15 In the US, the way it's being
16 organized is, first, you secure a lease. That's
17 called site control.

18 After that, you run your
19 environmental surveys, you develop your project,
20 and you become eligible to participate to what --
21 I can't remember the terms in the US, not a
22 specialist. But to contract standards.

23 That's when you then can
24 secure a long term PPA.

25 In Canada, it was the

1 opposite. You were applying for a PPA and then
 2 you were awarded access to the land to develop it,
 3 and then that gives you the possibility to look at
 4 the grid and develop your project so --
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 Offshore or onshore or both?
 7 A. [TETARD] Well, we are
 8 talking offshore.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 In Canada.
 11 A. [TETARD] Yes. Talking
 12 about the Windstream project as an offshore
 13 project, yes.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 Right. But what land are you leasing?
 16 A. [TETARD] The sea area,
 17 sorry. Or the seabed.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 So you agree with Dr. Guillet that there is a
 20 difference in these US lease projects that any
 21 difference in the regulatory environment may or
 22 may not be a factor in price.
 23 But there is a difference in
 24 these US project structuring because you need the
 25 lease first?

1 A. [TETARD] It's a different
 2 approach. It's a different -- yes, it's a
 3 different approach.
 4 It's just that the way the US
 5 approach this is by monetizing, at the earliest,
 6 this access to land. Sorry, I am calling "this
 7 land" but, you're right. It's a sea area.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 Well, some of it is land because, the shore of New
 10 York, we have Block Island. Some of it is land.
 11 A. [TETARD] Right.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 In the US.
 14 But the difference is you have
 15 property and lease rights in what you're selling
 16 here and, our Windstream, there wasn't?
 17 A. [TETARD] In the case of
 18 Windstream, I understand that there was no cost
 19 associated, there was no competition associated in
 20 securing the land or the sea area.
 21 Instead, the competition was
 22 on the PPA.
 23 So it was being awarded the
 24 PPA that was granting the project, itself, to
 25 permitting, grid, and future construction.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 We might come back to your comment that the
 3 competition was on the PPA, but I might leave that
 4 to someone else.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Just one quick
 6 clarification on this Slide 20.
 7 The transactions referred to,
 8 they weren't all leasing transactions. For
 9 example, the last one, which we will be discussing
 10 later in our slide, was a transaction for a -- the
 11 actual revolution wind in South Fork wind farms,
 12 which had PPA contracts already. Wasn't purely a
 13 leasing transaction.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 Okay. So 5 is just the lease and 6 had the lease
 16 and the PPA?
 17 A. [TETARD] Also, Number 3
 18 is an M&A transaction. It is Ørsted buying
 19 Deepwater; Deepwater having a number of assets,
 20 including leases and PPAs.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 So bullet 3 and bullet 6, there were PPAs in
 23 place?
 24 A. [TETARD] Yes, and they
 25 are the same assets considered in those

1 transactions.
 2 First, Ørsted buys Deepwater.
 3 And then Ørsted sells part of Deepwater to
 4 Eversource.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Slide 21.
 6 So we were just discussing the
 7 leasing transactions.
 8 And, on this slide, we have
 9 extracted some figures from our first reports that
 10 show the upper trend in the amounts that were paid
 11 to acquire offshore wind leasing rights in the US
 12 in the period leading up to the valuation date.
 13 As we just heard from
 14 Mr. Tetard, these were much earlier stage projects
 15 with no revenue contract, no permits or grid
 16 agreements in place.
 17 And, further, as you heard
 18 from Mr. Milburn, the PPA prices that were being
 19 awarded on US other projects at the time,
 20 especially leading up to the valuation date, were
 21 significantly lower than the PPA price of the
 22 Windstream project.
 23 As you can see, this upward
 24 trend further demonstrates that the offshore wind
 25 industry's growth between NAFTA 1 and

1 February 2020.
 2 Slide 22.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 The problem with scripts, Mr. Tetard just told us
 5 that two out of the eight did have PPAs, Number 3
 6 and number 6.
 7 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, those
 8 Number 2 and 6 aren't included on this chart.
 9 Those are different transactions.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 Oh, I see. So that's not tracking the items on
 12 Slide 20?
 13 A. [TOBIS] No. There are
 14 some overlap. Two of the items on Slide 20 also
 15 show up in this slide.
 16 This is -- sorry, the last
 17 four items on Slide 20, because those are the more
 18 recent ones from December 2018. As well as the
 19 December 2016 one.
 20 But Slide 21 does not include
 21 that -- what we call transaction 3 and 6 from the
 22 previous slide.
 23 Slide 21 is simply the leasing
 24 transactions.
 25 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: All

1 leasing transactions?
 2 A. [TOBIS] Slide 21 is all
 3 leasing transactions.
 4 All these transactions are
 5 just simply to acquire leasing rights. No
 6 permits, no PPA, no grid.
 7 What it demonstrates is the
 8 amounts the buyers were paying just simply to
 9 purchase leasing rights drastically increased
 10 between 2012 and the most recent ones prior to the
 11 valuation date of December 2018.
 12 Slide 22.
 13 A. [MILBURN] So, just to
 14 recap, all five of these factors have a positive
 15 impact on the project's value.
 16 Also, all lease factors are
 17 independent of the project's ability to advance
 18 its development from the date of NAFTA 1 to the
 19 valuation date.
 20 But, notwithstanding all of
 21 these positive market developments since NAFTA 1,
 22 Dr. Guillet insists the project's value didn't
 23 change from 2011 to the valuation date in 2020,
 24 which, in our view, is simply not tenable.
 25 Slide 23.

1 A. [TETARD] Moving to --
 2 moving on to the market approach valuation of the
 3 project.
 4 On Slide 24, so we have
 5 previously expressed that there are no two
 6 perfectly comparable projects and transactions.
 7 To obtain a valuable sample of
 8 comparable transactions, one must set relatively
 9 strict criteria.
 10 We discuss here the criteria
 11 applied by both experts in composing the selection
 12 of relevant and comparable transactions.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Mr. Tetard, could I ask you a prefatory question
 15 to your discussion. You are moving into the
 16 market approach now, so you are going to be
 17 spending some time there.
 18 A. [TETARD] Yes. We going
 19 to spend some time on select transactions, yes.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Okay. Keep going.
 22 A. [TETARD] Date of
 23 transaction, we commented earlier.
 24 We limit transactions up to
 25 three years prior to valuation date. Our view is

1 that market context matters.
 2 Dr. Guillet's transactions
 3 date back 12 years prior to valuation date.
 4 On the development stage, we
 5 do agree that the project or the transaction
 6 volume of project has to be in the development
 7 phase and must not have achieved financial close.
 8 Revenue certainty.
 9 We only select transactions
 10 where projects have secured the PPA or other
 11 revenue contract. As expressed earlier, PPA price
 12 certainty matters greatly.
 13 Dr. Guillet does not apply
 14 such filter.
 15 Availability of reliable
 16 information.
 17 We only use public
 18 information. Dr. Guillet also includes
 19 transactions where no public record exist, hence
 20 cannot be crosschecked.
 21 Floating comparable.
 22 We believe floating offshore
 23 wind is not comparable to bottom-fixed, as
 24 previously expressed.
 25 Future contingent

1 consideration.
 2 We believe they must be
 3 included and risk weighted discounted as of
 4 transaction date. If not, value of the
 5 transaction is not accurately reflected.
 6 Dr. Guillet states several
 7 times he excludes contingent consideration.
 8 Exclusion of premium
 9 transactions with above market price PPA.
 10 We disagree also given
 11 Windstream itself had above market price PPA.
 12 Dr. Guillet excludes
 13 subjectively several transactions he calls
 14 outliers, including those with above market price
 15 PPA like the project.
 16 And finally, in transactions
 17 involving both undeveloped acreages and identified
 18 projects, we allocated value based on analyzing
 19 undeveloped acres value based on
 20 publicly-available information.
 21 Dr. Guillet himself
 22 arbitrarily allocated 50/50 of value between the
 23 two assets. This approximate approach has an
 24 impact of 30 percent on valuation.
 25 Slide 25.

1 A. [TOBIS] In this slide, we
 2 show summary of the ten comparable transactions
 3 used in our valuation.
 4 And the ones that we have
 5 highlighted in green are the ones that Dr. Guillet
 6 had also included valuation multiple in his
 7 report.
 8 We note that these four
 9 transactions, in particular, were all at least one
 10 and a half years away from FID, financial close,
 11 as of the transaction date. Some several years --
 12 several time longer, several years away.
 13 Therefore, we will spend the
 14 next few slides discussing why these four
 15 transactions, in particular, should be considered
 16 in a comparable transactions analysis for the
 17 project at the valuation date.
 18 Slide 26.
 19 A. [TETARD] So Revolution
 20 Wind and South Fork.
 21 So I was personally involved
 22 in the acquisition of Deepwater by Ørsted in
 23 2017/2018.
 24 This transaction included the
 25 South Fork Wind and Revolution Wind projects,

1 50 percent of which were acquired by Eversource a
 2 few months later.
 3 Contrary to what Dr. Guillet
 4 claims, that projects do not get valued using DCF
 5 prior to FID or IOC, these projects were valued
 6 using DCF, although had made little progress in
 7 the permitting process and were not anywhere close
 8 to FID.
 9 Also contrary to what Mr. --
 10 to what Dr. Guillet said, these two projects were
 11 not the subject of impairment announced by Ørsted
 12 in November 23rd.
 13 In fact, even during the
 14 challenging years of 22/23, both projects
 15 successfully passed their FID and are in
 16 construction today.
 17 This transaction is very
 18 important as it is the only transaction in the
 19 relevant sample that takes place in North America.
 20 It also includes other very comparable features,
 21 as we can see on the next slide, Slide 27.
 22 These projects were several
 23 years away from FID. Revenues was largely secured
 24 but, in fact, the Revolution Wind project, the
 25 bigger of the two projects, had yet to fully

1 negotiate the terms of the PPA.
 2 Permitting was little
 3 progressed. Site control was achieved, as well as
 4 grid. Although, actually, information for the US
 5 projects could not be found.
 6 Similar wind speeds and PPA
 7 contract terms.
 8 The biggest difference with
 9 the project being the PPA price secured.
 10 As you can see, tariff at COD
 11 \$254, Canadian dollars for the project, versus a
 12 weighted average of 139, which is almost double
 13 for the project.
 14 And this raises the question
 15 that a significantly superior PPA price could
 16 command on a superior valuation for the project.
 17 Slide 28.
 18 A. [TOBIS] On this slide,
 19 will show how we have calculated the transaction
 20 multiple from the February 2019 Revolution Wind
 21 and South Fork transaction just discussed by
 22 Mr. Tetard.
 23 We also show how the multiple
 24 was calculated based on Guillet 2.
 25 Based on this transaction, the

1 Windstream project would have an implied value of
2 \$131 million, based on Dr. Guillet's approach
3 after he corrected for the math errors from his
4 first report to his second report. The implied
5 value of the project would be \$104 million.

6 We have included this
7 transaction in our market approach. And
8 Dr. Guillet has inappropriately excluded the
9 multiples from this very comparable Revolution
10 Wind and South Fork transaction as of 2019, from
11 his valuation of the project.

12 Slide 29.
13 On the next few slides, we
14 will discuss the sale of a minority interest in
15 what we refer to as the LEM project in France,
16 which was sold by EDPR in December of 2018.

17 As at the transaction date,
18 these projects had significant permitting risks
19 due in part to the various litigations they were
20 involved with at the time.

21 And these wind farms were
22 several years away from reaching FID, which we now
23 know did not end up occurring until April of 2023,
24 i.e., approximately four and a half years after
25 the transaction date.

1 On the screen here are
2 extracts from EDPR's 2019 audited financial
3 statements audited by PwC where they describe this
4 transaction.

5 EDPR explains that the
6 transaction amount included contingent
7 consideration and that they and their auditors
8 calculated the fair value of this contingent
9 consideration after considering the probability
10 and discount associated with the contingent
11 consideration.

12 The slide also shows that EDPR
13 recognized an accounting gain on sale which
14 provides evidence on the total cost that are being
15 incurred on each site as of the transaction date.

16 Slide 30.
17 On this slide, we have taken
18 numbers directly from the previous slide which was
19 EDPR's audited financial statements -- the
20 highlighted number there -- and demonstrated that
21 the fair value of the total consideration paid in
22 this transaction implied a multiple of 9.4 times
23 the costs incurred.

24 This is relatively consistent
25 with the value to cost multiple implied in our

1 valuation of approximately 10X, i.e.,
2 approximately 300 million divided by 30 million.

3 Slide 31.
4 On this slide, we show the
5 implied project value based on the multiples
6 derived from the LEM transaction.

7 We also show the original and
8 corrected calculations conducted by Dr. Guillet
9 for this transaction.

10 The key issue that remains
11 with Dr. Guillet's corrected calculations is that
12 he has still inappropriately excluded the
13 36.4 million euros fair value of the contingent
14 consideration.

15 As described in the prior
16 slide, the fair value of this contingent
17 consideration was set out in EDPR's audited
18 financial statements.

19 From a valuation perspective,
20 it is simply wrong to exclude the contingent
21 consideration when calculating the valuation
22 multiple from this transaction.

23 As a result, Dr. Guillet's
24 valuation multiple from this transaction is
25 significantly understated.

1 Slide 32.
2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
3 Give me a minute here.

4 What did they value the
5 contingent payment as? What percentage of its
6 actual value?

7 A. [TOBIS] If we go back up
8 to Slide 29.

9 They just indicate what the
10 fair value of the contingent consideration is but
11 they don't say what the undiscounted value is.

12 So they say, for example, the
13 first highlighted note, the contingent
14 consideration was -- the fair value of that was
15 16.4 million euros.

16 They don't -- they don't
17 indicate what the un -- you know, the actual
18 amount was before any risk adjustments.

19 That's the risk adjusted
20 present value of the contingent consideration.

21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
22 see. I see.

23 So we don't know whether it's
24 2 percent or 90 percent?

25 A. [TOBIS] Exactly. We

1 don't know. We don't know what the specific terms
2 were.

3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

4 And we don't know what it was contingent upon and
5 we don't know the timing.

6 A. [TOBIS] Exactly.

7 We are relying upon PwC as the
8 auditors that is part of the process they would
9 do. Because that number directly impacts the
10 financial results of EDPR presented to the public
11 markets and their shareholders.

12 And, as a former auditor
13 myself, I know the amount of diligence that would
14 go into auditing that figure to ensure that it is
15 reasonable and reliable.

16 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: But
17 are you saying, then, that this contingency factor
18 is very tailored to the specific, specifics of a
19 particular thing, of a particular development?

20 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

21 Every contingent payment would
22 be exactly as you said. Tailored to the terms of
23 that contingency. When is the payment expected to
24 be made and what's the risk of achieving those
25 milestones.

1 I could speculate that, in
2 this case, they might have expected an additional
3 100 million euro payment in two years, subject to
4 hitting a milestone. The auditors considered the
5 chances.

6 After impact, considering the
7 risk and timing of that amount, they said the fair
8 value of that payment today is 16.4 million euros.

9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

10 And this process requires you to apply probability
11 analysis; does it? Or somebody to apply a
12 probability analysis?

13 A. [TOBIS] Yes, it depends
14 on what the terms of the contingency are.

15 Some contingent payments, even
16 though they are called contingent, they are
17 effectively, more or less, guaranteed the issue is
18 just timing.

19 So then it's applying time
20 discount to the payment.

21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

22 Is that right for development stage offshore wind?
23 Because the timing must correspond to a
24 development stage.

25 So if the timing is 31st

1 December 2025 because that's the date we have
2 programmed for financial close or financial
3 investment decision. But financial close doesn't
4 happen because we have global financial crisis and
5 all the banks pull out, then it can't just be
6 timing.

7 A. [TOBIS] Yes. Sorry, my
8 comment was just in general for contingent
9 consideration.

10 But you are correct. Likely
11 with development stage offshore wind projects.

12 From what we have seen -- and
13 I am sure Mr. Tetard can speak to his industry
14 experience -- usually, those contingent payments
15 are subject to meeting certain milestones.

16 So to quantify the fair value
17 of them, as the auditors have done in this case,
18 they would have had to consider probability
19 factors.

20 Not dissimilar from what we
21 have done in our DCF approaches in our report as
22 well. Assessing probability factors of achieving
23 certain milestones.

24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

25 But this is the market comparables?

1 A. [TOBIS] Right.

2 Our view is that the
3 comparables in DCF work hand in hand, just to
4 understand how valuation works.

5 But, with this particular
6 contingent consideration, yes, the auditors and
7 management would have had to derive a probability
8 of receiving that contingent consideration and
9 considered the timing of when that would be paid.

10 And then calculated the fair
11 value of that which would imply the net present
12 value of that payment on transaction date since
13 they needed to report that amount in the audited
14 financial statements.

15 And this is commonly applied
16 on not just any industry, but multiple M&A
17 transactions with various forms of contingent
18 payments, earnouts and so forth.

19 This is common practice across
20 the board.

21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

22 But, in the words of Lewis Carroll, it's jam
23 tomorrow? Right.

24 It's not money -- it's not jam
25 today. Your money today is we will pay you a

1 million for where you are in your early stage
 2 development.
 3 If and when you ever reach
 4 financial close, we will give you 100 million.
 5 And then this, for the audited
 6 statements, they are giving a contingent value to
 7 the chance of reaching the 100 million stage?
 8 A. [TOBIS] That's partially
 9 correct.
 10 So, in any transaction --
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Which part is incorrect?
 13 A. [TOBIS] I will explain.
 14 Everything you said is correct
 15 and perhaps I will add one nuance on top of that.
 16 Any transaction, a buyer can,
 17 in theory, say I will give you, as you describe, 1
 18 million today and 100 million in two years from
 19 now if you meet a certain milestone.
 20 In the alternative, I will
 21 give you \$5 million today and then no future
 22 payments.
 23 They are always -- from a
 24 buyer and seller perspective, there is that
 25 amount. From a financial perspective, it would be

1 indifferent between receiving the amount today
 2 versus receiving the amount in the future.
 3 Today's amount, again which is
 4 fundamental to business valuation, represents the
 5 net present value of that future payment after
 6 risk adjustments.
 7 A seller might say I would
 8 rather have 5 million bucks upfront and forego the
 9 chance of getting 100 million in two years from
 10 now. Or a buyer might say the same thing. I
 11 would rather just take you off the table right now
 12 and give you 5 million today.
 13 But that 5 million, as you
 14 heard, is greater than the 1 million payment in
 15 the multistructure process.
 16 So what the auditors are
 17 doing, and what we are doing as well in our
 18 report, is coming up with what is the cash
 19 equivalent value, today, had a buyer and seller
 20 decided to end this whole process on day one and
 21 come up with one cash equivalent number; what
 22 would that number have been.
 23 It would have been less than
 24 the upfront payment plus the contingent
 25 consideration because you have to account for

1 risk.
 2 How much less?
 3 That's what we are here for
 4 and that's what the 16 million represents.
 5 They are saying had we --
 6 effectively, the auditors and management are
 7 saying -- and perhaps they have got this number
 8 from negotiations, which is where I have seen
 9 myself where it comes up.
 10 In M&A negotiation process,
 11 EDPR and Sumitomo might have, at one point, said,
 12 okay, let's make a deal where you give me 16
 13 million today. And they said, actually, no, let's
 14 structure it contingently.
 15 And the auditor said that's
 16 pretty good evidence of what the today value of
 17 that contingent consideration is because it was
 18 negotiated between the buyer and seller.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 In our language, you are basically valuing a loss
 21 of chance?
 22 A. [TOBIS] No, I wouldn't
 23 describe it that way.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 Well, a probability analysis is a chance of

1 getting somewhere and you agreed it was a
 2 probability analysis.
 3 A. [TOBIS] I think every
 4 valuation -- and, technically, in that term, could
 5 be described in that way.
 6 Every valuation is the value
 7 of the cash, my expected cash flow. So there's a
 8 chance of receiving future cash flows.
 9 And what valuers do we, as I
 10 am sure you are quite familiar, is that's what a
 11 discount rate is and risk factors.
 12 So every valuation is,
 13 technically, what's the today's value of a future
 14 cash flow amount.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Right.
 17 But the discount rate and risk
 18 factors are in your DCF.
 19 This is the loss of chance in
 20 a market comparable.
 21 So you are saying, in my early
 22 stage development, I believe I will get payment X,
 23 now, in my early stage development.
 24 But I have a structured
 25 transaction that I am due X to 2 in three years'

1 time and five years' time, if I hit these events.
 2 And you are giving that a
 3 present value for the probability that you will
 4 hit that point?
 5 A. [TOBIS] So I am not
 6 giving -- in this case, I am not giving any
 7 present value. I am relying on what the auditors
 8 and EDPR assessed in open market context.
 9 What they would have done is,
 10 what we have seen in M&A context, is they would
 11 have -- every transaction, specifically, that I
 12 can speak to, would have prepared a model. And
 13 they would have said what is the value, what we
 14 think the value of this project is today, and one
 15 cash equivalent value.
 16 We think that value is -- if
 17 you flip to Slide 30 -- we think the value of
 18 these two projects is 79.2 million euros. That's
 19 the total value.
 20 Now let's figure out how to
 21 structure the payment.
 22 Either you could write me a
 23 cheque today for 79.2 million, because that's the
 24 value of the project today.
 25 Or, just for whatever business

1 purposes and tax reasons or whatnot, we could
 2 structure it in a way, well, you will give me 42
 3 million today and perhaps 100 million in two years
 4 from now, subject to meeting milestones.
 5 And, therefore, the -- you
 6 still get to the same point. Where the value of
 7 that whole project, as of valuation date, is still
 8 79.2 million.
 9 It's just -- it's the same
 10 thing as, you know, half a dozen of one or a
 11 dozen -- whatever the phrase is.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 Six and one-half dozen of the others.
 14 Professor Gotanda had his
 15 finger on the button.
 16 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: So if
 17 I understand correctly -- go back to Slide 29.
 18 Correct me if I am wrong here
 19 because my understanding of the accounting
 20 principles are not all that great. I have seen it
 21 before.
 22 They complied -- this is
 23 actually set out -- the way they did this is
 24 actually set out, in very relatively rigid
 25 accounting principles, if I remember correctly.

1 In the sense that they didn't
 2 just pull this calculation out of -- you know,
 3 made it up.
 4 There is a provision, if I
 5 remember correctly, on how to actually do this so
 6 that it's relatively standard sort of practice;
 7 isn't it? I could be wrong.
 8 A. [TOBIS] Are you talking
 9 from IFRS accounting standpoint?
 10 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: From
 11 an accounting standpoint and auditing standpoint,
 12 if I remember correctly -- it could be not in
 13 accounting. It could be in auditing.
 14 The process of valuing
 15 something that is contingent payment in the future
 16 is -- there are standards that have -- that need
 17 to be followed.
 18 In other words, there are
 19 standards and guidelines to do it.
 20 In other words, they didn't
 21 just make this process up. It's a pretty standard
 22 procedure to do this.
 23 A. [TOBIS] Exactly on point.
 24 I'd be happy to walk through, in detail, the
 25 various IFRS standards on fair value assessments.

1 But, in a nutshell, IFRS
 2 requires companies to calculate under the IFRS
 3 definition of fair value, especially in a
 4 transaction context.
 5 That definition, more or less,
 6 lines up exactly with what we call fair market
 7 value. There are slight little wording nuances
 8 but, ultimately, it's the same thing.
 9 What is the price that would
 10 be paid in an open market context for the data on
 11 this date.
 12 IFRS assessed other various
 13 valuation approaches that should be used to assess
 14 fair value.
 15 What's interesting is it
 16 actually sets out a -- using a future cash flows
 17 approach as an appropriate standard, it doesn't
 18 distinguish between stages of development.
 19 It ultimately says come up
 20 with a number that would be appropriate in an open
 21 market context to value this asset on that date.
 22 So there are very rigid IFRS
 23 standards on valuation and they, more or less,
 24 line up with general business valuation
 25 principles.

1 We have been involved in many
2 cases where auditors have been sued or companies
3 have been sued for misreporting valuation
4 concepts. There are very strict penalties in
5 place.

6 As Professor Gotanda noted,
7 these aren't just plucking numbers out of the air.
8 These are very strictly applied auditors that, as
9 I can speak myself, work very hard to ensure every
10 number in a public financial statement is as
11 accurate to the best of their ability.

12 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: How
13 do you compare -- naive question, perhaps.

14 But you have these contingency
15 factors which you say have to be valued and you
16 say they are different for different projects,
17 obviously.

18 And one project might have
19 very high contingency and then another. And you
20 get your comparables together and you say, well,
21 this is the rate.

22 But how does that work in a
23 comparable analysis?

24 Because don't you have to go
25 into the background of the different

1 contingencies, notwithstanding what a particular
2 company is valued at. It may be valued at more or
3 less, depending on those contingencies.

4 So how do we take a figure
5 when we don't know what those contingencies are?

6 A. [TOBIS] Excellent
7 question.

8 If you go back to Slide 30 for
9 a second.

10 Ultimately, all we are
11 concerned with, the proper way to do a comparables
12 analysis -- and, again, this is what we previously
13 thought was non-contentious amongst valuers --
14 is -- what we are concerned with is that
15 79.2 million that what is the fair value of all
16 consideration payments on transaction date.

17 Every transaction will get to
18 that day one implied value differently because
19 every transaction structuring will have different
20 contingencies, different risk factors.

21 And, to compare apples to
22 apples, we need to put everything on the same
23 platform.

24 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
25 Exactly.

1 A. [TOBIS] Where we come up
2 with that what the is the cash equivalent value
3 today, of the amount that was paid in this
4 transaction.

5 In some transactions, there
6 just isn't enough information available to
7 properly do that assessment.

8 Usually, when we do comparable
9 transactions, if we don't have enough information
10 that we can get comfortable on to understand what
11 the cash equivalent value of the transaction
12 amount was on transaction date, we will exclude
13 that. We will only include transactions where we
14 have sufficient information.

15 In this case, we had what we
16 considered to be very objective and reliable
17 information that helped us derive the cash
18 equivalent value of this transaction on
19 transaction date, that's 79.2 million. And that's
20 the only number we care able.

21 Again, half a dozen of one or
22 a dozen of the other. It doesn't matter, from the
23 way we are treating it, whether the specific
24 contingency factor is in each transaction.

25 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:

1 Thank you.

2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
3 So time check.

4 I have a bunch more questions
5 on this. But one that you might be able to answer
6 very, very quickly.

7 At Slide 29, EDPR sold a
8 13.5 percent stake in return for these payment
9 amounts; right.

10 So if one were then to
11 calculate EDPR's value on a discounted cash flow,
12 they would have to give them -- help me --
13 86.5 percent of those cash flows; right?

14 It's not all theirs, they have
15 sold part of the enterprise to somebody else?

16 A. [TOBIS] I think I
17 understand your question.

18 Sorry, did you want to try
19 this one?

20 A. [TETARD] No, I think if
21 EDPR sells 13.5 percent of the equity of the
22 project to Sumitomo, it means that Sumitomo
23 acquires 13.5 percent of the future assets and
24 liabilities, positive and negative cash flows of
25 this project.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 2 think we will take the break. Yes, yes.
 3 A. [TETARD] I want to make
 4 sure I understood your question.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 Yes, right.
 7 So, therefore, EDPR is not
 8 entitled to 100 percent of the value of the
 9 project.
 10 Your DCF, Mr. Milburn, assumes
 11 that Windstream always keeps 100 percent of the
 12 project.
 13 So it never assumes -- or does
 14 it? Is this in your debt equity ratio?
 15 Are you discounting, somewhere
 16 in there, for part of Windstream to be sold to
 17 equity investors?
 18 A. [MILBURN] No.
 19 Our calculation is to the
 20 Claimant who owned 100 percent of the project, so
 21 there's no such an --
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 And you are assuming any financing, that they will
 24 continue to keep 100 percent. So they can't sell
 25 any equity.

1 A. [MILBURN] Well, they
 2 could.
 3 We are assuming they are
 4 entitled to -- they own 100 percent on the
 5 valuation date, so they are entitled to
 6 100 percent of the value.
 7 A. [TOBIS] If I may just
 8 add.
 9 Our valuation would be the
 10 same thing as assuming that they were going to
 11 sell 100 percent of the equity on valuation date.
 12 If, on February 18, 2020,
 13 Windstream decided to sell 100 percent of the
 14 equity to a third party, what our conclusions
 15 represent is here is what he what we think they
 16 would get in one cash payment on day one.
 17 Obviously, they can structure
 18 it however they want in any kind of ways, but here
 19 is our conclusions represent the cash equivalent
 20 value to 100 percent of Windstream on valuation
 21 date.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 So the question I would like you to think about in
 24 the break -- and we are going to take a break --
 25 is I can't put my fingers on it immediately.

1 But, at some point, in this
 2 structured transaction analysis, for the contingent
 3 payment -- so it's not upfront plus contingent,
 4 necessarily.
 5 These things can be structured
 6 all sorts of ways. And, quite often, there is an
 7 in between of carrying the OPEX or DEVEX, either
 8 past or future.
 9 So whoever is putting money in
 10 in the structure transaction approach will pick up
 11 some of the development cost.
 12 You are shaking your head,
 13 Mr. Tetard.
 14 A. [TETARD] It can. But
 15 this is not the assumptions that we have made.
 16 But it can be a way of
 17 structuring the transaction where the acquirer
 18 only acquires part of the project at different
 19 milestones.
 20 But we have not assumed it
 21 this way.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 23 have read your report. So I am assuming you are
 24 not disagreeing with the fact that they can be
 25 structured to have that development expenditure.

1 A. [TETARD] It can be. It
 2 can be done this way.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 4 hope so because that's what you said in your
 5 report.
 6 A. [TETARD] Then maybe I am
 7 not understanding the question presently.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 Maybe.
 10 So that is not what I want
 11 your help with.
 12 What I want your help with is,
 13 if I understand Dr. Guillet correctly, he is
 14 saying early stage development, market
 15 comparables, don't need a DCF. Just need to look
 16 at what other projects buy and sell for at that
 17 time.
 18 And what we have been talking
 19 about for the last 20 minutes is do I or don't I
 20 put in contingent future payment into that number.
 21 If you are to take a
 22 structured transaction approach and you do
 23 attribute -- as, Mr. Tobis, you have very
 24 eloquently said financial accountants and auditors
 25 do do -- attribute a value to the future

1 contingency of the possible payment at the next
2 stage.

3 How do you calculate the
4 amount of that future contingent payment other
5 than a DCF?

6 A. [TOBIS] I think you hit
7 the nail on the head.

8 Which is why, as you have seen
9 from our reports and here discusses, DCF really
10 needs to be used hand in hand with a market
11 approach. These are two tools in the valuation
12 practitioner's toolbox and --

13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

14 If you have a structured transaction approach --
15 you don't always have a structured transaction
16 approach.

17 If you do, then -- so two
18 separate questions.

19 If you don't have a structured
20 transaction approach, though, then, arguably,
21 Dr. Guillet's approach, at the first stage
22 payment, early stage, some -- a person owns some
23 land and they have not got any money to develop
24 it. But they are selling the chance early on.
25 That might not necessarily --

1 they might just have an upfront payment.

2 Dr. Guillet's approach that
3 you don't need DCF for that is a different
4 proposition to if you move into a structured
5 transaction approach that requires a financial
6 close payment.

7 A. [TOBIS] So I think a
8 helpful way to think about it would be that, in
9 typical M&A transactions, the investment bankers
10 sell a site. They will, first -- they will
11 negotiate and then figure out what's the actual
12 cash equivalent value of this business or asset
13 today. What number.

14 And they will likely use a
15 combination of DCF and market approaches,
16 transaction structure, and say, today, we think
17 this asset is worth a million dollars.

18 Had we sold it today for one
19 payment, we would ask for one million dollars for
20 this.

21 How they get to that million
22 dollars, they might have more relied on DCF, more
23 relied on market approach. They will usually do
24 some kind of football field chart. That's later
25 in our presentation.

1 Then, when they come to
2 negotiations, and they sit down at the bargaining
3 table, they say we agree that the value today
4 would be a million.

5 Let's figure out a different
6 complex way to structure this that, effectively,
7 gets back to the same present value of a million
8 dollars, we are going to structure with
9 multitiered payments on certain earnouts and so
10 forth.

11 But that's just step two.
12 That's just negotiations. That's between the
13 buyers and sellers. And they come up with -- and
14 this is why investment bankers charge so much
15 money, they are coming up with these structuring
16 approach.

17 Then it's a way to move risks
18 around between clients, but it starts first with
19 the value today. The cash equivalent value today.

20 So, in this example, I wasn't
21 involved in negotiating this transaction but I
22 would have assumed, based on experience with other
23 transaction in the market, they first would have
24 come up with we want to ensure that the value of
25 what we are selling this for is equivalent to 79

1 million euros.

2 Okay, now let's structure this
3 in a way that still gets us back after accounting
4 for probability and risk and timing that still
5 gets us back to that approximately 79 million
6 euros today value.

7 Does that answer your
8 question?

9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

10 No, it does. It's excellent. Thank you.

11 The bit I struggled with in
12 Dr. Guillet's report was he said, when he was
13 responding to Mr. Tetard's comments about the time
14 you worked together -- and I can't find the place
15 so I am going to misquote him.

16 But he said, yes, but, at
17 early stage development, we were approaching it
18 from the buy side. What are we going to pay to
19 acquire an early stage development.

20 Whereas, we would look at DCF
21 to see what we could sell it for at financial
22 close.

23 Did I get that right? You are
24 looking confused.

25 I don't want you to tell me

1 whether he is right or not. But am I recollecting
 2 what he said correctly or do you not remember?
 3 A. [TETARD] I would need to
 4 read the paragraph again to.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 All right. I will try and find it on the break as
 7 well.
 8 But my recollection is that he
 9 said that, yes, we would look at DCF to what we
 10 could sell it for in the future. But in terms of
 11 what we've priced for what we'd acquire it for,
 12 early stage development, we would look at market
 13 comparables.
 14 I struggled to see -- and
 15 including for the reason you just said,
 16 Mr. Tobis -- how those two things can be
 17 disconnected in the same way.
 18 And I also couldn't see how
 19 that took into account if you were the acquirer
 20 and the acquirer -- so if you were buying an early
 21 stage development intending to keep it at
 22 financial close, so it was a structured
 23 transaction. So you are buy-buy. You are not
 24 buy-sell, if you follow.
 25 So that analysis -- and we

1 will speak to Dr. Guillet about it.
 2 But if you could help me to
 3 try to understand what's wrong with that analysis
 4 because it doesn't feel right. To me, that would
 5 be helpful.
 6 And Dr. Guillet, this
 7 afternoon, will tell me what's right with it and
 8 why I am wrong.
 9 And, if I find the paragraph,
 10 I will tell you. It's in his first report. If
 11 someone just word searches "sell", they will find
 12 it.
 13 We are going to take the
 14 break. We are 15 minutes late.
 15 But, before we do that, what
 16 shall we do? Give us a time check. What have we
 17 got?
 18 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL:
 19 28 minutes and 30 seconds, so there's 1.5 minutes
 20 left.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 Okay. So that's your time deducting what we have
 23 spent. So you have got one and a half minutes
 24 left, now.
 25 Ms. Squires, are you the

1 damages boss for the government?
 2 MS. SQUIRES: For better or
 3 for worse.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 What should we do?
 6 We may go into the breakout
 7 room and my co-arbitrators may tell me to just zip
 8 up and leave everybody alone. That's quite
 9 possible.
 10 But, but, unless they do that,
 11 I am finding this quite helpful.
 12 They have got one and a half
 13 minutes left. That's not entirely because of my
 14 interruptions but they have had to stop-start,
 15 stop-start.
 16 Could we give them a bit more
 17 time?
 18 MS. SQUIRES: Yes, I think
 19 that's fine, a bit more time. I think we are
 20 finding it helpful as well, the questions and the
 21 answers.
 22 So I think, yeah, we have no
 23 problem with a little bit more time.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 And we would afford Dr. Guillet the same courtesy.

1 MR. TERRY: Of course, yes.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Okay.
 4 Now, then, the question,
 5 gentlemen.
 6 Mr. Milburn, you sort of been
 7 tucked in the back there. I think we are going to
 8 come to you at Slide 36 with a vengeance.
 9 So we don't want to kick out
 10 your time but, roughly, what was your timing from
 11 Slide -- we are up to Slide, I think more or
 12 less -- have we done the comparables.
 13 I think we are up to Slide 36
 14 now. I think we are up to the income approach.
 15 But how much longer did you
 16 have planned in your presentation, if you're
 17 uninterrupted?
 18 A. [MILBURN] I think we are
 19 on Slide -- we are on Slide 32. So I think we
 20 still had a few important market transactions to
 21 walk through.
 22 And then talk about
 23 Dr. Guillet's comparable transactions and why we
 24 disagree with them.
 25 And then get into the income

1 approach which was going to be relatively quick,
 2 so there were sort of five minutes on the income
 3 approach.
 4 So we probably have, I think,
 5 maybe 15 minutes total.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Okay. All right. Well, that seems very
 8 reasonable.
 9 So, all right, so we will take
 10 the break now. We will come back at 11.
 11 So we will come back at 11.
 12 I will find the part in
 13 Dr. Guillet's report that I am referring to.
 14 But we look forward to hearing
 15 the rest of your presentation.
 16 Thank you very, very much.
 17 And you remember, no
 18 discussing anything between counsel and one
 19 another.
 20 A. [MILBURN] Thank you.
 21 --- Upon recess at 10:48 a.m.
 22 --- Upon resuming at 11:07 a.m.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Our apologies for coming back late.
 25 If anybody wanted to briefly

1 to try to enlighten me on what was paragraph 116
 2 of Dr. Guillet's first report, now is your chance.
 3 A. [TETARD] Thank you.
 4 It doesn't make a lot of
 5 sense.
 6 Because what we are saying
 7 here is that we are taking the same project. When
 8 we buy them, we don't value them. We just pay a
 9 multiple.
 10 But, once we have them, we
 11 value them using a DCF so that we can anticipate
 12 what our future profits, when we sell them at
 13 financial close.
 14 So, with the same project, at
 15 one end, you don't value them to buy them but you
 16 value them to sell them.
 17 I think what -- and this is --
 18 when we put together that investment proposal,
 19 trying to raise these fund together in 2014, 2015,
 20 we did not value projects to buy them. We did
 21 not. We did not carry any valuation of the
 22 projects that we were intending to buy. We didn't
 23 get to that stage, unfortunately.
 24 What Jérôme is explaining here
 25 is we needed an input, an assumption, as to how

1 much was going to cost us to buy a project. To
 2 put it in our financial model.
 3 So that's what he is saying.
 4 And he is insisting that
 5 because this is what we did, at the time, I was
 6 convinced that this was the way to value early
 7 stage development projects.
 8 Which, to me, is going a
 9 bridge too far in the sense that, no, we did not
 10 value those projects. We did not. We simply
 11 assumed that we could buy them for a price and we
 12 could sell them for another.
 13 I don't know if that is
 14 helpful.
 15 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
 16 Depends what you mean by "valuing".
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 That is exactly what I was going to say.
 19 You are trying to find what a
 20 reasonable willing buyer would pay a willing
 21 seller. And, if that's finger in the air, then
 22 that's a lot of this process; isn't it.
 23 Okay. All right.
 24 But, in terms of methodology,
 25 the market comparable methodology, he is saying,

1 at the early stage development, on base of
 2 milestones and pricing, what are we going to pay
 3 for them, I think.
 4 A. [TETARD] That's correct.
 5 What is important to read as
 6 well is that, even though those projects that we
 7 were assuming we would acquire for such price,
 8 these projects were, at that moment, at an early
 9 stage or at a development stage, still years away
 10 from financial close.
 11 But we were then creating a
 12 DCF model for those projects in anticipation to
 13 then reach financial close, maybe three years
 14 later, in order to know what the value of that
 15 project, three years later, could be.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Yeah, I think --
 18 A. [TETARD] Right.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 20 think the point he is making -- and you have
 21 helped me understand it a bit better I think.
 22 I think, from what I
 23 understand is the point he is making is, for a
 24 fund, which was the purpose of the exercise that
 25 you and he were undertaking, I want to be able to

1 buy something at the lowest possible price.
 2 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 And sell it at the highest possible price.
 5 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 And I need to show what my KPIs are on my fund.
 8 So I need to show that, if I
 9 buy it for X, I can sell it X, whatever. X times
 10 2, X times 3.
 11 So, in order to do that, I
 12 have to look at my selling price and see -- to see
 13 what the return is on my fund investment. And I
 14 need to tell that to my fundraisers or whoever is
 15 providing me money in my fundraising.
 16 So I think that makes more
 17 sense. That's helpful.
 18 And, if I understand what
 19 you're saying, if you can get away with buying the
 20 early stage development projects in a portfolio,
 21 as cheap as possible, including on a market
 22 comparables approach, of course you would do that.
 23 And a portfolio is exactly the
 24 right -- we are so moving outside the scope of
 25 this case now, I think.

1 market with untested permitting and regulatory
 2 regime, in a market with no existing supply chain,
 3 with challenging technical characteristics such as
 4 earthquakes and typhoons, yet attracting
 5 experienced and international developers -- in
 6 this case, Ørsted and Macquarie -- as well as the
 7 international lending community.
 8 A transaction date.
 9 The project hasn't yet secured
 10 all its key permits. It has secured some but not
 11 all and hasn't fully secured its PPA price. It
 12 has some indication but not fixed.
 13 Although the PPA price is
 14 similar to the project, it is not inflation
 15 adjusted during its tenure of 20 years. It's a
 16 key difference between those two projects.
 17 Other factors include
 18 political risk proceeding in Taiwan commanding a
 19 higher cost of capital and higher CAPEX for
 20 Formosa 1, given soil conditions and typhoon
 21 imposing the use of over engineered typhoon type
 22 certified wind turbines.
 23 All factor combined, the
 24 project would likely command a higher multiple
 25 than this transaction. And, based on this

1 But a portfolio, if 1 in 5 in
 2 your portfolio goes and sells for a good financial
 3 close price, then it's worth it; isn't it?
 4 A. [TETARD] Success.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 Unfortunately, it wasn't. You didn't get the fund
 7 up and running; did you?
 8 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 9 And we didn't have access to
 10 acquisition opportunities, really. We never got
 11 a data room opened. We never looked at wind
 12 reports or, you know -- so we didn't carry
 13 valuation of those projects we wanted to acquire.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 Okay. All right.
 16 José Luis, that was all my
 17 time.
 18 So Slide 32 and I will put my
 19 listening ears on.
 20 A. [TETARD] Slide 32.
 21 So it's another interesting
 22 precedent which is the Formosa 1 project, a
 23 project I was involved in also, personally, at my
 24 time at Ørsted.
 25 It's a first project in new

1 transaction, the project would be worth just north
 2 of \$100 million, according to our calculation.
 3 Slide 33.
 4 The NNG project is arguably
 5 more advanced than the project, having obtained
 6 its permits and having achieved several other
 7 development activities. Hence, being perceived as
 8 less risky. Therefore, commanding a higher value.
 9 Yet, it is not near achieving
 10 its financial close as it only happens 18 months
 11 later.
 12 It also includes an above
 13 market PPA price which also is an important factor
 14 explaining its superior value.
 15 According to information
 16 available in the public domain, we end up
 17 calculating a multiple of 1.71 million per
 18 megawatt; while Dr. Guillet, also based on
 19 information available in the public domain,
 20 calculates a multiple of 2.05 million per
 21 megawatt.
 22 On the bottom left side of the
 23 slide, reference is made to a transaction aborted
 24 on this project at a value of 100 million euro,
 25 just two years earlier.

1 The jump of value to 600
2 million was largely explained by the falling costs
3 of developing offshore wind in recent years, while
4 benefitting from a 15-year inflation-linked PPA
5 secured three years prior to the transaction.

6 Slide 34.

7 A. [TOBIS] So, on this
8 slide, we just show what the impact or market
9 approach would be if we were to just use the four
10 transactions described above, which were all at
11 least one and a half years away from financial
12 close and, in some cases, even much, much longer,
13 up to four or five years away.

14 As you can see, using just
15 these four transactions would result in implied
16 project value of 200 to 250 million.

17 Slide 35.

18 A. [TETARD] We do -- sorry,
19 Dr. Guillet's comparable transactions are not
20 comparable.

21 We challenge transactions
22 Number 1 to 10 being older than three years prior
23 to the valuation date.

24 As explained, transactions
25 happening in the market context that is too

1 different from the project evaluation date are
2 unlikely to reflect the current state of affairs.

3 Transactions 11 to 17 consider
4 projects that do not have a PPA price certainty or
5 other forms of revenues.

6 And noting transaction 17, it
7 may seem confusing, but what Dr. Guillet includes
8 here are only the undeveloped acres of that
9 transaction.

10 Transaction 18 is a floating
11 project. We challenge the comparability between
12 floating and bottom-fixed project.

13 And transaction 19 to 23 are
14 hindsight information which we disregarded.

15 Slide 36. Section on income
16 approach valuation of the project.

17 Slide 37. So we produced a
18 DCF model to project the future class flows, in
19 negative and positive anticipated for the effect,
20 based on information produced by experts, as
21 commonly done for this stage of development as the
22 project.

