In the matter of an arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of
the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes

Case No. ARB/21/51

> The International Dispute Resolution Centre (IDRC)
> 1 Paternoster Lane
> LONDON, EC4M 7BQ

Day 4
Monday, 5th February 2024
Hearing on the Merits
Before:
PROFESSOR GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER
MR STEPHEN L DRYMER
PROFESSOR PHILIPPE SANDS

DISCOVERY GLOBAL LLC
Claimant
-v-

SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Respondent

Secretary to the Tribunal: JARA MÍNGUEZ ALMEIDA Assistant to the Tribunal: MAGNUS JESKO LANGER

> Transcript produced by Anne-Marie Stallard and Emma Lovell

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## (9.30 am)

THE PRESIDENT: Fine, I see everyone is ready to proceed, and I see Professor Števcek is online. It's a little weird having no one there

Do I look into this camera, I suppose? Yes.
Is there anything to be raised before we start with the examination?
MR TUSHINGHAM: Nothing from the Claimant's side, Madam President.
MR PEKAR: Nothing, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Good, then we can start.

## PROFESSOR JUDr MAREK ŠTEVCEK (called)

(Evidence interpreted)
THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, sir. Do you hear me well? That is, do you hear the interpreter?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes, greetings. We can hear you very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Excellent. So thanks for being with us this morning. You are Marek Števcek?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes, indeed, I confirm.
THE PRESIDENT: You are a professor of civil law at the Comenius University in Bratislava?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes, that is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: And you're currently director of the

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09:34
MR MAJERNÍK: Yes, of course. I'll do it. Is this better?
THE PRESIDENT: Good. Can we have the names of the people who are there, or do we have them on the participant list? I don't think so.

MR MAJERNIK: Madam President, members of the Tribunal, my name is Andrej Majerník and I am on behalf of Discovery.

THE PRESIDENT: Fine.
Can the other person please introduce herself?
MS PAVLOVICOVA: Adriana Pavlovicova, I am here on behalf of Squire Patton Boggs.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. I think, for the interpreters, I'm just mentioning that we have it on the recording, so I think that is enough, and I see counsel nodding so we can proceed.

Professor, you are heard as an expert. As an expert you are to make only such statements that are in accordance with your sincere belief. Can you please confirm that this is what you will do by reading the expert declaration that you should have there in front of you. You do, yes, absolutely.
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that my statement will be in accordance with my sincere belief.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
So now we can proceed. You will first be asked

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university?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
You provided us with two written expert opinions, the first one of 30 September 2022, and the second one of 15 September 2023. Do you have your opinions with you?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes, I have them both with me. THE PRESIDENT: And they are in clean, unannotated copies? PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes, I have printed copies.
THE PRESIDENT: You have no notes on your copies?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: No. Please have a look.
THE PRESIDENT: Good. Excellent.
Are you sitting alone in the room?
He has two people in the room.
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: No, I'm here with two of my colleagues, one lady and one gentleman colleagues.
THE PRESIDENT: And this is agreed like this? Yes.
MR PEKAR: Madam President, it is --
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: I think this is how it has been agreed?
MR PEKAR: It is agreed, Madam President. But I would kindly ask the gentleman sitting to the left of Professor Števcek to go further away a little bit.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, because he is in -- can you please move somewhat away from the witness?

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questions by Claimant's counsel, and then we will turn to Respondent's counsel.

Mr Tushingham.
(9.36 am)

Direct examination by MR TUSHINGHAM
Q. Thank you, Madam President.

Professor Števcek, do you see me on the screen in front of you?
A. Yes. Yes. Well, specifically not you, Mark, I am afraid.
Q. Well, you can hear me, as I understand; is that right?
A. I can hear you, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Can I step in, because I forgot to mention something before.

Professor, you can confirm to us that you have no other communication channels open than the one on which we communicate now, which is the Zoom video link, and possibly one screen where you will be shown documents; is that right?
A. Yes, I confirm there is no other communication channel that I would have.
THE PRESIDENT: You have switched your phone into flight mode?
A. Yes, I do.