23 For the purpose of this
24 exercise, value must be expressed in cash
25 equivalents as at the valuation date.

1 This approach from a
2 reasonable perspective, a reasonable purchaser
3 would be indifferent between paying 293.4 million
4 dollars upfront and paying 46.1 million upfront
5 and the larger amount of 376.4 million at
6 financial close.

7 The choice of associating a
8 second payment as of financial close is in
9 recognize that a project, having achieved such
10 milestone, is largely derisked, being fully
11 diligent and contracted being confidence to a
12 purchaser disburse a larger amount than.

13 The 15 percent IR adopted in
14 our calculation is high because it accounts for
15 the risks associated with the project stage of
16 development, as of valuation date, including
17 permitting, design, procurement, financing and
18 general project schedule.

19 Our central case leads to a
20 valuation of 293.4 million.

21 A. [MILBURN] Slide 38.

22 We also conducted a version of
23 our DCF analysis where we calculated the net
24 present value as of financial close and then
25 applied a risk adjustment factor for the

1 probability that the project would have
2 successfully advanced through permitting and
3 obtained financing and reached financial close.

4 Based on our analysis of the
5 number of similarly situated projects that reached
6 financial close in the period leading up to the
7 valuation date, we applied a 55 to 60 percent risk
8 adjustment to reduce the project's value at
9 financial close of 575.2 million, which is seen
10 under the "totals" column, to arrive at the value
11 of the project as of the valuation date as of --
12 in the amount of 330.7 million.

13 Slide 39.

14 And, here, we just see a
15 comparison of the income approach relative to the
16 market approach.

17 So our conclusions under both
18 the market and income approaches are consistent.

19 It's always important for a
20 valuator to consider and perform multiple
21 valuation approaches where possible.

22 And the fact that we obtained
23 similar results under two of the three main
24 valuation approaches that are available to us
25 gives us comfort that our conclusions are

1 reasonable.
 2 Slide 40.
 3 A. [TOBIS] On this slide, we
 4 summarize the impact of the various sensitivity
 5 calculations that we included in our second
 6 report, based on some of the issues that were
 7 raised by Dr. Guillet in his first report.
 8 In the rejoinder, Dr. Guillet
 9 has raised a new argument that the project would
 10 potentially not have an 18-month extension period
 11 available after the revised MCO of January 31st,
 12 2025, which provides additional buffer in the
 13 schedule.
 14 First, we understand, from
 15 Claimant's counsel, and as we heard in openings,
 16 that, legally, that 18-month extension and buffer
 17 time period would still be available to the
 18 project even if it was ultimately required.
 19 We understand that this is
 20 due, in part, to the fact that the Grasshopper FIT
 21 4 contract, referred to in Dr. Guillet's report,
 22 was different from Windstream's FIT 1 contract.
 23 For example, the FIT 4
 24 contract did not have clause 8.1(d), which is the
 25 clause of Windstream's contract that allowed the

1 developer to purchase an additional 18 months as
 2 buffer time or extension periods at a rate of
 3 \$0.15 per kilowatt per day.
 4 Second, although as noted
 5 earlier, the COD based on the technical expert
 6 reports, which were prepared under a worst case
 7 scenario, is already one and a half months prior
 8 to the MCO.
 9 If one were to assume this
 10 18-month buffer beyond the MCO was no longer
 11 available, the proper way to account for this in a
 12 valuation would be to look at the project
 13 differently, likely leading to a partial reduction
 14 in value.
 15 It would not reduce the value
 16 of the project to zero, as Dr. Guillet has
 17 suggested.
 18 To do this risk adjustment
 19 properly, we would require additional technical
 20 and engineering expert evidence.
 21 We had some discussions with
 22 Mr. Ian Irvine who is the author of the Wood
 23 report and Two Dogs reports that we relied upon.
 24 And we have conducted some rough additional
 25 sensitivity analysis to assess the potential

1 impact of additional risk that would be associated
 2 in this hypothetical scenario.
 3 However, we have not had the
 4 opportunity to produce any reports with these
 5 analyses, as this issue was only raised by
 6 Dr. Guillet in his rejoinder report.
 7 Slide 41.
 8 A. [MILBURN] This brings us
 9 to our damages conclusions.
 10 So this last slide presents
 11 our conclusions, the components of which are the
 12 fair market value of the project, then we deduct
 13 the NAFTA 1 award. We also deduct the letter of
 14 credit amount. And then we add pre award
 15 interest.
 16 And, under the income
 17 approach, our damages conclusion ranges from
 18 291.4 million to 333 million.
 19 And, under the market
 20 approach, the range is from 281.8 million to
 21 297.7 million.
 22 And we have a few slides,
 23 reference slides with some additional footnotes
 24 and explanations, but that concludes our
 25 presentation. Thank you.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 Can I just come back on the IRR and the haircut,
 3 briefly.
 4 So I think it was Slide 37.
 5 So when you take the first --
 6 to get to a 15 percent IRR, you manipulate your
 7 discount rate in order to achieve that 15 percent
 8 IRR.
 9 Is that what you do in your
 10 DCF model?
 11 A. [TETARD] I do not
 12 manipulate the discount rate. I mean, the
 13 15 percent IR is the discount rate.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 You assume, across the lifetime of the project,
 16 all costs in, all revenue out, a 15 percent
 17 return, 15 to 16 percent, I think --
 18 A. [TETARD] Between 14 and
 19 16. 15 percent, yes.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 So you assume that is what you will make over --
 22 if you put in a dollar, you will get back \$1.15;
 23 is that right?
 24 A. [TETARD] I would get
 25 \$1.15 after one year if I was putting one dollar,

1 yes.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Right.
 4 So you -- as I understand the
 5 way you've -- I have to say your IRR has confused
 6 me a lot.
 7 A. [TETARD] I am sorry about
 8 that.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 It's not something I have come across in the way
 11 you have approached it and it seems to me to be
 12 prescriptive, not descriptive in your DCF.
 13 So you have taken an
 14 assumption and made your DCF fit the assumption,
 15 is what it looks like to me.
 16 So your assumption is 15 to
 17 16 percent IRR across the lifetime of the project;
 18 correct?
 19 A. [TETARD] It is an
 20 assumption, yes.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 So you assume, for an offshore wind project
 23 lifetime, my return on investment, 15 percent.
 24 A. [TETARD] For a project at
 25 this stage, I believe the market would be

1 attracted -- attracted by acquiring this project
 2 and generate a 15 percent equity return over the
 3 lifetime of the investment.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 This is what I want to come to.
 6 You say they would think about
 7 a 15 percent return looking at the value at this
 8 stage of the project, is what you just said.
 9 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 But the 15 percent IRR is necessarily calculated
 12 across the whole lifetime of the project.
 13 A. [TETARD] Necessarily --
 14 well, not necessarily but, in that case, it was,
 15 yes.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 In your case, it was.
 18 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 And you say -- manipulate was perhaps too motive a
 21 word.
 22 But you did not use an -- did
 23 your -- when you calculated your discount rate,
 24 did it just happen that there was a 15 percent
 25 return across the whole project?

1 A. [TETARD] In this
 2 approach, I am not calculating a discount rate.
 3 The discount rate is 15 percent.
 4 So, if I do an NPV 15 of all
 5 the cash flows, I get to zero.
 6 So NPV 15 equals zero.
 7 I do not make any discount
 8 rate calculation.
 9 I assume that I want to
 10 generate a 15 percent return on my investment
 11 which leads me to be able to pay for this project
 12 this much.
 13 Because I believe this project
 14 will cost this much to get to financial close;
 15 that, at financial close, the project will cost X
 16 CAPEX and I will be able to raise an amount of
 17 that.
 18 And that, after two years of
 19 construction, I will generate 30 years of positive
 20 cash flows.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 So you're not dealing at all with a net present
 23 value here?
 24 A. [TETARD] I am not dealing
 25 with net present value, or, in other words, by

1 using a discount rate of 15, I calculate that my
 2 net present value is zero.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 4 have read that in your report, in the footnote and
 5 I still don't understand what you are doing and
 6 you haven't helped me but perhaps
 7 cross-examination might help me.
 8 My separate and related
 9 question was on the haircut. So on the 55 to
 10 60 percent haircut.
 11 First of all, the comparables
 12 that you use to get this 55/60 percent number are
 13 different comparables to what you use for your
 14 market comparable methodology?
 15 A. [MILBURN] Yes, I believe
 16 so.
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 There is a couple of overlaps. There's a French
 19 one, I think, is an overlap. No, it's a different
 20 date, actually, interestingly enough.
 21 A. [TOBIS] I might be able
 22 to help elaborate on that.
 23 For the transaction market
 24 comparables approach, there needs to have been an
 25 actual transaction in this offshore wind farm that

1 we could derive the value from.
2 For this assessment of the
3 probability of financial close, we are not looking
4 at transaction multiples. There could be a
5 project that was never sold once it was operated
6 by the same company from beginning to end.

7 We are simply looking at the
8 progress of each of these projects. How likely is
9 it -- was it that these projects were able to
10 advance to financial close.

11 So it's a totally different
12 analysis so it's not the same wind farms.

13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
14 get it. I get it.

15 A. [TOBIS] The French one
16 overlaps but the dates are different so it's
17 different assessments.

18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
19 get that.

20 My question is this:

21 You were applying the 55 to
22 60 percent discount rate, basically a haircut, to
23 your entire DCF net present value.

24 A. [MILBURN] Yes, that's
25 correct.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
2 Yeah. So your net present value around 500
3 million; 55 to 60 percent gets you down to your
4 200 and something million.

5 A. [MILBURN] That's right.
6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
7 The percentage, the 55 to 60 percent is
8 obtained -- and I think this table is at
9 paragraph 104 of your report, page 72 of your
10 report.

11 You say 55 to 60 percent of
12 the market comparables you have chosen for this
13 purpose reach financial close.

14 It's possible, isn't it, that
15 a project can reach financial close but not reach
16 COD?

17 A. [MILBURN] Yes, it's
18 possible.

19 But our DCF is calculated as
20 of the financial close date and then we apply a
21 discount rate of future cash flows which would
22 include the risk of getting to the commercial
23 operations.

24 So we have got the timing of
25 all the cash flows that are necessary and we have

1 got a discount factor in there to reflect industry
2 level risk of a project at that kind of similar
3 stage.

4 I would also add that I think
5 a construction risk is relatively low in the grand
6 scheme of things. I think once you get to
7 financial close, it's pretty, pretty high chance
8 you are going to make it to commercial operations.

9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
10 Clearly you have not done as much construction
11 arbitration as I have.

12 A. [TOBIS] But for the
13 alleged breaches.

14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
15 Specifically, on that construction risk, I did
16 have another question about that.

17 You talk about, at 6.107 of
18 your report, it would be worth 575.2 million to
19 the notional purchaser if the -- once the project
20 achieved financial close, it would be worth 575.2
21 million to the notional purchaser, with the
22 difference representing the return for the
23 additional risks associated with investing in the
24 project at its current development stage.

25 And when I look back in your

1 report to what risks you say they are, so the
2 risks that are removed, in order for you to get to
3 the 572 value, those risks look to me to be what's
4 at 6.98 of your report, permitting risk,
5 environmental approvals, financing risk and
6 construction execution risk.

7 Perhaps construction execution
8 risk had some magic nuance that I wasn't reading,
9 but I'd understood that, reading together
10 paragraph 6.98 and 6.107 of your first report, to
11 mean that once you get to financial close, there
12 is no construction risk.

13 Now I understand, Mr. Milburn,
14 what you just said to me that your discount rate
15 factors in a risk, and I am sure you will be
16 cross-examined on whether or not that does that
17 adequately. I am not going to do that.

18 But I think you have assumed
19 here that your total income in this model, pre
20 haircut for development stage, is without any
21 construction risk at all?

22 A. [MILBURN] Again, I think
23 there's -- I think, in the cash flows themselves,
24 there is assumptions as to what the amounts of
25 CAPEX that would be necessary and the timing of

1 those cash flows. So that's based on the experts.
 2 So that reflects the likely,
 3 again, timing and amount of the cash flows that we
 4 think is reasonable.
 5 And then we do discount it by
 6 the discount rate over that period which includes
 7 a beta risk factor in there that includes
 8 industry-level risk for Windstream projects.
 9 A. [TOBIS] If I may add on
 10 top of that, just to add on to what Chris just
 11 mentioned.
 12 In the capital cost that we
 13 derive from various technical experts, there are,
 14 I mean, 10 to 12 percent contingency factors.
 15 So risk in a DCF model can be
 16 captured either in the cash flows or in the
 17 discount rate or in a haircut.
 18 So we looked at these -- one,
 19 the contingency factors and the capital costs;
 20 two, that these cash flow schedules were prepared
 21 on a worst-case scenario basis; and, three, all
 22 the various examples of float built into the CAPEX
 23 schedule.
 24 So we assess that there is
 25 construction risk, as you correctly note. But, if

1 you also account for that in the discount or
 2 haircut, you are double counting that risk, so.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 4 think I understand all of that and whether or not
 5 it's the right discount rate in the DCF properly
 6 to account for the construction risk is an
 7 entirely separate inquiry.
 8 What I am looking at is just
 9 in your report. What you have put pre haircut and
 10 post haircut.
 11 And it seems to me you treat
 12 the financial risk in your report, not necessarily
 13 in your model, but in your report, by reading 6.98
 14 and 6.107 as the construction risk being
 15 eliminated as at financial close.
 16 Right, so -- right. So you
 17 back out 55/60 percent because that includes three
 18 buckets of risk, one of those buckets of risk is
 19 construction risk.
 20 A. [TOBIS] I will just add
 21 two points on that.
 22 Construction risk is
 23 significantly mitigated at financial close
 24 because, at that point, you have all your
 25 contracts signed.

1 Part of the construction, the
 2 schedule is even starts prior to financial close.
 3 So you have already secured funding -- and
 4 Mr. Tetard can speak from his experience -- but my
 5 understanding that the contracts, a lot of them
 6 might be fixed-price contracts, et cetera.
 7 So, one, it's significantly
 8 mitigated.
 9 The second point is we had
 10 access to a database from 4C Offshore which we
 11 referred to extensively in our report.
 12 And although I'm just sharing
 13 some information from that database, in that
 14 example, we didn't identify wind farms that, once
 15 they achieved financial close, they did not
 16 eventually reach COD.
 17 So that gave us further
 18 comfort that there was a little to no risk of --
 19 you asked earlier about going from financial close
 20 to COD. Other than industry-level risk that's
 21 captured in the cash flows and the discount rate
 22 that Mr. Milburn described.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Okay. So it's not just in the discount rate, the
 25 discounted cash flow, then. Construction risk,

1 you have spread it into both.
 2 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 All right. I see.
 5 I thought we did, in this
 6 case, I thought, on the record, there was a
 7 decision about the government compensating for a
 8 project that was partly constructed.
 9 Was that just not offshore?
 10 A. [TOBIS] Are you referring
 11 to the White Pines project?
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 That's what I am referring to.
 14 Was that onshore?
 15 A. [TOBIS] Yes, that was
 16 onshore. It was in Ontario so there is no
 17 offshore wind in Ontario.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Okay.
 20 A. [TOBIS] My understanding
 21 of that -- again, it's more legal facts.
 22 But is my understanding is
 23 that -- or my assumption is that the amount that
 24 was compensated was the assumption of the value of
 25 that project, given its stage of development, its

1 PPA contract, onshore wind price, bid contract
 2 price is reported lower than offshore prices and
 3 that's what was assessed to be the value of that
 4 project at that stage of development.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 6 was more mentioning it for the fact that we do
 7 have preset of partly constructed wind farms just
 8 not offshore.
 9 A. [TOBIS] One other point
 10 that may be helpful on this point is in Schedule 3
 11 of our report.
 12 If we turn to it.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Which report?
 15 A. [TOBIS] Of our first
 16 report.
 17 If you notice, there are two
 18 transactions for the Moray East offshore wind
 19 farm. We didn't discuss them earlier.
 20 But this is the same wind farm
 21 that there is two transactions and two dates; one
 22 was in March of 2018 and one was in November of
 23 2018.
 24 And financial close of this
 25 wind farm was December 2018.

1 So as you -- the first
 2 transaction we have noted was that a value of .34
 3 million per megawatt hour as it was further away
 4 from financial close.
 5 The same wind farm sold for a
 6 value of .72 per megawatt hour as it was closer to
 7 financial close.
 8 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: Can
 9 you give me a page.
 10 A. [TOBIS] Sorry. It's
 11 page 183 of our first report.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 Say it again.
 14 A. [TOBIS] On page 183 of
 15 our first report, I am just drawing the Tribunal's
 16 attention to the Moray East transactions.
 17 So there's two transactions
 18 for the same wind farm. One is Row 3 and one is
 19 on Row 6 of that schedule.
 20 The first transaction, we have
 21 a value of .34 millions per megawatt. The second
 22 one is .72 so nearly double.
 23 It's the same wind farm, just
 24 further along its development trajectory, closer
 25 to financial close.

1 What this demonstrated to us
 2 is that it's quite reasonable that, as a project
 3 moves closer to financial close, in this case, the
 4 value roughly doubled which is broadly in the
 5 range of the haircut we applied.
 6 I imagine when Dr. Guillet has
 7 referred to the second transaction, in particular,
 8 being what he considers too close to financial
 9 close, it was on the development trajectory, that
 10 is right. It is closer and obviously much closer
 11 than Windstream was.
 12 We still considered this in
 13 our analysis, given it had such a low PPA price,
 14 we considered that to be offsetting risk factor.
 15 But that's just a total separate issue.
 16 I am just pointing out here to
 17 your earlier comment about how value can increase
 18 double, let's say, as the same project goes on its
 19 development trajectory which gave us further
 20 comfort on that haircut factor that Mr. Milburn
 21 was discussing earlier.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 But you don't think we should use any of these --
 24 either of the Moray East for our comparable
 25 transactions.

1 A. [TOBIS] We have included
 2 all ten in our, call it our primary market
 3 approach.
 4 In our presentation, we
 5 presented another calculation focusing just on the
 6 four that were much further away from financial
 7 close to give the Tribunal an alternative
 8 calculation in case they find that more
 9 appropriate.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 Okay. So those two weren't included on your
 12 slide?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Yes. Those two
 14 weren't included in that Slide 25, yes.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 And they are also not included in the list of
 17 mostly different comparables to get your 55 to
 18 60 percent haircut?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 20 That was a different analysis.
 21 This was based on wind farms that had transactions
 22 and that other analysis was simply based on
 23 looking how long it takes a wind farm to move from
 24 stage to stage.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Right.
2 But because we have the two
3 different transaction times, we have some stage to
4 stage information in this chart, but you
5 haven't --
6 A. [TOBIS] This one didn't
7 meet the criteria that we needed it to meet in
8 order to be included in that haircut factor.
9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
10 Fair enough.
11 Okay. Ms. Squires. They're
12 all yours. I am turning my mic off.
13 MS. SQUIRES: Thank you.
14 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. SQUIRES:
15 Q. Good morning, everyone.
16 As you know, my name is Heather Squires and I am
17 counsel for the Government of Canada in these
18 proceedings.
19 I am going to ask you all a
20 few questions about the expert reports you have
21 provided in this arbitration.
22 Before the hearing began, we
23 asked the Claimant to provide us with copies of
24 your expert reports with colour coded version to
25 let us know who spoke to which section.

1 So you can see there is a
2 binder floating around with all the binders in
3 front of you there that has those colour-coded
4 versions.
5 But I know your counsel has
6 also provided you with copies so feel free to use
7 whichever one you want when I am referring to your
8 first or second report. It's fine.
9 I will note, though, that the
10 presentation this morning led me to be a little
11 bit confused on the colour coding because it did
12 seem a bit like you were each speaking to each
13 other's topics.
14 For now, I will leave that.
15 But when I am asking
16 questions, I have arranged my script based on the
17 text that was provided by the Claimant's counsel,
18 so if I am asking a question that's better
19 referred to someone else, please let me know and
20 we can go from there. Because I have structured
21 it in a certain way.
22 Also in front of you, you have
23 a binder. There's two different -- there's three
24 binders. The content is in two different binders
25 in content.

1 Mr. Tobis and Mr. Milburn, you
2 have copies of the same binder, so that will be
3 your cross bundle. And, Mr. Tetard, you get
4 special treat of your own binder and that will be
5 your cross bundle.
6 If you don't understand a
7 question I am asking, please ask me to clarify. I
8 am more than happy to take the time to give you
9 some context.
10 If the answer to my question
11 leads to a yes or no right off the bat, I
12 appreciate you gave me that and then follow-up
13 with your context after that, just so we can keep
14 the transcript a bit clear.
15 I don't know if we are going
16 to be going to confidential information this
17 morning but, if we do, I will let you know in
18 advance. And I think you know the drill by now.
19 We will let our friend Alfonso
20 know. He will shut down the lights for us and we
21 will go into confidential session and we will go
22 from there.
23 Sound good so far?
24 A. [TETARD] Yes.
25 Q. Now, I understand from

1 Claimant's counsel that you have listened to the
2 opening arguments and you know that the Tribunal
3 has questions on certain points that they are
4 interested in.
5 So the way I have tried to
6 structure the questions this morning is in
7 categories related to those types of questions.
8 So the first thing that I
9 would like to do is to come to you, Mr. Tetard.
10 And I'd like to spend a bit of
11 time discussing the inputs you have used into the
12 DCF analysis -- CAPEX, OPEX, those types of
13 things.
14 And, after that, we will spend
15 a bit of time on one question that the Tribunal
16 has been asking a fair bit about and that's the
17 development stage of the project. So early
18 development, late development, these types of
19 things?
20 Once that's done, we will
21 probably wrap up questions for you, like President
22 Miles said, please don't go far but we might be
23 done with you.
24 Then I am going to come to
25 you, Mr. Tobis, and I want to have a discussion

1 about the sunk costs in this arbitration.
 2 The reason I am bringing that
 3 up is twofold.
 4 The Tribunal has asked some
 5 questions in advance of the hearing about value
 6 created of the investment since the Windstream I
 7 arbitration. And that goes a bit to the sunk
 8 costs, I believe you noted in your report.
 9 But, also, we have had a lot
 10 of discussion this morning about contingent
 11 payments.
 12 And, in your report, you
 13 structure the contingent payment. That first
 14 payment is based on a multiple of sunk costs that
 15 have been incurred.
 16 I want to go through a bit of
 17 the sunk costs so we can figure out what went
 18 into, if we are in the world of contingent
 19 payments, what that contingent payment would be
 20 for this project.
 21 Mr. Milburn, you may have
 22 noticed I have not mentioned you so far.
 23 You are along for the ride a
 24 little bit this morning so you can take a deep
 25 breath, relax. I am not sure I am going to come

1 to you entirely but we will see how things go,
 2 given the presentation. But I will leave you in
 3 suspense.
 4 A. [MILBURN] All right.
 5 Q. Okay.
 6 So now, having laid that out,
 7 I do want to though turn to a couple of questions
 8 that came out of the presentation.
 9 First, Mr. Tobis, you may or
 10 may not be aware but the question of the valuation
 11 date in this arbitration is very much a legal
 12 question. So the Tribunal can decide whether they
 13 want to award damages as of the date of the breach
 14 or damages as of the date of the decision, the
 15 award?
 16 If the Tribunal decides to use
 17 the date of the award as the proper date to value
 18 the Claimant's losses, you would agree with me
 19 that everything happened between 2020 and 2023
 20 would go into that valuation?
 21 So all of the discussion on
 22 the increases in inflation rate, the supply chain
 23 issues, projects being cancelled, that would then
 24 go into the valuation because the valuation date
 25 then would become sometime after today?

1 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 2 Q. The second question I
 3 wanted to ask arose out of something that you said
 4 on Slide 12 with respect to projects taking
 5 impairments as a result of those changes in the
 6 market.
 7 So, if a purchaser was to buy
 8 100 percent of the Windstream investment in 2020,
 9 at the current stage of development, when
 10 financial close arrived for the project in 2023,
 11 per the Claimant's own schedule, it is possible
 12 that that purchaser would have to take an
 13 impairment on the project; correct?
 14 A. [TOBIS] That would be
 15 completely irrelevant as of a February 2020,
 16 valuation date because the amount they would pay
 17 at that date, they don't know what's happening in
 18 2023. They are making assumptions about the
 19 future.
 20 So what you're describing is a
 21 current date valuation.
 22 Q. I understand.
 23 So, as I mentioned, that's a
 24 legal question, right, the valuation date.
 25 But, outside the world of --

1 if we are just talking about the purchase of the
 2 project. In 2020, based on a DCF.
 3 By the time you reach
 4 financial close, if that DCF is no longer accurate
 5 because interest rates have skyrocketed, because
 6 the contracts you have to sign are costing you a
 7 lot more, it is possible -- I don't need you to
 8 say it is certain.
 9 It is possible that that
 10 purchaser would take an impairment at that time?
 11 A. [TOBIS] If you're in the
 12 world of hindsight, then, legally, you are saying
 13 this is the scenario, yes.
 14 Q. One other question for
 15 you, Mr. Tobis.
 16 You mentioned, just towards
 17 the end, that you used the 4C database to
 18 determine the construction risk, and that you said
 19 you did not identify wind farms that, once they
 20 achieved financial close, they did not eventually
 21 reach COD.
 22 Those are your words; correct?
 23 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 24 Q. In looking at that
 25 database, did you determine whether any projects

1 were constrained by a FIT contract where they only
 2 had, on their own development schedule, two years
 3 to reach commercial operation date?
 4 So I understand this is the
 5 case when you have all the time in the world,
 6 projects go from financial close to operation.
 7 If you only have two years to
 8 do that, did you look at the 4C database and
 9 determine what risk is involved in that?
 10 A. [TOBIS] That information
 11 was not available.
 12 Q. Okay.
 13 Mr. Tetard, a question for you
 14 that came out of the presentation and out of some
 15 questions from President Miles.
 16 We spoke a bit about the
 17 supply chain constraints, or possible constraints
 18 because of more activity in the market. And you
 19 mentioned a reference to turbines being like
 20 refrigerators. Yeah, there is a lot of them.
 21 But, in terms of other
 22 components or items that will be required to build
 23 this project, are you aware that the turbines had
 24 to be brought in to Lake Ontario via the Great
 25 Lakes system and the complex locks that exist in

1 the St. Lawrence Seaway?
 2 A. [TETARD] I was aware,
 3 yes.
 4 Q. Now, not every vessel
 5 that can be used for an offshore wind farm can fit
 6 through those locks; is that correct?
 7 A. [TETARD] The vessels to
 8 transport the turbines are adapted to the capacity
 9 to the size of such turbines.
 10 And I understand that some --
 11 this had been done before for onshore wind
 12 projects.
 13 So it was not identified as an
 14 issue that vessels used to import those turbines
 15 would have encounter any issue for delivering --
 16 Q. That was onshore --
 17 sorry. Those onshore wind turbines that came in,
 18 they were not 4.5 megawatt turbines; correct?
 19 They were 2.3 --
 20 A. They were smaller, yeah.
 21 Q. And you just mentioned
 22 that the vessel size depends on the turbine size?
 23 A. [TETARD] To some extent
 24 it does, yes.
 25 Q. Have you done any

1 analysis or seen any analysis on the record about
 2 whether, specifically, a vessel that can fit a 4.5
 3 megawatt turbine can fit through the Great Lakes
 4 seaway?
 5 A. [TETARD] I personally
 6 didn't because I am not an engineer. I do rely on
 7 my experts for this kind of analysis and I was not
 8 presented with a red flag from that perspective.
 9 Q. Okay.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 Were you presented with a green flag from that
 12 perspective?
 13 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 14 Q. Sorry, I will bring up
 15 the green flag.
 16 In the Two Dogs turbine
 17 selection criteria, they looked at whether one of
 18 the criteria in selecting the 4.5 megawatt
 19 turbines was that it could be brought into the
 20 Great Lakes.
 21 They have relied on a vessel
 22 called the RD McDonald; are you familiar with that
 23 vessel?
 24 A. [TETARD] I am not
 25 familiar with that vessel.

1 Q. So they have picked out
 2 one particular vessel.
 3 For those that were around for
 4 the Windstream I arbitration, there was quite a
 5 bit of discussion on cross-exams with Weeks Marine
 6 and Baird about that vessel because it wasn't
 7 built at the time. It was new vessel.
 8 If that is the only vessel
 9 available to fit through the Great Lakes lock
 10 system and that is somehow tied up with another
 11 project because of the boom in the offshore
 12 industry in the United States, you would agree
 13 with me that that presents a risk to the
 14 Claimant's ability to get that vessel; correct, if
 15 there's only one?
 16 A. [TETARD] If there is only
 17 one vessel and that vessel is not available, yes,
 18 it's an issue.
 19 Q. But the assumption here
 20 is that that vessel would be available?
 21 A. [TETARD] That it would be
 22 available -- I don't know which vessel was used
 23 for the technical evaluation of transporting those
 24 turbines. So, that, I can't say.
 25 But those vessels, those

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1 transportation vessels, yes, need to be booked in
 2 advance and so that's something that would have
 3 happened.
 4 Q. Okay. Thank you.
 5 Okay. Let's move on to a few
 6 different things.
 7 So let's talk a bit about the
 8 inputs that went into the DCF and I want to talk
 9 specifically about CAPEX and OPEX which I
 10 understand, from the colour coding of the reports,
 11 you were responsible for inputting into the
 12 discounted cash flow; correct?
 13 A. [TETARD] I was --
 14 generally, it was a joint effort but I was
 15 generally involved, yes.
 16 Q. Okay.
 17 I would like to turn now to
 18 Schedule 2 of the first Secretariat report. So
 19 that's tab -- I don't know what binder you are
 20 going to use.
 21 For anybody who is using the
 22 binder Canada prepared, that's the Secretariat
 23 report is at Tab 1 of the Secretariat bundle.
 24 It's page 179 in the PDF.
 25 We are going to turn to

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1 pretty big chunk. They make up about 22 percent
 2 of the CAPEX, on my math.
 3 A. [TETARD] I will trust
 4 your math.
 5 Q. I don't know if I would
 6 but, okay.
 7 We are going to leave the
 8 schedule for just a minute, just we have
 9 established now that you have put the 296 million
 10 in for the wind turbines.
 11 And I want to go to the Two
 12 Dogs report on turbine selection which is at Tab 1
 13 of your cross bundle.
 14 I would like to turn to
 15 Chapter 4, page 18.
 16 So, here, it notes the five
 17 criteria that were used to select the wind
 18 turbines for the project as it's designed in this
 19 arbitration; do you see that?
 20 A. [TETARD] I see Slide --
 21 sorry, page 18, yes.
 22 Q. So let's move forward in
 23 that chapter a little bit to Section 4.3 which is
 24 on page 23.
 25 And it notes there in, the

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1 Schedule 2. I will give everyone a moment to get
 2 there.
 3 A. [TOBIS] I apologize. The
 4 schedules, in particular, asked us to look at the
 5 schedules were allocated under my colour coding.
 6 So, depending on what your
 7 questions, are Mr. Tetard helped identify the
 8 inputs, but the actual schedule creation is under
 9 my colour coding. So I am just giving that
 10 advance notice, depending where we go with these
 11 questions.
 12 Q. That's fine. Frankly, it
 13 doesn't bother me who answers the question at this
 14 point.
 15 Are we all there? Schedule 2.
 16 Okay.
 17 So, here, we see the CAPEX
 18 that was used to develop the DCF; correct?
 19 And, in here, we have things
 20 like the cost of the gravity base foundations, the
 21 wind turbines, management and insurance costs,
 22 those types of things; correct.
 23 And the.
 24 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 25 Q. And the turbines are a

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1 second paragraph, that there were four types of
 2 turbines that were:
 3 "Selected for further
 4 analysis as they are
 5 believed to present the
 6 lowest technology risk
 7 and shown to meet the
 8 selection criteria."[as
 9 read]
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 12 Q. So let's move on, then,
 13 to Table 10. That's on page 29.
 14 This is a table listing off
 15 the CAPEX and the OPEX for those four different
 16 types of turbines; do you see that?
 17 A. [TETARD] Table 10?
 18 Q. Table 10, yes.
 19 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 20 Q. So it has a different
 21 amount there for the CAPEX and OPEX, depending on
 22 the particular turbine that you're looking at;
 23 correct?
 24 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 25 Q. And, depending on the

1 turbine, it results in a different cost of energy
 2 for the project, there in the last row across;
 3 correct?
 4 A. [TETARD] Yes. Those are
 5 ways of calculating but, yes.
 6 Q. Okay.
 7 And then, to get to Two Dogs'
 8 conclusion, we move down to page 30. And we can
 9 see there, under Section 6.6, that Two Dogs noted
 10 that:
 11 "COE is an appropriate
 12 basis on which to rank
 13 turbines."[as read]
 14 So that's the cost of energy;
 15 correct?
 16 A. [TETARD] Um-hmm.
 17 Q. And that the 4.5 megawatt
 18 turbine was shown to have the lowest cost of
 19 energy and, therefore, considered the most
 20 appropriate to deploy for the Windstream project;
 21 correct?
 22 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 23 Q. Now, it was these 4.5
 24 megawatt turbines that were used to develop that
 25 CAPEX we just saw in Schedule 2; correct?

1 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 2 Q. If these selected
 3 turbines were not available to Windstream and one
 4 of the others had to be chosen, you would agree
 5 with me that the CAPEX and the OPEX of the project
 6 would change; correct?
 7 A. [TETARD] The CAPEX, the
 8 OPEX and the energy yield of the project would
 9 change.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 The, what? Can you say that last word again. The
 12 CAPEX, the OPEX and the?
 13 A. [TETARD] The energy
 14 yield. The power produced by the turbines.
 15 Q. And all these of those
 16 inputs go into your current DCF, your current
 17 valuation?
 18 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 19 Q. Now, are you aware that
 20 Windstream had negotiated a turbine supply
 21 agreement with Siemens?
 22 A. [TETARD] Yeah. I am not
 23 sure it was a negotiated turbine supply agreement
 24 at the time. But I was aware the existence of a
 25 relationships and, you know, long -- between the

1 project and the OEM, yeah.
 2 Q. So I can take you to the
 3 exhibit if you want.
 4 Ms. Baines did confirm for the
 5 IESO, in 2017, in the context of the decision on
 6 FIT termination, that the turbine sales agreement
 7 that it had with Siemens remained in place.
 8 Are you aware of that?
 9 A. [TETARD] No.
 10 Q. Okay.
 11 So we are going to go into
 12 confidential session for a minute because I do
 13 want to go to the turbine sales agreement for a
 14 couple of minutes.
 15 So, Alfonso, over to you.
 16 --- CONFIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPT COMMENCES AT 12:02
 17 p.m.
 18 MR. HAUSER: We are in
 19 confidential mode now. Thank you very much.
 20 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 21 Q. We are going to open up
 22 now Exhibit C-0576 which is at Tab 2 of your cross
 23 bundle.
 24 This is the Siemens turbine
 25 supply agreement for Wolfe Island Shoals offshore

1 wind farm. It's dated December 19th, 2011; do you
 2 see that?
 3 A. [TETARD] Is it signed?
 4 Q. I believe there's a
 5 signed -- I don't know if that copy is signed, the
 6 version that you have. If not, we will dig it up.
 7 I will say that the turbine
 8 sales agreement is in about six different exhibits
 9 throughout the last -- both Windstream
 10 arbitrations and the schedules are actually a
 11 separate exhibit from this.
 12 So I don't -- perhaps your
 13 counsel can or Claimant's counsel can address this
 14 in redirect. I don't think there is any dispute
 15 that this was signed between Windstream -- there
 16 we go, signed. Sorry.
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 It is going to matter for your questions.
 19 MS. SQUIRES: No.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 21 don't think it matters. Just answer the
 22 questions.
 23 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 Just answer the questions. It doesn't matter.

1 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 2 Q. We are going to turn to
 3 the schedules and, as I mentioned, for some
 4 reason, they have been exhibited separately.
 5 But let's turn to Tab 4 of
 6 your binder. This is Exhibit R-0270. And this is
 7 Schedule A1 which deals with the contract price
 8 for those turbines.
 9 So if we turn to the second
 10 page, and we can see there the third line of that
 11 first paragraph says that:
 12 "This is a turbine sales
 13 agreement for the
 14 SWT-2.3DD-113WTGs."[as
 15 read]
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 18 Q. So 2.3 megawatt turbines,
 19 not 4.5; correct?
 20 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 21 Q. Now, it says, in the
 22 first line, the very first line, it sets a
 23 contract price.
 24 The contract price shall be
 25 1.7 million euros per megawatt installed; do you

1 see that?
 2 A. [TETARD] Actually, no,
 3 sorry. I'm on Exhibit 4 and you said page 2.
 4 Q. Yeah. So if you just
 5 turn around and look at the screen behind you, it
 6 might help a little bit. It's the very first
 7 sentence under "contract price".
 8 A. [TETARD] Okay, yeah.
 9 Q. So it says there
 10 1.7 million euro per megawatt installed; correct?
 11 A. [TETARD] Installed, yeah.
 12 Q. So, for a 300 megawatt
 13 wind farm, if we multiply that by 1.7 million
 14 euro, that's about 508 million euros in 2014
 15 prices for the turbines; correct?
 16 A. [TETARD] For 300
 17 megawatts. Sure.
 18 Q. It's just math.
 19 A. [TETARD] Can I do the
 20 math.
 21 Q. If you would like to, you
 22 can absolutely do the math.
 23 A. [TETARD] So 1.7 times
 24 300.
 25 Q. Is 508.

1 A. [TETARD] Very good.
 2 Q. Million euros, not
 3 dollars.
 4 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 5 Q. That is not the value you
 6 have used for turbines in your discounted cash
 7 flow; correct?
 8 A. [TETARD] I don't think it
 9 is.
 10 Q. No. You have used 295 or
 11 296 Canadian dollars, not 508 million euros;
 12 correct?
 13 A. [TETARD] Um-hmm. This
 14 contract was for 130-units.
 15 Q. Um-hmm.
 16 A. [TETARD] Is that right?
 17 I don't think we are using 130 units.
 18 Q. So the price -- it does
 19 say 130 units. I know, right now, we are not
 20 using 130 units.
 21 A. [TETARD] Yeah, yeah.
 22 Q. The price is per megawatt
 23 installed though; correct?
 24 A. [TETARD] Right.
 25 But it's not -- we are not

1 using the same machine so you can't really compare
 2 a price per megawatt of a 2.3 megawatt turbine
 3 versus a 4.5.
 4 Q. I agree.
 5 Because your discounted cash
 6 flow uses a different turbine than the one in the
 7 signed turbine sales agreement between the
 8 Claimant and Siemens?
 9 A. [TETARD] That's not what
 10 I am saying.
 11 I am saying you are comparing
 12 what we are putting in our model, what is the
 13 turbine we assume in our model is different than
 14 this turbine.
 15 Q. Yes.
 16 A. [TETARD] Right.
 17 Q. Did they have a turbine
 18 sales agreement for the 4.5 megawatt?
 19 A. [TETARD] No, it didn't.
 20 Q. Did they have a turbine
 21 sales agreement for the 3.2 megawatt?
 22 A. [TETARD] No.
 23 Q. That's what this; is it
 24 not?
 25 A. [TETARD] This one is a

1 2.3.
 2 Q. Sorry, 2.3 -- for the
 3 2.3, they had a turbine sales agreement?
 4 A. [TETARD] Right. But that
 5 was not going to be used; right.
 6 Q. Exactly.
 7 A. [TETARD] This TSA, this
 8 contract was not going to be used.
 9 Q. And where is the evidence
 10 that this TSA was not going to be used, was going
 11 to be terminated, was going to be renegotiated;
 12 where is that evidence?
 13 A. [TETARD] No, I don't have
 14 that evidence.
 15 Q. Let's move on to
 16 something else.
 17 A. [TETARD] There is just
 18 one small detail.
 19 Q. Sure.
 20 A. [TETARD] It says it's
 21 installed so it means that Siemens would have done
 22 the whole transportation and installation
 23 activities. Okay.
 24 Q. Okay.
 25 A. [TETARD] Understood.

1 Q. So let's move on to a
 2 different input into your DCF, a different CAPEX.
 3 And President Miles asked this
 4 morning about the electrical infrastructure,
 5 transformers, this sort of thing.
 6 And I want to talk
 7 specifically, if we turn back to Schedule 2 in
 8 your report where you have listed off the CAPEX, I
 9 want to talk -- oh, we can come out of
 10 confidential session.
 11 --- CONFIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPT ENDS AT 12:07 p.m.
 12 MS. SQUIRES: Are we good to
 13 go?
 14 MR. HAUSER: One second,
 15 please. I am confirming. One second.
 16 MS. SQUIRES: Okay. Thank
 17 you.
 18 MR. HAUSER: We are ready to
 19 go. Thank you.
 20 MS. SQUIRES: Okay. Thank you
 21 so much.
 22 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 23 Q. Let's turn back to
 24 Schedule 2 in the first Secretariat report.
 25 Under the CAPEX.

1 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
 2 Page, please.
 3 MS. SQUIRES: Sorry, that is
 4 on -- Schedule 2 is on page.
 5 A. [TETARD] 175.
 6 MS. SQUIRES: 175.
 7 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
 8 Thank you.
 9 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 10 Q. So, under the CAPEX
 11 there, we also have something referred to as the
 12 offshore substation; do you see that?
 13 A. [TETARD] I do.
 14 Q. So this is the
 15 substation, if I understand correctly, where the
 16 cables from the turbine would kind of meet there
 17 and then would connect to the underground cable
 18 that then goes to shore; is that correct?
 19 A. [TETARD] It's not an
 20 underground cable but that's right.
 21 Q. Underwater cable?
 22 A. [TETARD] Underwater and
 23 then on land, yeah.
 24 Q. And the amount there that
 25 you have included is 52.2 million?

1 A. [TETARD] Right. I can
 2 see that, yeah.
 3 Q. Okay. So let's turn to
 4 Tab 6 in your cross bundle.
 5 And what we are looking at
 6 there at Tab 6 is the report filed by Wood in this
 7 arbitration. And I want to turn to page 106.
 8 And the last paragraph on that
 9 page, there is a sentence that says:
 10 "The project offshore
 11 substation will be
 12 island-based and is
 13 arranged as a typical
 14 land-based
 15 substation."[as read]
 16 Do you see that?
 17 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 18 Q. And it notes that the
 19 substation is currently designed as an extension
 20 to Pigeon Island; do you see that?
 21 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 22 Q. What we are talking about
 23 here is a land-based substation, not a platform
 24 based substation; correct?
 25 A. [TETARD] Yeah, that's the

1 way it's described here. It makes sense since the
 2 substation is on land. But, yeah.
 3 Q. In the second last
 4 paragraph on that same page, Wood notes that:
 5 "Offshore wind project
 6 substations are either
 7 island-based or
 8 platform-based."[as read]
 9 So like we just spoke about:
 10 "Island-based structures
 11 provide a significant
 12 potential to reduce
 13 substation cost by
 14 allowing the construction
 15 of the substation using
 16 typical land-based
 17 construction methods."[as
 18 read]
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 21 Q. So onshore substations
 22 are cheaper than offshore platforms?
 23 A. [TETARD] Makes sense to
 24 me.
 25 Q. Now, if Pigeon Island was

1 not available for use as the offshore substation
 2 and a platform-based substation was required, you
 3 would agree with me that the CAPEX in your
 4 discounted cash flow would change; is that
 5 correct?
 6 A. [TETARD] Likely.
 7 Q. Okay.
 8 And are you aware -- are you
 9 aware that the Claimant was told by the Canadian
 10 Coast Guard that they could not install even a met
 11 tower on Pigeon Island?
 12 No, okay.
 13 Let's turn now to talk about
 14 the project itself and its stage of development.
 15 We are going to move off of discounted cash flow
 16 for a couple minutes and I want to talk about the
 17 stage of development for the project.
 18 And then, after that, we will
 19 move to talk about market comparables.
 20 So let's turn to Appendix 2 in
 21 the first Secretariat report. So it's at page 117
 22 of that report.
 23 A. [TETARD] Sorry, can you
 24 repeat?
 25 Q. We are in Appendix 2, not

1 Schedule 2.
 2 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 3 Q. So Appendix 2 of the
 4 report. It's at page 117.
 5 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 6 Q. I understand from counsel
 7 for the Claimant that you drafted this appendix,
 8 it's entirely in the blue highlighting; correct?
 9 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 10 Q. So I want to turn to
 11 paragraph A2.2.
 12 So, there, you note three
 13 phases of an offshore project's life: Development,
 14 construction and operation; correct?
 15 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 16 Q. And, for the development
 17 stage, you note that it starts with site
 18 identification and ends with financial close or
 19 final investment decision; correct?
 20 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 21 Q. And, if we move down to
 22 the next paragraph, A2.3, here, you note that the
 23 appendix will focus on the development stage
 24 because that's where the project would have been
 25 as of the valuation date; correct?

1 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 2 Q. So let's keep going now
 3 down to subsection C which is immediately before
 4 paragraph A2.4.
 5 This is entitled "development
 6 Phase 1 - from site identification to shovel ready
 7 status"; do you see that?
 8 A. [TETARD] Sorry, which
 9 section?
 10 Q. Paragraph A2.4.
 11 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 12 Q. That's under the heading
 13 "development Phase 1"?
 14 A. [TETARD] Yeah, I am
 15 there.
 16 Q. So you also identify, in
 17 a few paragraphs later, a second development
 18 phase, development Phase 2 or the preconstruction
 19 phase; correct?
 20 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 21 Q. So, in your report, as
 22 you drafted it, you have the two different
 23 development phases; correct?
 24 A. [TETARD] Exactly. So
 25 it's not that it's different. It's that those are

1 -- you can look at them like this, but it's a
 2 continuum. So those phases tend to overlap,
 3 sometimes, quite a lot, actually.
 4 Q. Sometimes they can
 5 overlap. Sometimes by a lot. Not always.
 6 Depends?
 7 A. [TETARD] Depends on the
 8 regulatory framework, depends on the pace at
 9 which you want to go.
 10 Q. So if we turn to
 11 paragraph A2.11.
 12 There, you note, when a
 13 project has obtained its permits, site control,
 14 grid access and revenue clarity, the project is
 15 considered shovel ready and can initiate its
 16 preconstruction phase; do you see that?
 17 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 18 Q. And then, if we just keep
 19 moving a little bit further in paragraph A2.16,
 20 under that second development stage -- and I
 21 understand they can move together, but just as
 22 it's written here.
 23 Under the second development
 24 stage, you note that that stage usually includes
 25 three activities: Completing the full and final

1 project design, procurement and contracting, and
 2 financing; correct?
 3 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 4 Q. Now, you note, in
 5 paragraph A2.16, that the three activities in
 6 development Phase 2, as you have described it, can
 7 be achieved within a time frame of two to three
 8 years; correct?
 9 I am just asking what you said
 10 on the report.
 11 A. [TETARD] Yeah, but it
 12 depends on the complexity of the project. It
 13 varies a lot.
 14 Q. Okay.
 15 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 16 Q. Now, in order to have the
 17 full and final project, as designed here, the
 18 project would have had to move through all of its
 19 permitting processes correct?
 20 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 21 Can I also mention something.
 22 In this development Phase 1, I
 23 mention and the development shovel ready stage,
 24 when we talk permits, there are a number of
 25 different permits. There are some permits that

1 you will need to do your activities that are part
 2 of this Phase 2 in development. For example, your
 3 on site investigations. Right.
 4 Q. Um-hmm.
 5 A. [TETARD] But those
 6 permits will be necessary.
 7 What will not be necessary to
 8 have achieved as permitting will be those permits
 9 that give you the right to build.
 10 These final permits you can
 11 have them during your Phase 2 development that I
 12 described.
 13 Right. So that's why I am
 14 saying a lot of the things overlap.
 15 Q. Okay. So just so I am
 16 sure I am following you.
 17 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 18 Q. Permits on the right to
 19 build --
 20 A. [TETARD] -- are necessary
 21 to give you comfort that you can build.
 22 Q. Right.
 23 And they would -- you would
 24 get those permits in Phase 1 or Phase 2? Depends?
 25 A. [TETARD] Correct.

1 Q. Okay.
 2 Are you aware of how the
 3 renewable energy approval process worked in
 4 Ontario?
 5 A. [TETARD] I am not a
 6 specialist.
 7 Q. Okay.
 8 If I was to tell you that all
 9 permits -- the reason that that was created was to
 10 have all permits required for the renewable energy
 11 project to come in one package at the end?
 12 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 13 Q. So, in that case, you
 14 would have to wait for all your permits to be
 15 ready before you have your full and final project
 16 design and then you can move forward; correct?
 17 A. [TETARD] So you would
 18 need to wait for this final grouped permits to
 19 carry out your on site measurements? That doesn't
 20 sound right.
 21 Q. No.
 22 So you may have heard
 23 testimony earlier this week from Ms. Baines.
 24 There's been questions on access, applicant of
 25 record status and site control.

1 A. [TETARD] I heard about
 2 that.
 3 Q. So you're aware that
 4 there was a process to achieve applicant of record
 5 which gave you the right to do testing?
 6 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 7 Q. And then after that --
 8 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 9 Q. -- you would then proceed
 10 to get all the other permits you needed, all
 11 environmental permits, land tenure, land use
 12 permits; that would all be separate from the wind
 13 testing ability?
 14 A. [TETARD] Wind or soil or
 15 environmental testing, yes.
 16 Q. That would all come
 17 after?
 18 A. [TETARD] That's exactly
 19 what I meant; okay.
 20 Q. Okay.
 21 So the Claimant's expert,
 22 Ms. Powell, who speaks about the renewable energy
 23 process and the timelines to achieve that
 24 renewable energy permit, she says that it's
 25 reasonable to assume that the -- that renewable

1 energy process would have been completed in
 2 approximately three years.
 3 So this is the Claimant's
 4 expert, not Canada's.
 5 A. [TETARD] Um-hmm.
 6 Q. So she says three years
 7 to get the renewable energy permit?
 8 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 9 Q. The REA.
 10 If that is true, and then we
 11 were to build further time on to get any necessary
 12 procurement, contracting and those sorts of things
 13 in place that were not available to be done prior
 14 to that permit, you would need more time, then,
 15 before you reach financial close; is that correct?
 16 A. [TETARD] That's what I am
 17 saying.
 18 So these final permit, you
 19 would not have needed to have almost finalized
 20 your final design procurement activities.
 21 Q. So your position is you
 22 did not need a renewable energy permit to figure
 23 out a design of the project?
 24 A. [TETARD] You may be. You
 25 may approach this in this way.

1 Q. In the event you moved
 2 through environmental permitting and you find
 3 shipwreck on the lake bed and --
 4 A. [TETARD] Of course.
 5 Q. -- and we know from -- I
 6 am just going to finish my question then I will
 7 let you answer.
 8 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 9 Q. We know, from the record,
 10 from the experts filed by the Claimant, that there
 11 is quite a bit of -- I am just going to use
 12 shipwrecks as -- quite a bit of shipwrecks in the
 13 area.
 14 If, through the renewable
 15 energy process, the Claimant is not able to place
 16 certain turbines in certain areas or it loses
 17 certain turbines, you'd agree with me that then
 18 impacts what's going forward? The design --
 19 A. [TETARD] That's right.
 20 Q. So you would need the
 21 renewable energy process to have taken place
 22 before you know what the project, the full and
 23 final design of the project?
 24 A. [TETARD] That's what I am
 25 saying, is that the project is the one carrying

1 out all the environmental and site surveys; right.
 2 So it received information as soon as it becomes
 3 available.
 4 So that is based on the
 5 information received, based on-on site
 6 measurements. At that point, a project can start
 7 while it progresses its permitting process. It
 8 can progress its own design and procurement
 9 process.
 10 Q. So that design and
 11 procurement process, then, would be occurring
 12 prior to financial close?
 13 A. [TETARD] Of course.
 14 Q. And that cost, then,
 15 would be borne entirely by the complainant?
 16 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 17 Q. There would be no debt
 18 financing?
 19 A. [TETARD] There would be
 20 no debt financing.
 21 Q. Have you seen any
 22 information on the record about a financing plan
 23 for the Claimant to pay for anything, all of those
 24 permitting, contracting prior to financial close?
 25 A. [TETARD] Yes, there is

1 a -- that's what we call the DEVEX budget,
 2 development budget.
 3 Q. And can you walk me
 4 through, in the DEVEX budget -- so, in the DEVEX
 5 budget, can you break down for me what is being
 6 actually used there; what is going into the DEVEX
 7 budget?
 8 A. [TETARD] Yes. So it's
 9 that schedule we are looking at earlier, the
 10 sources and use -- they have a line, DEVEX, for
 11 \$49 million. That's the budget.
 12 Q. I am just going to grab
 13 my copy.
 14 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: What
 15 page are you at?
 16 A. [TETARD] It is page 175.
 17 This is the same table we were looking at earlier.
 18 And this DEVEX, this includes
 19 the cost relating to study, stakeholder
 20 engagement, site investigation, technical
 21 advisory, legal fees and other advisory fees to
 22 obtain the data and the information required, as
 23 well as to secure the procurement and funding of
 24 the project to reach financial close.
 25 Q. So what we are talking

1 about there is the work that went into that
 2 renewable energy permit?
 3 A. [TETARD] And everything
 4 else. But, yeah.
 5 Q. I am just trying to get
 6 some specificity on what you mean by "everything
 7 else"?
 8 A. [TETARD] I am going to --
 9 sorry.
 10 The definition of DEVEX that
 11 we have on page 51, it includes costs relating to
 12 studies, stakeholder engagement, site
 13 investigation, technical advisory, legal fees and
 14 other advisory fees, to obtain the data and
 15 information required, as well as to secure the
 16 procurement and funding of the project to reach
 17 financial close.
 18 So the category studies and
 19 site investigation and technical advisory and
 20 legal would feed the impact, the environmental
 21 application, for example. The environmental
 22 permitting application.
 23 Q. I am going to bookmark
 24 this for a second because I think I might have
 25 another question on it. I am pretty certain I

1 have another question on this but I am going to
 2 give my brain a minute to catch up with the
 3 reports.
 4 Okay.
 5 Let's move on to talk about
 6 site control. And I know we have had a bit of a
 7 discussion about that this morning.
 8 And I want to turn to
 9 paragraph 2.12 of the first Secretariat report.
 10 Here, you make a comment that:
 11 "As of the valuation
 12 date, the project had an
 13 exclusive and priority
 14 position secured on the
 15 site the project would be
 16 built on, but still
 17 required complete site
 18 control."[as read]
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 21 Q. And then, if we look at
 22 footnote 24, which you refer to for this, you cite
 23 to Mr. Baines' first witness statement in the
 24 Windstream I arbitration; correct?
 25 A. [TETARD] Yes.

1 Q. And that witness
 2 statement, it can be found at Tab 12 of your
 3 binder, if you want to go there. It's dated
 4 August 18th, 2014.
 5 A. [TETARD] 2014?
 6 Q. 2014. Yes. On the last
 7 page of the witness statement, you can see
 8 Mr. Baines signed it on August 18th, 2014.
 9 A. [TETARD] Yes, I can see.
 10 Sorry.
 11 Q. Sorry, I was looking down
 12 and I need a yes or no into the mic so that I also
 13 pay attention myself, it seems.
 14 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 15 Q. Now, you don't cite to
 16 anything past this for any propositions with
 17 respect to site control; this is what you rely on;
 18 correct?
 19 A. [TETARD] I rely on
 20 different things. I rely on conversations with
 21 Ian. I rely on conversations with Torys. I am
 22 trying to understand how it works to get to, call
 23 it final site control. I tried to understand the
 24 mechanisms as to how a developer or a company can
 25 secure a unique position on the site via, yes, via

1 conversations.
 2 Understanding how does it work
 3 in Ontario to get through the final sort of
 4 milestone which is signing a long term lease
 5 agreement with the owner of the area.
 6 Q. Yes.
 7 Would you agree with me that
 8 nothing has changed with respect to site control
 9 since the Windstream I arbitration for the
 10 Claimant?
 11 A. [TETARD] I am not sure I
 12 can say that.
 13 Q. Would anybody else like
 14 to answer the question?
 15 A. [TOBIS] I can do my best
 16 to just add, in addition to the witness statement
 17 of Ian Baines, there was a document on the record.
 18 I don't have the exhibit number with me now. It
 19 was the letter from Minister Cansfield that
 20 confirmed our understanding of site control as
 21 well.
 22 So, again, it wasn't just
 23 information from our client. It was looking at
 24 the underlying documents that supported our
 25 assumptions around site control.

1 We also, I think we had looked
 2 at current maps in the Ontario registry showing
 3 the retail application.
 4 So our understanding is that
 5 Windstream is still considered an applicant for
 6 the applicant of record system. And, even as at
 7 the current date, which means today, they still
 8 have this exclusive and priority position on this
 9 portion of the lake bed.
 10 And, therefore, in theory, had
 11 the contract not been cancelled, their applicant
 12 of record application status -- I might be
 13 misusing the words, not exactly precisely. But
 14 their priority access still existed as of the
 15 valuation date.
 16 Q. I want to pick up on
 17 something you said there, because I think it's
 18 extremely important.
 19 You said you might be missing
 20 the words exactly. And it's extremely important
 21 that the words are said correctly in this context.
 22 The Claimant did not have
 23 applicant of record status; correct?
 24 A. [TOBIS] Correct. They
 25 were applicants to the applicant of record status

1 which is what gave them the priority and exclusive
 2 position, especially according to Minister
 3 Cansfield's letter.
 4 Q. Okay.
 5 So what they had -- and you
 6 can correct me if I am wrong -- was a priority in
 7 line to have their application for applicant of
 8 record considered first?
 9 A. [TOBIS] That's one way to
 10 put it.
 11 But what that means is no
 12 other offshore wind developer could have accessed
 13 that site to carry out studies or even apply for a
 14 FIT contract -- I mean, no one else could access
 15 that site except for Windstream.
 16 Q. No one else's application
 17 to access that site would be considered before
 18 Windstream's application was considered?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Exactly.
 20 Q. Okay.
 21 A. [TOBIS] And that still
 22 shows today on the Ontario government website.
 23 Q. Right.
 24 So what we are talking about
 25 there, when we talk about priority status, is that

1 Windstream was before anybody else to have their
 2 application considered, but not yet that
 3 Windstream had priority over the land; correct?
 4 There is a distinction there.
 5 A. [TETARD] Yeah, that is
 6 correct. That is correct.
 7 And also noting that
 8 Windstream was the only company in Canada having a
 9 Feed-In Tariff, PPA, in relation to that area.
 10 Right.
 11 So who else? Who else was
 12 going to be next in line?
 13 Q. I agree with you.
 14 But you would also agree with
 15 me that getting applicant of record status does
 16 not guarantee you will then get site control;
 17 correct?
 18 So it does not guarantee --
 19 applicant of record status does not guarantee that
 20 you will then get that final piece of the puzzle,
 21 the land tenure. That is a separate process you
 22 have to go through.
 23 So even if I agree with you
 24 there was no one else around --
 25 A. [TETARD] That is what I

1 am trying to explain, that obtaining that status
 2 of AOR, in the world of offshore wind, would be
 3 considered as having site control.
 4 Because what I am saying is
 5 signing the long term tenure --
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Mr. Tetard, just stop a minute.
 8 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 We do have limited time and you may have very
 11 successfully taken Ms. Squires off track.
 12 I would actually like you to
 13 answer her original question, which is -- if I can
 14 find it now.
 15 Has anything changed --
 16 Ms. Squires, you might have it written down.
 17 But has anything changed,
 18 factually, in respect of the status of site access
 19 since the first award. She asked you that
 20 question and you said I can't say that.
 21 I am asking you that question.
 22 Has anything factually changed?
 23 A. [TETARD] I am sorry.
 24 What I meant by "I can't say that" is because I
 25 don't know.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 Do you know -- are you able to tell us anything,
 3 factually, that has changed in respect of site
 4 access?
 5 A. [TETARD] I cannot say
 6 that, no.
 7 MS. SQUIRES: I think perhaps
 8 my --
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 I'm sorry, is the answer a no?
 11 A. [TETARD] It means I don't
 12 know anything that has changed.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 So you cannot say anything that has changed?
 15 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Okay. All right.
 18 Perhaps you were coming back
 19 to it but I think we have gone down a rabbit hole.
 20 MS. SQUIRES: I am going to
 21 get out of the rabbit hole because I do have one
 22 more question on site control, but I am not going
 23 to go down it --
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 Right.

1 Mr. Tobis, you referred to a
 2 letter that, I assume, postdated the award.
 3 A. [TOBIS] The letter I was
 4 referring to, it's referenced in footnote 24 of
 5 our first report.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Does it predate or postdate the award?
 8 A. [TOBIS] 2009. So it
 9 predates the award.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 So it predates the award as well. All right.
 12 A. [TOBIS] If I could just
 13 answer.
 14 My understanding, looking at
 15 maps today, is that nothing has changed on the
 16 issue of site control as of the valuation date
 17 compared to the previous. They are still in the
 18 same priority position that they had in NAFTA 1.
 19 So that's my understanding of
 20 the facts.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 Okay.
 23 So if a Tribunal has of fact
 24 has decided, on the basis of assessing all the
 25 evidence, that there was no site access on the

1 27th of September 2016, factually, in your expert
 2 opinion, nothing has changed.
 3 A. [TOBIS] Partially.
 4 And, to elaborate on
 5 Mr. Tetard's point earlier, we would -- we are not
 6 here to reargue any conclusions of the prior
 7 Tribunal. We agree they may have recognized that
 8 from a legal perspective.
 9 Actually, legally, they did
 10 not have what we would consider site control.
 11 But Mr. Tetard and the way we
 12 are looking at it, from a valuation standpoint,
 13 they have what would be considered site control
 14 for the purposes of assessing the stage of the
 15 project.
 16 So it's similar to the concept
 17 of de jure and de facto. You know, de facto,
 18 legal did not have what the Tribunal said in their
 19 award. You know, site control.
 20 But, as a valuator, we would
 21 -- or Mr. Tetard, in his experience, would
 22 consider this to be site control, so it's a little
 23 nuanced difference.
 24 Not disagreeing with the prior
 25 Tribunal. Just applying a slightly different

1 definition as to how it would be looked at from a
 2 valuation standpoint.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Okay. With respect, I am not sure that made
 5 sense.
 6 But my question to you was,
 7 factually, nothing has changed. You said
 8 partially.
 9 Partially, what facts have
 10 changed?
 11 A. [TOBIS] Sorry.
 12 Factually, nothing has changed.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Thank you.
 15 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 16 Q. I am going to talk about
 17 something that has changed with respect to site
 18 control, as far as your assumptions that you have,
 19 that the Claimant has provided to you for your
 20 report.
 21 And I want to turn to
 22 paragraph 2.18 of the first Secretariat report.
 23 Here, you can see the
 24 instructions that you received -- or that
 25 Secretariat received from counsel.

1 And if we look at subparagraph
 2 4 -- and, Mr. Milburn, I can see this is in yellow
 3 so, if you want to have your moment, this might be
 4 it.
 5 A. [MILBURN] This is it.
 6 This is it.
 7 Q. Are you ready?
 8 A. [MILBURN] We will see.
 9 Q. Now, we can see here, in
 10 this subparagraph, subparagraph 4, that you were
 11 instructed to assume that MNRF would have
 12 permitted Windstream to proceed through MNRF's
 13 Crown land application process and granted
 14 Windstream site release; do you see that?
 15 A. [MILBURN] Yes, I do.
 16 Q. So Ms. Baines confirmed,
 17 and we have talked about this at length, the
 18 Claimant had not yet received site release, no
 19 applicant of record status.
 20 So, for the purposes of your
 21 valuation, you were instructed to assume that the
 22 project was further ahead in gaining site control
 23 than it was in the real world.
 24 A. [MILBURN] Well, the
 25 assumption is, as stated in our report, that they

1 would have been permitted to proceed through the
 2 application process and been granted site release.
 3 So, to the extent that's
 4 further along than they actually were, that's an
 5 assumption we have been instructed to make.
 6 Q. So the answer to my
 7 question is yes?
 8 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 9 Q. Okay. I think -- I am
 10 conscious of the time. I am wondering if it might
 11 make most sense now -- I have just a couple short
 12 questions on grid access, and then I don't know if
 13 it makes sense to take the lunch break before I
 14 move on to market comparables, or if you would
 15 like me to just keep going. I am in your hands.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 José Luis, what is the time check? We have not
 18 interrupted much. What is the time check in terms
 19 of the chess clock?
 20 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL: So far,
 21 Respondent has used 49 minutes today, almost 50.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 Of what?
 24 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL: There is
 25 time allocated for the entirety of the hearing,

1 not for the specific examinations.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Okay. All right.
 4 How much in cross-examination
 5 have we used; an hour and a half?
 6 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL: Today,
 7 50 minutes, five-zero.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 Of cross-examination?
 10 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL: Yes,
 11 excluding Tribunal questions.
 12 MS. SQUIRES: We have used
 13 59 minutes?
 14 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL: 50? No,
 15 49 today, excluding Tribunal questions and just
 16 today.
 17 MS. SQUIRES: But we have
 18 quite a bit more time set aside. I guess we could
 19 burn up all our time, if we wanted to.
 20 --- Off-the-record discussion re timing.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 More important than where we have been is where we
 23 are going.
 24 So how much longer do you have
 25 in your questions?

1 MS. SQUIRES: Quite a bit of
 2 time, not too much more with Mr. Tetard but --
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Numbers, numbers. Hour, two hours, six hours,
 5 four weeks?
 6 MS. SQUIRES: Two hours.
 7 Around two hours, a bit more.
 8 MR. TERRY: Madam President,
 9 just a reminder to everyone that we do -- we
 10 certainly provide in the schedule that there can
 11 be overflow of the experts into tomorrow, if
 12 necessary. So just in terms of considering the
 13 options here.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 So you budgeted three hours cross?
 16 MS. SQUIRES: That's correct.
 17 Originally, in the schedule,
 18 if it helps clarify things, we were going to cross
 19 Mr. Tetard separately from Mr. Milburn and
 20 Mr. Tobis, and then we have agreed with counsel
 21 for the Claimant yesterday to just merge
 22 everything together for the benefit of, I guess,
 23 us, but also the Tribunal, so that all three
 24 experts would be present together for questions.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 But you never had three hours cross time in the
 2 schedule, even broken up. You had an hour with
 3 Mr. Tobis and Mr. Milburn and an hour and a half
 4 with Mr. Tetard, so that's two and a half hours.
 5 So that's okay. But you
 6 budgeted for three hours cross?
 7 MS. SQUIRES: Yes.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 You have used oneish. Have you done one hour's
 10 cross. It's been 50 minutes.
 11 But, through your budget, how
 12 far are you through? Are you a third through?
 13 MS. SQUIRES: Yes, I am a
 14 third through for sure.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Okay. All right.
 17 We will just see how much you
 18 get through by one. Then we will take the lunch
 19 break and we will talk about whether we take a
 20 shorter lunch break. We may well.
 21 I understand about tomorrow.
 22 I would like not to eat up tomorrow because,
 23 frankly, we would really like to spend some time
 24 tomorrow working out very important issues on
 25 question of law and what we need to hear from. So

1 we don't want to chew up this entire arbitration
 2 with the damages experts.
 3 MR. TERRY: Understood.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 So let's get through as much as we can today and
 6 all of it, if we can.
 7 And you have only got one.
 8 MR. TERRY: Exactly.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 Okay, I will stop wasting time. Ms. Squires, you
 11 can carry on to 1.
 12 MS. SQUIRES: Thank you.
 13 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 14 Q. Mr. Tetard, in the
 15 presentation this morning -- my next question will
 16 be for you, Mr. Tobis, because, despite it being
 17 designated to Mr. Tetard in the report, you spoke
 18 to it this morning.
 19 You noted that having
 20 guaranteed grid access on receipt of NTP meets the
 21 definition of having grid connection from the
 22 perspective of assessing a project's development
 23 stage.
 24 So you used the word
 25 "guaranteed" grid access; do you recall that?

1 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 2 Q. The grid access that the
 3 Claimant had was conditional approval; correct?
 4 A. [TOBIS] Can you take me
 5 to the document that says that?
 6 Q. I can.
 7 Let's turn to your report at
 8 paragraph 212.
 9 A. [TOBIS] Okay.
 10 Q. And it says -- you note
 11 there about -- note there about grid access and
 12 it's referenced to a footnote 23.
 13 So, if we go down to footnote
 14 23, we are, again, relying on Mr. Baines' witness
 15 statement from the first Windstream I arbitration?
 16 A. [TOBIS] His witness
 17 statement and the exhibits, the factual exhibit
 18 that's referenced there. Not exclusively his
 19 witness statement.
 20 Q. Right.
 21 So the exhibits he has then
 22 referenced in that first witness statement?
 23 And it says there, in that
 24 footnote that he notes that, Mr. Baines, WWIS
 25 received a notification of conditional approval on

1 November 8th, 2010; do you see that?
 2 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 3 Q. So conditional, not
 4 guaranteed, is what he is saying?
 5 A. [TOBIS] That's what the
 6 words there say, yes.
 7 Q. And nothing has changed
 8 with respect to grid access since the first NAFTA
 9 arbitration; correct?
 10 A. [TOBIS] Not to my
 11 understanding.
 12 I could clarify my comment in
 13 the presentation that what we were saying this
 14 notice is what's considered grid connection when
 15 we are assessing the project stage of development
 16 and the NAFTA 1 Tribunal reached the same
 17 conclusion.
 18 Once you reach your NTP, the
 19 grid connection is there waiting for you.
 20 Obviously, they can't connect to the grid because
 21 they haven't built their wind farm yet.
 22 They have the FIT Contract and
 23 they have this notice which is all you need, and
 24 if we are looking at other projects from a
 25 comparable perspective and saying, you know, want

1 to compare apples to apples of grid connection or
 2 not, this is the definition.
 3 And the NAFTA 1 Tribunal
 4 reached the same conclusion which we were
 5 surprised to see it was even brought up again as
 6 an issue in Dr. Guillet's report.
 7 Q. I am not going to go down
 8 the rabbit hole of grid access like we just did
 9 with site control but just one question.
 10 That conditional grid access
 11 approval was done in 2010. Your but-for valuation
 12 world is now in 2020.
 13 It's possible that that grid
 14 access would have to be reassessed as of 2020;
 15 correct?
 16 A. [TOBIS] I can't discuss
 17 completely hypothetical situations, what's
 18 possible.
 19 What I understand, from the
 20 factual record, is that nothing has changed. That
 21 grid connection, that promise, that letter still
 22 exists as of 2020. I haven't seen anything to
 23 imply otherwise.
 24 We could discuss all kinds of
 25 hypotheticals. There could have been an

1 earthquake at the project site. Who knows. Those
 2 are macro factors that nobody accounted for.
 3 So, once we are in the realm
 4 of what's possible, we are kind of leaving the
 5 world of what we do in valuation.
 6 Q. Are you aware that the
 7 Windstream project was to connect at the Lennox
 8 station and that is the same station the Claimant
 9 took us to yesterday with respect to gas plants
 10 and issues of transmission capacity after 2010?
 11 A. [TOBIS] I am familiar
 12 with reading that in the Two Dogs and Wood report.
 13 But I think that would probably be an issue to ask
 14 Mr. Irvine. I think he is in the room now but.
 15 Q. All right. We are going
 16 to move on to market comparables.
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 Can I just -- somebody had turned my mic off.
 19 There is a message.
 20 Mr. Tobis, you said the
 21 Tribunal found there to be grid access. They
 22 didn't. They found the Claimant did have a grid
 23 connection.
 24 In your mind, is there a
 25 difference?

1 A. [TOBIS] I think, in the
 2 perspective we are looking at it, which is the
 3 perspective of assessing the project stage of
 4 development and how to use this in a comparables
 5 analysis, the words I think might be used a little
 6 loosely. We just walked through what the actual
 7 -- what we are talking about here, which document
 8 gave that promise to grid.
 9 Whether it's sometimes called
 10 grid connection or sometimes called grid access,
 11 from our perspective, the definition that's
 12 applied in the valuation world is this is what's
 13 considered, call it what you want, grid
 14 connection, grid access. This is hitting that
 15 checkmark on the milestone stage.
 16 I respect that people looking
 17 at all these words, as we discussed earlier --
 18 site control, grid connection -- there could be
 19 slightly nuances and differences and definitions
 20 applied from a legal standpoint versus a valuation
 21 standpoint.
 22 We are not expressing any
 23 opinion on law. We are coming from the world of
 24 valuation and finance and this is how we would
 25 look at it from a valuing risk perspective.

1 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 2 Q. Okay. I want to talk
 3 just for a little bit about the comparable
 4 projects that you have relied on.
 5 And perhaps, first, just a
 6 question of clarification.
 7 In the presentation this
 8 morning, you have taken us through four projects
 9 of the ten.
 10 You are not presenting that as
 11 the new valuation for us to use; it's just an
 12 alternative valuation; is that correct?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 14 Q. Now, you walked us
 15 through -- you walked us through, Mr. Tobis -- or
 16 Mr. Tetard. I can't recall. So please jump in --
 17 the Revolution and South Fork wind projects; do
 18 you recall?
 19 A. [TETARD] Yeah, I do.
 20 Q. And you mentioned that
 21 the projects were similar to the Claimant's
 22 project, for various reasons. You listed them
 23 off: Revenue was largely secured, permitting was
 24 little progressed.
 25 These sorts of things;

1 correct?
 2 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 3 Q. In your comments, you
 4 noted that the transaction, I believe, was in 2017
 5 to 2018; correct?
 6 A. [TETARD] Yeah, so there
 7 are -- there are two transactions around those
 8 assets.
 9 Q. Okay.
 10 A. [TETARD] The first
 11 transaction is Ørsted acquiring them from
 12 Deepwater.
 13 Q. Um-hmm.
 14 A. [TETARD] So when they
 15 acquire Deepwater, they buy those assets.
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 A. [TETARD] And then the
 18 second transaction where the figures are derived
 19 from is when Eversource buys 50 percent of those
 20 project.
 21 Q. And that --
 22 A. [TETARD] So I am involved
 23 in the transaction of Ørsted buying Deepwater. I
 24 am not involved in the transaction of Eversource
 25 acquiring 50 percent of these assets that were

1 bought of Deepwater.
 2 Q. Okay. I appreciate that
 3 your personal knowledge may go to one but not the
 4 other.
 5 My question won't relate to
 6 your personal knowledge.
 7 A. [TETARD] Okay.
 8 Q. The timing of the
 9 transactions, the Deepwater -- Ørsted acquiring
 10 Deepwater was in 2017 to 2018, per your
 11 presentation. And then that second transaction by
 12 Eversource was a few months later.
 13 So we are talking about
 14 transactions that were in 2017 to 2018?
 15 A. [TETARD] So the first
 16 transaction closes, I think, November 2018.
 17 Q. Okay.
 18 A. [TETARD] And the second
 19 is February 2019.
 20 Q. Okay. 2019 --
 21 A. [TETARD] I am sorry. Not
 22 November 2018. October 2018.
 23 Q. And the second one --
 24 A. [TETARD] And the second
 25 one, February 19. So it's four months.

1 A. [TOBIS] I think just the
 2 reference to 2017 is just the due diligence began
 3 in 2017.
 4 A. [TETARD] It's actually a
 5 bit different. It's that the conversations
 6 between Ørsted and the sellers of Deepwater were,
 7 were quite extended.
 8 Q. It's okay. We don't
 9 need -- you guys are all sequestered so that's a
 10 good topic for your break.
 11 Okay. So February 2017 for
 12 the first transaction -- sorry, 2019 -- sorry, I
 13 am going to start again.
 14 February 2019 for the
 15 transaction that you used in your table for the
 16 valuation?
 17 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 18 Q. Now it came into -- now,
 19 by the time it had -- that transaction had taken
 20 place, certain work had been done on the project;
 21 is that correct?
 22 A. [TETARD] Very little.
 23 Q. Very little; okay.
 24 And it's coming into
 25 construction -- when did it begin construction?

1 A. [TETARD] So there are two
 2 projects. The smaller one, South Fork, FID in
 3 '22. And Revolution Wind, FID in October '23.
 4 Q. So Revolution Wind
 5 starting construction -- the transaction took
 6 place in 2019 with very little work done.
 7 Construction began in October 2023?
 8 A. [TETARD] Correct.
 9 Q. So about, what are we
 10 talking about there, four years? Over four years?
 11 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 12 Q. Okay. That's when
 13 construction began?
 14 A. [TOBIS] 4.8 years.
 15 Q. Pardon. 4.8 years?
 16 A. [TOBIS] Yeah, it's on our
 17 slide at 27.
 18 Q. So construction starting
 19 at 4.8 years?
 20 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, that's
 21 4.8 years just to financial close. But yeah, I
 22 guess.
 23 A. [TETARD] To FID.
 24 A. [TOBIS] Yeah. To FID.
 25 Q. Okay. So the project

1 took 4.8 years to go from nothing to financial
 2 close --
 3 A. [TETARD] So the bigger
 4 project of the two took 4.8 years.
 5 Q. Okay.
 6 A. [TETARD] The smaller
 7 project of the two took three years.
 8 Q. You have valued them
 9 together; correct?
 10 A. [TETARD] Yes, we did.
 11 Q. Yes. Okay.
 12 If those projects had a PPA
 13 similar to the Claimant where a termination right
 14 arose if they had not reached commercial operation
 15 in five years, you would agree with me that, to
 16 avoid termination, Revolution Wind -- or these
 17 projects had .4 of a year left to get all the
 18 turbines in the water and reach commercial
 19 operation before termination could happen?
 20 A. [TETARD] So a point of
 21 comment here.
 22 South Fork took three years,
 23 therefore, it had the two years to build.
 24 Q. Okay.
 25 A. [TETARD] To be within --

1 Q. I understand that.
 2 A. [TETARD] Correct. Okay.
 3 And the second comment is
 4 between February 2019. And then we have COVID and
 5 the war in Ukraine.
 6 Q. Right. So things slowed
 7 down?
 8 A. [TETARD] So things slow
 9 down.
 10 Q. And that's exactly the
 11 time, in the Claimant's development schedule, that
 12 they would have been doing the exact same things?
 13 A. [TETARD] It -- I don't
 14 know because those projects were bigger. They
 15 were in different location. They were more
 16 complex.
 17 Q. But, just on the project
 18 schedule, Mr. Tetard, they start -- they reach
 19 financial close on February 2023?
 20 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 21 Q. They are moving through
 22 the same time periods here, as you're talking
 23 about for Revolution Wind.
 24 But I think I want to go back
 25 to my question.

1 A. [TETARD] Yeah.
 2 Q. 4.8 years to reach
 3 financial close or final investment decision for
 4 the project --
 5 A. [TETARD] Or three years
 6 for the smaller project.
 7 Q. Because you have lumped
 8 them all together. We have no way of parsing them
 9 out to actually figure out big project, small
 10 project. You've lumped them all together.
 11 4.8 years to reach financial
 12 close; correct?
 13 A. [TETARD] For the big
 14 project of 700 megawatts, yes.
 15 Q. Okay. So the big
 16 project --
 17 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 18 Q. It took 4.8 years to
 19 reach financial close?
 20 A. [TETARD] Yes.
 21 Q. If it had a FIT contract
 22 that required it to reach commercial operation in
 23 five years, that big project would have --
 24 A. [TETARD] An issue.
 25 Q. -- .2 of a year left to

1 get all the turbines in the water before it could
 2 be terminated?
 3 A. [TETARD] Yes, yes. Your
 4 math is correct, yes.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Can I jump in.
 6 This a significantly larger
 7 project of 700 megawatts. It wouldn't have a
 8 contract of five years to build. It's apples to
 9 oranges.
 10 You can't end up being built
 11 in an ocean that's 46 metres in depth versus 30
 12 metres in a lake bed. It's an apples to oranges
 13 timeline comparison.
 14 Each contract has its own
 15 schedules, its own timelines, and you really just
 16 can't compare them on that sense.
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 And that would affect how you value them?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Of course.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Thank you.
 22 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 23 Q. Okay. So --
 24 A. [TOBIS] No two projects
 25 are the same which is one of the reasons why

1 comparables tend to be done in conjunction with
 2 the DCF approach.
 3 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 4 Q. Okay. So -- is there a
 5 question, or?
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 No.
 8 MS. SQUIRES: Okay.
 9 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 10 Q. I actually think we can
 11 probably let market comparables sit right --
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 Hang on. I think there is a question.
 14 Justice McLachlin does have a
 15 good question.
 16 You acknowledged, Mr. Tobis,
 17 that COVID delays did enter into the timeline on
 18 your valuation on this project.
 19 A. [TETARD] I did and, not
 20 only that, availability of vessels for during that
 21 time.
 22 The vessels that have very
 23 specialist for bigger turbines which the
 24 project --
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 So my question is to the modelers, to Mr. Milburn
 2 and Mr. Tobis.
 3 Did you factor in the
 4 COVID-related and/or Ukraine-related additional
 5 delays in your model?
 6 A. [TOBIS] So this goes back
 7 to --
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 9 know you have a sensitivity analysis on delay. If
 10 that's where it is, just say that's where it is.
 11 A. [TOBIS] That's not where
 12 it is.
 13 It goes back to the question
 14 of valuation date and hindsight.
 15 So, our understanding, it's a
 16 legal issue. We were legally instructed to do a
 17 valuation as of February of 2020.
 18 So we put ourselves as if we
 19 are standing on that date making projections based
 20 on information known or knowable at that date. At
 21 that date, no one knew what was going to happen
 22 with the COVID pandemic so our model is based on
 23 that.
 24 If we were asked or if we were
 25 instructed to do a valuation at the current date,

1 a lot of things would change. The COVID impact
 2 would be taken into account.
 3 But as it stands today,
 4 actually, inflation, you know, in February 2024,
 5 inflation and interest rates are coming back down.
 6 So what happened in 2023 might
 7 not even be relevant today. You might not even
 8 have the same value today. We haven't done that
 9 analysis. We could. It would be different and
 10 multiple different inputs.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Yeah, I understand that. Thank you.
 13 Does this impact --
 14 Dr. Guillet put, in his market comparables set, a
 15 couple that postdate our valuation date. Maybe
 16 three, I think?
 17 Is that right? Just yes or
 18 no. Am I remembering that right?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Does he add some?
 22 A. [TOBIS] He added going
 23 out about six months post valuation date, he
 24 included a few comparable transactions. We can
 25 look up maybe three, four, five of them.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
2 So just taking your analysis. Those comparables
3 could be impacted by unknowable facts at the
4 validation date like COVID.
5 A. [TOBIS] Yeah.
6 What's interesting is the ones
7 that were shortly after the valuation date in mid
8 2020 were actually quite a bit even higher than
9 what our valuation date is referenced in our
10 report in September of 2020. There was a very
11 large transaction. It was Empire Wind
12 transaction.
13 So those -- I mean, we didn't
14 rely on those. They were hindsight. But that, in
15 the year or the six months a year after that
16 valuation date, those ones were very high.
17 Things only started getting
18 rough in 2023 as government started increasing
19 interest rates around the world which causes a
20 whole whirlwind of impacts.
21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
22 And fuel price, presumably.
23 A. [TOBIS] Yeah. In 2020,
24 if I remember, interest rates dropped significant
25 when all the active values in multiple industries

1 skyrocket in value.
2 If you were valuing this in
3 September 2020, I think our valuation would be
4 significantly higher than February 2020.
5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
6 Your value would -- your costs would be
7 significantly higher.
8 A. [TOBIS] No, not in
9 September of 2020. Because, again, just everyone
10 remembers, in the pandemic, governments
11 drastically reduced interest rates in March and
12 April of 2020.
13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
14 Oh, I see.
15 A. [TOBIS] And then
16 inflation went down. It went almost negative.
17 So September 2020, costs are
18 even lower. There's lower inflation. Value is
19 skyrocketing. It only started getting shaky in
20 2023 which is when some of these impairments.
21 I read, just prepping for this
22 hearing, that in February, just last week, Ørsted
23 announced they are taking a U-turn and actually
24 going back into the full steam ahead in certain
25 other US offshore wind projects.

1 Which just goes to show that
2 the valuation date is important. Obviously, if
3 we are valuing this in July 2023 when you are in
4 the midst of this super high interest rate and
5 high inflation rate, you reach a different
6 conclusion.
7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
8 What date was the IRA?
9 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, IRA?
10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
11 The Inflation Reduction Act, what date was that?
12 A. [TOBIS] In the US, Biden
13 administration, are you referring to? I don't
14 know the exact date.
15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
16 He influenced more than COVID.
17 A. [TOBIS] Probably, yeah.
18 MS. SQUIRES: I don't have any
19 other questions on the market comparables and we
20 are right on one o'clock to take the break.
21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
22 Oh, okay. All right. So does that mean you have
23 about an hour 45 still or does it mean.
24 MS. SQUIRES: Yeah, an hour
25 and a half -- about an hour and a half, I would

1 say, when we come back.
2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
3 Okay. That's fine.
4 How do you feel about us
5 coming back at 1:30?
6 MS. SQUIRES: That's okay with
7 me.
8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
9 So we are going to come back at 1:30.
10 Please, no discussing the
11 matter of -- and just be careful because we are in
12 a communal dining area.
13 So I think what I would like
14 to do, please, is could we just all pause and let
15 these three gentlemen go and get their lunch, take
16 it to their breakout room and then we will all
17 leave in a couple of minutes so that they are not
18 caught in conversations in the hall or overhearing
19 them.
20 Okay. Thanks.
21 --- Upon luncheon recess at 1:03 p.m.
22 --- Upon resuming at 1:33 p.m.
23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
24 All right, Ms. Squires, when you're ready, please.
25 BY MS. SQUIRES:

1 Q. Okay. Welcome back.
 2 So we are going to move on to
 3 a new topic, sunk costs.
 4 And, as I mentioned earlier, I
 5 am bringing this up for a couple of reasons
 6 because there has been some Tribunal questions
 7 with respect to value created after the Windstream
 8 I award.
 9 Also because there has been
 10 some questions about the contingent payment and
 11 how that would be structured.
 12 And I understand from the
 13 report that the contingent payment is structured
 14 as such that it would arise out of sunk costs that
 15 have been paid since the Windstream I award,
 16 generally speaking.
 17 A. [TOBIS] I will wait until
 18 we see the questions on it.
 19 Q. I am not going to ask you
 20 about the structuring of the contingent payments.
 21 I am going to focus on the sunk costs.
 22 So I want to turn to Schedule
 23 3 in the first Secretariat report.
 24 Which I understand, Mr. Tobis,
 25 you were responsible for putting together?

1 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 2 Q. Now, just to confirm,
 3 this is Windstream Energy LLC's sunk costs;
 4 correct? Or past costs incurred?
 5 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
 6 Could you direct me to the page.
 7 MS. SQUIRES: Sure. I do not
 8 have the page number -- 176.
 9 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
 10 Thank you.
 11 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 12 Q. So my question when
 13 you're ready, Mr. Tobis, is just confirmation that
 14 this is Windstream Energy LLC's sunk costs?
 15 A. [TOBIS] I believe that's
 16 the case.
 17 Q. So I want to take a look
 18 at some of the numbers that went into your
 19 calculation.
 20 Now, based on this table, you
 21 arrive at costs incurred since NAFTA 1 by
 22 subtracting costs incurred as of -- subtracting
 23 costs incurred as of December 31st, 2015, from
 24 costs incurred as of February 18th, 2020, the
 25 valuation date; correct?

1 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 2 And I could clarify that date,
 3 December 31st, 2015, in that column. That's for
 4 the year ending December 31st, 2015.
 5 Some of the costs subtracted,
 6 the NAFTA 1 costs were the costs that were
 7 included in the Deloitte cost schedule that was
 8 presented in NAFTA 1. But, in certain categories,
 9 it only represented costs incurred or accrued up
 10 to, let's say, May or June of 2015.
 11 Q. Okay.
 12 If I understand correctly what
 13 you just said, is that the December 31st, 2015,
 14 column, those were taken from the Deloitte report,
 15 but the Deloitte report only goes up to June?
 16 A. [TOBIS] June of 2015.
 17 Q. June of 2015?
 18 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 19 Q. Okay.
 20 So what you have done to
 21 arrive at costs incurred since NAFTA 1 is take
 22 costs incurred up to June of 2015 and subtract
 23 that from costs incurred as at the valuation date
 24 and that gives you the delta?
 25 A. [TOBIS] The other way

1 around.
 2 Q. Sorry, yes.
 3 A. [TOBIS] We came up with
 4 the total costs as of the valuation date and
 5 backed out the costs included in the Deloitte
 6 report, for the most part, which were up to June
 7 of 2015.
 8 Q. So I am just a little
 9 curious about the dates there because the first
 10 NAFTA award was September of 2016.
 11 So I just seeking some
 12 clarification.
 13 Are you not over counting
 14 time, then, in your sunk costs of costs incurred
 15 since NAFTA 1?
 16 A. [TOBIS] So costs that
 17 would have been incurred between June of 2015 and
 18 September of 2016, the date of the award, would
 19 be, in this approach, would be included in the
 20 post NAFTA 1 costs.
 21 The NAFTA 1 costs that we are
 22 referring to here are the costs that were
 23 considered by the Tribunal based on the expert
 24 reports and NAFTA 1. So, in the NAFTA 1 award,
 25 there is a reference to 17 million of total costs

1 incurred.
 2 Q. Yeah.
 3 A. [TOBIS] That's based on,
 4 primarily based on the costs that were calculated
 5 by Deloitte up until June of 2015.
 6 Q. Yeah.
 7 So the answer to my question
 8 then is, yes, you're over counting costs in the
 9 last column because you're not counting costs
 10 incurred from September 2016 onward; you're
 11 counting costs incurred as of June 2015 onward?
 12 A. [TOBIS] I wouldn't
 13 describe it as over counting. I would describe it
 14 as, factually, what it is.
 15 That is the costs that were
 16 considered by the Tribunal in the NAFTA 1 award
 17 were primarily only costs up to June of 2015.
 18 The only one that's a bit of a
 19 nuance is the first row because that's based on
 20 the costs from WWIS' financial statements.
 21 So, for that one, we used
 22 their December 2015 financial statements. So that
 23 one, actually, that's what I meant earlier when
 24 there's a slight distinction between June 2015 and
 25 December 2015 in this category.

1 Q. Yes, I understand that.
 2 Okay. So, in the second last
 3 column, you've indicated certain totals, then, for
 4 December 31st, 2015, and you have indicated
 5 18.26 million?
 6 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 7 Q. So I am clear that on
 8 where we are, the difference between that and the
 9 Deloitte number is because of the June to December
 10 time period reflected in the capital costs by WWIS
 11 in the first; and, also, because you've added in,
 12 I believe, a couple costs that Deloitte didn't
 13 have to consider. There's two extra things.
 14 You've added in a couple
 15 things than Deloitte. That's the difference at
 16 how you arrive at 18 instead of the 17; correct?
 17 A. [TOBIS] We could
 18 reconcile it exactly to the Deloitte report. I
 19 understand it's primarily due to the category on
 20 Row 1.
 21 I think we used the same
 22 categories as Deloitte, so we didn't add any
 23 different categories in what's called column B
 24 there.
 25 Q. Okay.

1 A. [TOBIS] Just Deloitte
 2 project costs capitalized, I think they might have
 3 been using the December 2014 financial statements.
 4 So, actually, for that category, at least there is
 5 a year's worth more of costs in that row.
 6 Q. Now you have mentioned, a
 7 second ago, the Windstream I award?
 8 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 9 Q. So I assume you have read
 10 it?
 11 A. [TOBIS] Yes, I have.
 12 Q. Okay. So I want to call
 13 it up right now. It's RL-109 and it can be found
 14 at Tab 3 of your binder.
 15 And I want to turn
 16 specifically to paragraph 481.
 17 A. [TOBIS] Yes, I am very
 18 familiar with this paragraph.
 19 Q. You knew where I am
 20 going.
 21 So you can see here, at the
 22 start of the paragraph, the Tribunal is assessing
 23 Deloitte's sunk costs at the 17 million, so the
 24 number that you have used.
 25 And then you can see -- I can

1 give everyone a bit of time to read the paragraph
 2 but, as you said you're familiar, we will skip
 3 forward.
 4 You can see they have noted
 5 some problems with that number from an evidentiary
 6 perspective?
 7 And, at the end, they say:
 8 "Based on this yardstick,
 9 the Claimant's sunk costs
 10 would amount to some 8 to
 11 10 million." [as read]
 12 Do you see that?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 14 Q. Okay.
 15 So the number that you relied
 16 on to calculate the 2015 sunk costs has already
 17 been reduced by the Windstream I Tribunal;
 18 correct?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Part of the
 20 reason for that reduction is that, in the Deloitte
 21 calculation of costs, they were including a lot of
 22 amounts that were accrued, in particular, on the
 23 interest amounts which I imagine we might get
 24 into.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Mr. Tobis, can I just ask you to do something for
2 me and for the transcript, is listen to the
3 question and answer the question.

4 So most of the questions are
5 designed to be yes/no. The number you relied on
6 has already been reduced by the Windstream I
7 Tribunal; correct?

8 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
10 Then you provide or ask if you may provide a
11 further explanation if you want to; okay.

12 A. [TOBIS] May I provide a
13 further explanation.

14 Q. I don't think I need a
15 further explanation. I just wanted to make sure
16 that you understood that that number had been
17 reduced.

18 A. [TOBIS] I understand.

19 Q. Okay.

20 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Can I
21 ask just a quick question.

22 The interest seems a bit high
23 under the circumstances.

24 Now, I understand they are
25 fronting the capital and, you know, that it's

1 going to be high.

2 But interest rates, at that
3 time, were near zero or very low and weren't
4 they -- it just -- I haven't done the calculation
5 real quick in my head but 12 and a half, yeah. I
6 thought it was around 12 percent compound.

7 A. [TOBIS] Yes, that's
8 right. The interest that was paid by Windstream
9 to its investors for fronting the money for the 6
10 million letter credit was paid at 12.5 percent
11 rate that was a contractual amount.

12 I guess, given the stage of
13 the investment at the time, that's -- that was
14 Windstream's cost of debt. Low interest rates
15 would be to businesses that weren't in maybe the
16 same kind of risk category of Windstream.

17 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Yeah.
18 Okay.

19 A. [TOBIS] If it helps, the
20 last slide of our presentation, the appendix, we
21 had a walk through that interest calculation. I
22 am happy to answer questions on it, if it would be
23 helpful.

24 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: I will
25 come back to that later but after.

1 BY MS. SQUIRES:

2 Q. I am going to come to
3 that as well so maybe we will save all of our
4 questions for the same time.

5 Okay. If we were, for the
6 sake of argument -- let's come back to Schedule 3
7 so it's in front of us.

8 For the sake of argument, if
9 we were going to reduce the costs incurred up to
10 December 31st, 2015, to reflect what the Tribunal
11 found, that would, on this, on the numbers here,
12 that would make the costs incurred, both before
13 and after the NAFTA 1 award, pretty similar. 8 to
14 10 million, the Tribunal said, and you have costs
15 incurred after NAFTA 1 as 9.4?

16 A. [TOBIS] No --

17 Q. Follow -- no, it's a
18 mathematical question, Mr. Tobis.

19 A. [TOBIS] Yes. The
20 majority component of that reduction, from the
21 paragraph award you put up, was the 6 million
22 letter of credit. That's included in our column B
23 as a pre NAFTA 1 cost. So that would cause column
24 B instead of being what's shown as 18 million, if
25 it's 8 to 10 million, that's what they said.

1 But the final column there is
2 separate from that. Those are costs in addition.
3 That's separate.

4 So they, the 27 total --
5 27.7 million costs there, you reduce that by,
6 let's say, 10 million. That's what NAFTA 1
7 reduced the costs by. That whole 10 million would
8 be applied to column B, not to the costs since
9 NAFTA 1 award.

10 Again, it's hard to know
11 exactly -- they use rounded numbers in that
12 paragraph so hard to know exactly which amounts.
13 But the largest one is that letter of credit and
14 perhaps there would be some slight other
15 reductions to the costs since NAFTA 1 award under
16 their approach. But it's hard to infer from
17 what's written in the award.

18 Q. So I can take you back to
19 the paragraph and I am going to come to the
20 \$6 million letter of credit for sure.

21 And maybe this point is
22 inconsequential, in any event, but the Tribunal
23 did consider the \$6 million; you're correct.

24 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.

25 Q. But they also said that

1 not all of the costs incurred by the Claimant
 2 after May 2012 can be considered arbitration
 3 costs.
 4 So, in that respect, they were
 5 talking about technical expert reports and these
 6 sorts of things. So they considered more than
 7 just the \$6 million letter of credit; correct?
 8 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 9 Can I elaborate on that point?
 10 Q. No. My point was really
 11 just -- I think we can move on. My point
 12 wasn't -- let's move on.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Mr. Tobis, you have done this before. You know
 15 how this works. Mr. Terry can come back and give
 16 you a chance in re-examination. It's just on his
 17 clock.
 18 A. [TOBIS] I understand,
 19 yes.
 20 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 21 Q. Yes, staying on Schedule
 22 3 and I want to discuss the first line but you
 23 refer to as project costs capitalized by WWIS.
 24 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 25 Q. And we see, in the last

1 column, that that amount is \$449,000 since NAFTA
 2 I; correct?
 3 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 4 Q. So it also notes there,
 5 in the third column, that you would go to note 1
 6 to learn more about this number.
 7 So let's go to note 1 which is
 8 on the next page in the document.
 9 And it refers there to two
 10 financial statements; one in 2019 and one in 2015;
 11 do you see that?
 12 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 13 Q. And it refers to
 14 incomplete project value for both of these;
 15 correct?
 16 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 17 Q. Now let's look at Exhibit
 18 C-2261. That's at Tab 4 of your binder.
 19 And that is the unaudited
 20 financial statement for the 2019-fiscal year for
 21 Windstream Wolfe Island Shoals Inc.?
 22 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 23 Q. I want to make sure
 24 what's being reflected here in this statement.
 25 And so let's look at page 3.

1 So, on page 3, there, we have
 2 some unpaid share capital and we have incomplete
 3 project listed as 4,784,546. So that's where you
 4 get the number; correct?
 5 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 6 Q. And these are unaudited
 7 financial statements; is that right?
 8 A. [TOBIS] Correct. They
 9 are prepared under the notice to reader standards
 10 by PwC.
 11 Q. But my question is are
 12 they unaudited financial statements?
 13 A. [TOBIS] They are
 14 unaudited financial statements.
 15 Q. Did you independently
 16 evaluate what the Claimant has included in these
 17 financial statements? Not somebody else, you?
 18 A. [TOBIS] No.
 19 Q. Okay. Let's turn to the
 20 reply memorial filed by the Claimant in this
 21 arbitration. And there's an excerpt of that at
 22 Tab 1 in your bundle and I want to turn to
 23 paragraph 82.
 24 A. [TOBIS] Got it.
 25 Q. So here. We can see some

1 arguments from the Claimant and I am not asking
 2 you at all to comment on legal interpretation or
 3 anything that comes out of this.
 4 But we can see here that the
 5 Claimant is noting, quoting them:
 6 "The engineering and
 7 environmental work done
 8 to progress the project
 9 both before and after the
 10 moratorium."[as read]
 11 And then I want to look at the
 12 ones that are specifically post the Windstream I
 13 award.
 14 So we are going to scroll
 15 down. So we are going to go through -- there's a
 16 giant list here. If you want some time to look at
 17 the ones that are all there.
 18 But if we get down to the very
 19 end of the list, at subparagraphs 8 and 9, that's
 20 when you get to the two studies that were done
 21 after the Windstream I award.
 22 It's on page 36.
 23 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 24 Q. So subparagraph 8 notes
 25 that:

1 "In February of 2017,
 2 Ortech prepared an
 3 updated project
 4 description report that
 5 was submitted to MOE and,
 6 in the spring of 2017,
 7 also prepared an updated
 8 wind resource
 9 assessment."[as read]
 10 Do you see that?
 11 A. [TOBIS] I do.
 12 Q. Have you reviewed any
 13 invoices with respect to these reports?
 14 A. [TOBIS] I don't recall.
 15 I remember seeing some but I have not obviously
 16 referred to those invoices.
 17 Q. Do you know how much
 18 Windstream Wolfe Island Shoals or Windstream
 19 Energy paid for this report?
 20 A. [TOBIS] I think I recall
 21 hearing, in Ms. Baines' testimony, a number that
 22 was in the sub 100,000. I don't remember the
 23 exact number but I recall her talking about it.
 24 Q. So Ms. Baines provided us
 25 with a couple numbers. They were the quotes. My

1 colleague Ms. Dosman took her to the documents.
 2 They were quotes from Ortech in advance of
 3 performing the work.
 4 My question is about payments
 5 after the work has been done.
 6 Have you reviewed any invoices
 7 with respect to the work that was done?
 8 A. [TOBIS] No.
 9 Q. Have you done any
 10 valuation of what that report would have been
 11 worth on the market to an independent buyer?
 12 A. [TOBIS] No.
 13 Q. Are you aware that that
 14 document is a public document in this proceeding?
 15 A. [TOBIS] It sounds
 16 familiar.
 17 Q. Now let's look at
 18 subparagraph 9. This is another study that was
 19 conducted after the Windstream I award and this is
 20 the CSR report.
 21 A. [TOBIS] I see it.
 22 Q. And let's turn to Tab 14
 23 of your binder. This is Exhibit C-2720A and this
 24 is an invoice from CSR to WWIS in the amount of --
 25 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, which tab?

1 Q. Sorry, Tab 14.
 2 A. [TOBIS] That's not what I
 3 have in Tab 14.
 4 Q. Are you in the right
 5 binder? You're not in one of your colleagues'
 6 binders, Mr. Tetard?
 7 A. [TOBIS] No.
 8 Q. Okay. There must be an
 9 error in the filing. Just give us one second.
 10 Sorry, just give us a second
 11 and we will find it for you. It's at Tab 12.
 12 You need your binder. You can
 13 have my binder if you want. There's no secret
 14 notes in it.
 15 A. [TOBIS] Thank you.
 16 Q. Okay. So we have the
 17 invoice. This is an invoice in the amount of --
 18 amount due of \$50,000, \$50,712; correct?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 20 Q. Have you seen a record of
 21 this invoice being paid by the Claimant?
 22 A. [TOBIS] No.
 23 Q. Have you done any
 24 valuation of what this report would be worth on
 25 the market to an independent buyer?

1 A. [TOBIS] No.
 2 Q. And you're aware that
 3 this report is also a public document in this
 4 arbitration?
 5 A. [TOBIS] I will take your
 6 word for it.
 7 Q. Okay.
 8 I want to turn now to another
 9 line in Schedule 3. So let's turn back to
 10 Schedule 3?
 11 A. [TOBIS] All right.
 12 Q. I wouldn't put that
 13 schedule very far away. We are going to use it a
 14 little bit this morning.
 15 A. [TOBIS] I have it here,
 16 open, ready to go.
 17 Q. I want to turn to the
 18 line that's entitled "IESO cost reimbursement
 19 relating to the 2018/2019 proceedings". It's the
 20 fourth line from the bottom; you see that?
 21 A. [TOBIS] I see it.
 22 Q. The total there is
 23 \$750,000; correct?
 24 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 25 Q. And if we turn to note

1 14, which is where you provide your description of
2 where you get that number on page 180, to see
3 where this number comes from, it notes that this
4 is from a legal settlement with the IESO from
5 2018/2019 dispute; do you see that?

6 A. [TOBIS] I do.

7 Q. Ms. Baines confirmed for
8 us that this was not a settlement. It was payment
9 of the IESO's costs related to the domestic
10 application; is that correct?

11 A. [TOBIS] Correct.

12 Q. If the Tribunal were to
13 award Canada to pay sunk costs in this arbitration
14 and these numbers were included, this would, in
15 effect, be making Canada reimburse the Claimant
16 for its legal costs in the domestic application;
17 is that correct?

18 A. [TOBIS] It would, in
19 effect, be reimbursing, yes, the cost, the 750
20 that the Claimant had to cover for the IESO. We
21 would consider that a project development cost.
22 Yes, that is what would be the impact.

23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

24 You might just have to speak a bit more clearly
25 because Lisa got that but I didn't.

1 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, I was just
2 processing the question.

3 The short answer is yes.

4 BY MS. SQUIRES:

5 Q. Okay.

6 I want to turn now to another
7 item in Schedule 3 and I want to look at the
8 management fees, the unpaid ones, to White Owl
9 Capital, and the unpaid management fees to 905085
10 Inc., which we also know by the name Controltech.

11 A. [TOBIS] Yeah.

12 Q. And those are discussed
13 in notes 4 and 6, respectively. So we will turn
14 to notes 4 and 6.

15 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.

16 Q. If we turn there, we can
17 see that you rely on two documents to arrive at
18 these numbers, C-2409 and C-2492. So let's have a
19 look at those numbers.

20 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.

21 Q. So let's turn first to
22 C-2409. It's at Tab 8 of your binder.

23 A. [TOBIS] Yeah.

24 Q. You're there.

25 Did Secretariat prepare this

1 document?

2 A. [TOBIS] No.

3 Q. In looking at this
4 document, is there any evidence at all as to who
5 prepared it?

6 A. [TOBIS] It was prepared
7 by David Mars.

8 Q. But I am asking, in
9 looking at this document, is there any evidence as
10 to who prepared it?

11 A. [TOBIS] Not what I see
12 right here, no.

13 Q. Is there any evidence as
14 to the date it was prepared?

15 A. [TOBIS] Not on what
16 you're showing on the screen now, no.

17 Q. You can take time to look
18 for the full document if you want.

19 A. [TOBIS] I'd say no.

20 Q. Okay. Let's turn to
21 page 2.

22 This page is entitled "905085
23 Ontario Inc. accruals", and the date range is
24 June 30th, 2015, to February 18th, 2020; do you
25 see that?

1 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

2 Q. And, if we go down to the
3 end of page 12, we see, for the total time period,
4 we arrive at a total of 2.728 million; do you see
5 that?

6 A. [TOBIS] I do.

7 Q. And, if we go on to the
8 next page, we see that's where we start the White
9 Owl Capital accrual; correct?

10 A. [TOBIS] Correct.

11 Q. And these are two
12 different entities on the same document; 905085
13 and White Owl Capital are not the same entity but
14 they are in the same document here?

15 A. [TOBIS] They are not the
16 same entity and they are being shown in the same
17 document here.

18 Q. Okay.

19 So White Owl Capital accruals
20 are for the same time period; correct?

21 A. [TOBIS] Correct.

22 Q. And, if we go to the end
23 of that document, we see a total of 1.5 million;
24 you see that?

25 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

1 Q. And then we see, if we go
 2 back to that very first page, we see those numbers
 3 reflected in the last column under "total". The
 4 2.7 is there and the 1.5 is there; correct?
 5 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 6 Q. Now, I am having trouble
 7 matching these numbers up with what's in Schedule
 8 3 so I am hoping you can help.
 9 Let's turn back to Schedule 3.
 10 And, for the White Owl Capital
 11 management fees in the schedule, you have included
 12 \$945,000 for the period up to February 18th, 2020;
 13 do you see that?
 14 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 15 Q. Okay.
 16 So that's not the 1.5 million
 17 that we saw in C-2409, the document you relied on;
 18 correct?
 19 A. [TOBIS] Those numbers are
 20 not the same; correct, yeah.
 21 Q. Okay.
 22 And the same is true for
 23 905085. You use 1.593 million but, in the
 24 document we just looked at, it was 2.728 million;
 25 correct?

1 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 2 Q. Okay.
 3 Now, this document starts
 4 counting as of June 30th, 2015, and these past
 5 costs incurred are December 31st, 2015.
 6 So am I correct in assuming
 7 that you're calculating as well that six-month
 8 period in your numbers here?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Yes, it's picking
 10 up where the Deloitte report left off.
 11 Q. Okay.
 12 Let's look, then, at the other
 13 documents that you rely on. And that's an invoice
 14 that goes to some of these underlying amounts.
 15 So let's turn back to note 4
 16 and you can see we are going to talk about an
 17 invoice underlying the White Owl Capital
 18 management fees.
 19 And, to determine that number,
 20 you pointed to one document that you say is
 21 C-2492. So I want to turn there. This is at
 22 Tab 9.
 23 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm. Yes.
 24 Q. This looks like an
 25 invoice from David Mars from Kinetic Blueprint

1 Inc. -- or LLC, sorry, to Windstream Energy LLC;
 2 do you see that?
 3 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 4 Q. It is not to the Claimant
 5 from White Owl; is that correct? There is no
 6 reference to White Owl?
 7 A. [TOBIS] David Mars is
 8 White Owl. I know he structured the --
 9 Q. My question is whether
 10 there is a reference to White Owl on this
 11 document?
 12 A. [TOBIS] This document
 13 does not contain a reference to White Owl.
 14 Q. And this document is
 15 dated September 1st, 2020?
 16 A. [TOBIS] I --
 17 Q. You can see that under
 18 "invoice date"?
 19 A. [TOBIS] That might be the
 20 month and days switched around.
 21 Q. So maybe it's
 22 January 1st, 2020?
 23 A. [TOBIS] Or January 9th,
 24 2020.
 25 Q. It's 2020; right. That,

1 we can agree on?
 2 A. [TOBIS] It's 2020, yes.
 3 Q. So, this document, if
 4 it's September 1st, 2020, this document was
 5 created after the Notice of Intent in this
 6 arbitration; correct? That was February of 2020?
 7 A. [TOBIS] If that is
 8 September, yes, it would be after the Notice of
 9 Intent.
 10 Q. If it was January, it was
 11 created a month before -- six weeks before the
 12 Notice of Intent; correct?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 14 Q. Okay.
 15 And now, if we look at the
 16 details of what's here, these are for consulting
 17 services from 2015; correct?
 18 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, are you
 19 referring -- which line on Schedule 3 are you
 20 referring to?
 21 Q. Right now, I am still on
 22 the Kinetic Blueprint invoice.
 23 A. [TOBIS] Where does this
 24 relate to in the cost schedule so I can orient and
 25 I can give you the price --

1 Q. Yeah, for sure.
 2 You refer to it in note 4 for
 3 where you derive values for White Owl Capital's
 4 management fees following the Windstream I award.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Right.
 6 Q. Okay.
 7 A. [TOBIS] Okay.
 8 Q. So, when I look at what's
 9 invoiced here, it's for consulting services that
 10 occurred in June, July, August, September,
 11 October, November 2015; do you see that?
 12 A. [TOBIS] I do.
 13 Q. So did you review any
 14 invoices for management fees of White Owl Capital
 15 after November 2015? Invoices is my question.
 16 A. [TOBIS] No. We had an
 17 agreement or a contract, I think it was a NAFTA 1
 18 exhibit about the amount per month that was paid
 19 to White Owl. And the other exhibit in the three
 20 refers to the monthly fee amount of C-1891 and
 21 C-1892.
 22 Q. Mr. Tobis, my question
 23 was just about whether you reviewed any other
 24 invoices, not agreements?
 25 A. [TOBIS] No.

1 Q. Now, I want to look at
 2 the amount you note for interest paid net of
 3 interest earned.
 4 So we are going to come to
 5 talk a little bit about interest. We have been
 6 waiting to get there.
 7 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.
 8 Q. And I want to look at
 9 note 8 on page 178 of the first Secretariat
 10 report.
 11 So we can see, under note 8,
 12 two documents that you refer to: C-2082, and then
 13 you also refer to C-1889 for the calculation of
 14 the interest, total interest as of June 2015.
 15 You see those two documents
 16 referred to there?
 17 A. [TOBIS] Yeah.
 18 Q. So, if I understand
 19 correctly, these are the two documents, C-2028 and
 20 C-1889, that you relied on to calculate the
 21 interest; correct?
 22 A. [TOBIS] There was another
 23 document that probably should have been listed in
 24 that footnote. It was the document that had the
 25 agreement of the 12 and a half percent but this

1 was --
 2 Q. Do you know --
 3 A. [TOBIS] I don't have the
 4 exhibit number off by heart. I remember looking
 5 at it in preparation. I think it's referenced on
 6 the slide in our presentation, if it's helpful.
 7 C-1529.
 8 Q. So you're referring to --
 9 okay, C -- we are going to back here now. I am
 10 going to back to Windstream I in my mind.
 11 You are referring to C-1529;
 12 correct?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 14 Q. So that was an agreement
 15 between the shareholders in Windstream, so William
 16 Ziegler, individuals like that, and the Claimant,
 17 Windstream Energy?
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Hang on. You might be entering confidential
 20 territory.
 21 MS. SQUIRES: I don't believe
 22 so.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 It's blanked out in earlier proceedings.
 25 So, Mr. Terry, are we okay?

1 MR. TERRY: Just one moment.
 2 We are okay.
 3 MS. SQUIRES: There we go. We
 4 got the go ahead.
 5 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 6 Q. Okay. So you have
 7 referred to that document at C-1529.
 8 Now, two questions I want to
 9 ask you about that document.
 10 Are you aware that, in the
 11 Windstream I arbitration, my colleague
 12 Mr. Spelliscy took Mr. Low to that document where
 13 Mr. Low confirmed that that number is, in fact,
 14 not interest, it is a fee?
 15 A. [TOBIS] Yes, I read the
 16 transcripts from Windstream I.
 17 Q. Are you also aware that,
 18 in the Windstream I arbitration, my colleague
 19 Mr. Spelliscy took Mr. Low to that document where
 20 it was confirmed that it was an unsigned document;
 21 correct?
 22 A. [TOBIS] Correct. Happy
 23 to elaborate but correct.
 24 Q. That's fine. Okay.
 25 So we have these three

1 documents, C-2082, C-1189 and then the one we just
 2 spoke about.
 3 And I have to admit I am a bit
 4 confused again about these documents. So let's go
 5 to them.
 6 Let's start with C-1889 and
 7 that's at Tab 14 of your binder.
 8 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.
 9 Q. And this is where you say
 10 the interest as of June 19, 2015, came from;
 11 correct?
 12 A. [TOBIS] No, the interest,
 13 as of June 2015, came from the Deloitte report,
 14 Schedule 3B. Deloitte had derived it from this
 15 document.
 16 Q. So I will agree with you
 17 there. This is the same document that Deloitte
 18 relied on and the reference to that is the
 19 Deloitte report paragraph 6.25A, for the record.
 20 And, I have to admit, as you
 21 can see when we haul this up. We are going to
 22 haul it up. Can we have C-1889 on the screen,
 23 please.
 24 Okay. This is not an invoice
 25 or any sort of formal business document, any

1 exchange about collecting fees; correct?
 2 A. [TOBIS] This is a summary
 3 of the accrued interest as of the date of the
 4 Deloitte report --
 5 Q. Fee. Sorry, fee?
 6 A. [TOBIS] Accrued fees,
 7 sorry, as of the date of the Deloitte report. It
 8 was unpaid at that time.
 9 Q. Who prepared this
 10 document?
 11 A. [TOBIS] I understand it
 12 was Mr. Mars.
 13 Q. But it doesn't say on
 14 this document who prepared it?
 15 A. [TOBIS] It does not say.
 16 Q. Okay.
 17 Do you know when this document
 18 was prepared?
 19 A. [TOBIS] I recall you
 20 asked Mr. Low that question as well.
 21 It says June 19th, 2015.
 22 Or, sorry, your colleague
 23 asked him that and so I assume it was prepared
 24 sometime in 2015 and Deloitte relied upon it in
 25 their June 2015 report.

1 Q. So Mr. Low was asked
 2 about this?
 3 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 4 Q. He said he did not know
 5 who prepared it. It was not Deloitte. And he did
 6 not know when it was prepared?
 7 A. [TOBIS] I know it was
 8 prepared by Mr. Mars.
 9 Q. Okay.
 10 Now, let's look at what else
 11 you referred to. Because we have looked -- that's
 12 the document for 2015.
 13 Let's look at what you now
 14 refer to for the 2020 date. And I want to turn to
 15 that document.
 16 It is -- I don't want to turn
 17 to the document yet but I want to turn to note 8
 18 in your schedule.
 19 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.
 20 Q. And we can see you are
 21 referring to C-2082, Windstream payouts; do you
 22 see that?
 23 A. [TOBIS] I do.
 24 Q. Now, before we leave the
 25 schedule, because I am going to lump a bunch of

1 things in here together, I want you to confirm you
 2 also rely on C-2082 and it's the only document you
 3 cite to in your report for what you rely on, for
 4 notes 5, note 7, note 8, note 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
 5 14, 15, 16, 17; correct?
 6 A. [TOBIS] I will take your
 7 word for it. It seems about right.
 8 Q. So those lines, for the
 9 record, correspond to the letter of credit, what
 10 you say is interest paid or earned, which I am
 11 going to correct to be a fee, legal fees paid
 12 incurred to advance the project, public relations
 13 fees, data room fees, expert report, expert report
 14 fees, which I understand were not included they
 15 were excluded?
 16 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 17 Q. Government relations
 18 fees, accounting fees, equity expenses
 19 reimbursement, and tax payments.
 20 You relied on C-2082 as your
 21 only evidence to support that.
 22 So let's turn to that
 23 document. So that document's at tab 10 of your
 24 binder?
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Was there a question before you got there? Do you
 2 want him to confirm?
 3 MS. SQUIRES: He can confirm
 4 if he can.
 5 A. [TOBIS] I confirm.
 6 Q. Okay.
 7 So let's turn to that
 8 document, C-2082.
 9 Did Secretariat prepare this
 10 document?
 11 A. [TOBIS] No. This
 12 document was emailed to me by David Mars and we
 13 walked through it, he explained what each item
 14 was --
 15 Q. Okay.
 16 But, on this document, there
 17 is no evidence of who prepared it?
 18 A. [TOBIS] No. I know it
 19 was prepared by David Mars.
 20 Q. Is there any evidence as
 21 the date to which it was prepared?
 22 A. [TOBIS] I know it was
 23 prepared at the end of 2020, the last date listed
 24 in the last row of this document.
 25 Q. So this document was

1 prepared after the Notice of Intent was filed in
 2 this arbitration, end of 2020, you just said?
 3 A. [TOBIS] Yes. Because
 4 it's including also costs --
 5 Q. Okay.
 6 Did you independently evaluate
 7 the invoices that led to these numbers?
 8 A. [TOBIS] I don't recall.
 9 I understand there is an invoice available for
 10 each of these numbers but --
 11 Q. But you did not review
 12 that.
 13 Earlier today, in your
 14 presentation, you mentioned your --
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 Hang on, hang on. Slow down.
 17 MS. SQUIRES: Sorry, sorry.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Getting a little bit excited post lunch. Give him
 20 a moment to answer, please.
 21 So you haven't got the
 22 transcript, have you. So hang on.
 23 You said you did not
 24 independently evaluate the invoices that led to
 25 these numbers. Mr. Tobis said I don't recall. I

1 understand there is an invoice available for each
 2 of these numbers but -- you jumped in, but you did
 3 not review that.
 4 I don't -- maybe you did
 5 answer. I don't recall.
 6 Did you independently evaluate
 7 the invoices that led to these numbers, Mr. Tobis?
 8 A. [TOBIS] I do remember
 9 looking at several of these invoices. For
 10 example, the Torys invoices in 2017, 2018, that
 11 are included in note 9.
 12 I think those, ultimately,
 13 weren't produced. They were considered, I guess,
 14 confidential.
 15 But I independently reviewed
 16 the amounts that were on those invoices that
 17 matched the amounts in Mr. Mars' schedule here of
 18 the total payments he's made.
 19 There might have been other
 20 items like that as well. I gained comfort over
 21 the reasonability of the numbers on the
 22 spreadsheet. I appreciate those invoices aren't
 23 in front of us today but I was comfortable that
 24 these were all reasonable and real expenditures
 25 incurred by Windstream.

1 MS. SQUIRES: I have a follow
 2 up to that, if I may.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Yes.
 5 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 6 Q. So I understand, if we
 7 turn to note 9.
 8 So you have referred to some
 9 invoices that were paid to Torys?
 10 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 11 Q. That you have taken out
 12 of the number. So you have taken a number from
 13 2082 and you have subtracted from that some
 14 invoices because they were not suitable to be
 15 included as sunk costs?
 16 A. [TOBIS] Yes. Because
 17 they related to this arbitration and I didn't want
 18 to make the same issue --
 19 Q. Yes. But the ones you
 20 left in for sunk costs, you did not review
 21 invoices for those; right?
 22 A. [TOBIS] No, I did as
 23 well.
 24 Q. You did. You haven't
 25 cited to any of them?

1 A. [TOBIS] No, we haven't
 2 produced them because they are confidential.
 3 Q. Okay.
 4 A. [TOBIS] But I reviewed
 5 them, as an expert, to ensure that the numbers put
 6 in my report appeared reasonable.
 7 Q. They are not on the
 8 record?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Those invoices
 10 are not on the record.
 11 Q. The Torys invoices?
 12 A. [TOBIS] The Torys
 13 invoices.
 14 And I recall reviewing several
 15 other of these invoices. I don't believe they are
 16 on the record. But I have reviewed several of
 17 these invoices when preparing the schedule. We
 18 walked through them with Mr. Mars. And some of
 19 them might have been screen shared with me. I
 20 will have to go back and check my notes.
 21 But I remember gaining comfort
 22 over the reasonability of the numbers on the
 23 C-2082 schedule.
 24 Q. Okay.
 25 So in terms of what we have on

1 the record in this arbitration, then. We have
 2 C-2082 and we have your testimony that you
 3 reviewed the Torys invoices and some other
 4 specific invoices?
 5 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 6 Q. Okay.
 7 I want to turn now to one
 8 final series of questions on sunk costs --
 9 actually two, and then we are going to move on.
 10 Yesterday, Ms. Baines
 11 indicated, in her testimony, that her and
 12 Mr. Baines have not been paid for services
 13 rendered since the Windstream I award because of
 14 an arrangement that they had with the investors.
 15 And she referred to it as skin in the game.
 16 Given that, if we come to
 17 line 5 in schedule -- sorry, if we come to
 18 Schedule 3, and we look at the management fees for
 19 905085 Ontario, it says there that, since NAFTA 1,
 20 the amounts paid, so not accrued but paid, have
 21 been \$523,000.
 22 Can you tell me where that
 23 number comes from?
 24 A. [TOBIS] So 905085 Ontario
 25 received a cheque for \$2 million in May of 2017.

1 That cheque related to all their accrued fees up
 2 to that date.
 3 1.477 million of those fees
 4 were accrued up until June of 2015 which were
 5 included in the Deloitte schedule in NAFTA 1,
 6 which means that the remaining amount of those
 7 fees, the 523,000, which is the difference between
 8 column A and B, reflects their accrual from June
 9 of 2015 until May of 2017 when the amount was
 10 paid.
 11 Q. So some of the 523 was
 12 for services rendered prior to the NAFTA 1 award?
 13 A. [TOBIS] It depends how
 14 you define the NAFTA 1 award. It goes back to our
 15 earlier discussion.
 16 The column B relates to costs
 17 that were included in Deloitte's cost schedule in
 18 the NAFTA 1 award.
 19 So 523,000 I will just
 20 factually say was accrued costs from June 2015
 21 until May of 2017.
 22 Q. Okay.
 23 But we can take as agreement
 24 that the NAFTA 1 award date isn't September 2016.
 25 You don't dispute that. You have a different

1 interpretation of what is meant by "after the
 2 NAFTA 1 award", but you agree with me that the
 3 award itself is September of 2016?
 4 A. [TOBIS] The award is
 5 September 2016; correct.
 6 Q. Okay.
 7 Let's turn now to Exhibit C
 8 2020 at Tab 15 of your binder.
 9 A. [TOBIS] Sorry, I don't
 10 have a Tab 15 in my binder.
 11 Q. Oh, my goodness. I
 12 apologize for this.
 13 There we go, 13.
 14 Okay. Now this is an exhibit
 15 that Secretariat indicated it reviewed in
 16 preparing its first report. It's listed in the
 17 documents that you reviewed.
 18 And you note Secretariat
 19 refers to this document as Wolfe Island Shoals
 20 expenses 2016 to 2019.
 21 Do you know who prepared this?
 22 A. [TOBIS] Can you please
 23 take me to where we have referenced this in our
 24 report. That may help refresh my memory on this.
 25 Q. Yeah, absolutely.

1 I don't have the exact page
 2 number but it's in the first report, Secretariat's
 3 first report where you list off all the documents
 4 that you reviewed.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 6 Q. In that list of
 7 documents, C-2020 appears.
 8 A. [TOBIS] Was it referred
 9 to in any footnotes?
 10 Q. I cannot find it anywhere
 11 in your report but it does say that you reviewed
 12 it?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Okay. We could
 14 check this but let's continue.
 15 Q. Okay.
 16 A. [TOBIS] If it's there,
 17 the list of documents reviewed, then, yes, we
 18 reviewed it and it informed our view in our
 19 report.
 20 Q. Absolutely.
 21 If it wasn't you that reviewed
 22 it, I know Secretariat -- I am using the term
 23 singularly, but there's three people. So maybe
 24 somebody else looked at it. They can jump in.
 25 Not a problem.

1 So do you know who prepared
 2 this document?
 3 A. [TOBIS] I can't say with
 4 100 percent certainty. I will assume it was
 5 Ms. Baines.
 6 --- Reporter appeals
 7 Q. At the bottom of the page
 8 there, we can see four red checks?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Yup.
 10 Q. Is that because these
 11 numbers weren't finalized; do you know? Do you
 12 know what that check means?
 13 A. [TOBIS] That's very
 14 common in any accounting spreadsheet. It's just
 15 the way to make sure that your math is right.
 16 Q. Okay.
 17 A. [TOBIS] This is obviously
 18 a column that's been down added and check if any
 19 of our spreadsheets have that.
 20 Q. That means the math is
 21 right?
 22 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 23 Q. Okay.
 24 A. [TOBIS] When the number
 25 next to the check is zero, it means that you

1 reconciled to the columns in the spreadsheet.
 2 Q. Okay. Perfect. You can
 3 see I am not an accountant.
 4 A. [TOBIS] It's okay.
 5 Q. Now --
 6 A. [TOBIS] I am not a lawyer
 7 either, so.
 8 Q. There we go. Even.
 9 Let's move to the top.
 10 And I want to look at the row
 11 where it says "incomplete project". So it's to
 12 the left-hand side. It says "Wolfe Island Shoals"
 13 and, right underneath that, it says "incomplete
 14 project"; do you see that?
 15 A. [TOBIS] Oh, now, you just
 16 refreshed my memory what the schedule is.
 17 Q. Okay. I feel like you
 18 may have looked at it.
 19 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 20 Q. Now, we see there are
 21 numbers right across the top that go across the
 22 that row for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019;
 23 correct?
 24 A. [TOBIS] Correct. Those
 25 numbers reconcile to the financial statements that

1 we looked at earlier.
 2 Q. Right.
 3 So those -- this incomplete
 4 project, those numbers are reflected in the
 5 unaudited financial statements and then they are
 6 then included in your Schedule 3 as project costs
 7 capitalized; correct?
 8 A. [TOBIS] Yeah, I see that.
 9 And we had asked Ms. Baines to
 10 provide this to us so we could have a better
 11 understanding of the numbers on the financial
 12 statements. We wanted to see what the breakdown
 13 of the cost spend each year was, what the various
 14 categories were.
 15 Q. Okay. So this, so this
 16 helps us determine what kind of things went into
 17 the incomplete project. What's made up of that
 18 value.
 19 A. [TOBIS] Exactly.
 20 Q. Okay.
 21 Now -- and just so I am clear
 22 on how this spreadsheet works, if we just take the
 23 2015-year for incomplete project, we add the
 24 4.335435 million to the 2016 expenses, that's how
 25 we end up at the balance for fiscal year 2016?

1 A. [TOBIS] Perfect.
 2 Q. There we go. I am
 3 learning.
 4 And the WEI there, referenced
 5 in the columns with the date, that's Windstream
 6 Energy Inc.?
 7 A. [TOBIS] I will take your
 8 word for it.
 9 Q. I don't know. I am
 10 asking?
 11 A. [TOBIS] I, I don't know
 12 either. I don't remember.
 13 Q. Okay.
 14 I want to turn down to the
 15 fourth line item, government relations.
 16 It says 6806 Wolfe Island
 17 government relations; do you see that?
 18 A. [TOBIS] I do.
 19 Q. And, for the time period
 20 that this document covers, we have three entries:
 21 One just over 12,000, one for 20,000, and one for
 22 just over 71,000; do you see that?
 23 A. [TOBIS] I do.
 24 Q. So we are at about
 25 \$103,000 there?

1 A. [TOBIS] Yeah.
 2 Q. Okay.
 3 So, using this, here, we have
 4 government relations fees that are then captured
 5 in that incomplete project value; correct?
 6 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 7 Q. And then, in turn, in
 8 your capitalized cost in Schedule 3; correct?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 10 Q. Okay.
 11 So if we -- let's turn back to
 12 Schedule 3. And we see the project capitalized
 13 cost there at the top.
 14 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 15 Q. And, if we go about five
 16 lines from the bottom of Schedule 3, we can see
 17 that for, in the period post NAFTA 1, you have
 18 included 220 -- you have included \$270,000 for
 19 government relations; correct?
 20 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 21 Q. So have you ensured,
 22 through your calculation, that you are not double
 23 counting any government relations here, given what
 24 we know about how money flowed from WWIS to
 25 Windstream Energy Inc. to Windstream Energy; have

1 you done a check to make sure that nothing is
 2 overlapping here?
 3 A. [TOBIS] Yes, of course --
 4 Q. Where --
 5 A. [TOBIS] -- we discussed
 6 this with Mr. Mars and Mr. Baines and we
 7 understand that some of these fees were paid
 8 directly to the WIS entity and some were paid --
 9 the cheque was written out of the Windstream
 10 Energy entity. But there is definitely no double
 11 counting here.
 12 Q. Okay.
 13 Where on the record can we see
 14 the evidence to help us ascertain exactly what
 15 government relations fees were paid by which
 16 entity if we wanted, ourselves, to go back and
 17 recreate that?
 18 A. [TOBIS] Well, the numbers
 19 in Row 13 are the ones paid by the American
 20 entity, Windstream Energy. And the numbers you
 21 referred to on the screen before were paid by the
 22 Canadian entity.
 23 We obviously want to ensure
 24 there is no double counting. We put a note next
 25 to each other, no double counting, no double

1 counting. That's one of the checks we will do on
 2 our work.
 3 Q. I want to be clear, I am
 4 not at all questioning your integrity in preparing
 5 this document in any way. I am trying to recreate
 6 it.
 7 In terms of the invoices, when
 8 we talked about C2082 which is where you derive
 9 the number for February 18, 2020, you said you
 10 looked at some invoices, you had some
 11 conversations.
 12 I guess my general point is we
 13 have to take your word for it, that that was done
 14 but there's nothing on the record to help us
 15 determine that for sure; is that correct?
 16 A. [TOBIS] So, in C-2082,
 17 you can see some line items for Rubicon, for
 18 example. And, November 2018, there's a \$90,000
 19 payment made, wire payment made --
 20 Q. Yeah?
 21 A. [TOBIS] -- so that's the
 22 evidence we relied upon.
 23 That might have been one, I
 24 might have seen the invoice for that. I might
 25 have to check my notes. It might have been

1 confidential. Its government relations emblem was
 2 written on the invoice.
 3 But I gain comfort that if
 4 this C-2082 spreadsheet said they paid \$90,000 to
 5 Rubicon on November 2018, I gain comfort that that
 6 was reasonable.
 7 Q. Okay. But we haven't
 8 reviewed the invoices.
 9 Just for the sake of
 10 completion -- I am going to move on to the haircut
 11 which I like the term of. We are going to move on
 12 to that in a second.
 13 There are several other things
 14 as well on this Exhibit C-2020 that also overlap
 15 in categories like legal fees, management fees,
 16 these sorts of things. You have ensured that
 17 there is no duplication there?
 18 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 19 Q. And while we are on
 20 C-2082, if we could call it up again.
 21 Sorry, C-2020. Sorry, Ryan.
 22 We can see, about halfway down
 23 the page, we have "6815 Wolfe Island REA"; do you
 24 see that?
 25 A. [TOBIS] The row that has

1 no costs in it.
 2 Q. That's right. I am just
 3 asking you to confirm no costs were spent with
 4 respect to the renewable energy approval, based on
 5 this document?
 6 A. [TOBIS] No, I don't think
 7 you can conclude that. An accountant can
 8 categorize costs in all different kinds of
 9 categories.
 10 I imagine Ms. Baines can
 11 answer. She might have categorized the costs
 12 spent on an REA in one of the other categories on
 13 the spreadsheet. You can't conclude from that
 14 that no amounts were spent on REA. All you can
 15 conclude is that row is empty.
 16 Q. Okay.
 17 Just give me one second.
 18 Sorry, one more question on
 19 Schedule 3 and then we are going to hopefully put
 20 it away.
 21 A. [TOBIS] I still got it
 22 here.
 23 Q. There we go. Okay.
 24 Line 7, the \$6 million
 25 security deposit that the Claimant provided the

1 IESO.
 2 A. [TOBIS] Yeah.
 3 Q. You have that as a sunk
 4 cost incurred as of December 31st, 2015; correct?
 5 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 6 Q. And that security deposit
 7 has been returned to the Claimant; correct?
 8 A. [TOBIS] Correct.
 9 Q. You don't make any
 10 deduction from that in your sunk costs
 11 calculation?
 12 A. [TOBIS] We take it out of
 13 our final damages conclusion in our conclusion
 14 slide. So we took it out.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 But, in this 9 million here,
 17 you make no deduction for that?
 18 A. [TOBIS] In this schedule,
 19 which isn't a damages conclusion, it's not been
 20 deducted.
 21 Q. I understand that's
 22 not -- it's for the Tribunal to decide what the
 23 damages value is here.
 24 And I want to make it clear
 25 that, if the Tribunal were to look at this and

1 award costs incurred since NAFTA 1 as sunk costs
 2 in this proceeding, and they were to look at that
 3 9.4 million, that, if the Tribunal was to award
 4 the Claimant 9.4 million, they would be paid twice
 5 for the letter of credit; is that correct?
 6 A. [TOBIS] No. The
 7 9.4 million does not include the 6 million in that
 8 total. So they wouldn't be paid twice. If they
 9 were to award 27.7 million, potentially.
 10 Q. I understand the
 11 9.4 million is not included -- the 6 million is
 12 not included in that 9.4 million because this is
 13 as of February 18, 2020.
 14 But we know that, since this
 15 time there, has been an inflow to the company of
 16 \$6 million.
 17 So if the Tribunal was
 18 awarded -- if the Tribunal awards \$9.4 million,
 19 with the information we have now, knowing that
 20 \$6 million of that has flown back to the company,
 21 you would agree with me that, to be properly made
 22 whole, it would have to be 3.4 million?
 23 A. [TOBIS] No, I don't
 24 agree. I can elaborate if you want but my answer
 25 is no.

1 Q. Let's turn on to
2 something else then.
3 Let's turn to the project
4 stage risk adjustment factor. And I have just a
5 couple short questions about this. I think
6 Dr. Guillet is wanting to speak about this as
7 well.

8 We have already gone through
9 the methodology of calculating that net present
10 value using the 15 percent IRR and then we have
11 taken the haircut of the 57 percent; correct?

12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
13 Ms. Squires, just before we move on to that topic,
14 can I just ask a question that's been puzzling me.
15 You may not know the answer.

16 Did the letter of credit -- I
17 am sorry.

18 Did the \$6 million that was
19 held in respect of the letter of credit accrue
20 interest?

21 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
23 And where is that reflected? Who earned that
24 interest and where is it reflected and at what
25 rate? I know that's three questions. So let's

1 take them one at a time.

2 A. [TOBIS] It's explained in
3 the last slide of our presentation in the
4 appendix.

5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
6 The one that -- all right, then, maybe we won't
7 waste.

8 A. [TOBIS] Just to simply
9 answer. You are welcome to walk through it after.

10 But, to simply answer, it was
11 paid to three entities at the rate of 12 and a
12 half percent. And it was paid out in actual cash,
13 an actual cheque was written in May of 2017.

14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
15 No, no, no.

16 So you've borrowed the money
17 from Lucky Star and Co.

18 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
20 And you pay them 12 and a half percent interest.

21 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
23 The money sits in an escrow account somewhere.

24 The money sits somewhere.

25 As the money sits somewhere,

1 for example, in a bank.

2 A. [TOBIS] Um-hmm.

3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
4 That nobody can touch it -- you need to be quiet,
5 Mr. Mars. You are not giving evidence. You are
6 not testifying in this hearing. So, please, no
7 commentary from you, okay. Thank you.

8 If somebody wants to call you,
9 they will, and you will be testifying under oath
10 like everybody else.

11 So my question was did -- are
12 you aware, in the information you have, having, it
13 looks to me like you fairly carefully audited the
14 information available, was there any interest
15 accrued on the 6 million?

16 A. [TOBIS] If I am
17 understanding your question correctly, note 7 of
18 our Schedule 3 where you refer to the interest
19 that was earned on the 6 million -- so this 6
20 million was sitting in a bank and it was
21 generating very low amounts of interest. I think
22 we calculated \$46,000 in the last couple of years.

23 We deducted that amount from
24 the total cost because that's an offsetting. That
25 was money that was benefitted to Claimants. We

1 wanted to keep them even. So we added the
2 interest paid and took off the interest earned.
3 That's why the row is -- sorry, it's page 178 of
4 our first report.

5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
6 So your note to Schedule 3. Which note?

7 A. [TOBIS] Note 7, the
8 bottom part in note 7, it says "interest earned in
9 UBS account". It shows negative.

10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
11 Got it.

12 And this is referring to that
13 same exhibit that Ms. Squires was talking about
14 that you rely on for a bunch of your --

15 A. [TOBIS] Yes, yes. These
16 numbers come from that same exhibit.

17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
18 see.

19 So earned interest of 46,000
20 Canadian dollars.

21 A. [TOBIS] Yes.

22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
23 Paid interest about 5 and a half million or
24 fees --

25 A. [TOBIS] Yeah, I think

1 that was over the entire time period.
 2 I should point out that this 6
 3 million was continuing to accrue interest to
 4 investors since May of 2017. I don't -- we
 5 haven't included, in any of that continuing
 6 accrued interest -- well, sorry. Fees -- there's
 7 a distinction between fees and interests.
 8 We have only included the
 9 amounts that have actually been paid. That's a
 10 distinction between us and Deloitte on that point.
 11 At the time of the Deloitte
 12 report, those fees were unpaid, accrued and there
 13 was questions, are they even real. Who knows.
 14 It's an unsigned document.
 15 In our case, we are including
 16 only the fees that were paid. Technically, since
 17 May 2017, they are still accruing more fees on
 18 this amount. We just haven't included those as
 19 well. We were trying to be reasonable in
 20 preparing the schedule.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 So, sorry, I am just trying to look in real-time
 23 and I am not sure.
 24 So on the line in your
 25 Schedule 3, in the line interest paid, net of

1 interest earned, and you have got 46,000 in square
 2 brackets there.
 3 That's where you have
 4 accounted for interest earned on the 6 million
 5 sitting in UBS?
 6 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 7 There, and also in the first
 8 part of note 7, if you notice when the money came
 9 back from BMO, it came back at 6.126 million.
 10 Initially, they put in 6
 11 million. They also had to pay 120,000 in fees and
 12 they got back 6.162.
 13 So that's further interest
 14 earned that's deducted from our total costs.
 15 So, really, there's 162,000 of
 16 interest earned up until -- in that category. And
 17 then there's also the additional 46,000 of
 18 interest earned in the second part of note 7.
 19 Again, it's a very, obviously,
 20 much lower rate of interest than what they were
 21 paying to investors to borrow this money --
 22 interest or fees. I apologize.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Okay. So the 46, if I look at note 7, relates to
 25 interest earned, like proper bank interest earned.

1 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Since the award.
 4 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 But I thought your Schedule 3 also tried to tell
 7 me about costs before the award and I'm not -- I
 8 don't think I am seeing any interest earned before
 9 the award.
 10 A. [TOBIS] That would be
 11 captured in the first part of note 7. That's the
 12 42 -- the 42,000. Because the 6 million --
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Oh, I see.
 15 A. [TOBIS] -- was put in and
 16 then they took out 6.162 million.
 17 So that's -- they had to
 18 replace their letter of credit so that's the
 19 interest up to that date.
 20 Perhaps, you know, to be more
 21 meticulous or to put that 42,000 amount in the pre
 22 NAFTA 1 category, we were trying to be consistent
 23 with how the previous experts looked at costs.
 24 And so that is just where
 25 it -- these were relatively minor amounts in the

1 context of the cost numbers we are talking about,
 2 but we tried to be as meticulous as possible.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 4 see. That's helpful. Thank you.
 5 IRR, Ms. Squires.
 6 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 7 Q. Okay.
 8 So the project stage risk
 9 adjustment factor, I understand from this morning
 10 that this involved discounting the cash flows
 11 using that 15 percent IRR that you have assumed.
 12 And then, once you arrive at
 13 that number, you use the 57 percent probability of
 14 reaching financial close and that's how you got
 15 your number.
 16 I am looking at -- I am
 17 scanning all three here. I am not sure who --
 18 Mr. Tetard, looks like he is waiting for a
 19 question.
 20 Is the question best to you?
 21 You are turning the mic towards your colleague.
 22 So I will ask the question and then you guys can
 23 confer.
 24 A. [MILBURN] I think I can
 25 answer.

1 Q. I just want to confirm
 2 that's basically the process of what happened?
 3 A. [MILBURN] I think you're
 4 mixing. We did two --
 5 Q. That's most likely.
 6 A. [MILBURN] We did two DCF
 7 scenarios, intentionally.
 8 One used the IRR method which
 9 Mr. Tetard spoke to.
 10 The other one, just a more
 11 traditional DCF, where we discounted by a cost of
 12 equity, and that's the one that we apply the
 13 adjustment for risk to.
 14 Q. Right. Okay.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 And what was the IRR in your second model?
 17 A. [MILBURN] It was a
 18 10 percent discount rate.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 That was your WACC; that's your 10.58 or
 21 something.
 22 A. [MILBURN] Yeah --
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Okay, okay.
 25 A. [TOBIS] Effectively, a

1 simple way to think about it is the 10 percent
 2 discount rate plus the risk factor in our second
 3 income approach is the same thing as just using a
 4 15 percent discount rate in the first approach.
 5 Mathematically, it kind of
 6 gets complicated but it's, ultimately, as if the
 7 transaction structuring approach, it's as if we
 8 used a 15 percent discount rate.
 9 BY MS. SQUIRES:
 10 Q. Okay.
 11 So my question relates a bit
 12 more to the probability of reaching financial
 13 close. So the 57 percent. So I want to just turn
 14 there.
 15 Now, Windstream's project
 16 schedule had it reaching financial close in three
 17 years; correct?
 18 A. [MILBURN] Yeah, that's
 19 correct.
 20 Q. Now, in the projects that
 21 you have used, the eight projects that you relied
 22 on to calculate your probability of reaching
 23 financial close, have you accounted for the
 24 probability of reaching financial close in three
 25 years?

1 A. [MILBURN] I think the way
 2 that we did it was we identified -- this is at
 3 paragraph 6.103 of our first report, sub 2.
 4 We selected projects that
 5 obtained revenue clarity during the period from
 6 January 2010 to February 2017 and then we assessed
 7 which of those had reached financial close within
 8 the three-year period before our financial --
 9 sorry, three-year period before our valuation
 10 date.
 11 Q. Right.
 12 So you have looked at the
 13 three-year period before the valuation date to see
 14 which projects reach financial close.
 15 But you didn't determine which
 16 of those projects only took three years to reach
 17 financial close.
 18 Do you see the distinction I
 19 am making there?
 20 So some of those projects took
 21 more than three years to reach financial close,
 22 even if they did reach that financial close in
 23 that three-year period; is that correct?
 24 A. [MILBURN] Yes, I think
 25 that's correct. It was --

1 Q. So, if we wanted to
 2 assess the probability of a project reaching
 3 financial close by the valuation date and being
 4 able to do so within three years, we would have to
 5 add an extra level -- extra criteria to your list;
 6 is that correct?
 7 A. [TOBIS] We comment on
 8 that in our second report and I can't find the
 9 exact paragraph reference right now but we
 10 responded specifically to that point.
 11 That analysis would not be
 12 helpful at all, given, as we discussed earlier,
 13 every project is unique and there's different
 14 sizes and different construction profiles,
 15 different water depths, ocean verse lake.
 16 So you can't just compare a
 17 three-year timeline of Windstream's project to
 18 some other project in the North Sea that's triple
 19 the size and has a different construction
 20 schedule. That's not the right way to compare
 21 timelines.
 22 Mr. Irvine, who is here today,
 23 in the Two Dogs report, extensively confirmed the
 24 project timelines by comparing to comparable
 25 projects in various places in similar conditions,

1 lake beds, et cetera. And that's how it was the
 2 right way to assess the three-year time frame, not
 3 by this analysis which was capturing a
 4 different -- was a totally different apples to
 5 oranges analysis, from what you're describing.
 6 Q. So Mr. Irvine's
 7 calculations in the Two Dog report relate to
 8 construction schedules; correct?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Construction
 10 schedule, CAPEX, wind turbine selection. A whole
 11 bunch of technical issues.
 12 Q. And he didn't opine on
 13 anything that happens prior to construction in
 14 terms of timelines?
 15 A. [TOBIS] Ms. Powell is the
 16 one that gives evidence on the permitting process.
 17 Mr. Irvine and Wood and Two
 18 Dogs review certain aspects of that as well, given
 19 that some construction activities are even
 20 beginning prior to financial close. Ones that, as
 21 Mr. Tetard explained, certain design categories
 22 can start prior, you know, and they are funded by
 23 equity holders.
 24 Q. Okay. I am quite
 25 familiar with Mr. Irvine, having had him sit in

1 this exact seat in front of me eight years ago for
 2 a nice lengthy discussion.
 3 Let's -- okay. The last thing
 4 I want to take you to, before I hand you over to
 5 Claimant's counsel, is the market comparable or
 6 the -- the valuation that you have done by looking
 7 at the lease transaction for US offshore projects.
 8 So let's turn to the first
 9 Secretariat report at paragraph 7.16 -- 7.16.
 10 So there. Good.
 11 Okay. So this is the first
 12 paragraph where you're discussing those offshore
 13 wind lease transactions.
 14 And, if we turn to the next
 15 page in Figure 7.5, we can see the numbers that
 16 you provide; correct?
 17 A. Correct.
 18 Q. Okay.
 19 So, unlike in a market
 20 comparables that Mr. Tetard has done or
 21 Dr. Guillet has done, what you have used here is a
 22 value per acre of land that the project -- that
 23 was purchased, I guess, for these projects;
 24 correct?
 25 A. [TOBIS] Because these

1 were so early stage, the appropriate way to value
 2 such early stage assets are on a dollar per acre
 3 basis.
 4 Q. Okay.
 5 So, using this method, you
 6 conclude, at paragraph 7.21, that the Claimant
 7 would have been able to sell the project for a
 8 minimum of \$68 million as of the valuation date;
 9 correct?
 10 A. [TOBIS] That sentence
 11 says:
 12 "This would imply a
 13 minimum value of
 14 approximately \$68 million
 15 for the project."[as
 16 read]
 17 Q. So you come at it minimum
 18 of approximately 68?
 19 A. [TOBIS] That's what it
 20 says.
 21 Q. And, if we look at
 22 footnote 209, you base your calculation of the
 23 acreage on Exhibit C-0877, a technical report that
 24 was done on December 2nd, 2020.
 25 And you indicated that, based

1 on this, the project will be located on
 2 approximately 48,000 acres of shallow water
 3 shoals; correct?
 4 Sorry, 2010. Sorry, I think I
 5 might have misspoken and said 2020.
 6 2010.
 7 A. [TOBIS] Yes, that's what
 8 my footnote says.
 9 Q. So let's turn to page 54
 10 of Secretariat's first report.
 11 And I want to look at
 12 paragraph 6.36.
 13 This might be for you,
 14 Mr. Milburn. I will toss it out there.
 15 Now, this is the section
 16 dealing with the base land rent fee for the area
 17 of the seabed to be occupied by the project;
 18 correct?
 19 A. [MILBURN] That's correct.
 20 Q. And it notes there, in
 21 the second line, this would result in a total area
 22 of 31,778 acres; do you see that?
 23 A. [MILBURN] Yes, I do.
 24 Q. And that's based on the
 25 project layout, as it's currently designed for

1 this arbitration; correct?
 2 A. [MILBURN] Correct.
 3 That's the footprint of the wind generators.
 4 Q. Okay.
 5 So, well, the land-based
 6 rental fee is paid on not just where the
 7 foundations are placed; right? It's based on all
 8 of the Crown land that you have a lease over?
 9 I guess I could just make my
 10 question maybe -- if, in fact, this is the total
 11 area the acreage of the project and not the
 12 \$40,000, it would lower the valuation -- 40,000
 13 acres, sorry. Dollars.
 14 A. [TOBIS] No, no. I
 15 suspected that's where we were going with this.
 16 We thought long and hard about this.
 17 Q. Okay. Good. I am not
 18 the only one.
 19 A. [TOBIS] I am glad you
 20 asked.
 21 An important aspect of
 22 valuation, especially when using market
 23 comparables, is ensure what the valuation base you
 24 are using is comparable.
 25 Q. Yes.

1 A. [TOBIS] So you're apples
 2 to apples. I know I have said that a few times so
 3 far.
 4 When we are looking at
 5 acreages from those offshore lease areas, we are
 6 looking at the total acreages that they received
 7 some form of site control over.
 8 Any project that was
 9 ultimately built on those sites wouldn't all use
 10 those acreages.
 11 So, here, Windstream had what
 12 we call, from a valuation standpoint, site control
 13 over 40,000 acres.
 14 So, to compare that apples to
 15 apples to those transactions, we have to use the
 16 full acreage. If we want to do this analysis
 17 based just on the acreages that would be used in
 18 the layout, we would need much more insider
 19 knowledge about each of those lease area
 20 transactions, which we don't have.
 21 So either we could do total
 22 acres and total acres, or component of total acres
 23 or component of total acres.
 24 To do otherwise would be
 25 mixing and matching which would be inappropriate.

1 Q. Okay. I understand.
 2 So you have derived this
 3 value, then, out of the assumption that they have
 4 site release and site control of certain areas of
 5 land, as described in the project description; is
 6 that correct?
 7 A. [MILBURN] Yeah, I believe
 8 so. That was from the Wood report.
 9 Q. Okay.
 10 And, again, to go back to a
 11 point about site control.
 12 They did not yet know that
 13 they could access or lease that site, as of the
 14 valuation date; correct? It's an assumption
 15 that's been made?
 16 A. [MILBURN] Yeah, I believe
 17 so. I mean, they were early in the process there.
 18 Q. Okay. I don't think I
 19 have anything else for you. You are released from
 20 me, at least.
 21 A. [TOBIS] Thank you.
 22 A. [MILBURN] Thank you.
 23 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Can I
 24 jump in and ask my question.
 25 I want to go back to the

1 interest IRR and tie it up all together. I know
 2 it was a little disjointed.
 3 So you needed to pay
 4 12.5 percent to get the investors to fund the
 5 letter of credit. That, I get. And that makes
 6 sense.
 7 There's little risk, right,
 8 though, after Windstream I, given what the
 9 Tribunal says there.
 10 It's not risk free but there
 11 is actually, at that point, if Canada's taking the
 12 letter of credit, they are paying for it. The
 13 Tribunal makes that pretty clear; right.
 14 So, so there's little risk,
 15 isn't there, at that point? That doesn't mean
 16 12.5 is inappropriate. I am not saying that at
 17 all. It's just that the risk, at that point, is
 18 relatively low.
 19 A. [MILBURN] I mean, you
 20 would hope so. I mean, I think there's also just
 21 the cost of money.
 22 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Right.
 23 Right.
 24 A. [MILBURN] Right. They
 25 couldn't use that money in an alternative

1 investment.
 2 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA:
 3 Yeah -- I am sorry, I am talking over you. I
 4 won't do it again. I promise.
 5 That was at a time, though,
 6 that the interest rates were really low.
 7 So, so, it's a low risk.
 8 Relatively low risk at that point.
 9 Here is where it relates to
 10 this IRR, or your internal rate of return, yeah.
 11 15 percent seems, to me, a bit
 12 low given 12 percent -- 12.5 is what they were
 13 paying here for almost a pretty sort of not risky
 14 investment.
 15 So the industry, if I
 16 understand the Respondent's expert correctly, he
 17 was saying it should be 30 to 40 percent. He was
 18 saying 18 to 20, if you got a fully developed
 19 ready to go permitted, all of that, project. You
 20 went to 15. And I read -- I understand why you
 21 went to 15.
 22 I am trying to square that,
 23 though, in this entire sort of circumstance that
 24 we are in where, in the letter of credit, they
 25 were getting 12 and a half.

1 They should, it seems like, to
 2 me, an investor, if they were getting 12 and a
 3 half just for this letter of credit that seemed
 4 relatively to pay for that -- they got to be
 5 requiring more than 15; shouldn't they, for
 6 something at an early stage development?
 7 And my -- what I am trying to
 8 figure out here is, if they paid more, you know,
 9 an investor were needed to pay more, maybe not
 10 40 percent, but perhaps anything above 20 might
 11 make this -- might put the whole thing under
 12 water; wouldn't it?
 13 I haven't done the
 14 calculation. But, just looking at your numbers
 15 here, going from 15 to, say, 25 would put -- would
 16 essentially wipe out all the profits; wouldn't it,
 17 in this case?
 18 A. [TETARD] We didn't run
 19 that calculation using a 25 percent IR because my
 20 view is that 25 percent is not what this project
 21 would have been sold for.
 22 It wasn't 25 percent for this
 23 kind of project that had a PPA, where it was in
 24 the process of degree, process of getting land,
 25 did not justify 25 percent return.

1 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: And we
 2 will hear from the Respondent's expert.
 3 But what -- if I read his
 4 report correctly, what he was saying was I have
 5 looked at comparable transactions and they were
 6 requiring 30 to 40 at early stage development.
 7 And, if I understand your
 8 correctly, you're saying -- well, 25 would not
 9 have been sufficient; right. Yeah. And that's
 10 even at a later stage.
 11 So I am trying to figure out
 12 how the 15, actually, in the real world -- I
 13 understand what you're saying in terms of you
 14 looked at -- you have got this, you know, the FIT.
 15 And you've got sort of an income stream but it's
 16 not the same as, is it -- and here is where your
 17 chance to explain.
 18 Given all of these
 19 circumstances, it just seems hard to believe that
 20 that contract alone and just a little more is
 21 going to allow you to run with a, you know, with a
 22 15 percent. When, geez, they are paying 12 and a
 23 half for almost -- I am not calling it a risk-free
 24 letter of credit.
 25 This is a lot more risky and

1 if it's a lot more risky, isn't it going to be
 2 closer to 20 or more. And that now, please, tell
 3 me why, why the 15 seems right?
 4 Because I don't see any market
 5 sort of data on that. You looked at other
 6 projects and that's what they did, or maybe I am
 7 missing it, so.
 8 A. [TETARD] So I would not
 9 comment on the 12 and a half percent because I
 10 didn't look at this. I didn't consider this.
 11 What I considered is what is
 12 the expected return that an experienced offshore
 13 wind potential buyer would expect to generate for
 14 this project. And that's how I get to this
 15 15 percent.
 16 The next milestone where you
 17 see another market for experienced developers or
 18 investors is call it FID or financial close.
 19 At that point, the market
 20 would go down to around 10 percent. Because the
 21 risk would have increased.
 22 The next milestone is when the
 23 project gets into operation. And, there, you will
 24 expect maybe 7 or 8 percent.
 25 So we can see this decrease in

1 return requirement at different stages of a
2 project.

3 This, this 15 percent was
4 describing a range between 14 and 16 percent.
5 This is what we were observing in the market at
6 the time.

7 It's not that there are
8 libraries of private transaction records that you
9 can access in the public domain, unfortunately.

10 So but, in my reasonable
11 opinion, this is the rate of return that I would
12 have used as a potential interested buyer for a
13 project like this one.

14 Again, which had a contract,
15 which had a path to create, a path to site, and an
16 experienced team that had proven its ability to
17 develop an onshore wind project nearby, a few
18 years earlier.

19 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: It's a
20 real big difference, though, between the two
21 experts. And I guess we will ask tomorrow but,
22 literally, it makes -- at least from my just
23 glancing -- and, again, I haven't run the numbers.

24 But a 10 percent, you are off
25 by more than 10, but even a 10 percent swing here

1 is -- would devastate the --

2 A. [TETARD] We haven't
3 checked. We haven't checked this sensitivity but
4 it would be a very important impact. I don't know
5 if it brings to a zero or not but, yeah.

6 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Or
7 close to it. I mean, it could be pretty close to
8 what the last Tribunal awarded in the end, but --

9 A. [TETARD] I don't know.

10 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: So I
11 am trying to figure -- help us.

12 How do we choose, if we went
13 down this path, how do we choose that right number
14 because it makes the world of difference here?

15 A. [TOBIS] Can I just point
16 to two aspects to respond to some of your
17 questions.

18 Footnote 360 of our second
19 report, we say -- we note that, all else equal,
20 using a 20 percent IRR in our transaction
21 structuring approach, instead of 15 percent, would
22 result in a value of approximately 147.3 million
23 for the project as of the valuation date.

24 So it's about -- we are
25 talking about sensitivities. It's approximately

1 reduction of half.

2 We didn't run beyond
3 20 percent. In our view, that would just be in a
4 territory of just unreasonable.

5 We also noted, in Figure 6.4
6 of our second report, on page 96, we extracted a
7 chart from one of Dr. Guillet's presentations
8 where he showed, at least this is what he is
9 saying in the public record what expected IRR, an
10 early development project with no debt. So that
11 would be our project and, this presentation, 20 to
12 25 percent.

13 We could run, you know,
14 another sensitivity slightly above 20 percent.
15 Mr. Tetard explained, his experience in the market
16 at the time, that 15 was appropriate. Obviously,
17 you might have slightly different views.

18 But I don't think -- of the 30
19 to 40 numbers where the numbers changes just
20 afterwards, that is not what he is saying in the
21 public domain.

22 If the Tribunal finds that
23 number in footnote 360 be helpful, then that gives
24 a sense of the impact.

25 The second point is, that 12

1 and a half percent, my understanding of that, that
2 only the rate up until the first payment was --
3 the payment was made after NAFTA 1.

4 You're correct. The risks
5 would have gone down after that. And my
6 understanding is the new accrued interest is only
7 at 8 percent.

8 So it's a big distinction.
9 It's about a one third drop, 8 percent to
10 15 percent is different.

11 Also, as we see in other
12 sectors, interest rates on the predevelopment
13 process are higher. As the project would get into
14 development, they would have access to much
15 cheaper capital.

16 So you wouldn't assume that
17 high interest rate for the entire project life.
18 The 15 percent that Mr. Tetard is saying is the
19 blended rate over the life of the project which
20 incorporates the post financial close.

21 A. [MILBURN] Sorry, one more
22 point.

23 Just as reference, when you're
24 comparing to the 15 percent.

25 So, in our secondary DCF, we

1 use a 10 percent which we independently derived
 2 and that starts with a risk free rate of
 3 1.45 percent which is as of the valuation date.
 4 So that's for a project that
 5 was at financial close before the risk adjustment
 6 for getting there.
 7 So that's more of a comparison
 8 between the 15 -- like with a risk adjustment,
 9 essentially.
 10 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Right.
 11 But the risk adjustment would
 12 go higher, according to the Respondent's expert.
 13 A. [MILBURN] Right. Right.
 14 He thinks it would be higher, yes.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 And what happens to this 147.3 million if you
 17 apply the sensitivity analysis?
 18 A. [TOBIS] I think we could
 19 easily run those calculations on a break. It
 20 would probably take us ten minutes to do, if it's
 21 helpful.
 22 I imagine the percentage
 23 impact of each of those sensitivity analyses will
 24 be relatively the same. Obviously, the absolute
 25 dollar figure will be different.

1 If we want to just back of the
 2 napkin it for now. Assume it's the same
 3 percentage and just on a lower dollar amount. And
 4 happy to run the calculations on a break. We have
 5 our models here. We can do that.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 So, if we look at Slide 40, it's about 12 --
 8 15 percent; is it? Impact? For each of the
 9 sensitivities.
 10 No, the top one is much
 11 higher.
 12 A. [TOBIS] Yeah, the top one
 13 is the highest.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 The top one has 15.
 16 The next one is 5 --
 17 A. [TOBIS] 1 percent, 3
 18 million out of 300 million.
 19 The last one is about -- it's
 20 10ish, 5 to 10 percent. It impacts slightly
 21 differently on each approach, just the way the
 22 math comes out.
 23 But the rough ranges, you
 24 said, are correct.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Although -- I am sorry. I was taking the value
 2 from the transaction structure approach and
 3 looking at the impact from the project stage,
 4 sorry.
 5 You go back -- right. This is
 6 what comes off and this is the new value. Oh, so
 7 we don't have the old value to put it against.
 8 A. [TOBIS] To get the old
 9 value, for example, the first one, you would add
 10 the two numbers together. And the old value is
 11 also showed in the other slide with our main
 12 conclusions.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Would you run those in the break for us.
 15 So these numbers that are on
 16 Slide 40, just out of curiosity, against the
 17 number in 360 of your second report, footnote 360
 18 of your second report.
 19 A. [TOBIS] Sure.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Yeah. You have got your model with you.
 22 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Yes. So just run the 20 percent IRR and then run
 25 those three sensitivities. That would be

1 interesting.
 2 A. [TOBIS] To confirm that
 3 we have all our checks and balances, would we have
 4 permission to speak to some of our other team
 5 members that are here to ensure we run these
 6 numbers properly.
 7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 8 Within Secretariat?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Yes, within
 10 Secretariat. We don't have to but.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 You can do that. It's just really out of
 13 curiosity.
 14 A. [TOBIS] We can do it on
 15 our own. It's no problem.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Yeah, no, that's fine. Within Secretariat.
 18 A. [TOBIS] Yes, within
 19 Secretariat.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 And just while we are on those sensitivities, I
 22 asked you this question but just -- and I think
 23 you said you agreed.
 24 These don't include the
 25 six-month delay, these sensitivities? If you take

1 the six months off your window.
 2 A. [TOBIS] That's what
 3 sensitivity 2 is.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 Oh, that is the -- okay.
 6 A. [TOBIS] It means --
 7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 8 No, I don't think it is. I don't think it is.
 9 You are already six months
 10 into your five-year contract.
 11 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 When the breaches in the first proceedings first
 14 occurred or first began.
 15 So I think Dr. Guillet said
 16 you haven't got five years from your date of
 17 recommencement through to your date of end.
 18 Because you are already six down. You spent over
 19 and over it. So you have only got four and a
 20 half.
 21 At one point, in your second
 22 report, you adjusted for that six months. I think
 23 you added in a penalty; is that one of these?
 24 A. [TOBIS] Yes, that's the
 25 second row --

1 PRESIDING MEMBER MILES: That
 2 is the second row --
 3 A. [TOBIS] That second row
 4 in the schedule called "revised MCO due to REA
 5 appeal".
 6 So that approximately 3
 7 million impact is the impact of that scenario. It
 8 captures the penalty payment which is really the
 9 only difference, the penalty payment.
 10 MS. SQUIRES: May I ask a
 11 question of clarification on that. Because I
 12 think it might be helpful.
 13 The second sensitivity
 14 analysis was in the event the REA appeal period is
 15 not adopted; correct? So that you lose that six
 16 months; correct?
 17 A. [TOBIS] Is it described
 18 in our report --
 19 Q. It's the six months for
 20 the REA appeal; correct?
 21 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 22 Q. The six months the
 23 presiding arbitrator is referring to is not the
 24 six months for the REA appeal. It's a different
 25 six months that was used by the Claimant prior to

1 the moratorium, prior to the force majeure event
 2 happening.
 3 So you have not done a
 4 sensitivity analysis that accounts for the fact
 5 that, as of project reoperation date, you already
 6 have four and a half years.
 7 And then, in addition to that,
 8 you have not done, if you were to use that, if you
 9 were to take your REA appeal one, the sixth months
 10 you have there, in order to account for the six
 11 months for the prior to force majeure, you would
 12 need another six months added on there.
 13 These are two different events
 14 of six months we are talking about?
 15 A. [TOBIS] I think if we
 16 refer to Figure 6.1 of our second report,
 17 Section 6(a), it will explain all that, that I
 18 don't think they are two separate issues.
 19 I am happy to go through the
 20 weeds on it, but we explain how we capture for
 21 the -- we already incorporated the six months from
 22 May 2010 to November 2010 and then, basically, we
 23 say you get that six months back because of the
 24 REA appeal being added to force majeure.
 25 If you don't get that six

1 months back then, yes, your revised MCO becomes,
 2 I think July 2015. It's set out in our report.
 3 And that's what this
 4 sensitivity is -- it's basically saying.
 5 I can't count that six months
 6 -- in no scenario that we have are we recounting
 7 that six months from May to November of 2010.
 8 Q. Okay.
 9 So, on that point, there is a
 10 project development schedule here that takes
 11 58-months; correct?
 12 A. [TOBIS] The worst case
 13 scenario, yes.
 14 Q. 58 months with a one
 15 month buffer --
 16 A. [TOBIS] One and a half
 17 months.
 18 Q. One and a half months;
 19 okay.
 20 If you count this six months
 21 they have already used, that puts the total time
 22 needed for the project as six months plus
 23 58 months.
 24 So now we are at 64 months for
 25 the project?

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 Ms. Squires, I think we will leave this for your
 3 submission.
 4 MS. SQUIRES: Okay. Yeah.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 6 have got very careful notes of the six month and I
 7 think Mr. Tobis is right.
 8 If you disagree, you are
 9 welcome to make submissions on that on Friday.
 10 But he -- we all know he has
 11 accounted for a six month period in the
 12 sensitivity analysis. So all we want you to do on
 13 the break is run that the once.
 14 You can make a submission
 15 later on that, if you want.
 16 What we will do now, I
 17 think -- Mr. Terry, are you going to be very long?
 18 Do you want to take a break before re-exam or
 19 should we get it done?
 20 I would quite like to get it
 21 done, if you're happy to do that. But, if you
 22 want time to consult, that's fine too.
 23 MR. TERRY: I don't think I
 24 need time to consult but I don't want to finish,
 25 complete everything because, of course, the

1 experts are going to go and consider over the
 2 break and then come back with their answers to
 3 you.
 4 So we could either -- I have
 5 only got brief, sort of five or a little more
 6 minutes worth of re-examination. I could either
 7 do it now, in which case, I think we would have to
 8 keep the experts sequestered and do that.
 9 Or we could send them off now
 10 and then come back in 15. They could answer your
 11 question.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 Why don't we do this.
 14 Why don't you proceed. You
 15 just run those numbers. There's only three
 16 numbers. And just give them on a piece of paper
 17 to Ms. Squires, probably, is appropriate. And
 18 Ms. Squires can talk to Mr. Terry and we can get
 19 those numbers.
 20 If we have more questions, the
 21 rules are you are staying anyway. So I think we
 22 can just get those back as numbers, unless you
 23 feel they require further explanation.
 24 But we will ask your questions
 25 now. Or you can just come back and read the

1 numbers into the record, perhaps, afterwards.
 2 But, either way, you
 3 re-examine, now and if they open up further
 4 questions, you can come back.
 5 MR. TERRY: Okay.
 6 RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. TERRY:
 7 Q. Okay. I have one
 8 re-examination question for Mr. Tetard and the
 9 rest, I think, for Mr. Tobis.
 10 For Mr. Tetard --
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Can you not have just one for Mr. Milburn? I feel
 13 quite bad for him.
 14 A. [TOBIS] He can help with
 15 mine.
 16 MR. TERRY: He certainly has
 17 license to jump in if he wants.
 18 BY MR. TERRY:
 19 Q. Mr. Tetard, do you recall
 20 when the Tribunal president was asking you
 21 questions about the cable, the amount of cable
 22 that was required for the project?
 23 A. [TETARD] Yeah, the
 24 distance, yes.
 25 Q. And we have a document

1 that I would like to bring up from the Wood
 2 report. If we could go to the page 2 of the
 3 executive summary.
 4 And I know, Madam President,
 5 this was also your particular request so I
 6 won't -- if I could just direct the witness to
 7 read -- and we haven't highlighted this -- but
 8 it's in the first paragraph, if you can just read
 9 the first paragraph, please, particularly the --
 10 A. [TETARD] The first
 11 paragraph of the executive summary.
 12 Q. Of the executive summary?
 13 A. [TETARD] So:
 14 "Wood --"[as read]
 15 Q. You don't have to read it
 16 out loud but if you can just review it, please.
 17 A. [TETARD] Oh, okay.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 19 think you can cut this short.
 20 I don't think Ms. Squires is
 21 going to object to cross-examination. I see that
 22 there's 28 kilometres long of cable but then it's
 23 10K offshore. So.
 24 MR. TERRY: Exactly.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 You can just cut straight through it. Why are
 2 they different.
 3 BY MR. TERRY:
 4 Q. And, Mr. Tetard, I
 5 appreciate this isn't your document.
 6 But could you explain, from
 7 this, your understanding of the length of the
 8 cables and the reference here in the report?
 9 A. [TETARD] So the cable of
 10 28 kilometre long is distance between the
 11 substation of the project all the way to the
 12 onshore Lennox terminal station. Which is where
 13 there is grid capacity to connect the project.
 14 Q. All right.
 15 And unless, Madam President,
 16 you have other questions, I know you were
 17 particularly concerned about the cabling?
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Not concerned, just curious.
 20 MR. TERRY: Okay.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 So these are transformer stations, there is no
 23 converter there?
 24 A. [TETARD] I need to ask my
 25 engineer.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 Okay. What do you understand the Lennox terminal
 3 station to be, a transformer or converter?
 4 A. [TETARD] Possibly both.
 5 I am not sure. Because I don't know what are the
 6 technical requirements of the cable for 28
 7 kilometre between the site and the connection
 8 point.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 The point being there's lots of bits of
 11 infrastructure that can cost money that go between
 12 a windmill and somebody's house?
 13 A. [TETARD] Sure. Yes. I
 14 agree. Here we stop at the grid, right, the
 15 project connects to the grid.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Fair enough we stop at the grid, yes fair enough.
 18 BY MR. TERRY:
 19 Q. Okay. For Mr. Tobis, do
 20 you recall, and if I could ask the award
 21 paragraph 481 to be brought up, please.
 22 And, Mr. Tobis, do you recall
 23 being asked questions by Ms. Squires about
 24 paragraph 481 of the award?
 25 A. [TOBIS] Yes, I do.

1 Q. And do you recall being
 2 asked questions about the number you calculated
 3 for 2015 sunk costs have been already reduced by
 4 the Tribunal?
 5 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 6 Q. And you said, in answer
 7 to Ms. Squires' question, you responded, correct,
 8 but said that you wanted to make a further
 9 explanation?
 10 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 11 So part of the reason for the
 12 difference between 17 million and 8 to 10,
 13 obviously, the biggest component was the 6
 14 million.
 15 But, also, in the -- what
 16 Deloitte did in the NAFTA 1 arbitration is they
 17 included some costs related to the actual
 18 arbitration in itself, some of the expert report
 19 costs and the various engineering reports that
 20 were done in 2014, 2015, they were challenged on
 21 that because, technically, arbitration costs
 22 should be considered separately.
 23 My understanding is those were
 24 part of the costs the Tribunal took out to get to
 25 8 to 10 million. Again, they don't do a very line

1 by line reconciliation from 17 to 8 to 10. But,
 2 after watching Deloitte's testimony and reading
 3 this, that was my understanding.
 4 In our case, that wouldn't
 5 have applied because amounts that were spent on
 6 engineering reports in 2014, 15, related to the
 7 NAFTA 1 arbitration, when we are valuing it in
 8 2020, those are real costs that has helped the
 9 project get to where they are at February 2020.
 10 Those reports were included in the -- in
 11 Windstream's reapplication 2017. That was real
 12 engineering work that was done.
 13 So, at the time of NAFTA 1, it
 14 was somewhat of a legal issue whether you count
 15 that toward sunk costs or not.
 16 But, at the time of NAFTA 2, I
 17 would definitely consider that to be a legitimate
 18 sunk cost for the project.
 19 And that, in addition to the
 20 point I think I did get to make about accrued fees
 21 verse actual fees. So Deloitte had included --
 22 the fees to the investors, at that time, were
 23 accrued. There were questions as to is this real?
 24 Are they not? Are they actually going to get
 25 paid?

1 We included the fees that
 2 actually were paid. The cheques written to the
 3 investors for interest/fees, so we -- our costs
 4 amount is -- stands on more solid ground than the
 5 costs in the NAFTA 1 award.
 6 So, that being said, the 6
 7 million is the 6 million, but I am not sure how
 8 much, based on that methodology in NAFTA 1, how
 9 much of that reduction would apply to our sunk
 10 cost calculation for this arbitration.
 11 Q. And next question that --
 12 Ms. Squires, do you recall her asking you several
 13 questions about the documents you relied on to
 14 compile the sunk costs in your Schedule 3?
 15 A. [TOBIS] Yes, I do.
 16 Q. And what types of records
 17 are generally acceptable to prove or establish
 18 sunk costs in valuation?
 19 A. [TOBIS] It's really case
 20 dependent and depends -- representing costs is our
 21 primary approach or just as information for the
 22 Tribunal to consider.
 23 So, again, we consider the
 24 same type of evidence that was considered by
 25 Deloitte. And, other than the 6 million letter of

1 credit and some expert fees, seem to have been
 2 mostly accepted by the NAFTA 1 Tribunal.
 3 Some cases, you needed to do
 4 very forensic deep dives and look at every invoice
 5 and bank statement.
 6 We didn't think that, this
 7 case here, given the credibility of these costs in
 8 the first round, what they related to, given the
 9 agreements we saw, we didn't consider them to have
 10 required a very deep dive forensic analysis.
 11 I should also point out the
 12 costs from the PwC notice to reader report, that
 13 that was not an audited report but it still was
 14 something that was signed by PwC and that those
 15 numbers would go on the company's tax returns.
 16 As a professional accounting
 17 firm, they would still have an obligation to
 18 ensure that costs that are on their financial
 19 statements that they are signing, even though
 20 they're unaudited, are legit and reasonable and
 21 plausible.
 22 They are reporting to the
 23 Canadian government those costs as well in their
 24 tax returns, that they line up. And there is
 25 different levels of assurance provided over them.

1 But I wouldn't consider the numbers straight off
 2 those financial statements to be not reliable.
 3 Q. And, again, for
 4 Mr. Tobis.
 5 You were taken to various
 6 documents you said were prepared by Mr. Mars.
 7 How do you know they were
 8 prepared by Mr. Mars?
 9 A. [TOBIS] Mr. Mars emailed
 10 them to me directly. And then we had a call
 11 during COVID. Everything was video calls.
 12 But, yeah, he walked them
 13 through me. I ask him a lot of questions about
 14 them. He screen shared and showed what support he
 15 had and I made sure I understood every -- you can
 16 see all the notes on the schedule, every item in
 17 that document to make sure I knew what it was.
 18 --- Reporter appeals
 19 A. We applied a strict
 20 criteria to those costs. As noted in our
 21 schedules, some of them we didn't include in our
 22 calculation of sunk costs. We didn't think they
 23 met the appropriate criteria.
 24 We went line by line with them
 25 and he told us directly I prepared this. He sent

1 it to us and we walked through it. I had no
 2 reason to believe he was lying to me in any way.
 3 Q. Next question relates to
 4 document C-1529 which you were taken to.
 5 If that can be brought up,
 6 please.
 7 And this was a document, you
 8 were asked if Mr. Low, the expert at Windstream I,
 9 had confirmed it was unsigned and you said yes,
 10 and then you asked to elaborate and weren't able
 11 to.
 12 Could you please elaborate?
 13 A. [TOBIS] Yes.
 14 So, at the time of NAFTA 1, in
 15 reading the transcript, Deloitte had included
 16 accrued fees, primarily based on this document and
 17 the schedule that was prepared by Mr. Mars.
 18 And I understood there were
 19 some questions about the authenticity of this
 20 document and had it been signed, did all the
 21 witness know about it, et cetera. There was maybe
 22 some more questions about those accrued fees.
 23 What we have done differently
 24 is we are using fees that are actually paid. A
 25 check was written. We are no longer in a world

1 of, you know, uncertainty or what -- I don't
 2 really care if this document exists, is real or
 3 not. Obviously, it's better if it is. But, if an
 4 actual amount was paid, that's the amount I am
 5 using in my costs.
 6 I didn't include any
 7 additional accrued fees beyond 2017. You know, I
 8 didn't have, for all I know, Windstream is
 9 continuing to accrue fees to its investors at
 10 8 percent. I didn't have sufficient evidence that
 11 I felt comfortable including those additional fees
 12 in my cost schedule.
 13 That's the distinction between
 14 how we treated these fees versus how they were
 15 treated by Deloitte in NAFTA 1. We applied a
 16 stricter criteria.
 17 Q. And final question,
 18 Mr. Tobis.
 19 You were asked whether the
 20 return of the \$6 million letter of credit, that
 21 amount should be deducted from the sunk costs.
 22 Again, you said no and you asked to elaborate and
 23 you weren't able to.
 24 Could you please elaborate?
 25 A. [TOBIS] Maybe I will hand

1 this one off to Mr. Milburn so he is not.
 2 A. [MILBURN] Wow, thanks.
 3 Thanks so much.
 4 MR. TERRY: Congratulations.
 5 You get the last word.
 6 A. [MILBURN] All right.
 7 Yeah. I don't see any reason
 8 why, the 6 million would be deducted from a
 9 damages calculation in this hearing. It's already
 10 been deducted in the first one, so. It should not
 11 be deducted.
 12 MR. TERRY: I have no further
 13 questions. Thanks. And thank you, panel members.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 Thank you so much.
 16 Just before we do break, if I
 17 may, I do have one more question.
 18 Let me try and ask it.
 19 Mr. Milburn, I think you can
 20 answer it.
 21 If the first -- so I will ask
 22 it to you and then, Mr. Tetard and Mr. Tobis, wade
 23 in if you want.
 24 If the award in these
 25 proceedings has determined that the value of the

1 project, at the valuation date applied in that
 2 award, is 31 million Canadian dollars.
 3 And I accept you don't agree
 4 with the methodology, but it was through a market
 5 comparables methodology approach.
 6 If we were to accept your
 7 argument that the loss accrued, post award, to
 8 where we are now, from subsequent alleged
 9 breaches, shouldn't we value it at a market
 10 approach -- market comparables approach? Should
 11 we value it at an income assessment?
 12 Should we not start by
 13 deducting the income assessment valuation that
 14 Deloitte had assessed as at the first valuation
 15 date?
 16 So, if I put it another way,
 17 you have two competing valuations based on two
 18 competing methodologies.
 19 So you have market
 20 comparables. I don't remember what Deloitte's
 21 market comparables was, but their income
 22 assessment was around 300, depending if it was
 23 with or without the 5-mile. And they had two
 24 different numbers for expropriation. But it was
 25 around 300.

1 If the purpose of the award
 2 was to make whole, based on the valuation
 3 methodology and application of that methodology,
 4 that the Tribunal decided this is what it means to
 5 make you whole at the date of that award, then
 6 don't we restart the clock on value from that
 7 point?
 8 So, if we are to apply an
 9 income assessment, we could only apply the
 10 differential between the income assessment from
 11 what Deloitte said it was before and what you say
 12 it is now?
 13 And, if we do that -- if you
 14 are with me so far.
 15 If we do that, then, to
 16 Professor Gotanda's point that the Claimant could
 17 do nothing at all but the market could move around
 18 it, not like gold, but like offshore wind, the
 19 market could move around it.
 20 Where that market would move
 21 is the differential; isn't it?
 22 A. [MILBURN] Okay. There
 23 was a lot there.
 24 But I think, if I understand
 25 your question, in order to make them whole, as of

1 our valuation date, due to the new breaches, it
 2 should be the fair market value as of today,
 3 regardless of which approach that you use.
 4 And then relative to what they
 5 have already been paid.
 6 So you wouldn't go back and
 7 change the amount that they got -- deduct some
 8 amount they never got paid --
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 No, I didn't explain my question well. Let me
 11 explain my question differently.
 12 Assume, for me, that the
 13 Tribunal in the Windstream award made the Claimant
 14 whole for the loss that it had suffered. So it
 15 zeroed it.
 16 So you are whole. You have
 17 had your full reparation. I am not giving you
 18 your 6 mill because you haven't lost it. But I
 19 have made you whole at that date.
 20 Just work with me.
 21 A. [MILBURN] Okay.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 Just work with me and assume, assume, for the sake
 24 of argument, that that is what this Tribunal did.
 25 Therefore, they are starting

1 at the 28th of September 2016 or perhaps at the
 2 valuation date. You have got that wiggle room at
 3 zero.
 4 So any appreciation in value,
 5 either because of things the Claimant did, which
 6 is not very much, or because of the movement in
 7 the market, which you say is quite a lot, that
 8 appreciation of value, you have been made whole
 9 once for what happened up to then.
 10 A. [MILBURN] Right.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Now you can only start from zero and what you've
 13 appreciated.
 14 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 If we chose to -- if we found there to be a breach
 17 and we found there to be a loss, and we chose to
 18 value that loss on an income approach.
 19 A. [MILBURN] Um-hmm.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Logically, don't we then have to deduct what the
 22 income approach would have been prior to that
 23 date?
 24 A. [MILBURN] No, I don't
 25 think so.

1 I think what we have done is
 2 essentially, what you have just described.
 3 So the loss that they have now
 4 experienced is equal to the value of the project
 5 for the alleged breaches as of 2020, less what
 6 they have already received, which, as you say, is
 7 essentially the value of the entire project back
 8 in 2016, less the letter of credit.
 9 So, assuming that they got the
 10 valuation correct back in 2016, regardless of what
 11 method you use, you have got to get the right
 12 value. We think that's approximately the right
 13 value.
 14 We think the DCF value that
 15 Deloitte did probably was overstated and didn't
 16 really properly reflect the risks like we think we
 17 have.
 18 So I think what we have done
 19 is what you're describing.
 20 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: I am
 21 not sure -- I am sorry.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 You go ahead, Beverley.
 24 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: I
 25 was just going to say haven't you overlooked the

1 assumption that was put to you by Madam President.
 2 Assume the Tribunal made the
 3 Claimant whole as of the date. So we are then
 4 starting at zero.
 5 That is what was put to you.
 6 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 7 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: And
 8 how do you, on that assumption, what would your
 9 answer be.
 10 A. [MILBURN] Sorry, maybe I
 11 am not understanding what you mean by starting at
 12 zero.
 13 Because, at that time, in the
 14 actual case, they had the FIT contract that was
 15 basically worthless.
 16 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: So
 17 you were asked to assume.
 18 A. [MILBURN] So that's zero.
 19 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: Yes.
 20 You may not accept the
 21 assumption but you're an expert.
 22 And the question was if you
 23 assume that en commencer à zéro, you start at zero
 24 at that date, what would your answer be?
 25 A. [MILBURN] Again, unless I

1 am not following what you mean by starting at
 2 zero.
 3 They are starting the whole
 4 project again from zero.
 5 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: No.
 6 Assume that, in legal terms --
 7 this may be the problem -- that the Claimant has
 8 been made whole. Nothing is owed for anything,
 9 including that fifth contract.
 10 Just assume that. I know
 11 there are arguments to the contrary.
 12 But, if you were just to
 13 assume that, that, at that point, they had made
 14 whole. And we are just looking at what happened
 15 after.
 16 I think that's -- is that
 17 correct?
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Yes.
 20 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: So
 21 the question had that assumption in it. That you
 22 are not going back before the date of the award
 23 for any kind of loss.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 And perhaps -- were you going to say something?

1 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Yes,
 2 if I can just -- I don't know if I am helping at
 3 all.
 4 But I know how you did it and
 5 you subtracted out to avoid double counting.
 6 A. [MILBURN] Yes.
 7 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: But,
 8 what it looks like -- I am just playing devil's
 9 advocate. I am not sure I agree.
 10 But what it looks like is
 11 almost you are getting two bites at the apple;
 12 right.
 13 And so, to avoid the two bites
 14 at the apple, I think what we are asking is taking
 15 -- and now I am hearing you disagree with what
 16 Deloitte did.
 17 But Deloitte valued it up to,
 18 using an income sort of approach, up to the date
 19 of the last, let's say, award. Then you do your
 20 analysis post that.
 21 It's almost the difference,
 22 shouldn't it be, between the two?
 23 I understand you're saying no
 24 because we are subtracting out already what the
 25 Tribunal awarded to make you whole.

1 But you see the concern is
 2 that the Tribunal made you whole until, as of that
 3 2017, 2016, 2017 date, it's only that going
 4 forward.
 5 So, if you value the whole
 6 project the way you've done under the income
 7 approach, that almost gives you two bites at the
 8 apple in the sense that you get to redo how the
 9 damages, overall for the project, are calculated.
 10 And so I think what the
 11 Tribunal is trying to ask is avoid that, apples to
 12 apples. Then you only get this difference.
 13 How do you do that?
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 And I think there's a much easier way to ask the
 16 question. Sorry for complicating it.
 17 If you were just calculating
 18 incremental value for the improvement to the value
 19 of the project from the date of the last award, to
 20 today, just the appreciation only, don't you have
 21 to deduct value before appreciation date on the
 22 same methodology?
 23 A. [MILBURN] No. Fair
 24 market value is fair market value regardless of
 25 the methodology that you're using.

1 So assuming they were made
 2 whole back in 2016, that's the value. It's not a
 3 different value if you do a DCF. DCF value isn't
 4 higher than market comp value. It's all fair
 5 market value.
 6 So they received fair market
 7 value back in 2016. Now -- that's what we have
 8 calculated, is the increment in value that they
 9 should now receive.
 10 They have now received 31
 11 million less 6 of it. Now the value has increased
 12 and they should get the difference.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 So, on your analysis -- just sense checking it --
 15 in the course of eight years -- oh, not, not eight
 16 year, four years, this project, on the basis of an
 17 FIT that was about to become terminable, and a
 18 letter of credit that was repaid in full, that, in
 19 four years, this project appreciated, in its fair
 20 market value, in terms of what a willing buyer
 21 would purchase from a willing seller,
 22 \$260 million?
 23 A. [MILBURN] Yes. That's
 24 our conclusion based on the but-for scenario.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 Okay.
 2 A. [MILBURN] That, that we
 3 have been instructed to assume. That's exactly
 4 right.
 5 A. [TOBIS] Just flagging
 6 there that that 30 million, as we noted in our
 7 presentation, in NAFTA 1, that was based on
 8 transactions from 2009 to 2013.
 9 It, ultimately, was a
 10 2011/2012 valuation date. They referred to it as
 11 a 2016 value by using the 2016 exchange rate but
 12 there is some inconsistency in how that number was
 13 derived.
 14 A. [MILBURN] If I may also.
 15 This is also why it's
 16 important to do both approaches. So we get to
 17 that conclusion through both market comparables
 18 and through the DCF.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 Right. The Tribunal 1 valued the project at that
 21 date. Full stop. End of; right? This is not an
 22 appeal court.
 23 A. [TOBIS] Agreed.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 But my question arose from the changing the

1 methodologies as opposed to what happens with the
 2 market comparables.
 3 I accept, if you asked my
 4 question, just dealing with market comparables,
 5 then you're much more in like for like territory
 6 in terms of the methodology. I understand that.
 7 So I understand that's the point you're making.
 8 But you don't get to revisit
 9 what they valued at that date.
 10 A. [TOBIS] 100 percent.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 All right, so that was meant to be one question.
 13 I did wince before I asked it. We are at two
 14 hours.
 15 Did you have anything that you
 16 wanted to ask that arises out of that?
 17 MS. SQUIRES: No, I am good.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Mr. Terry?
 20 MR. TERRY: Same with us.
 21 Nothing more.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 Okay. Very good.
 24 Can you please go away and do
 25 your homework.

1 --- Upon recess at 3:30 p.m.
 2 --- Upon resuming at 3:51 p.m.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 My apologies. So.
 5 MR. TERRY: Madam President,
 6 if I may, just before we start with Dr. Guillet,
 7 and we have conferred with the other side on this.
 8 Mr. Tobis is sitting here just
 9 solely so he can present the results of the
 10 conversation.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Perfect.
 13 Thank you, Mr. Tobis.
 14 A. [TOBIS] So, prior to the
 15 break, you asked us to run additional sensitivity
 16 calculations based on the 20 percent IRR scenario.
 17 Just to recap. In footnote
 18 360 of our second report, we noted that if we use
 19 a 20 percent IRR in our transaction structuring
 20 approach, instead of 15 percent, this would result
 21 in a value of approximately 147.3 million for the
 22 project at the valuation date.
 23 In Slide 40 of our
 24 presentation this morning, we summarized the
 25 alternative calculations that we had done in our

1 report. If it's possible to get that slide up or
 2 it might be helpful just to bring it up in front
 3 of you. Slide 40 of our presentation from this
 4 morning.
 5 So, starting from Row 1. One
 6 year delay in COD using a 20 percent IRR. The
 7 impact would be 179.6 million and the new value
 8 would be 113.8 million.
 9 Going down to Row 2. Provides
 10 MCOD to the REA appeal. The impact would be
 11 148.5 million. The new value would be
 12 144.9 million.
 13 Going down to Row 3. Equity
 14 requirement, 25 percent instead of 20 percent.
 15 The impact would be 169.6 million. The new value
 16 would be 123.7 million.
 17 Now moving over to the project
 18 stage risk adjustment factor approach.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
 20 don't think you need to do that. Because this IRR
 21 only related to the transaction structure and
 22 approach.
 23 As I understand it, your model
 24 took off its 55/60 percent on the whole with the
 25 10 percent WACC; didn't it?

1 A. [TOBIS] It did. What we
 2 ran, if it's helpful, is 20 to 15 as a 30 percent
 3 -- 33 percent increase in that discount factor so
 4 that same adjustment could be applied --
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 Oh, I see. You are marrying it up. All right.
 7 Off you go.
 8 So what would it change your
 9 WACC to?
 10 A. [TOBIS] To approximately
 11 13 percent. We round our WACC to the nearest
 12 percentage, as we explained in our report.
 13 The impact would be negative
 14 138.6 million. New value of 192.1 million.
 15 In Row 2, and, again, we are
 16 in the project stage risk adjustment approach.
 17 The impact would be negative 112.3 million. The
 18 new value would be 218.5 million.
 19 In Row 3. Equity requirement
 20 of 25 percent instead of 20 percent. The impact
 21 would be negative 123.1 million. The new value
 22 would be 207.7 million.
 23 I should just note all of
 24 these impacts are standalone impacts. They cannot
 25 be added together. It would be different math.

1 Happy to do it, if requested.
 2 But, for now, as presented,
 3 they are all standalone impacts.
 4 Thank you.
 5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 6 Understood.
 7 Thank you very, very much,
 8 Mr. Tobis.
 9 Okay. All good.
 10 Dr. Guillet, welcome.
 11 DR. GUILLET: Good afternoon.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 We will ask you separately to give your
 14 affirmation.
 15 DR. GUILLET: I solemnly
 16 declare on my honour and conscience that my
 17 statement will be in accordance with my sincere
 18 belief.
 19 AFFIRMED: DR. JÉRÔME GUILLET
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Perfect. Thank you.
 22 And you have seen the process.
 23 Speak clearly. Make sure the mic is working.
 24 Speak slowly and don't over speak.
 25 Right. Ms. Squires, just give

1 me a moment to sort my papers.
 2 Please proceed.
 3 MS. SQUIRES: I don't think I
 4 have anything for you, Dr. Guillet. You can go
 5 ahead and start your presentation.
 6 EXPERT PRESENTATION BY DR. GUILLET:
 7 DR. GUILLET: Thank you.
 8 Next slide.
 9 So I will do quick
 10 introduction of who am I am and what I am speaking
 11 here. I will provide my views on evaluation of
 12 the project, both from the original report and the
 13 comments I made in the 2015 report and the
 14 comments I made in my first report for the second
 15 arbitration.
 16 And then I will go into a
 17 detailed discussion of some of the items of the
 18 second report.
 19 So that's me. Probably last
 20 time I wore a tie.
 21 I have been 30 years in the
 22 energy finance, starting in oil and gas and moving
 23 to renewables. And I have been in offshore wind
 24 finance since 2004, so we are getting close to
 25 20 years.

1 I did the very first offshore
 2 wind debt financing, and the second, and the
 3 third, and the fourth.
 4 And then I founded Green
 5 Giraffe based on that. And we have been involved
 6 in the very large majority of offshore wind
 7 projects that have been done to date.
 8 And involved in every aspect
 9 of these projects from very early development to
 10 financing and refinancing.
 11 I don't know if you can show
 12 the next slide.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Dr. Guillet, why is it called Green Giraffe?
 15 DR. GUILLET: Yeah, I got that
 16 question a lot.
 17 It came out of the mind of one
 18 of my colleagues and it stuck around and it's
 19 pretty much unforgettable and irresistible. It's
 20 good. Since I am gone, I didn't bring the toy
 21 giraffes but, if you want one, I can send it.
 22 So the next slide, which you
 23 see is just a sample of a few projects I worked on
 24 directly. So, across the years, across the
 25 continents and across the phases.

1 And the one thing that you can
 2 see from this graph is that these projects take a
 3 long time and we have been involved for a very
 4 long time in many of them. In some cases, five,
 5 seven, eight years.
 6 And you can see that the
 7 development phase of these projects can be, can be
 8 very long. And this is a point that I will get
 9 back to again and again. The development in
 10 offshore wind takes time.
 11 Next slide.
 12 So first a quick recap.
 13 I was already involved as an
 14 expert in the first arbitration. I was quoted in
 15 various ways from that early report as well as
 16 from the second.
 17 So the -- in the first, the
 18 first time around, I was asked to value the
 19 project as it was then back in '15 or '16.
 20 And I explained the different
 21 ways to value project, depending on the phases of
 22 development, and I will show in the next slide.
 23 And saying that early
 24 development projects, fundamentally, are based on
 25 milestones.

1 And I think the Secretariat
 2 team agreed on the milestones, site control, grid
 3 access, permits and revenue regime, and I will
 4 discuss these a bit later as concerns the project.
 5 And the valuation is based on
 6 whether these milestones are met or not. It's
 7 going to be country-specific because, in different
 8 countries, the requirements are different. The
 9 bottlenecks can be different.
 10 So the -- each of the many
 11 milestone may have more importance and they are
 12 not always allocated in the same order. So this
 13 is, indeed, done on a case-by-case basis.
 14 But there is still and there
 15 has been strong consistency across the years. And
 16 the fact that some of my projects in the database
 17 and the references that I use are old is not an
 18 argument against them. It actually shows that
 19 there is consistency throughout the years and
 20 throughout the countries to evaluate these early
 21 stage projects.
 22 And what we have seen is that
 23 fully permitted projects, so those that have met
 24 the four milestones, also known as ready to build.
 25 Before FID can be worth something, around 200,000

1 euros per megawatt.
 2 And projects before that are
 3 going to be a worth a fraction of that. And that
 4 fraction is going to be linked to, well, how close
 5 you are to meeting the milestones, how many of them
 6 you need to work on and how likely you are to
 7 reach these milestones, as perceived by the
 8 market.
 9 DCF methodologies at that
 10 stage are -- I mean, you can run DCF methodology
 11 to see what the projects will be worth,
 12 ultimately, at site. Let's hope that this is what
 13 it's going to be worth at the end.
 14 But, at this stage, the
 15 assumptions that you need to put in are so
 16 volatile that the numbers you can get are
 17 essentially useless.
 18 And some of the conversations
 19 you had earlier today show that. That the numbers
 20 can move very much by simply moving one
 21 assumption. And the assumptions are on the cost
 22 side of the project. They can be on the revenue
 23 side if you don't have the certainty, or if you --
 24 they are on the interest rate. They are on the
 25 inflation assumption that you make. And an

1 important one is they are on the date when you
 2 actually start having revenues.
 3 Because when you're in early
 4 development stage, the first question is this
 5 going to take four years or is this going to take
 6 seven years or is this going to take 15 years?
 7 And all of these have happened.
 8 And, obviously, if you have to
 9 discount from 15 years later into the future, the
 10 value is not the same.
 11 And, essentially, a DCF
 12 methodology, at this point in time, you can make
 13 it say whatever you want it to say.
 14 So it's not very useful. It
 15 gives a reference point or a target point far into
 16 the future, but that's not what the market uses to
 17 value projects at this stage.
 18 Just to finish on the 2015
 19 report, it also covered -- I was asked to discuss
 20 some of the assumptions already used in the
 21 Deloitte DCF market value.
 22 And I noted that most of these
 23 assumptions were very highly optimistic. I would
 24 that say it's normal for a developer to present
 25 optimistic assumptions and it's not unfair.

1 But if you look at it from the
2 perspective of lenders and the investors, they are
3 obviously going to discuss each of these
4 assumptions.

5 And maybe, as an aside, your
6 question, the last question you asked to the
7 Secretariat team about the deduction of the value
8 of the 2015.

9 I mean, if you say that the
10 DCF should be used in 2020, it should also have
11 been used in 2015, and then you should, indeed,
12 deduct the value calculated as of 2015 from a
13 whatever number you find for 2020.

14 So I would actually be curious
15 to see the 2015 numbers, as calculated by
16 Secretariat, as of the first award date as a
17 reference point. That is an interesting question
18 and we can see if the assumptions are as
19 aggressive as they are for the second one.

20 The next slide.

21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
22 Well, we know, and Secretariat have given evidence
23 on this, that the assumptions by Deloitte were a
24 lot more aggressive.

25 So it's not quite right,

1 despite my question to them, that you simply
2 deduct the Deloitte DCF number. You would need to
3 run the model using the same assumption.

4 DR. GUILLET: Yeah, they
5 should run their version of their model as of
6 2015.

7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
8 think what we were looking for was what was the
9 incremental increase in value.

10 So if the market comparable
11 valuation isn't the right deduction, nor is the
12 Deloitte valuation, to be fair. That's the only
13 one we have.

14 Since I have interrupted you,
15 I may as well keep going, hey.

16 I was interested that you said
17 that the DCF is essentially useless. We generally
18 have a rule never to put our hurdle higher than we
19 need to reach.

20 Essentially useless is pretty
21 high statement for a DCF.

22 Why would anyone ever, ever,
23 ever use it, prior to financial close, if it's
24 essentially useless?

25 DR. GUILLET: Well, you don't

1 use it to buy a project. You use it to see how
2 much it's going to be worth if you meet all the
3 milestones.

4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
5 What about at financial close?

6 DR. GUILLET: Yes, at
7 financial close, it's relevant.

8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
9 What about a week before financial close?

10 DR. GUILLET: It's still
11 relevant.

12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
13 What about a month before financial close?

14 DR. GUILLET: Still relevant.

15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
16 What about a year before financial close?

17 DR. GUILLET: Well, then, it
18 starts depending on what's missing to get to
19 financial close.

20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
21 Which brings me to my question that I have about
22 the award at paragraph 474.

23 I have never really understood
24 whether the Tribunal decides, at 474, that DCF --
25 that the appropriate method of valuation, of

1 market comparables is appropriate at early stage
2 development, which I had understood to have been
3 your position in those proceedings; or whether, as
4 the last sentence of that paragraph suggests, that
5 DCF isn't used for any project until financial
6 close which would include late stage development.

7 And it may be that they just
8 didn't make clear in that paragraph which.

9 But am I correct that, your
10 opinion in those proceedings and now, is that this
11 is an early stage development and DCF is
12 inappropriate for early stage development.

13 DR. GUILLET: Yes, I would say
14 it's definitely inappropriate for early stage.

15 There is a grey area and, in
16 particular, from ready to build to financial
17 close. So, from fully permitted to financial
18 close, where the DCF starts eliminating the value
19 of the project, so to speak.

20 So you still have a large risk
21 that you don't get financial close.

22 And, in 2015, that risk is
23 probably higher than it is -- it was in 2020 and
24 it is now. There were several projects that failed
25 to reach financial close even though they were

1 fully permitted.
 2 Cape Wind being the most
 3 famous or infamous one and there were other cases.
 4 So there was still a lot of
 5 risks, in that case, where the value could fall to
 6 zero because it failed to reach financial close.
 7 So that was -- financial was a
 8 real step and Green Giraffe exists because we were
 9 good in that phase and we make projects happen so
 10 we made money from that.
 11 That risk has receded and you
 12 asked the question whether projects that have
 13 reached financial close reached COD. It's pretty
 14 much always the case.
 15 These days, projects that are
 16 fully permitted will almost always -- will always
 17 reach financial close because it's worth it and
 18 it's just a matter of competence to bring them
 19 there.
 20 Unless you have an event of
 21 God that happens and stops projects in their
 22 tracks, which can happen, but it is within the
 23 control of developers once you are ready to build
 24 to get to financial close, usually.
 25 So, in that phase, you do use,

1 you start looking at DCF and, indeed, if you have
 2 a tariff which is out of the market, then this is
 3 going to influence your valuation, because the
 4 valuation, the development premium that you get at
 5 financial close is based on, in principle,
 6 competitive auction-based tariff.
 7 If you have got a tariff that
 8 is out of the market, there is a different and
 9 future revenue that can justify a premium.
 10 And how much of that premium
 11 goes to the developer is linked to the risk of
 12 getting there to the financial close. But it's
 13 also linked to the commercial power between the
 14 buyers and the sellers and whoever is in charge of
 15 financial close.
 16 So it's going to be a tricky
 17 question but there is something there and that's
 18 what's happened on projects like NNG and
 19 Saint-Brieuc, and I will go through these in my
 20 presentation.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 So just you mentioned fully permitted.
 23 When you -- I think you were
 24 using fully permitted, if not interchangeably, at
 25 least very close in the development cycle to

1 financial close; is that right?
 2 DR. GUILLET: No, no.
 3 Fully permitted is the same as
 4 ready to build and the difference between the two
 5 is contracting and financing.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Okay, okay.
 8 So late stage development but
 9 when you haven't quite got your construction
 10 agreement signed up.
 11 DR. GUILLET: Um-hmm.
 12 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 13 So the Tribunal used "fully permitted" in a fairly
 14 scientific way and I just want to make sure it's
 15 the same way you are using it today.
 16 At paragraph 478 of the award,
 17 they said -- they talk about projects that are not
 18 fully permitted, (i.e. that do not have one of
 19 site control, permits, a revenue regime, grid
 20 access).
 21 So they were -- one could say
 22 there's four factors, one is permitting. Or one
 23 could say fully permitted requires four factors,
 24 one is permitting.
 25 DR. GUILLET: It requires all

1 four. So if you are missing one of the four, in
 2 principle, you are not fully permitted.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Right.
 5 So fully permitted means
 6 permitting, plus grid access, plus revenue regime,
 7 plus site control.
 8 DR. GUILLET: Yes.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 And, when you use it, you use it in that way,
 11 consistent with the Tribunal.
 12 DR. GUILLET: Yes.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Okay. Thank you for that.
 15 DR. GUILLET: So the image on
 16 the screen essentially shows the phases and I am
 17 not going to bother you with all the tasks and
 18 risks.
 19 But, as you can, see the value
 20 -- and that's where you have got the value based
 21 on milestones up to the development and move to IR
 22 driven.
 23 One of the important lines is
 24 timing, again. And, as you can see, there is a
 25 lot of volatility and uncertainty or wide range of

1 outcomes in terms of the timing of the early
 2 development phases.
 3 And that's the biggest risk at
 4 that stage. Usually, you'll get there eventually.
 5 Most projects that get developed, unless there's a
 6 technical factor that prevents it. These do
 7 happen.
 8 But if you don't have a
 9 technical factor, it's going to be linked to
 10 political risk or the regulatory environment and
 11 then it's a matter of time. Maybe the next
 12 government will allow the projects to go ahead or
 13 something like that.
 14 So the timing can be, can be
 15 very uncertain.
 16 And maybe mention that I put a
 17 mention of the investment which is the cost. The
 18 value is not driven by cost. Basically, developer
 19 has done a good job if they manage to spend less
 20 than what they will get to reach a milestone.
 21 So the premium is the
 22 difference between the value, as you can sell the
 23 project, based on the milestone value, minus the
 24 cost.
 25 And we are -- and this is very

1 relevant because we are seeing, these days,
 2 projects, developed by the likes of the oil and
 3 gas companies, they spend zillions on the projects
 4 and then they get nowhere and they say offshore
 5 wind is expensive.
 6 Yeah, well, if you spend so
 7 much on the phase that has a limited value in
 8 absolute terms, you are never going to make money
 9 on these projects.
 10 So cost discipline, in that
 11 phase, is very important. So you can't just put
 12 in costs and say that creates value. There is a
 13 value and you need to make sure that your costs
 14 are below the value that you can expect.
 15 If we move to the next slide.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Just before you leave that slide. There is a
 18 technical question that you probably can't answer
 19 but I don't have the authors of the Wood report to
 20 ask.
 21 But you distinguish between
 22 fixed-bottom foundations and offshore and floating
 23 foundations.
 24 So what is a semi-floating
 25 gravity-based foundation? I know I have got

1 pictures of it in the Wood report but is it
 2 floating or is it not floating and how is it
 3 semi-floating? Do you know? You maybe don't
 4 know.
 5 DR. GUILLET: I expect that
 6 it's, because it's transported empty, it's put on
 7 the soil and then it's filled with ballast and
 8 then it will become a fixed foundation at the
 9 right location.
 10 That's been done -- I don't
 11 know if that's what they had planned for this one.
 12 But, in one of the early
 13 projects that I worked on, C-Power, that's what
 14 they did. There was concrete foundations. They
 15 were empty. They were carried floating by barge
 16 to the site. They were dropped down there and
 17 filled with sand to stand by matter of gravity.
 18 So I suspect that is.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 Oh, I see. Like an anchor on a boat.
 21 DR. GUILLET: It's an empty
 22 glass you carry. You put it in the water. You
 23 fill it with sand and it will hold there.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 But it doesn't fall over because of gravity,

1 because of the weight on the bottom. You have to
 2 have enough weight for the height of the turbine.
 3 DR. GUILLET: Yes.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 Funky. Why don't they do those in the ocean?
 6 Because of the tides?
 7 DR. GUILLET: They have done
 8 it with a number of projects, usually when it's
 9 not too deep.
 10 The main issue is that it's
 11 actually quite complicated on the port side.
 12 These are huge -- I mean, you have to see one of
 13 these foundations to -- it's bigger than this room
 14 and it's the size of the building, basically.
 15 So, on a case side, you can't
 16 put that many.
 17 On my project, it was done
 18 with six foundations and then they realized it was
 19 too complicated so they went for the steel motor
 20 piles for the next phase which was 60 turbines
 21 instead of six.
 22 So the logistics of offshore
 23 wind are humongous.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 Yeah. Technology is improving all the time so we

1 are pleased about that.
 2 DR. GUILLET: It's not such
 3 complicated technology but it's big. It's big.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 Moving along.
 6 DR. GUILLET: So, in Slide 8,
 7 I have shown the tables which are sort of the
 8 before and after. I have taken into account the
 9 corrections on the couple of mistakes that I made
 10 in my '22 report.
 11 And the one project that --
 12 where Secretariat provided enough data for me to
 13 add.
 14 So that's for the late-stage
 15 projects. Ready to build or close to that.
 16 And, as you see from the line
 17 that's -- I don't know how visible it is -- that's
 18 highlighted. The average is between 0.18 or 0.22,
 19 depending on how you weigh the projects, instead
 20 of 0.17, 2.19 under my old calculations.
 21 That's excluding the windfall
 22 projects which I will discuss in a minute.
 23 But, basically, these numbers
 24 have been very consistent over a time. Maybe, as
 25 I said, there has been a very gentle increase over

1 time as cost of capital has gone down and the
 2 risks have been perceived to be a bit less in the
 3 late phase.
 4 But it's a very small increase
 5 and one factor that pushes the price of project
 6 fully developed down is the fact that, well, since
 7 all the costs have gone down, costs of
 8 construction, costs of capital, the development
 9 site cannot stay immune to that.
 10 So the premium that you get
 11 from the development side cannot stay as high as
 12 it's been if all the other parts of the cost of
 13 the project are squeezed.
 14 So the value of projects, at
 15 that stage, has not moved much.
 16 And, if you look on the next
 17 slide, which is the early stage projects, then the
 18 numbers there have moved even less.
 19 There's a couple of projects
 20 that have slightly higher numbers and we will
 21 discuss this. They are mainly linked to some of
 22 the US projects.
 23 But, basically, you are below
 24 the 100K per megawatt range quite consistently.
 25 So that's -- these are the

1 tables from my reports. The first one and the
 2 updated one. So there's no new information there.
 3
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 Just, again, so I am looking at like for like on
 6 your Slide 8, paragraph 478 of the award.
 7 The Tribunal took late stage
 8 numbers at .1 --
 9 DR. GUILLET: Yeah. So, in
 10 the early report, I say it was from .01 to .1.
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 12 Overall valuations projects at early stage, .01 to
 13 .1. Whereas, late stage, from .1 to .5.
 14 And then evidence on fully
 15 permitted, .2 to .7, so similar to Messrs. Taylor
 16 and Low's evidence.
 17 But they distinguish those to
 18 approximately 4 million per megawatt for projects
 19 that have reached financial closure.
 20 So are you, here, late stage?
 21 Is this at financial closure?
 22 DR. GUILLET: The 4 million,
 23 that's after financial. That's the value of
 24 project under construction or under operation and
 25 that value is fully driven by NPV.

1 These are based on revenue.
 2 These are revenue driven. They are projects that
 3 are operating or will be operating very soon with
 4 high certainty. So they are based on the revenue
 5 flows from the operational phase.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 So I am just trying to match what you are saying
 8 on Slide 8 with the stages in the award.
 9 And, at paragraph 478 of the
 10 award, it says -- sorry, just let me -- early
 11 stage, they value from the low, .1, the projects
 12 that are not fully permitted -- that's the four
 13 features -- to .2 for fully permitted early stage
 14 projects, to approximately 4 million euro per
 15 megawatt for projects that have reached financial
 16 closure, and up to euro 4.5 million per megawatt
 17 for projects that have reached commercial
 18 operation.
 19 So they give two different
 20 prices between commercial -- or values between
 21 commercial operation and financial closure.
 22 DR. GUILLET: Probably because
 23 you have the construction risk between the two.
 24 So that's to take into account the construction
 25 risk which is real, but.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
2 Yes.
3 So what you are doing here,
4 you are not financial close.
5 DR. GUILLET: Basically, at
6 financial close -- financial close is with the
7 banks. FID is just investor on its own deciding
8 to.
9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
10 No, I understand.
11 What is your stage at Slide 8?
12 DR. GUILLET: So Slide 8 is
13 just before financial close. It's right between
14 ready to build or around ready -- so it's before
15 financial close.
16 It's that 0.01 to 0.5.
17 On Slide 7, maybe it's going
18 to be clearer because you have all the phases on
19 one slide.
20 If you go back to Slide 7 of
21 my presentation.
22 So late development --
23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
24 Yes. So where is financial close on this slide?
25 DR. GUILLET: It's at the end

1 of the late development phase.
2 So this is between ready to
3 build which, here, is called shovel ready, which
4 is the same thing.
5 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
6 So it's the line between the last two boxes? The
7 line between the last two rows?
8 DR. GUILLET: No, that's COD.
9 The milestone is at the end
10 where you have the tick.
11 COD is the last tick, so
12 between four and five.
13 FC is between second to last,
14 so between third column and fourth column.
15 And shovel ready, which is
16 ready to build, is at the end of the second
17 column.
18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
19 think that's what I said. What I tried to say.
20 DR. GUILLET: Okay. Then we
21 agree.
22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
23 There are five grey columns. At the end of grey
24 column Number 3 before grey column Number 4, that
25 line is financial close.

1 DR. GUILLET: Yes.
2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
3 Yes, okay.
4 But that's not what Slide 8
5 represents.
6 Slide 8 represents what is in
7 the second row -- second column.
8 DR. GUILLET: No. Slide 8 is
9 the third column and Slide 9 is the second.
10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
11 Okay. Thanks.
12 DR. GUILLET: So then if we
13 move to Slide 10.
14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
15 When you say early, you mean early and mid on your
16 own chart?
17 DR. GUILLET: It's a
18 continuum. But, yes, it can be. It's
19 somewhere -- well, mid is basically when you're
20 getting close to getting all the permits and early
21 is where you are starting out.
22 So where was the project or
23 where is the project, that's what I am looking at
24 Slide 10. So that has been discussed already, to
25 some extent.

1 Site control was the project
2 at exclusive right to apply to an application.
3 I understand that, from a
4 developer's perspective, indeed, the fact that
5 you're ahead of the others has some, some interest
6 because that means you can focus on the zone and
7 work on it without anybody else taking the zone
8 away from you.
9 And, in some markets, this is
10 a very relevant -- you identify a site. You do
11 some studies, preliminary studies. You try to see
12 if it's good. And then someone else comes along
13 and says I want this site and you get nothing.
14 So having that priority right
15 is a first step towards site control. From what I
16 understood, it was not formal site control.
17 So, from an investor's
18 perspective, it would be seen as a good chunk of
19 the milestone site control but maybe not the full
20 milestone.
21 And whether that's valued at
22 50 or 80 or 90 percent of the milestone is going
23 to be linked to the perception of each investor.
24 But it's, it's, let's say it's
25 on its way to being achieved, on its way.

1 Grid connection would tend to
 2 be in that same position. There was some a grid
 3 connection agreement which was subject to
 4 technical feasibility studies which may or may
 5 not -- I have no idea if the grid was congested in
 6 that that area.
 7 In some markets, that can be a
 8 real obstacle. In this one, I can't comment.
 9 It would have needed to be
 10 updated with all the delay but I am willing to say
 11 that it's well on its way again but it's not
 12 formally there either is how I see it.
 13 Permits is where the project
 14 is least advanced and I think this was
 15 acknowledged by the project side.
 16 There's everything needed to
 17 be done, at least most of the work needed to be
 18 done, even if some, some preliminary work had been
 19 done. A lot of permits needed to be obtained.
 20 And I did not say that,
 21 without the moratorium, the perception would be
 22 negative.
 23 But the reality was that this
 24 is a new market so the ministries have never done
 25 this. So they are going to learn on the spot.

1 They are going to ask colleagues from other
 2 countries, how do you deal with this issue. They
 3 are going to deal with their stakeholders which
 4 may also be influenced by stakeholders from other
 5 countries. Information circulates.
 6 So the permitting process for
 7 a first project in any country is always going to
 8 be slower because you create the precedents, you
 9 have to test the administrative machinery in a
 10 country. So it's not a criticism but it's a fact
 11 that simply things have not been done.
 12 When you are in the UK and
 13 this has been done 50 times by others and by
 14 yourself, you know who the people are, they know
 15 what the standards are, they know what precedents
 16 have been set, what's needed to get a permit. So
 17 you have a better visibility, both in terms of
 18 content and in timing.
 19 So, in a new market, even if
 20 you ignore there was no moratorium, let's say, in
 21 2010, before the moratorium, the signals were
 22 positive but it was still a challenge together
 23 because this simply had not been done before.
 24 And the tariff, obviously,
 25 that's the PPA was in place. But -- and that's

1 something I was involved with other developers at
 2 the time and they told me, very explicitly, we
 3 think Windstream made a mistake to go for the PPA
 4 so early because the clock is ticking. They don't
 5 have a lot of time to get to permitted and then
 6 get the project build.
 7 So these are the developers.
 8 Did not ask for the PPA because they did not want
 9 to get the clock ticking. They wanted to get a
 10 bit further on the other preliminary work on the
 11 project before getting the PPA.
 12 Ironically, they got less in
 13 their own litigation than Windstream got the first
 14 time round.
 15 But, in terms of project
 16 development, the fact that there is a deadline to
 17 the PPA is a terrible thing. It means that there
 18 is a cliff effect and there is a risk that your
 19 project loses all value because you have missed
 20 out on the deadline.
 21 So this one, the PPA is real.
 22 It's a high level PPA. It's a good -- on its own,
 23 it's a good PPA. If you had financial close and
 24 you had that PPA, it's great.
 25 But the fact that you only

1 have four years to develop or five years, plus or
 2 minus whatever the little leeway was, that is a
 3 massive challenge and, as we have seen, very few
 4 projects have ever made it in such a short
 5 timeline, even in mature markets.
 6 So, from a valuation
 7 perspective, that would actually be seen as a
 8 major hurdle.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 And the same question I asked the Claimant's
 11 experts on paragraph 475 of the award where the
 12 Tribunal noted that the Claimant did have an FIT
 13 contract and a grid connection and it did not yet
 14 have site control.
 15 If I understood your site
 16 control explanation properly -- and I want to make
 17 sure I did -- you say they did have site priority
 18 and that wasn't nothing. That's important.
 19 DR. GUILLET: These are worth
 20 something. It is enough for a developer to say we
 21 can continue to work, at least with -- but no
 22 other developer is going to take this away from
 23 us. We don't know if the site is good enough and
 24 will work, but at least no one will take it from
 25 us.

1 So that is worth a little
2 something. From the developer's perspective, that
3 is true.
4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
5 It's like a dibs.
6 DR. GUILLET: Yeah, that's
7 exactly what it is.
8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
9 And the Tribunal did find they had a grid
10 connection, so I see you equivocated a little bit
11 on that but that's -- you accept that's what the
12 Tribunal found.
13 DR. GUILLET: Yeah. They were
14 decently well on their way to grid connection.
15 They had made good progress. There were certain
16 technical milestones to be met and I can't comment
17 as to whether they were just the factual tick the
18 box thing or if there was a genuine technical
19 issue.
20 In some markets, congestion of
21 the grid is a real issue and that's what these
22 studies do. They tell you -- so I am not sure if
23 the study that haven't been done were just, you
24 know, do we need a bolt of that size in that hole
25 or do we need something more substantial to make

1 it work.
2 But I am willing to accept
3 that it was well on its way.
4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
5 Yeah, all right.
6 And I am not aware but tell me
7 if you are aware of any evidence on the record in
8 these proceedings before us that suggests there
9 was a grid congestion or any other connection
10 problem anticipated?
11 DR. GUILLET: I don't have any
12 information on that, no, in either direction.
13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
14 Yeah.
15 So I just want to come back to
16 the paragraph I went to -- oh, just in the award,
17 the Tribunal uses grid access and grid connection
18 interchangeably.
19 When you talk about the four
20 elements of fully permitting, do you distinguish
21 between grid connection and grid access in that
22 conversation?
23 DR. GUILLET: That's going to
24 be, I would say, country by country specific.
25 The reality is that you need

1 to have the right to access the grid and that can
2 be regulated in many different ways. And then you
3 need to have the physical ability to inject power
4 into the grid in that location.
5 And, as a side note, and
6 whether it's counted as grid or as permits, often,
7 you need permits for the onshore connection. The
8 landfill, through the beach and, on some projects,
9 actually getting the permits for the onshore grid
10 connection can be the most difficult part of the
11 whole permitting process. Because that's where
12 you have people that may object to the
13 construction and to the transformer station and
14 things like that.
15 So this is real.
16 Access to the grid on the
17 commercial and right basis, in some markets, is an
18 issue. In the US, you have got queues. In some
19 other markets, you've got queues to get on to the
20 grid. You wait in line to get access to the grid.
21 And the grid operator will grant connection
22 rights, which may include the necessity to build
23 reinforcements to the grid.
24 So there may be some delays
25 there as well. They say, okay, I will give you

1 the rights to connect in a place.
2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
3 That's fine.
4 So my question was, was there
5 anything that you have seen, in the evidence on
6 this case, to suggest there is a grid congestion
7 or connection problem and I think your answer was
8 no.
9 DR. GUILLET: I am not aware.
10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
11 Good. We don't have to solve for the whole world.
12 DR. GUILLET: No.
13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
14 In respect of the test that the Tribunal applied
15 in order to decide to apply a market comparable
16 method, it appears to apply a fairly binary test.
17 There are four requirements
18 for fully permitted and, if you don't have one of
19 them, you are not fully permitted, therefore, you
20 don't move from early stage to late stage.
21 My question to you is it
22 actually that binary or is it more nuanced and
23 more subtle?
24 DR. GUILLET: It can be both
25 and it -- sorry to say, depends. It's not a --

1 let me explain.
 2 In some countries, you have
 3 permits that cannot be granted until you have
 4 actually done things so there is -- so it's step
 5 by step process.
 6 And, when it's well mapped,
 7 you don't have the last permit but you know
 8 exactly what you need to do to get there.
 9 So banks and investors will
 10 say, okay, we haven't ticked the box but we know
 11 that it takes one month when you have submitted
 12 such application to get it and you can submit that
 13 application because you have done this before.
 14 So there's a clear process and
 15 it's accepted, you are not formally fully
 16 permitted but you know what it takes to get there.
 17 And, conversely, you have got
 18 situations where you have got the permits but
 19 there is a legal appeal against it and it can be
 20 the bird society appealing in something.
 21 And then you may have all your
 22 permits. As long as this appeal is not resolved,
 23 one way or the other, you cannot move. Because
 24 this is a deal breaker.
 25 If the appeal is accepted and

1 the permit is rejected, you have no project. And,
 2 if the appeal is rejected and the permit is
 3 unappealable, then you're fully permitted. And we
 4 have seen cases of both.
 5 So and, but that's what the
 6 legal due diligence will tell you when you do that
 7 on a country by country or a project by country
 8 basis, is that permit that we are missing, is this
 9 something that can be contested, or is it
 10 something that the government or the regulatory
 11 body is obliged to give you if you do X, Y and Z
 12 and you know exactly how to do X, Y and Z.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 Okay.
 15 DR. GUILLET: And that's the
 16 kind of things that haven't been tested in
 17 Ontario, for instance.
 18 Will there be something that
 19 trips the project? We don't know yet. That's the
 20 thing.
 21 So Slide 11, yeah, Slide 11.
 22 Is essentially a summary of that which is to say
 23 that all these elements matter, not just
 24 valuation. And any of the others can trip and
 25 depending on how close you are to fully permitted.

1 Okay.
 2 And the tariff, the fact that
 3 you don't have a PPA, for instance, can, these
 4 days, the zero bids were mentioned by the
 5 Secretariat team.
 6 Some investors have decided to
 7 go ahead with projects on a fully merchant basis.
 8 So they rely on revenues from the wholesale market
 9 without PPA or a tariff. It's daring but it's
 10 been done so you can actually go forward even
 11 without a PPA.
 12 So it's not even an
 13 indispensable bid of fully permitted. It's a good
 14 one, obviously, because having revenue certainty
 15 allows you to attract cheaper capital. It usually
 16 makes your cost of electricity cheaper in the end.
 17 So it makes the projects more attractive. But
 18 it's not 100 percent indispensable.
 19 So and, again, to point out
 20 that the, the main obstacle to the DCF valuations
 21 is that they are very volatile and, between 15 and
 22 20, everybody was used to things improving. So
 23 your numbers only went in one direction.
 24 And then, from 2020, some -- I
 25 am not trying to say that insight. I am just

1 saying it's volatile and we have seen the
 2 volatility, in one way and then the other
 3 direction over the course of four years. Nasty
 4 drop in prices and nasty increase in prices. And
 5 each of these makes the numbers.
 6 And I think it was mentioned,
 7 if you did the valuation in late '20, instead of
 8 early '20, you got a different result.
 9 The thing is the project,
 10 under development, it's a five- to ten-year
 11 endeavour. You can't rely on the prices of the
 12 value of interest rates or the cost of steel or
 13 the cost of turbines at a given moment until you
 14 actually know when you are going to order them.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 It took me a while to get this from your model but
 17 I think I understand it. I want to make sure I
 18 do.
 19 In this slide, you say, in
 20 your sub headline, the PPA is only one item and
 21 what remains a qualitative exercise.
 22 And I think where you diverge
 23 most with the Claimant's expert is you say the
 24 level of tariff in your FIT contract or your
 25 contract difference or whatever your PPA is, your

1 level of tariff is wholly and completely
 2 irrelevant at early stage development project
 3 valuation.
 4 All I care about is that you
 5 have got a revenue regime. I don't care if you
 6 are getting 2P a megawatt or 2 million.
 7 DR. GUILLET: Well, you do
 8 care a little bit that it's enough to be -- that
 9 you know that it's going to cost something so you
 10 need to have something in the end --
 11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: A
 12 realistic revenue regime.
 13 DR. GUILLET: A realistic is
 14 the right threshold.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 But once you get past that baseline, you say it
 17 makes no difference whether you are making --
 18 DR. GUILLET: Once we get
 19 there, we will calculate how much more money we
 20 can actually make once we are ready to make the
 21 jump.
 22 And maybe to say something on
 23 models.
 24 I have a mathematical training
 25 and I have been in banks for a long time. When I

1 see the model, the first thing I try to do is
 2 cheat and get the outcome I want by modifying the
 3 assumptions in the least visible way possible.
 4 And that's very easy to do.
 5 So these models are very
 6 complex. There are a lot of assumptions. Very
 7 long -- I mean, when you have a 30-year
 8 exponential, because that's what interest rates
 9 are and discount rates are, exponential, you
 10 modify your inflation assumption from 2 percent to
 11 1.5 percent, you get a lot more money on one side
 12 or not. So it is very easy.
 13 So when you are at a point
 14 where the assumptions can vary from single to
 15 triple or the costs can vary from 1 to 50 percent
 16 more, the numbers that you get from that model
 17 are, even from an order of magnitude perspective,
 18 they are very hard to pin down.
 19 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 20 Market comparable method is still a model; isn't
 21 it?
 22 DR. GUILLET: It's a multiple
 23 of megawatts.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 It's still a model.

1 DR. GUILLET: Well, it's just
 2 a rule of three. It's per megawatt.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Yes. But it's a model. It is what you feed into
 5 the model will determine what the multiple is
 6 going to be. I mean, it's, as with any model,
 7 rubbish in, rubbish out, I think is the point you
 8 were trying to make.
 9 DR. GUILLET: It's just one
 10 assumption so it's just one calculation. It's not
 11 five different assumptions with the exponential
 12 over 30 years. You don't have a build up of -- at
 13 least the link between your assumptions and your
 14 result is immediate and immediately
 15 understandable.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Did you have your finger on the button?
 18 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: I just
 19 have a question before you head on to the second
 20 report in your opinion.
 21 I just want your opinion on
 22 what the Tribunal did.
 23 Did the Tribunal then get it
 24 right? Because I have read your reports and I
 25 couldn't quite figure out whether you were saying,

1 in the end, the value is zero today and it would
 2 have been back then too.
 3 In other words, I wasn't quite
 4 sure whether you were saying the Tribunal actually
 5 got it wrong, just out of curiosity. I know we
 6 are not going to revisit that decision but.
 7 DR. GUILLET: No, no. When I
 8 say zero, I mean the value hasn't changed so they
 9 got compensation, they shouldn't get more.
 10 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Okay.
 11 It's from the 30 whatever, 30-something million.
 12 DR. GUILLET: On my side,
 13 the -- I mean I can't comment on the law but it
 14 didn't seem unfair that they got a little
 15 something. It was maybe on the high side.
 16 So it was not ungenerous but
 17 it was the right ballpark.
 18 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Okay.
 19 So it hasn't changed from the where the Tribunal.
 20 DR. GUILLET: Yes.
 21 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA:
 22 Stopped in 2016, and 2017.
 23 DR. GUILLET: Yeah, yeah. It
 24 was a fair decision, roughly fair decision then
 25 and the number hasn't moved from that today,

1 essentially.
2 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Thank
3 you.
4 DR. GUILLET: That's the short
5 version of my report.
6 Yeah, and then from next
7 slide.
8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
9 You would say your market comparables, they move
10 about 3 percent?
11 DR. GUILLET: Well, the thing
12 is it's an order of magnitude and, as you can see,
13 it can move around. So when I say it's 10, it can
14 be anything from 8 to 12 which is already a 30 to
15 40 percent gap.
16 So a 3 percent variation is
17 not noticeable within rounded numbers.
18 So I cannot give you a
19 10 percent precision on these numbers. They are
20 rounded estimates order of magnitude.
21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
22 thought you gave us a number. I thought you said
23 if you take the market comparables, the multiple
24 hasn't moved very much. It's moved by from .6 to
25 .66, or something, which equates to 3 percent.

1 I thought that's what you
2 said; did I misunderstand?
3 DR. GUILLET: Yeah. I said
4 it's a round number and it's another round number
5 which is very close. It's essentially the same
6 thing.
7 If the numbers look -- 1 and
8 1.1 to me are the same, essentially the same
9 valuation in this case.
10 You can't give too much
11 precision to what is a rough estimate. And,
12 usually, I try to give ranges. So the average is
13 something you calculate. It's the average of 20
14 numbers that exist. So it's a precise number but
15 it has no significance other than as a first rough
16 estimate.
17 And you can't get better than
18 that. To get better, then you will go into the
19 specifics of each project. And not just the
20 specifics of each project. It's also the
21 specifics of the market. Whether it's a buyer's
22 market or a seller's market, it depends. And the
23 profiles of both the seller and the buyer.
24 If the owner is someone that
25 has a lot of money and doesn't need to sell, they

1 can wait and say I will wait for the market to get
2 better. And then I will sell when there's a
3 hungry oil and gas company that needs to put a
4 wind turbine on their next yearly report.
5 And if it's right now that
6 they all hate offshore wind, I'll wait because
7 they don't want to buy my asset.
8 But some sellers cannot wait.
9 They need to sell. The only buyers are the people
10 left in the market, there is only one or two, and
11 that's the price they are offering me. It's that
12 or go bankrupt. I will sell at a lower price.
13 So the quality of the buyer
14 and the nature of the -- the quality of the buyers
15 and the nature of the seller do make a difference
16 for the very same project.
17 Which is why the starting
18 point is sort of a vaguely objective intrinsic
19 value of the project and then the commercial deal
20 that will, that will come in, if you're lucky and
21 we will get to the US projects in a minute, you
22 get buyers that are ready to pay stupid amounts
23 for projects and, if you're lucky, at that time,
24 you get an amount.
25 But saying my business model

1 is to have a project and expect that I will get
2 stupid buyers, that's a tough business case to
3 make.
4 I mean, you can be lucky.
5 That's the thing. But, essentially, they are
6 saying our project is worth what the luckiest guys
7 in the market got and that's not the standard that
8 should be used.
9 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Is
10 that right, though, in terms of, if we have buyers
11 who are willing to pay more, that sets the
12 market -- I will give you an example.
13 Basketball teams, if you do a
14 DCF analysis of revenue from a basketball team no
15 one would ever buy an NBA basketball team. But
16 they are worth billions because people are willing
17 to pay that for that. Right.
18 So if people -- if companies
19 are willing to pay more than, and perhaps over
20 value, at this point in time, that does set the
21 market price, though, even under the comparables
22 analysis; wouldn't it?
23 Or would you just say they are
24 all outliers?
25 Because I don't think you

1 could say that they are all outliers if the
 2 market, all of a sudden, is reset higher than what
 3 everyone else thought the market should be at.
 4 It's just a reset of the price.
 5 DR. GUILLET: Agreed. But not
 6 all transactions are at the outlier level.
 7 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: I
 8 agree. I agree.
 9 DR. GUILLET: That's why they
 10 are exceptional and we can explain why they happen
 11 and it's been a handful of cases.
 12 And, again, I accept that it's
 13 hindsight but the impairments that have been taken
 14 on some of these projects, not long after they
 15 were -- these payments were made show that the
 16 prices were crazy and the buyers acknowledged it
 17 not long after they made the payments.
 18 So but you can't know -- I
 19 agree. Beforehand, you can't know.
 20 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Yeah.
 21 DR. GUILLET: But what we do
 22 know is this is a market that has seen cycles of
 23 the utilities coming in and out. You know,
 24 offshore wind sucks. We love offshore wind.
 25 Offshore wind sucks. We love offshore wind.

1 And the oil and gas companies
 2 are doing the same.
 3 So we had a cycle where they
 4 all bought in. Right now, we are in a phase where
 5 they are all selling and, in two years' time,
 6 there will be a phase where they are all buying
 7 in too.
 8 So, if you have got capital
 9 and you have got something to sell and you get the
 10 timing right, you can get above the standard
 11 price. And that's a good commercial.
 12 But whether to say that's the
 13 price that you can expect, that's a tougher case
 14 to make because you don't know if the oil and gas
 15 companies will come into the market in one year's
 16 time, in two years' time or five years' time or
 17 ever. And maybe the politics of the sector will
 18 get toxic and the good times never come again.
 19 So it's a bet. Again, you
 20 can't make the valuation -- the numbers that I
 21 propose are numbers that have been valid,
 22 basically, throughout all the phases with the --
 23 they are dampened so the variations and,
 24 especially in the early stages, the variation are
 25 much less than the late stage.

1 But that value stays there
 2 throughout.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 So, early on in the answer, you said if you have
 5 the money to spare and you're not a seller who has
 6 to sell, if you can sit on the asset, you would
 7 sit on it and wait until prices have improved.
 8 As I understand your opinion
 9 in these proceedings is prices ain't going to
 10 improve on an early stage development or at least
 11 haven't, at all over the last ten, possibly
 12 15 years, you are saying early stage development
 13 is flat, doesn't improve. That seems to be your
 14 opinion.
 15 DR. GUILLET: Yes.
 16 Effectively, yes.
 17 And the additional comment is
 18 that, in this case, you have a deadline so you
 19 can't wait.
 20 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 21 Well, just the general point.
 22 DR. GUILLET: But the general
 23 point is, yes, the volatility on the early stage
 24 project has been fairly low.
 25 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:

1 So, and then your second point, I understand from
 2 your response to my earlier question, is, because
 3 you round so much in your use of comparables, your
 4 roughly right approach is so rough that it doesn't
 5 have any sensitivities at all to reflect movement
 6 in the market. Like, for example, a 3 percent
 7 movement, 5 percent movement.
 8 But your approach is so rough
 9 that you're not picking up any appreciation in
 10 value that may occur?
 11 DR. GUILLET: Well, what you
 12 have to remember is that it's a market that is
 13 consistent but it's a lumpy market. The number of
 14 transactions is not that high. I mean, I have
 15 been involved in that market for 15 years and I
 16 have been able to find 20ish --
 17 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 18 23.
 19 DR. GUILLET: -- transactions
 20 over that period so it's a couple -- I don't have
 21 all of them but I have a good number of them
 22 because I was involved.
 23 So and there's been a bit more
 24 activity in very recent years. But that may be
 25 post 2020 when new markets have opened for the

1 sectors. We certainly have transactions in
2 Australia and Vietnam and Taiwan and other places.

3 The buyers are a small group
4 of players. Not a lot of people are willing to
5 take early development risks.

6 So you, it's a small set of
7 developers that sell to slightly bigger or larger
8 developers that are willing the take early
9 development risk which are typically some of the
10 utilities and some of these IPPs that have been
11 funded with investor money or funds from fund
12 money.

13 It's a small market. So the
14 number of buyers is very small and the number of
15 transaction is not that large.

16 Most of the investors in
17 offshore wind are -- they want to be in the
18 operating phase where you have the stable cash
19 flows and the revenues prediction.

20 They are low IRR players, the
21 pension funds, and they want to invest billions.
22 And, when you tell them I want 20 million for my
23 project, I don't know where to find 20 million. I
24 know where to find a billion but I don't know
25 where to find 20 million.

1 So, the buyers are not so
2 many.

3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
4 But, again, it's the dubs approach. So what the
5 Claimant's experts have said in their report about
6 the structure transaction approach where you
7 reserve an upfront amount with a contingent amount
8 at financial close, that enables you to come in at
9 the billions level. It doesn't have to be limited
10 financial close; right. You can -- commercial
11 operation date could be when you pull in your big
12 payment.

13 So, if there's so much
14 competition later in the project, then that's an
15 incentive on buyers to come in with a structured
16 payment.

17 And you haven't really dealt
18 with it -- maybe you're going to so I'll let you
19 finish and we will see if you --

20 DR. GUILLET: I didn't
21 specifically but I can comment on this and the
22 example that was given earlier today was actually
23 quite telling.

24 Which is you can either get 5
25 million today with full certainty or you get 100

1 million in X years' time if you meet the milestone
2 but with an un -- a probability that's a lot
3 below.

4 And that example of 5 to 100
5 kind of gives you the kind of probability that you
6 will get the 100 million.

7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
8 So were the Claimant's experts accurate when they
9 said that, for the structured transaction approach,
10 you only took the upfront payment and ignored, for
11 the purpose of the purchase price on your market
12 comparables, you ignored the contingent payment
13 entirely?

14 DR. GUILLET: I have explained
15 that in my report.

16 I have taken into account the
17 payments that are certain request or quasi. So a
18 payment that says I will pay you X today and X
19 with certainly one year's time, I have taken into
20 account the payment in one year's time.

21 Or, if I will pay you in one
22 year's time if you submit the application, that's
23 something that's fully within the control of the
24 developer, that's something that can be counted as
25 a certain payment.

1 If the contingent payment is I
2 will pay you a second part of the price when you
3 get that milestone, that doesn't count because, at
4 that point, the project will be worth more so the
5 first payment is the value of the project now and
6 the second payment will reflect the value of the
7 project later.

8 So the value of the project
9 today is still linked to the first payment so it
10 is --

11 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
12 How do you know, precisely, what those contingency
13 milestones are if the Claimant's -- if these are
14 the Claimant's data points and they were unable to
15 derive that information from the annual reports
16 where they are getting these valuations.

17 DR. GUILLET: But that's the
18 point. These contingent payments -- unless you
19 are actually part of the transaction, you will
20 never know what they are.

21 And even if and you see the
22 annual accounts, they are ex post, so they are --

23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
24 Thank you.

25 DR. GUILLET: So they will

1 know if the risk of being met or not already, to
 2 some extent.
 3 The information on these
 4 contingent payments is hard to tell and the
 5 value -- I mean, if you want to discount it by
 6 some probability or percentage or something else,
 7 that's going to be very investor-specific.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 So I am just trying to understand your methodology
 10 and approach.
 11 So it is fair to say that,
 12 unless you have got proof that it's a milestone
 13 that you think, in your opinion, is one that can
 14 be met at early stage, you're disregarding it.
 15 If the information isn't
 16 there, you're not counting any future payment
 17 obligations.
 18 DR. GUILLET: Or if it's
 19 conditional to something happening linked to the
 20 development work.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 Or if you don't know what it's conditional upon.
 23 DR. GUILLET: Yeah.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 If you have got 1 million today, 100 million in

1 the future but you don't know what the 100 million
 2 is for, you just ignore it.
 3 DR. GUILLET: Yes. Because,
 4 if you get to that stage, maybe you could sell the
 5 project for that 100 million or 50 or 200. It's,
 6 it's going to -- the milestone payments,
 7 typically, reflect what you're going to be getting
 8 to.
 9 So if you get milestone
 10 payments that give you, you know, you get ten when
 11 you get site control. You get 50 when you get the
 12 grid connection. And you get 200 when you're
 13 fully permitted. You are just matching the actual
 14 increase in the value of the project so they are
 15 not providing new information compared to the risk
 16 you are taking.
 17 If the investor says you have
 18 just got site control which is worth 10, but I
 19 will give you 20 and you don't get any later
 20 milestones but you still have to do the work,
 21 that's maybe a deal that is attractive to the
 22 developer because they need the cash up front but
 23 they are going to get less in the future if they
 24 are actually successful.
 25 So that's going to be,

1 depending on how the seller and the buyer rate
 2 their changes of the milestone happening and their
 3 ability to finance the work up to there.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 Are you saying that we should accept your
 6 methodology, your approach, which is along the
 7 development milestones, as you have identified
 8 them, in place of the valuation standards that are
 9 applied in public listed company's financial
 10 accounts for valuing these contingent structured
 11 payment amounts?
 12 DR. GUILLET: I have no idea
 13 what these standards are so I couldn't tell you.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 Well, just let me put it this way.
 16 If an early stage development
 17 is valued in audited financial accounts to
 18 incorporate a net present value of a contingent,
 19 contingent payment amount, so an amount hasn't yet
 20 been paid, and that's audited and that's in
 21 accordance with financial standards, let's just
 22 assume that.
 23 Are you saying, no, we
 24 shouldn't do that. We should take your approach
 25 because your approach is better?

1 DR. GUILLET: I would say that
 2 both are legitimate, honestly. That's -- I would
 3 end up saying it's the preference of the investor.
 4 If you got audited numbers,
 5 it's obviously a number that has some reality and,
 6 if you're in a big company, you can cover your
 7 backside.
 8 Whether your own perception --
 9 I am comfortable in my abilities to assess
 10 projects but I don't want to impose that on
 11 anyone. Again, it's the market so people may have
 12 different views.
 13 Following an audited number is
 14 never crazy. It can be wrong but it's never
 15 unreasonable.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 But it's the same valuation standards, isn't it,
 18 that apply when you're valuing your assets for
 19 your purpose of your financial accounts.
 20 They are the same valuation
 21 standards that we are asked to apply in an
 22 international arbitration damages assessment?
 23 DR. GUILLET: No, I would tend
 24 to think that the big four will use NPV
 25 calculations that I tend to think are not

1 appropriate at early stages of projects.
 2 So you end up with a number
 3 that they have calculated. You have a model
 4 behind it. But, like I said, this is, to me,
 5 these numbers are highly arbitrary. But they come
 6 from a serious name so they are acceptable but, to
 7 me, they don't mean much.
 8 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 9 So when I say the same valuation standard is
 10 proper now, international valuation standards
 11 capital V, capital S, how people apply those
 12 valuation standards may vary, almost invariably
 13 vary between Claimant's experts and Respondent's
 14 experts in international arbitration.
 15 But they are the same
 16 standards that are applied in company accounts as
 17 what are applied -- as what we are asked to apply;
 18 correct?
 19 DR. GUILLET: I have no idea.
 20 I don't understand company accounts, you may be
 21 surprised to --
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 Do you know what valuation standards you are
 24 applying as a valuation expert?
 25 DR. GUILLET: I am not even

1 sure I understand the question.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Gosh, okay.
 4 Okay. You carry on with your
 5 presentation.
 6 DR. GUILLET: So the last part
 7 of my slides are about discussing some of the
 8 items and the ping-pong that's been happening
 9 between me and Secretariat on some of the topics.
 10 Part of it is being to try to
 11 reject some of my comparables and some of it has
 12 been to say that their comparables are more
 13 relevant.
 14 A lot of quotes, I publish a
 15 lot. So there's a lot of public information out
 16 there when I write. Most of it is about
 17 construction projects and a lot of their arguments
 18 are about applying arguments that I have made
 19 about construction stage or operation stage
 20 project and saying they apply to the same extent
 21 for projects under development which I have said I
 22 did not think was true and I didn't, didn't say.
 23 There has been a lot of
 24 nitpicking of some of the examples that I have
 25 chosen to exclude some of my data points, like

1 saying that the Scottish projects are not UK round
 2 3 projects which is silly.
 3 They were at the same time and
 4 they are mostly the same regulations with the
 5 minor changes in rules.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Maybe if you are talking to a Scottish person.
 8 DR. GUILLET: No.
 9 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 10 It was a joke. It was a joke.
 11 DR. GUILLET: No, but the
 12 stages are fairly similar -- fair enough.
 13 There is the ping-pong on the
 14 PPA being the valuation and I will get to that in
 15 the last slide on the -- saying that there was no
 16 revenue certainty from a vast number of projects
 17 in Europe that had Feed-in-Tariff at the time
 18 between 2010 and 2015.
 19 Basically, a project in
 20 Germany before 2014 that had site control. They
 21 had guaranteed Feed-In Tariff and they had
 22 guaranteed access to the grid.
 23 So they were in a better stage
 24 than the project from the moment they had site
 25 control or a right to site control -- site

1 exclusivity.
 2 And there were dozens of such
 3 projects. They were all killed when Germany
 4 changed the rule between 2014 and 2017 which means
 5 that when you take your sample, and that's the
 6 55 percent or 57 percent probability, that's
 7 been -- if you want to calculate a success rate
 8 for projects, you need to have a full sample.
 9 So if you ignore all the
 10 German projects which had site control and those
 11 tariffs and grid from the get-go and all of these
 12 failed, you are losing out a massive number of
 13 projects.
 14 The same with the UK projects
 15 in 2010. They all had the right to the ROC
 16 system.
 17 The system was changed later
 18 on but, when they started, and they got the
 19 initial leases to do the development work, they
 20 expected to be able to get the ROC system which
 21 was a fixed revenue plus. It was the best of all
 22 worlds. You had a minimum guarantee and you had
 23 the upside of the merchant prices. The same in
 24 Belgium.
 25 So there's a massive number of

1 projects that were not taken into account by
 2 Secretariat for no good reason.
 3 One item, and I suspect that
 4 this will come again, which is the standard, the
 5 question that was applied to the technical advisor
 6 in terms of is the project feasible and can it be
 7 built in this period or can it be developed in
 8 that period.
 9 When you ask a technical
 10 advisor like Sgurr, which is a good advisor, ask
 11 them show me a plan on how to build this that's
 12 realistic. And then you go and say I am the
 13 lenders. Now take your lenders' advisor hat and
 14 tell me what's the worst possible scenario that
 15 you think could happen. And can we withstand that?
 16 They are not answering the
 17 same question. They are looking at the same
 18 projects but they are not answering the same
 19 question.
 20 So the developer is looking
 21 what's the best and fastest way to build the
 22 project and show me something which is plausible.
 23 And I acknowledge that the scenarios are
 24 plausible. But that's not the standard that needs
 25 to be met by investors and then by lenders when

1 you finance the project.
 2 And which is why the cliff
 3 effect is so important because the lenders will
 4 not finance a project if there is a risk that you
 5 can lose your PPA along the way.
 6 And, that risk, they are going
 7 to look at what's the 1 percent chance that it
 8 happens, not the 50 percent chance that it doesn't
 9 happen.
 10 So the discussion on whether
 11 the assumptions are aggressive or less aggressive,
 12 that's a bit of a ping-pong which is legitimate
 13 between developers and financiers because that is
 14 something that happens when you are actually close
 15 enough to be able to calculate what the project is
 16 worth and how you are going to share it.
 17 So the next slide.
 18 In terms of, again, the
 19 comparables, the floating projects have been
 20 excluded or Secretariat would like to exclude the
 21 floating projects. And, here, I would like to
 22 make a distinction between the construction phase
 23 and the permits phase.
 24 It's true that floating wind
 25 is not a mature technology in terms of

1 construction and operations. But, in terms of
 2 development, it's not very different.
 3 You need to identify a site at
 4 sea, get wind measurements, identify the site
 5 constraints.
 6 It's actually potentially
 7 easier because you are farther away from shore,
 8 you don't need to deal with the view or the
 9 coastline, the impact on the coastline. You can
 10 choose your site to be away from shipping lanes
 11 and fishing grounds and things like that.
 12 So, potentially, you have even
 13 fewer obstacles. There is fewer ministries that
 14 care about what happens 100 kilometres from shore
 15 rather than 10 kilometres from shore.
 16 So, in terms of development
 17 and permitting, it's not that difficult to develop
 18 a floating project than it is from a fixed bottom
 19 project.
 20 So, from the valuation
 21 perspective of early development, given that you
 22 are not welcoming at all the uncertainty of the
 23 construction costs and the financing of that, they
 24 are, they are relevant, from my perspective. So
 25 that may vary.

1 And then the other way around
 2 in the comparables that Secretariat brings, and
 3 maybe we can look at that in the last slide in a
 4 minute.
 5 Their comparables are very
 6 different from the project.
 7 Let me say something about the
 8 outliers. And, in my reports, I pointed to two
 9 categories of outliers. One were the European
 10 ones and, really, there is two and three which is
 11 NNG and the French projects.
 12 These got tariffs early in the
 13 process and were delayed by appeals, legal
 14 appeals. In the case of NNG, that was a bird
 15 society that appealed against the environmental
 16 permits.
 17 And, France, it was a number
 18 of appeals. There are some -- a lot of people
 19 trying to block them and used every tool of the
 20 law to delay things.
 21 And what happened is that,
 22 when these projects came out of these appeals, so
 23 they finally became fully permitted, they had
 24 tariffs that had been decided several years before
 25 and the market had changed in the meantime.

1 So, suddenly, you are with a
 2 project that has 100 plus tariff when the new
 3 projects bidding are bidding at 50 or 60. So that
 4 difference, when you're fully permitted, is worth
 5 a lot.
 6 But they had more value
 7 because they were fully permitted. Because the
 8 only thing that was blocking was one appeal or one
 9 small thing.
 10 So, when the transactions
 11 happened, these projects were already in a
 12 position where the NPV did matter because they
 13 were fully permitted and close enough to financial
 14 close.
 15 So they got some of that and
 16 that's literally windfall effect. They were
 17 lucky. They were lucky that they were delayed, in
 18 a sense.
 19 And, in the case of France,
 20 the French government actually said, hey, guys,
 21 your tariffs are way too high compared to what's
 22 in the market. Let's renegotiate them down.
 23 And that's something that you
 24 pointed out yesterday or two days ago. That's a
 25 risk that could happen there.

1 And, actually, banks these
 2 days don't like tariffs that are out of market
 3 because they can see it as a risk that someone is
 4 going to say, hey, this is too much. We are going
 5 to take it away from you.
 6 It has happened in a number of
 7 jurisdictions and so banks don't like to lend
 8 against too high tariffs.
 9 So they wouldn't give credit
 10 for the high valuation.
 11 And, if I was the project and
 12 I got, at the end of the moratorium, I would go to
 13 government and say can you extend the PPA by
 14 several years so I can actually develop it and I
 15 will give you a lower price.
 16 That would actually be a
 17 rational approach to keep some value to that asset
 18 that otherwise dies because it has this cliff
 19 effect.
 20 So that was the first category
 21 of windfall effects.
 22 The other category of outliers
 23 were the US project and these very high lease
 24 payments that have been mentioned this morning for
 25 some of the US projects.

1 And, indeed, these lease
 2 payments were made to projects that were very
 3 early stage, that had no permits, that had no good
 4 connection. But they had the expectation of high
 5 tariffs. And, in that sense, they are similar to
 6 the project because, once you get a lease, you
 7 almost know for certain that you are going to get
 8 a PPA because only projects with leases can bid
 9 for the state processes that drive the PPAs.
 10 Because the lease is a federal
 11 process and the PPA are a state process so there
 12 was sort of a bottleneck at the federal level.
 13 And then, at the state level. So it's actually a
 14 novel way to get federal debt paid by the New York
 15 and Massachusetts rate payers.
 16 But it was still a bet
 17 because, indeed, these projects were not
 18 permitted. So, at the time they were made, you
 19 could say, okay, New York is very keen to offshore
 20 winds so we will get the tariff and the federal
 21 government is -- seems keen to make these projects
 22 happen.
 23 So it's about parking money
 24 for a few years and hoping that we can get that
 25 money back later on.

1 So the bet was racy. It was
 2 the one way that the oil and gas companies could
 3 beat the competition. Because, otherwise, they
 4 have no competitive advantage in offshore wind.
 5 Their cost of capital is more expensive.
 6 So having very large tickets
 7 and pushing out the competition was their way to
 8 grab projects and say, hey, we are doing green
 9 stuff. And, as it turned out, they overpaid by
 10 quite a bit in these markets and have had to take
 11 impairments.
 12 For some of these big player,
 13 it's a rational bet to make because utilities are
 14 a whiny lot. So they make one way bets. If they
 15 win, they keep it. And, if they lose, they go
 16 back to government and say give me another chance
 17 or give me a new tariff.
 18 So they say we will do the
 19 bet. It's highly political. We are going to bet
 20 on the very highly, highly political environment
 21 around these projects.
 22 Except that, in this case, in
 23 the US, it ended up biting them back because the
 24 politics of offshore wind became quite toxic. It
 25 became one of those issues that have been very

1 polarized between Democrats and Republicans and
 2 who knows where it's going to go.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Why do you say the expectation of high tariffs was
 5 relevant to them being an outlier?
 6 DR. GUILLET: Well, I mean, at
 7 some point, if you put a lot of money, you do
 8 expect to get it back. It's just that,
 9 essentially, they put the probability of not
 10 getting the permits at 100 percent, which was a
 11 very high, high threshold to meet.
 12 So that's where they're -- the
 13 price they paid are based on the assumption that
 14 these permits will be obtained and that's
 15 something is say, well, that's because the
 16 political will is very strong. And, if it's not
 17 there, we will make sure that it is -- that's the
 18 kind of bets that they made.
 19 And I think they misread the
 20 US political environment because most of these
 21 bets were made by European companies.
 22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 23 Mr. Aragón, how are we on Dr. Guillet's time?
 24 MR. ARAGÓN CARDIEL:
 25 32 minutes as compared to the 38 minutes used by

1 the Secretariat experts.
 2 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 3 Very good.
 4 Time check for you. You have
 5 six minutes.
 6 If you have got more to get
 7 through, you've only got two slides to go but you
 8 have six minutes. Our interruptions don't count
 9 against your time, nor do your answers to our
 10 interruptions, by the way.
 11 DR. GUILLET: I have got one
 12 more slide which I will go quickly through.
 13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 14 No, don't rush. You have got six minutes.
 15 DR. GUILLET: That's fine. I
 16 want to focus on the conclusion so that just get
 17 to Slide 14.
 18 That was just the tables on
 19 the comparables just to say that the sample that
 20 Secretariat has used as comparables to the project
 21 are -- most of them are very late-stage process,
 22 close to financial close or at least fully
 23 permitted, in the sense not comparable at all.
 24 And I have seen how they have
 25 tried to say that the development phase is

1 anything before financial close and, whether you
 2 are at 5 percent of the way or 95 percent of the
 3 way, it's the same phase. It's the same value.
 4 But it's not. The 5 percent developed project is
 5 not worth the same as a 95 percent developed
 6 project.
 7 So the table in 7.1 had the
 8 comparables, they are mostly more dense projects.
 9 The second table, which is the
 10 table used to calculate that proportion of project
 11 that reach, that actually reached financial close,
 12 the sample is way too, the sample is way too
 13 small.
 14 They ignore a vast number of
 15 projects the Germans, the UK round three and
 16 Belgium projects, just to give a few examples,
 17 that were at the same stage of development and did
 18 not get there. And especially did not get there
 19 in the time that was needed to get there.
 20 And, finally, the last slide
 21 on conclusions. So, again short version of my
 22 report, I don't believe the project is worth more
 23 than it was in 2015.
 24 Projects under development are
 25 valued on a milestone basis per megawatt with the

1 gold standard will be in the fully permitted at
 2 200,000 per megawatt. Early stage projects are
 3 worth a fraction of that. The fraction depending
 4 on the advancement of development across the four
 5 milestones.
 6 The project itself was an
 7 early development project so it was, at the
 8 beginning, it was at the bottom of that range in
 9 the 0.01 to 0.1 range that I presented in the
 10 first report and I believe is still correct today.
 11 So the first Tribunal put it
 12 at the top of that range which is fine. It's
 13 within the range and I believe it's still there.
 14 And, again, I don't believe
 15 the DCF method is reliable at that stage and I
 16 don't think it provides very useful information.
 17 It's just too volatile and too sensitive to the
 18 assumptions you use. And, as the market has
 19 shown, in all directions over the past 15 years,
 20 the assumptions do move the underlying, whether
 21 it's interest rates, steel prices, cost of
 22 turbines, they move.
 23 Finally, the guillotine-like
 24 risk of the termination of the PPA under very
 25 strict deadline that includes the permitting

1 phase, which is the most uncertain, time wise,
 2 presented a very high risk and that's why it would
 3 have been very hard to sell the project without a
 4 renegotiation of that deadline.
 5 And I do believe that this is
 6 backed by multiple comparables across 15 years and
 7 multiple jurisdictions.
 8 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: I have
 9 one question unrelated to this but because your
 10 valuation -- and I understand you are not an
 11 accountant.
 12 I want your thoughts on the
 13 costs associated with the letter of credit for the
 14 FIT.
 15 That would be a legitimate
 16 project cost; wouldn't it?
 17 In other words, let's just
 18 take one aspect of it. The bank requires -- there
 19 is a fee and it's not inconsiderable but there is
 20 a fee that goes along with that; that would be a
 21 legitimate project cost, in your mind?
 22 DR. GUILLET: Probably. I
 23 would need to check under what condition it can be
 24 repaid or not.
 25 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Right.

1 DR. GUILLET: But, if that's
 2 what you need to get a grid connection, that is an
 3 unavoidable cost. So that is something that would
 4 be credited to the project, indeed, as a specific
 5 item, yes.
 6 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Right,
 7 right.
 8 I am not asking you to weigh
 9 in on the amount.
 10 But the financing costs, if
 11 you needed to do it, because these are
 12 considerable, those would be legitimate project
 13 costs too?
 14 DR. GUILLET: I believe so.
 15 As you discussed earlier, I
 16 don't know what would be the legitimate rate
 17 because I don't have access to -- I didn't study
 18 the exact underlying risk.
 19 But, yes, it's a legitimate
 20 cost.
 21 CO-ARBITRATOR GOTANDA: Right,
 22 okay. Thank you.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Just on your last point on the value of the DCF
 25 and coming back to where you started of

1 characterizing it as essentially useless.
 2 In your professional opinion,
 3 is there no value at all in running a DCF as a
 4 reality check against your market comparable
 5 valuation or, indeed, your costs, investment costs
 6 valuation, if you do one, and you don't?
 7 DR. GUILLET: As a reality
 8 check, it will bring you some level of, yeah,
 9 maybe see if it's realistic. But, honestly, you
 10 can tell that from the price up front.
 11 If your price is at 50 or 80 or
 12 100, you have got a pretty good idea if you're
 13 going to be able to get below that and make a
 14 profitable project.
 15 Whether your returns is going
 16 to be 8 percent or 12 percent or 15 percent, which
 17 is an important question when you're going to need
 18 to attract investors later on. But, at this point
 19 in time, you can show scenarios that will show
 20 returns that look like what the investment they
 21 want but the credibility of that, to me, is quite
 22 low.
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 We are at an hour and a half -- thank you,
 25 Dr. Guillet. That was very helpful.

1 We are at an hour and a half.
 2 Mr. Terry, should we make a
 3 start? Maybe -- I don't know. What would you
 4 like us to do? We could make a start and run for
 5 as long as Lisa permits us to, maybe 30 minutes.
 6 That may be too long. It's late in the day.
 7 15 minutes, take a break for 15, and then come
 8 back. And should we do that?
 9 MR. TERRY: I am in the
 10 Tribunal's hands. I am ready to go. But I am I
 11 guess looking at everyone else and the amount of
 12 energy and ability to keep going.
 13 But I can certainly start and
 14 go for as long as everyone felt comfortable going.
 15 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 16 The energy may not improve.
 17 How about we do this.
 18 We go for another 15. So you
 19 make a start, get into it and so we will stop at
 20 25 to. But we will just stop for ten minutes. We
 21 will stop at 25 to and come back at quarter to 6.
 22 And then, how long we go from
 23 there, we will talk about that when we come back
 24 at quarter to 6. I don't think we will finish but
 25 you tell us at quarter to 6. Okay. Off you go.

1 MR. TERRY: Okay. And we do
 2 have some briefs, some documents to bring up to
 3 you. I think the witness already has them.
 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TERRY:
 5 Q. Mr. Guillet, just to
 6 confirm, you should have in front of you a
 7 document we called "cross-examination breach of
 8 Jérôme Guillet"?
 9 A. I do.
 10 Q. And, excuse me, I might
 11 have said Mr. I meant to say Dr. Guillet.
 12 And you should also have a
 13 copy of your December 12th, 2022, report?
 14 A. I have them.
 15 Q. And also a copy of your
 16 October 27th, 2023, report?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. I have highlighted some
 19 portions of this report just to make the
 20 examination more efficient.
 21 I'd like to start, please,
 22 Dr. Guillet, with the report that you presented
 23 when you were with Green Giraffe at the first
 24 hearing. And this is at Tab 1 of the Guillet
 25 cross brief.

1 And you'll see there this is
 2 your expert report dated November 6th, 2015.
 3 A. I see it.
 4 Q. And I want to focus on
 5 the model and the assumptions that you applied in
 6 your project comparables. And this is, of course,
 7 what you testified before the previous Tribunal.
 8 So if we could go to page 26.
 9 And if I could just start with
 10 the paragraph just below the table you have there.
 11 You distinguish between
 12 projects sold prior to being fully permitted and
 13 you call those early stage development projects;
 14 correct? Yes?
 15 A. In that report, I am not
 16 calling them anything in that sentence.
 17 Q. Right.
 18 I am combining, if you look,
 19 you say projects sold prior to being fully
 20 permitted. And, then above, you have your early
 21 stage comparables.
 22 I take it you mean the same
 23 thing when you talk about projects sold prior to
 24 being fully permitted and early stage; is that
 25 correct?

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 The heading says early stage. If you can look at
 3 the first highlighted line, it says "transactions
 4 for offshore wind projects - pre FC/FID - early
 5 stage".
 6 DR. GUILLET: Yes. And I
 7 guess, later in my reports, I fit that phase into
 8 early and mid, just to make sure I using the same.
 9 So early development in my
 10 presentation today and the later reports is
 11 probably an earlier phase. I split it into more
 12 details.
 13 So this the early stage of
 14 2015 covers more ground than in the later reports.
 15 BY MR. TERRY:
 16 Q. Okay. I will come to
 17 that later on. To be frank, I wasn't aware that
 18 you made distinctions between early and mid stage
 19 before you got to late stage. But we will come to
 20 that later on.
 21 Let's stick right now with
 22 what you told the previous Tribunal.
 23 So, if I could just look at
 24 that paragraph, it starts:
 25 "Projects sold prior to

1 being fully
 2 permitted."[as read]
 3 You say, in bracket:
 4 "Meaning that they do not
 5 have one of site control,
 6 permits that are no
 7 longer subject to appeal,
 8 a revenue regime and grid
 9 access."[as read]
 10 That's your definition of
 11 early stage projects or projects sold prior to
 12 being fully permitted; correct?
 13 A. In that report, yes.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 And then you say:
 16 "They uniformly have very
 17 low valuations, below 0.1
 18 million euros per
 19 megawatt, substantially
 20 less than euros 30
 21 million and typically
 22 closer to euros 10
 23 million for a 300
 24 megawatt scale project
 25 (or may have no material

1 value at all, depending
 2 on the
 3 circumstances)."[as read]
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. All right.
 6 And then above, in the table
 7 you have there, you have listed transactions for
 8 offshore wind projects - pre FC/FID - early stage,
 9 and you list six projects?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Okay. Now if I can go to
 12 the next page, page 27 -- sorry, before we do
 13 that, I just want to look at the --
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 As I have interjected, you said, in your answer,
 16 when Mr. Terry asked you what I thought was an
 17 uncontroversial question, that you have
 18 categorized these.
 19 This was your definition of
 20 early stage, those four factors that you and I
 21 talked about. And he said that was your
 22 definition of early stage and your answer was "in
 23 that report, yes".
 24 Is your definition different
 25 now?

1 DR. GUILLET: In the
 2 presentation that I showed today, I have actually
 3 called early development which was even before
 4 site control and mid development which was up to
 5 shovel ready.
 6 So early development, as it's
 7 being used for the tables, is correct. But I have
 8 probably, since I am really focusing on very early
 9 stage project myself, I have started making that
 10 distinction but it would be early stage projects
 11 prior to being fully permitted would be
 12 appropriate.
 13 BY MR. TERRY:
 14 Q. I if I may --
 15 A. So the mid would be part
 16 of early. It's the later part of early but it's
 17 still early stage.
 18 Q. And if I just may
 19 clarify, you mentioned that you made that
 20 distinction in your presentation.
 21 But you didn't make that
 22 distinction in the two reports that you've
 23 provided?
 24 A. That's right. That's
 25 correct.

1 Q. Okay.
 2 A. So let's stick to early
 3 stage for prior to being fully permitted, yes.
 4 Q. So I'd like to look now
 5 at the second paragraph, the one that's
 6 highlighted under the one I just talked about.
 7 And this one, here, you're
 8 talking about projects that are fully permitted.
 9 And, again, you have a very precise definition for
 10 this; meaning that they have each of site control,
 11 permits that are no longer subject to appeal, a
 12 revenue regime and grid access.
 13 That's your definition for
 14 projects that are fully permitted; correct?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And you say they do have
 17 value and that value has been typically expressed
 18 as a multiple of the project's nameplate capacity,
 19 with 0.2 million euros per megawatt being a good
 20 average figure?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And if we could go to
 23 next page, please, page 27.
 24 So I'd like to look at the
 25 tables at the top of page 27, and this is labelled

1 "transactions for offshore wind projects pre
 2 FC/FID the late stage".
 3 And so I take it this is your
 4 list of comparables that you define in your early
 5 report as late stage?
 6 A. Yes, in the subsequent
 7 reports as well.
 8 Q. Okay.
 9 And one thing I should note
 10 here is the comparables for both -- well, for late
 11 stage, they range in dates from 2008 to 2013;
 12 correct?
 13 A. In that report, yes.
 14 That's 2015 report.
 15 Q. And just, I should have
 16 done this before.
 17 But, in the early stage table,
 18 if we go back to that for a moment, the
 19 comparables range from, again, 2009 to 2013;
 20 correct?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. All right.
 23 So going back to the late
 24 stage table, consistent with your definition, you
 25 have got, you have got a column on the far right

1 which is headed "status"; do you see that?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And if we look at the,
 4 just below the chart, the asterisk, you say --
 5 beside the asterisk, you say "status of site
 6 control/permits/grid connection/revenue regime -
 7 see all details in annex 3".
 8 And, in the column for every
 9 one of these projects, you have got the status of
 10 "Y/Y/Y/Y"; what does that mean?
 11 A. Yes, yes, it has. It has
 12 these items.
 13 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN: It's
 14 got four Ys.
 15 BY MR. TERRY:
 16 Q. So each of these projects
 17 here has all of site control --
 18 A. They are fully permitted.
 19 Yes.
 20 Q. Sorry. It has all site
 21 control permits, including permits not subject to
 22 appeal, grid connection and revenue regime?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. And we can see that, if
 25 we turn to annex 3, which is excerpted on the next

1 page.
 2 This is -- is this the table
 3 that you're referring to when you said look to
 4 annex 3 to see a bit more detailed information
 5 about permitting status?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. All right.
 8 And this is the same, the same
 9 nine projects?
 10 A. The same list of
 11 projects.
 12 Q. All right.
 13 And, on each of them, you've,
 14 under the heading "site control permits revenue
 15 regime and grid access" -- sorry, we lost the
 16 document.
 17 A. Yes. I have it on paper
 18 under my eyes.
 19 And, yes, I provide a brief
 20 description of what they have for each of the four
 21 categories.
 22 Q. And this table, with the
 23 information you provide here, confirms that each
 24 of them has each of those four categories?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So, each of them, are you
 2 are confirming they are fully permitted?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And your evidence, as we
 5 have heard at the first hearing, was that when the
 6 Windstream project was an early stage development
 7 project?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. If I can take you to the
 10 next tab. This is at Tab 2 of the brief. I have
 11 got a copy here of the presentation that you made
 12 to the Windstream Tribunal.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Dated February 18th,
 15 2016; correct?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And, if I turn to the
 18 page that's excerpted here, you, in fact, have
 19 positioned the Windstream project, and we can see
 20 it's somewhere in the middle between you say start
 21 and fully permitted; correct?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. All right.
 24 Now, this is a presentation,
 25 of course, that you made to the previous Tribunal.

1 I would like to take you now to the Tribunal's
 2 award and the statements that it made of
 3 comparable transactions.
 4 And this is at Tab 3 of the
 5 brief.
 6 If I could start, please, with
 7 paragraph 477.
 8 You can see the Tribunal says:
 9 "The most comprehensive
 10 evidence relating to the
 11 comparable transactions
 12 methodology was provided
 13 by Dr. Guillet of Green
 14 Giraffe, and the
 15 Tribunal, therefore,
 16 takes his evidence as a
 17 starting point of
 18 analysis."[as read]
 19 And I take it you've read the
 20 award; have you, Dr. Guillet?
 21 A. Not recently but, yes.
 22 Q. Okay.
 23 But you can see the Tribunal
 24 here is relying upon your evidence and your
 25 comparable transactions methodology?

1 A. Okay.
 2 Q. All right.
 3 And then, and then I am just
 4 going to read what they say about your testimony.
 5 They say, paragraph 478:
 6 "Dr. Guillet testified
 7 that offshore wind
 8 projects have relatively
 9 consistent values in
 10 Europe. Depending on the
 11 development stage, the
 12 project value may range
 13 from below 0.1 million
 14 per megawatt per projects
 15 that are not fully
 16 permitted (i.e.--"[as
 17 read]
 18 And they quote your definition
 19 here:
 20 "That do not have one of
 21 site control, permits, a
 22 revenue regime, and grid
 23 access, to 0.2 million
 24 per megawatt for fully
 25 permitted early-stage

1 projects to approximately
 2 --"[as read]
 3 And let me stop there.
 4 That is the information that's
 5 consistent with the testimony you provided to the
 6 Tribunal; correct?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And then:
 9 "To approximately euro 4
 10 million per megawatt for
 11 projects that have
 12 reached financial closure
 13 and up to euro 4.5
 14 million megawatt for
 15 projects that have
 16 reached commercial
 17 operation."[as read]
 18 And then the Tribunal says:
 19 "As to the early-stage
 20 projects, specifically,
 21 Dr. Guillet's evidence on
 22 actual transactions
 23 before the Tribunal shows
 24 that the overall
 25 valuations of such

1 projects range from
 2 0.01 million per megawatt
 3 to approximately euro
 4 0.1 million per megawatt,
 5 depending on the
 6 development stage.
 7 Whereas late development
 8 stage projects have been
 9 sold for prices ranging
 10 from euro 0.1 million
 11 megawatt to euro
 12 0.5 million per
 13 megawatt."[as read]
 14 And feel free to check, if you
 15 want.
 16 But, as I read it, those
 17 statements there as to the range of values for
 18 early stage and late-stage projects correspond
 19 with the tables that you provided to the Tribunal;
 20 is that correct?
 21 A. In my previous reports,
 22 yes, so not in today's presentation where I have
 23 made this distinction between early and mid. But
 24 they should be put together.
 25 So Slide 7 of my presentation,

1 you can put 7 early and mid correspond to early
 2 stage in the reports. So to avoid any ambiguity.
 3 Q. Just to be clear,
 4 Dr. Guillet, I am just talking about what the
 5 previous Tribunal did.
 6 A. Yeah, yeah.
 7 Q. And they relied on your
 8 tables that you provided to them, at the time, to
 9 come up with their comparable transaction ranges;
 10 correct?
 11 A. Yes, that's what it looks
 12 like.
 13 Q. All right. You agree?
 14 A. Yes, that's what's
 15 written.
 16 Q. Okay.
 17 And then if I could turn to
 18 the next paragraph, paragraph 479.
 19 Dr. Guillet's evidence on
 20 early stage projects covered six different
 21 transactions.
 22 Whereas Mr. Goncalves'
 23 evidence covered three of the transactions
 24 considered by Dr. Guillet, as well as one
 25 additional transaction on an early-stage project

1 (Luchterduinen) which was not included in
 2 Dr. Guillet's evidence.
 3 :
 4 "The multiples of these
 5 seven transactions range
 6 from 0.01 million per
 7 megawatt to approximately
 8 euro 0.1 million per
 9 megawatt, with a median
 10 of approximately
 11 0.08 million per megawatt
 12 and an average of
 13 approximately euro
 14 0.01 million per
 15 megawatt. As noted
 16 above, Messrs. Taylor and
 17 Low did not consider
 18 early stage projects."[as
 19 read]
 20 So you'd agree with me, I
 21 assume, that the Tribunal here was relying on the
 22 six different transactions you provided plus one
 23 additional transaction from Mr. Goncalves, who was
 24 another expert for the Respondent, Canada, to
 25 describe -- and then goes on to assess medians and

1 averages based on those comparables you have
 2 provided with Mr. Goncalves' additional one.
 3 A. That's what I read as
 4 well, yes.
 5 Q. Okay.
 6 And then, finally, at
 7 paragraph 480, so last paragraph I would like to
 8 take you to here, the Tribunal says:
 9 "Depending on whether one
 10 relies on the median or
 11 the average multiple and,
 12 subject to any further
 13 adjustments that may be
 14 required, as noted above,
 15 the evidence on
 16 comparable transactions,
 17 thus, suggests that the
 18 value of the project
 19 would fall between euro
 20 18 million based on the
 21 average multiple of euro
 22 0.06 million per megawatt
 23 and euro 24 million based
 24 on the median multiple of
 25 euro 0.08 million per

1 megawatt."[as read]
 2 So you can see the Tribunal
 3 reaches their decision on the range of value based
 4 on the six comparable transactions plus the one
 5 from Mr. Goncalves; correct?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. And the six transactions
 8 that you provide; correct?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Now, I would like to
 11 leave the last proceeding and turn now to the
 12 reports that you have provided in this proceeding.
 13 And the first report,
 14 specifically, to start with and that's at
 15 December 12th, 2022, report.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Sorry, Mr. Terry. You were in full swing.
 18 MR. TERRY: Again, I am happy
 19 to stop at whatever point makes sense for everyone
 20 else here.
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 Let's do it now because we have stopped.
 23 So I definitely want to hear
 24 where you are going today.
 25 So let's come back at -- we

1 are at 5:40. Let's come back -- should we come
 2 back at 5:50.
 3 MR. TERRY: Sure.
 4 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 5 And talk about how long we think we might usefully
 6 go for. And it's going to depend on how long you
 7 think you will be. And, if we reach into
 8 tomorrow, how do we use the least amount of time
 9 tomorrow on this.
 10 That's what we are trying to
 11 achieve.
 12 MR. TERRY: That sounds fine
 13 to me. Thank you.
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 But still being useful tonight so we are not all
 16 so weary that it's less productive.
 17 MR. TERRY: Sorry, I just want
 18 to confirm. Ms. Shelley was just mentioning to
 19 me.
 20 Are the three experts that we
 21 heard from this morning, are they still
 22 sequestered at all? Because we weren't sure
 23 whether you would still want to hear from them.
 24 We are happy if they are sequestered. That's
 25 fine. I just want to clarify that.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 2 Yeah, I think best they are -- if you had of
 3 needed them but you seem perfectly well equipped.
 4 If you had needed them for your cross of
 5 Dr. Guillet, we could have talked about that. But
 6 it seems you are all good. It's not your first
 7 time at this rodeo.
 8 MR. TERRY: At this point, I
 9 am fine.
 10 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 11 All right. We can talk about it if that arises.
 12 But, otherwise, we will leave
 13 them sequestered, gentlemen. You have one
 14 another's company tonight. But staying under the
 15 shroud of silence vis-à-vis the team, if you
 16 could, please. And we will need you all here
 17 tomorrow as well.
 18 If you have been chatting, you
 19 can't have because we haven't had a break. We are
 20 going to have one now but you are still
 21 sequestered; do you understand.
 22 A. [TOBIS] Yes?
 23 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 24 Very good.
 25 Ten to.

1 Sorry, Dr. Guillet, it's not
 2 your first time either but you are not to talk to
 3 anybody at all about the case.
 4 --- Upon recess at 5:42 p.m.
 5 --- Upon resuming at 5:55 p.m.
 6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 7 Mr. Terry, it's kind of up to you. We could go an
 8 hour now and then finish off in the morning. It
 9 depends how much you have got.
 10 I think two and a half hours
 11 is around about what Ms. Squires had. You may not
 12 need as much.
 13 MR. TERRY: I am happy to go
 14 now for -- I mean, as you suggested, about an hour
 15 or so and see where we are at that point in time.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 Yeah. You can maybe stop at quarter to 7 and
 18 check in there. I would like Lisa to be out of
 19 the building by 7.
 20 --- Off-record discussion re timing
 21 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 22 We will have a hard stop at quarter to 7 today,
 23 wherever we are. And we will come back tomorrow
 24 and do what we can.
 25 --- Off-record discussion

1 BY MR. TERRY:
 2 Q. Dr. Guillet, I was just
 3 starting to take you to your December 12th, 2022,
 4 report. And I'd like to start by again looking at
 5 the methodology and assumptions that you apply in
 6 this report with respect to comparables.
 7 A. Okay.
 8 Q. So if we can go, please,
 9 to paragraph 24.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And, at paragraph 24, you
 12 say:
 13 "In this report, I
 14 confirm that the
 15 methodology to value
 16 offshore wind farms
 17 proposed in the Green
 18 Giraffe report was still
 19 fully applicable to the
 20 valuation of offshore
 21 wind farms in 2020."[as
 22 read]
 23 So you confirm that here that
 24 the methodology --
 25 A. I do.

1 Q. Okay.
 2 :
 3 "That methodology is
 4 based on the development
 5 stage of offshore wind
 6 projects, whereby
 7 investors differentiate
 8 between early stage
 9 development, late stage
 10 development, projects
 11 under construction and
 12 operating projects."[as
 13 read]
 14 So that's the methodology you
 15 are applying --
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. -- to this report?
 18 And then, if we go to
 19 paragraph 26, you say:
 20 "Late development phase
 21 projects are projects
 22 that are 'fully
 23 permitted', meaning that
 24 they benefit from, one,
 25 site control; two,

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1 permits that are no
 2 longer subject to any
 3 potential appeals
 4 process; three, a price
 5 regime for the sale of
 6 electricity (whether
 7 under a Feed-In Tariff,
 8 power purchase agreement,
 9 with a fixed price
 10 formula or a contract for
 11 differences); and, four,
 12 grid access, as further
 13 explained in paragraph 47
 14 and subsequent."[as read]
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And you answer that's the
 17 methodology you're applying; yes?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. And, at paragraph 27, you
 20 state:
 21 "I confirm that I
 22 continue to consider that
 23 a fully permitted project
 24 has a value of
 25 approximately 0.2 million

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1 as assessed by investors
 2 to be made to each of the
 3 milestones required to
 4 have a fully permitted
 5 project. Early stage
 6 projects are generally
 7 valued between 0.01 and
 8 0.1 million euros per
 9 megawatt."[as read]
 10 And then you have a reference
 11 to paragraphs.
 12 So that, again, you are
 13 applying the same methodology and, really, we see
 14 the same figures of million euros per megawatt
 15 that we also saw in the Green Giraffe report.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And then you state, at
 18 paragraph 31, you say:
 19 "My position today is
 20 that the valuation of the
 21 project, as of the
 22 valuation date, would not
 23 be different than the
 24 value articulated in the
 25 Green Giraffe report."[as

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1 euros per megawatt and
 2 this value has remained
 3 stable over the
 4 years."[as read]
 5 And that's consistent with
 6 what I think you were telling in response to the
 7 Tribunal questions --
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. -- and in-chief as well?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. All right.
 12 And if -- and then, at
 13 paragraph 28, if we can go a little further down,
 14 you state that:
 15 "Early stage development
 16 projects will be worth a
 17 certain percentage of
 18 this figure, increasing
 19 towards 0.2 million euros
 20 per megawatt as they
 21 progress closer toward
 22 achieving a permit. The
 23 actual percentage will
 24 depend on how much
 25 progress has been made or

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1 read]
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. Okay.
 4 A. Which I stated today
 5 again.
 6 Q. All right.
 7 Now, as in the Windstream I
 8 report, you have two comparable tables, the early
 9 development stage and the late stage. And I would
 10 like to turn to those now.
 11 And the early development
 12 stage table is at page 19 of your report.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And we can see here you
 15 have 23 comparable transactions.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. And transaction dates
 18 ranging from 2008 up to 2020?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And then, if I go to
 21 the -- to Table 7, which is at page 26 of your
 22 report.
 23 Here, you have got a heading
 24 that says -- sorry. If I go to the heading "late
 25 stage development projects".

1 And, again, you define these
2 at paragraph 68 as projects that are fully
3 permitted, meaning they have all four of the
4 features identified previously: One, site control;
5 two, unappealable permits; three, grid access; and
6 four, revenue regime.

7 So the same definition you
8 applied in the Green Giraffe report in 2015;
9 correct?

10 A. I do try to be
11 consistent. I hope we don't need to repeat it
12 every single time. And, basically, if it's not
13 stipulated in full each time, it's still the same
14 fully permitted, is a well-defined concept.

15 Q. Okay.

16 And then at, if we look in
17 this table, there are 24 comparable transactions
18 that you have put forward.

19 A. Yes. We -- I haven't
20 counted them recently but I trust your number. I
21 probably have counted them in the summary tables.
22 But, yes.

23 Q. And the transaction dates
24 range from, as with the early stage development
25 from 2008 to 2020?

1 A. Yeah. They were meant
2 to -- I mean, basically, they are all the
3 transactions for which I had information that I
4 believed to be reliable and useable to have as
5 wide a sample as possible.

6 So that's the -- essentially,
7 the standard is well what stage of development and
8 then whether I have the information.

9 So, every project for which I
10 had information, I put it in. I do note that
11 these are the values prior to the corrections that
12 were made in my 2023 report.

13 Q. And in terms of all the
14 transactions for which you had information, and
15 why did you go back to 2008?

16 Was that a particular date
17 that you chose, for some reason, in both tables?

18 A. That's the earliest
19 transaction for which I had information. And
20 there were not a lot of projects before that.

21 Q. Okay.

22 So in terms of the methodology
23 you were applying to determine what should be in
24 your tables, you took all the transactions you had
25 knowledge of over the past 12 years? Or was it

1 more than 12 years and then included those in the
2 transaction pool?

3 A. Yeah, effectively. So
4 all those for which I had direct information,
5 having been directly involved, and those for which
6 I deemed that the public information was
7 sufficient, which is not always the case. When
8 you have press releases, they give partial
9 information and it's not possible to guess or to
10 identify a like for like price.

11 So, when it was possible
12 enough or close enough, I tried to use these.
13 But, otherwise, when I considered that information
14 was too partial, I just didn't have the
15 information.

16 Q. I want to ask you some
17 questions focusing on the reliability of the
18 information in your tables.

19 A. Sure.

20 Q. And if I could start with
21 the -- I think it's on the same table. I will
22 have to get my reading glasses on.

23 It's the -- I would like to
24 start with the Ørsted project.

25 And that's the -- that's the

1 project that's listed five from the bottom, Ørsted
2 US assets?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. And Ørsted, as you have
5 pointed out here, this was a transaction that
6 involved 50 percent of the total assets which you
7 have described as 860 megawatts?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And to come up with that
10 amount of 0.12, if we look at the far right
11 column, .12 euros per megawatt, what you did --
12 this is in the Spruce report.

13 You divide the transaction
14 amount, which you describe as approximately 100
15 million euros, by the full megawatt capacity of
16 860; is that correct?

17 A. Yes --

18 Q. That's what gave you the
19 original 0.12?

20 A. Is that where I made the
21 mistake or where I have the number right? Is this
22 one where the calculation errors are.

23 Q. And, just to clarify,
24 this Ørsted US asset is the one also referred to
25 as South Fork and Revolution Wind?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Yes. Okay.
 3 A. I mean, if you want me to
 4 acknowledge that I made calculation errors, I have
 5 written it like I write in my report. So if you
 6 want to spend half an hour to restate that.
 7 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 8 This is not that. I am looking at your second
 9 report table.
 10 Mr. Terry, if it's just as
 11 easy to use his second report table, but Ørsted
 12 doesn't have a correction. It's only the Empire
 13 and Beacon.
 14 MR. TERRY: No. Actually, in
 15 fairness, Ørsted has been corrected in his second.
 16 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 17 I'm sorry --
 18 MR. TERRY: My point isn't to
 19 embarrass the expert. I just want to be -- I just
 20 want to go through and have the Tribunal and all
 21 of us understand the errors that were made and
 22 then I just have certain other questions that
 23 follow from that.
 24 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 25 Okay.

1 BY MR. TERRY:
 2 Q. Indeed -- well, first of
 3 all, this was pointed out to you by Secretariat
 4 when they filed their reply report in response to
 5 your's; correct? This mathematical error?
 6 A. It was in the Secretariat
 7 report and then I acknowledged it -- in the second
 8 Secretariat report and then I acknowledged it and
 9 corrected it in my second 2023 report.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 So if we go to -- and we can
 12 see that in the October 27th, 2023, report. We
 13 can see in late -- this is page 58, Table 7, late
 14 stage transactions.
 15 And you can see the US Ørsted
 16 assets have gained -- you have, as I understand
 17 it, bearing in mind your rounding practice, you
 18 have doubled the value from 0.12 to 0.23 million
 19 euros per megawatt; is that correct?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Right.
 22 And that's based on the fact
 23 that this transaction was not for the whole 860
 24 megawatts but, but at least, in this chart, you
 25 have reflected that, in your view, the transaction

1 was for 430 megawatts --
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. 50 percent.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Now, there is a second
 6 error that Secretariat pointed out with respect to
 7 this sale.
 8 They stated that the total
 9 megawatts was actually not 860 megawatts, but was
 10 actually 834 megawatts.
 11 And if I could turn up Tab 4
 12 of your -- of the brief.
 13 This is a press release with
 14 respect to Ørsted divesting 50 percent of the
 15 South Fork, Revolution Wind and two New England
 16 offshore wind lease areas to Eversource.
 17 Have you seen this document
 18 before?
 19 A. No, but I see it's an
 20 Ørsted press release.
 21 Q. All right.
 22 And you will see, if we look
 23 down -- we have highlighted the numbers -- the
 24 transaction involved, if I am adding correctly,
 25 Revolution Wind, 704 megawatts. And then South

1 Fork, 130 megawatts. With a total of 834
 2 megawatts.
 3 And that's what Secretariat
 4 pointed out to you; do you recall that?
 5 A. Yeah. It's a 3 percent
 6 mistake. And since I am doing an approximation by
 7 splitting the value 50-50, to me, it's a smaller
 8 error than the error I am making by making an
 9 estimate as to how the value allocated between the
 10 early stage and late stage of the project.
 11 So it has no impact on the
 12 results of my estimate.
 13 Q. And just to -- I don't
 14 want you to do the math right now, although you
 15 have mentioned you have some expertise in math.
 16 But when we did the math and
 17 you applied, you actually changed the 860 to 834,
 18 the number changed from 0.23 to 0.24.
 19 But I take it you don't
 20 consider that material?
 21 A. Material, no. No.
 22 Q. Oh. And then apologies.
 23 Just for the record, the exhibit number for this
 24 press release is C-2209.
 25 Now, if we could go back to

1 Table 7 in your first report.
 2 I'd like to ask you some
 3 questions about the LEM project.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And, this one, you can
 6 see listed just above the Ørsted project.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And you can see, in your
 9 first report, you stated the value of the
 10 transaction is 0.15 million euros per megawatt?
 11 A. Yeah. And I corrected to
 12 0.32 in the next one.
 13 Q. All right. So if we
 14 could change to -- if we could go to Table 7 of
 15 the second report.
 16 You changed that from 0.15 to
 17 0.32. And that, again, was after Secretariat
 18 pointed out the errors that you had made; correct?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. And, again, that's an
 21 increase of more than two times the original
 22 valuation you had?
 23 A. Exactly. Two times.
 24 But, yes, in this case, even more because -- yeah,
 25 two times.

1 Q. Now, this is -- and I
 2 don't want to belabour this point because we have
 3 spent a lot of time on it.
 4 The LEM transaction included
 5 both and upfront payment and contingent
 6 consideration; correct?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And the 0.32 number you
 9 have here does not include the contingent
 10 consideration?
 11 A. I would need to check my
 12 records because this is a transaction on which we
 13 were involved as advisors to Sumitomo. So I would
 14 actually have information as to what's the
 15 conditional payments were related to.
 16 I don't have this information
 17 off the top of my head right now so I can't tell
 18 you.
 19 But the standard that I have
 20 applied, as I mentioned, was that, if the payment
 21 was certain or quasi certain, or at least a very
 22 high probability of happening, I would include it
 23 into the transaction value.
 24 And, if it was conditional to
 25 milestones or to future things happening that were

1 not certain, I would not include it.
 2 From the numbers that I have
 3 seen that you have provided, it seems I have not
 4 included, which would mean that I did consider it
 5 to be at risk and consistent with the methodology
 6 which, I explained, I would not have included it.
 7 But, as discussed with the
 8 president, I accept that using the audited numbers
 9 from DPR is a legitimate position.
 10 I tend not to because I think
 11 it brings more confusion than clarity. Because
 12 you start comparing different things that are
 13 increasingly different, depending on how the
 14 milestones and how the conditions are to these
 15 payments.
 16 So it's my personal belief
 17 that it is simpler and fairer to not use these
 18 conditional payments but I accept that this is a
 19 personal position.
 20 Q. I'd like to take you to
 21 Tab 5 of the brief.
 22 And you'll see that this is
 23 the independent auditor's report dated
 24 December 31st, 2019, of EDP?
 25 A. Yes which we have seen

1 earlier today already, yes.
 2 Q. The document number is
 3 C-2260.
 4 And I believe, Dr. Guillet, we
 5 have seen information about this but we haven't
 6 seen the actual auditor's report yet.
 7 If we can go to the second
 8 page, you will see the auditor was PwC and this is
 9 the independent auditor's report on the
 10 consolidated annual account; do you see that?
 11 A. Yes. I mean, you are
 12 going to make the point that you have just made
 13 and I can repeat it. I accept that it's --
 14 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 15 Let me ask his questions. It works better that
 16 way.
 17 BY MR. TERRY:
 18 Q. If we could go to the
 19 next page, please.
 20 And, yes, we have had
 21 discussion of this earlier, but this is, this
 22 auditor's report states, in the sections we have
 23 highlighted here, the report deals with, among
 24 other things, with the contingent consideration.
 25 And, the sections we have

1 highlighted, you will see that the first one is
 2 with respect to the sale by EDP Renewables of
 3 13.5 percent of the equity consolidated company,
 4 Eoliennes en Mer Dieppe Le Tréport, by 39,077,000
 5 euros. And then there is an amount in the
 6 highlighted portion that says:
 7 "The above sale price
 8 includes a contingent
 9 consideration according
 10 to the relevant
 11 agreements signed."[as
 12 read]
 13 And I want to highlight these
 14 key words:
 15 "Which fair value, as of
 16 December 31st, 2018,
 17 amounts to 16,408,000
 18 euros."[as read]
 19 Do you see that?
 20 A. I didn't get the name of
 21 the company.
 22 Q. Yeah, you can see the
 23 reference above in the bullet. It's -- this is
 24 the LE transaction; right? You recognize the same
 25 transaction that we discussed in your comparables

1 tables?
 2 A. I know, just checking
 3 which paragraph are you reading --
 4 Q. Sorry, I apologize if I
 5 was confusing.
 6 I am reading, if we go down
 7 the first bullet, the bullet that says according
 8 to the sale agreements celebrated in 2018 between
 9 Sumitomo Corporation and EDPR and then there's two
 10 bullets below that.
 11 So I was just reading from the
 12 first bullet. Do you see that?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. And, the second bullet,
 15 it says:
 16 "EDP Renewables sold
 17 13.5 percent of the
 18 equity consolidated
 19 company."[as read]
 20 And it says:
 21 "The above sale price
 22 includes a contingent
 23 consideration, according
 24 to the relevant
 25 agreements signed, which

1 fair value, as of
 2 December 31st, 2018,
 3 amounts to 20,143,000
 4 euros."[as read]
 5 And, again, in both these
 6 statements, there's a reference to the fair value.
 7 Mr. Guillet, seeing these
 8 auditors' report, does that change your view as to
 9 whether it's appropriate for you, in your
 10 valuation here presented to the Tribunal, to
 11 include these contingent amounts as part of the
 12 value of the LEM project?
 13 A. It does not.
 14 As I have said, I accept that
 15 it's a reasonable position to take, but I stand by
 16 my position which I believe is also reasonable.
 17 Q. Now, I would like to just
 18 go to two other upward adjustments you made in
 19 your Table 7 after Secretariat pointed out
 20 additional errors.
 21 So if we could use the same
 22 table here.
 23 First of all, the -- the
 24 Seagreen 1 transaction, there are two Seagreen
 25 transactions. This is the one in green, that

1 happened in 2018. You can see it's seven -- you
 2 can see that one?
 3 A. Yes, I can see it.
 4 Q. If the Tribunal can see
 5 it too, you have a number there that's written in
 6 bold, 0.25 million euros per megawatt?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And the bold numbers here
 9 are information that you have put it in bold
 10 because it's information that's changed between
 11 your first and second reports; correct?
 12 A. Correct. It was 1200 in
 13 the first one.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 So you referred -- and when
 16 you're referring to 1200, you had inadvertently
 17 used, for the megawatt amount, you had used some
 18 of the number 1200 in that column and that had
 19 previously given you a valuation of 0.22 million
 20 euros per megawatt?
 21 And, as a result of
 22 Secretariat pointing out an error to you, you
 23 changed the amount of the megawatt and that gave
 24 you a new value of 0.25 euros per megawatt;
 25 correct?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And then one other
 3 example here in the project before that, the Neart
 4 na Gaoithe, NNG. You have a figure of 1.33 for
 5 the value there.
 6 And, again, in response to
 7 Secretariats pointing this out to you that you had
 8 made an error, you changed that from 1.25 to 1.33;
 9 correct?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Noting that, on this one, the
 12 value I use is actually higher than what
 13 Secretariat had. So there's variability in these
 14 numbers.
 15 But, to me, this is, you know,
 16 second order. It's better to be approximately
 17 right than exactly wrong is an old saying.
 18 Q. And then if I could go to
 19 table --
 20 A. And, by the way, the
 21 Seagreen project ended up being 1,075 so neither
 22 of these numbers is correct, in terms of what's
 23 actually been built.
 24 So there is some variability
 25 in these numbers that's in error as to the

1 development phase of the projects.
 2 Q. Right.
 3 But we, of course here, first
 4 of all, are focused on what was known in 2020;
 5 correct?
 6 A. Yeah, yeah.
 7 But I am saying that these are
 8 second order errors and they -- there is always
 9 small changes at the margin of these projects.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 And we are also focused on
 12 when the transaction occurred, what the buyer and
 13 seller viewed as being in terms of information at
 14 the time, the megawatts, all that information. We
 15 are focused on what was known at the time, not
 16 what's happened since then.
 17 A. Okay.
 18 Q. Correct.
 19 Now, there's also one other
 20 example I would like to point out from your early
 21 stage project. And if we could go to Table 4 on
 22 your first report.
 23 This is not Table 7 but
 24 Table 4, which -- excuse my delay -- yeah,
 25 Table 4. Yeah, Table 4 is at page 19 of your

1 first report.
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And this is the Empire
 4 and Beacon transaction.
 5 And, again, this is similar to
 6 the Ørsted transaction that we discussed. This is
 7 a purchase of 50 percent of the assets and you
 8 made the same calculation error here and you -- so
 9 the 0.15 was, in fact, half as much of the value
 10 as it should have been; is that correct?
 11 A. Yes, I will acknowledge
 12 my errors as many times as you ask. Yes.
 13 Q. And that was then changed
 14 to 0.28. And, in Table 4, the revised table of
 15 your -- which is page 57 of your second report;
 16 correct?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. All right.
 19 Every one of these errors that
 20 you made resulted in you understating the million
 21 euros per megawatt valuation for each of these
 22 projects; correct?
 23 A. As it happens, yes.
 24 Q. Now, Secretariat was only
 25 able to point out these errors because it knew the

1 transaction price because the information about
 2 these comparables was on the public record; is
 3 that correct?
 4 A. I don't know.
 5 Q. All right.
 6 What I am getting at here is,
 7 if a lot of the transactions you describe in your
 8 tables don't have the transaction price. They
 9 just say "ND" in the case where the transaction
 10 price should be in the table.
 11 So if you look, for example,
 12 at the early development stage chart which is
 13 Table 4, page 57 of your second report.
 14 If I can pull up a little bit.
 15 I mean, we have highlighted in green, going down
 16 there, in the amount euros per million of the
 17 transaction, there are 13.
 18 So more than half of your 23
 19 comparables list "ND" for the transaction amount.
 20 And then what you do for the
 21 million euros per megawatt is you have greater or
 22 less than values for those.
 23 So perhaps you can -- and we
 24 see similar numbers on the late stage table at
 25 page 58. Not as many but there are five

1 transactions there that have the ND instead of the
 2 actual amount.
 3 And I understand that ND, you
 4 footnote that at footnote 43 of your first report,
 5 ND means "not disclosed", i.e. the information is
 6 available to Green Giraffe but subject to
 7 confidentiality undertakings.
 8 And NA, which I take -- does
 9 NA mean "not applicable" -- or, "not available".
 10 It means it's not available to Green Giraffe.
 11 And I just note that some of
 12 these, there are some references in the early
 13 stage transaction table -- if we can go back to
 14 that for a moment -- when there is a reference to
 15 NA. For example, we see US Wind, and we see the
 16 AquaVentus examples towards the bottom that
 17 included the reference to NA rather than ND.
 18 So, so, I do recall,
 19 Dr. Guillet, that, when you did your first report,
 20 you also had some reliance on confidential
 21 information?
 22 A. It's the same, yes.
 23 Q. Sorry, the Green Giraffe
 24 report. You indicate you had access to
 25 confidential information at that time.

1 Is this the same database of
 2 confidential information you're relying on?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And just -- I just want
 5 to be clear about this.
 6 You left Green Giraffe in,
 7 perhaps you can remind me of the date?
 8 A. In the summer of 2021.
 9 Q. And now you are -- you
 10 have a company called Snow; is that correct?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. So this database of
 13 confidential information, just so I can understand
 14 how you -- no longer being with Green Giraffe, how
 15 do you still have access to this confidential
 16 information?
 17 A. As part of the agreement
 18 for my departure of Green Giraffe, the then
 19 ongoing mandates for arbitration, and there were
 20 three of them at the time that were under Green
 21 Giraffe's name but essentially performed by me,
 22 were transferred to me as part of the departure
 23 settlement. And that included me being authorized
 24 to keep access to the database of underlying data.
 25 So I do have access to the

1 data and I have the right to have access to it.
 2 But it's still subject to the same confidentiality
 3 undertakings, but I do have access to the data
 4 points.
 5 Q. And if you were going to
 6 obtain a waiver of those confidential
 7 undertakings, would that be from Green Giraffe
 8 that you would have to obtain it?
 9 A. No. It would be from
 10 each of the parties involved in the transactions.
 11 I mean, some of them are
 12 pretty old so they are probably released. I'd
 13 need to -- I don't know who I would need to
 14 discuss to but I would need to get some legal
 15 advice. But I guess, potentially, some of the
 16 older ones are probably out of confidentiality
 17 undertakings.
 18 Maybe. I don't know. To be
 19 checked.
 20 Q. And who actually compiled
 21 this information? The confidential information?
 22 A. Well, me together with
 23 people in my team at Green Giraffe.
 24 Q. So, after Secretariat
 25 pointed out the errors you had made, did you go

1 back and check your confidential information to
 2 see whether you had made similar errors?
 3 A. I don't believe I did,
 4 no.
 5 Q. And how exactly can we or
 6 the experts of the Tribunal validate the valuation
 7 you're providing if you're not able to disclose
 8 the actual transaction price?
 9 A. I guess you can't.
 10 Q. Now I'd like to now look
 11 a little more closely at some of the transactions
 12 you decide in your reports would fall into the
 13 late stage category rather than the early stage
 14 category.
 15 And I'd like to go to a new
 16 table, Table 8 at page 25 of the -- of your first
 17 report, the October 22nd, report.
 18 CO-ARBITRATOR MCLACHLIN:
 19 December.
 20 MR. TERRY: Sorry,
 21 December 22nd.
 22 BY MR. TERRY:
 23 Q. Now you have a table here
 24 that is similar to the -- very similar, at least
 25 in structure, to the table we saw earlier in annex

1 3 of the Green Giraffe report; correct?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. And you state, at the
 4 top, paragraph 72:
 5 "The following table
 6 shows the permitting
 7 status of the project at
 8 the moment of transaction
 9 and hence provides
 10 background for the
 11 valuation of the
 12 individual projects."[as
 13 read]
 14 Now --
 15 A. Yup.
 16 Q. -- in contrast to the
 17 annex 3 table we looked at earlier, under the
 18 "permit" column, there are a number of projects
 19 that you state do not have, do not fulfil the
 20 permit qualification or are under appeal; correct?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. All right.
 23 And I'd like to look at each
 24 of these.
 25 Starting with the Dungeon one.

1 And these are highlighted, just to make it easier.
 2 But the Dudgeon transaction
 3 from 2012. Under "permits", you state "no".
 4 And then I would like to look
 5 at where you have placed this Dudgeon project. If
 6 we could go to -- we should probably go to the
 7 second report on this Table 7.
 8 We see the Dudgeon project.
 9 You described it's a late stage development
 10 project and the value here is 0.30 million euros
 11 per megawatt.
 12 So, if we apply the
 13 methodology that you used in your Green Giraffe
 14 report for the previous Tribunal, because this
 15 project does not have the -- as you put it, the Y,
 16 the yes for the permit status, we would put that
 17 under the early stage development transaction
 18 table. And that would, of course, add a
 19 transaction that had a valuation of 0.30 million
 20 euros per megawatt.
 21 I am talking about if you
 22 applied the same methodology that you used in your
 23 first, your Green Giraffe report; is that correct?
 24 A. No, it's not. Because,
 25 as I have said, I think, in different places,

1 fully permitted, it's a formal status. But you
 2 can be close to enough that the transactions will
 3 be considered late stage.
 4 Fully permitted, if you look
 5 at it from 0 to 100 percent, being 5 percent fully
 6 permitted or 95 percent fully permitted is not the
 7 same thing.
 8 We can discuss some of the
 9 others where I have the explicit information.
 10 On Dudgeon, I don't remember,
 11 to be honest, what was the missing piece but for
 12 Gemini, which is the next one in --
 13 Q. --
 14 A. To explain, there is a
 15 reason why I consider it to be late stage. It's
 16 professional judgment that they were close enough
 17 to be fully permitted that it was comparable to
 18 the other full permitted transactions.
 19 Q. Okay. Looking at what
 20 you just said. You said "on Dudgeon, I don't
 21 remember, to be honest, what was the missing
 22 piece". But you say, in your professional
 23 judgment, you decided to put it into the late
 24 stage transaction.
 25 Without knowing what the

1 missing piece was?
 2 A. No, I did know but it's a
 3 2012 transaction. I have compiled this database
 4 over the years. So, if you ask me on a
 5 transaction from 2012, I would need to go back
 6 into my archives and see what I can find about it.
 7 But, right now, off the top of
 8 my head, I don't remember.
 9 What I do remember is that, if
 10 I decided to put it in this table and not the
 11 other, is because it was close enough to being
 12 fully permitted.
 13 And that's why I am pointing
 14 out to Gemini or Neart na Gaoithe, which are
 15 others in the same situation where I have put no
 16 to the permits, because it's formally no but it's
 17 something that they are going to get at a known
 18 date.
 19 Q. Listen, Dr. Guillet. We
 20 will take each of the examples in turn. But I
 21 just want to be clear.
 22 My understanding -- and you
 23 said this very clearly in your evidence.
 24 In your Green Giraffe report,
 25 the last Windstream Tribunal, you weren't

1 exercising professional judgment. You were very
 2 clear with your late stage transaction projects.
 3 They checked all those boxes. There was --
 4 everything was either was fully permitted and
 5 there were no permits under appeal.
 6 That's correct; isn't it?
 7 A. That's the standard for
 8 fully permitted, yes.
 9 But, again, these values are
 10 estimates.
 11 So the professional judgment
 12 is it close enough, does it risk -- what's the
 13 risk to get there.
 14 If the risk is considered by
 15 the investors to be low, then they will accept the
 16 valuation as if that last permit was already
 17 there. For instance, if it's a permit, if it's
 18 something specific. And for those where I have
 19 the memory today of the examples, I will give it
 20 to you.
 21 But, if you applied that
 22 standard, the project has no site control, no
 23 grid, no PPA, no, no permits. It's worth zero.
 24 Q. Dr. Guillet --
 25 A. If you want to apply that

1 standard and not accept that there's professional
 2 judgment applied to these evaluations, that's
 3 fine. But then let's apply it to the project to
 4 the same extent.
 5 Q. Dr. Guillet, I am talking
 6 about the -- I am not talking about what
 7 assumption I am coming at. I am talking about
 8 your model and your assumptions.
 9 And I am trying to understand
 10 if there is a difference between the model and
 11 assumptions you applied in the first Green Giraffe
 12 report --
 13 A. There is no -- the fully
 14 permitted is a very precise definition. But
 15 whether the projects are late stage or not is not
 16 as precise.
 17 I was not asked -- I am not
 18 providing the valuation of fully permitted
 19 project. I am providing valuation of late stage
 20 development projects, which is a range. As I have
 21 written in a number of places, there is a
 22 continuum.
 23 And, basically, I am saying
 24 these projects are close enough to be fully
 25 permitted to be relevant for that table.

1 But, again, it's in my
 2 professional judgment.
 3 Q. I apologize. I am just
 4 having trouble understanding exactly what you're
 5 saying here.
 6 If we go up just above this
 7 late-stage development -- actually, yeah. If we
 8 go to your first report.
 9 At table -- yes, Table 7,
 10 page 26.
 11 You say:
 12 "Late stage development
 13 projects that are fully
 14 permitted, meaning they
 15 have all four of the
 16 features identified
 17 previously, site control,
 18 unappealable permits,
 19 grid access, and revenue
 20 regime."[as read]
 21 And that's the same definition
 22 you applied --
 23 A. No, you don't read the
 24 end of the sentence. I say have a higher value.
 25 Q. Yes, have a higher value.

1 But I am focussed here on,
 2 again, the methodology and assumptions you are
 3 applying here in defining whether something is
 4 fully permitted or not?
 5 A. I am not saying that all
 6 these projects are fully permitted. I am saying
 7 they are late development stage projects. They
 8 are fully permitted or close enough to it.
 9 And fully permitted means a
 10 higher value but close enough to fully permitted,
 11 you get close enough to the value.
 12 So they are representative of
 13 what you can get for a fully permitted value.
 14 Q. Let me be as clear as
 15 possible -- and maybe I will go back to the Tab 1
 16 of the brief because I just want to understand,
 17 again, what you were doing -- what you were
 18 testifying in the first Windstream hearing versus
 19 now.
 20 And if I go to the annex -- if
 21 I look at this table, the table that's at the late
 22 stage development table on page 27, for status,
 23 site control permits, grid connection, revenue
 24 regime, you have, as we described, before you have
 25 "yes" in all the columns.

1 And then, if we go to the next
 2 page, we have got the annex 3 table.
 3 And, under "permits", you have
 4 all of them have permits. There is no, there is
 5 no -- I don't see any "no" there. I don't see any
 6 under appeal there.
 7 So, the first time around, you
 8 were applying a test that required projects, in
 9 this case, to use a permit example, to have all
 10 the permits; correct?
 11 A. Not necessarily.
 12 It happens that those that I
 13 brought in this category of late stage were all
 14 fully permitted. But it doesn't mean that all
 15 stage, late stage projects should exclude projects
 16 that are close enough to being fully permitted.
 17 And, basically, that's the
 18 judgment call I made to include some projects that
 19 are close enough to being fully permitted.
 20 We can go round in circles on
 21 this topic for as long as you like.
 22 Q. Dr. Guillet, early on in
 23 the testimony, you made the point, you said that
 24 you had mathematical training and you said, when
 25 you see a model, the first thing you try to do --

1 A. Is how to game it.
 2 Q. -- is how to game it. By
 3 modifying the assumptions in the least visible way
 4 possible and that's very easy to do.
 5 Are you modifying the
 6 assumptions you used in this case? That you used
 7 in the first time?
 8 A. In this case, it's not
 9 least visible possible since it's being put very
 10 explicitly "no" in the columns. So the
 11 information is fully transparent.
 12 Q. But you are modifying
 13 your assumptions?
 14 A. No.
 15 Again, I am not saying I am
 16 valuing only fully permitted projects. I am
 17 valuing late stage development projects.
 18 You are choosing to say that
 19 late stage development only strictly includes
 20 fully permitted projects.
 21 I am -- again, we can go
 22 around in circles. Yes, some of these projects
 23 are not fully permitted. If you want to exclude
 24 or if the Tribunal wants to exclude them for that
 25 reason, that's obviously up to them to do so.

1 I am just expressing my
 2 professional judgment that those that I included
 3 in that table that are not formally fully
 4 permitted are close enough to warrant and be
 5 included as representative of late stage projects.
 6 I can't say it any clearer.
 7 And, if you want to say they are not fully
 8 permitted, yes, I acknowledge that some of them
 9 are not fully permitted. And I hope most of the
 10 cases, if you want to go through them, I can
 11 explain to you why, formally, they are not fully
 12 permitted and why that does not matter too much in
 13 terms of valuation.
 14 MR. TERRY: Madam President, I
 15 am just thinking that now might not be a bad point
 16 at which to stop, if we are going to stop this
 17 evening. I am looking at the time.
 18 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 19 Okay. That's fine.
 20 Mr. Terry, I think -- and I
 21 hope you will come to it -- that the award at
 22 paras 474 and 478 are also not entirely consistent
 23 on this.
 24 So if that's part of where
 25 you're heading, that, I have to say, would be very

1 helpful.
 2 MR. TERRY: Yes. Thank you.
 3 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
 4 Okay, all right.
 5 Dr. Guillet, you have done
 6 this before. You understand the rules. It's not
 7 meant to be fun; okay. I am sorry. I have been
 8 cross-examined and it's the least fun position in
 9 the room.
 10 But it's really important.
 11 There are hundreds of millions of dollars at stake
 12 in a claim and it's really, really important that
 13 we understand this very, very precisely.
 14 And for us, the Tribunal,
 15 where we have an earlier award, we need to
 16 understand, very precisely, what the Tribunal's
 17 done and what you're telling us to do here.
 18 So be patient. It's late. We
 19 don't usually go this late so we apologize for
 20 that. And we thank you for enduring us and
 21 Mr. Terry.
 22 And, this evening, you will
 23 need to dine alone and so please don't.
 24 THE WITNESS: I am still on
 25 European time so I will go to bed fairly quickly.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
2 You need to dine for breakfast alone.
3 And what should we do
4 tomorrow?
5 How about we come in at 9 as
6 per normal.
7 I hope -- is there anybody who
8 matters -- you all matter.
9 But is there anyone who
10 critically matters for tomorrow who has a problem
11 with 9? No. Sort of looking at the dads in the
12 room. No child care responsibilities or anything
13 tomorrow.
14 Okay. Nobody is shaking heads
15 at me. Okay. All right. I am going to assume 9
16 works.
17 Let's come in at 9. Do you
18 have an idea?
19 MR. TERRY: I think well less
20 than an hour. I, you know, any of these
21 predictions are always fraught but I think I can
22 be quite efficient going through the rest of the
23 cross-examination.
24 I will bear in mind what you
25 mentioned as well about those paragraphs.

1 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
2 Okay. Then here is what I propose, is our plan
3 had been for Thursday morning to get together and
4 clarify additional questions that we wanted to
5 address in closing. And they will be, as I
6 forewarned, predominantly legal questions.
7 So we can do that. If we
8 finish up by 10, then we can go away and do that
9 and I think we can email those to you so, if you
10 have offices or places to get back to, you can do
11 that. I don't think we need to reconvene.
12 But we will, in any case, try
13 to get that to you around noon, lunchtime so you
14 have the afternoon to work on your closings to
15 answer our questions. And we really will want you
16 to focus on our questions. So if you focus on our
17 questions, we will interrupt you less. That's a
18 carrot.
19 All right, gentlemen,
20 Dr. Tetard, Mr. Milburn and Mr. Tobis. You are
21 still under witness sequestration.
22 Mr. Tobis and Mr. Milburn, I
23 think it's Dr. Tetard's first time so make sure he
24 understands well what -- you obviously can speak
25 to one another and we will see you at 9 in the

1 morning.
2 Did you have something else to
3 say?
4 MR. TERRY: Only we sort of
5 left hanging out there a little bit the process
6 for, the timing for closing submissions.
7 Again, we are flexible but
8 perhaps, if we would be happy to discuss it in the
9 morning or if you want to give direction when you
10 give us the questions.
11 I can't speak for everyone but
12 we are sort of at your.
13 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES: I
14 think the best we could do right now -- and you
15 should have read the tea leaves on this already --
16 is don't draft up two hours worth of presentations
17 at us each for Friday. That's not going to work.
18 Let us think about our
19 questions. But it's mostly useful to us if it's
20 iterative, as you'll appreciate, it's an unusual
21 case where there already is an award that gives
22 rise to a whole series of legal issues,
23 potentially, that we wouldn't normally face.
24 And we really want to
25 understand your respective positions on those,

1 including what they mean for damages, if we were
2 to get there.
3 So don't be having people up
4 all night writing big long speeches.
5 MR. TERRY: Message received.
6 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
7 That's all I can give you right now.
8 We will see how we go
9 tomorrow, hey. And, if we think it's useful to
10 come back and have a bit more of a conversation,
11 we might do that.
12 So we will finish off
13 Dr. Guillet. If we need to come back to all the
14 experts, at this stage, we are not anticipating
15 that. Then we will take a coffee break, we will
16 have a word and come back in before we dismiss
17 everybody for the day tomorrow and give you a
18 little bit clearer indication. But you might have
19 our questions by then.
20 MR. TERRY: That's great.
21 Thank you.
22 PRESIDING ARBITRATOR MILES:
23 Okay. Thank you, all, very, very much.
24 --- Whereupon matter adjourned at 6:48 p.m., to
25 resume Thursday, February 8, 2024, at 9:00 a.m.

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