THE PRESIDENT: Good. Thank you. Apologies for the
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| $09: 37$ | 1 | interruption. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | MR TUSHINGHAM: Thank you, Madam President. No problem at |  |
| 3 | all. |  |
| 4 | Professor Števcek, I understand that you wish to |  |
| 5 | make a few corrections, minor corrections, to the |  |
| 6 | English translations of your two expert reports; is that |  |
| 7 | right? |  |
| 8 | A. Yes, Mark. Indeed that is so. There were two terms not |  |
| 9 | well understood in the translation. So I would like to |  |
| 10 | change that to the term "public special purpose road" |  |
| 11 | everywhere that has been in my expert report mentioned. |  |
| 12 | And there is the paragraph 5.1, there was a wrong |  |
| 13 | translation, "merits". Instead it's supposed to be |  |
| 14 | "jurisdiction". |  |
| 15 | THE PRESIDENT: I should say for the record that we have |  |
| 16 | been handed a list of the corrections, and I assume |  |
| 17 | Respondent's counsel has as well? |  |
| 18 | MR TUSHINGHAM: Indeed, Madam President. |  |
| 19 | So with your leave, we would invite that document to |  |
| 20 | be added to the record. We can, of course, assign |  |
| 21 | a number to it after the examination. |  |
| 22 | THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. |  |
| 23 | MR TUSHINGHAM: Professor Števcek, are there any other |  |
| 24 | corrections that you would like to make to your expert |  |
| 25 | reports apart from the corrections listed in this |  |

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09:41 1 A. I will do my best.
2 Q. Thank you, Professor Števcek.
My first questions will actually relate to the corrections of your expert reports. Do the corrections come from your personal review of the English version of your English -- of your reports?
A. To put things in the right perspective, there were multiple versions of my -- over the time of my expert report, which is quite, I suppose, normal and understandable. Each one version was then translated. I don't know whether it has been the same person every time a new translation was made out, or there were several persons, in fact.

In any event, yes, I have identified two specific terms with which I was not satisfied the way they were translated. The first one, "merits" as opposed to "jurisdiction", I think is only a translation error, because from the context, I, in Slovak, never mentioned the word "merits". Perhaps "act", or "substance of act". In my Slovak version of the report has always been the word "jurisdiction".

With regards to the second term, that's the "public special purpose road", of course in English there could be multiple equivalents in English, how to translate this into English, and I think that the term "public

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09:39 $\quad 1 \quad$ document?
A. No, none.

MR TUSHINGHAM: Thank you.
Would you please now answer any questions that
Mr Pekar has for you.
THE PRESIDENT: Before Mr Pekar starts, I would like to ask that whenever we are not asking questions about a specific document, we see just the screen with the witness. And here we see the witness statements. Can you remove the witness statements, and make sure that we see the witness in -- on a large screen.

Who controls this? (Pause)
Cross-examination by MR PEKAR
Q. Thank you, Madam President.

Good morning, Professor Števcek.
A. Good morning.
Q. Professor Števcek, my name is Rostislav Pekar. I am counsel for the Slovak Republic, and I will ask you a few questions this morning regarding your two witness statements.

Because we are on transcript and because we are only connected by video, I would kindly ask you to answer in an audible manner to any of my questions so that we have it on the transcript and so that I can hear the interpretation of that answer that I am working on.

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special purpose road" covers all content of the term by which the legislator had in mind when enacting in legislation the very term of "public special purpose road".
Q. Thank you, Professor Števcek. So you agree that "public special purpose road" is the best translation of the Slovak original term; correct?
A. I dare to say yes. I'm convinced, due to what I've just said before, that it really covers all substantial signs of content: one is special purpose, that is supposed to serve a certain purpose; and the next one is being public, so it's publicly accessible.
Q. And Professor Števcek, I would ask you to look at paragraph 11.5 of your first expert report in both English and Slovak, please.
A. So I'm at liberty to view my report; right?
Q. Yes, you are. And I would like to ask you to view both the English and the Slovak version, and I believe it would be helpful now to have these two versions on the screen as well.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Would you agree with me, sir, that there are two sentences in the English version which span over almost three lines, while there is only one sentence in the Slovak original; correct?
A. Yes. But if I may add, in English the first sentence only mentions the merits of the fact, saying that the Madame Varjanová had filed an appeal; the second sentence says "the notice of appeal was struck out", and I don't know why there is only the second sentence in the English version saying that -- in the Slovak version, rather, that the appeal has been struck out. I don't know how to justify this being -- this discrepancy between the two language versions.
Q. Now I would ask you to please turn to paragraph 32 of your second expert report. And, again, it would be helpful to have both language versions in front of us on the screen.

So in paragraph 32 you are quoting Article 120, paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you please read out loud in Slovak, so that it can be interpreted by the interpreters we have here, the quote from paragraph 120 in the Slovak original. And I would ask the members of the Tribunal to compare that to the translation we have in the English version as they listen.
A. Yes, I can:
"[As read] The parties are obliged to mark evidence
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09:51 1
that you were. I would just ask you to confirm that the English version which says, "the court shall be under an obligation to take additional evidence", is, I would say, diametrically opposed to the Slovak version, which says that exceptionally it may take other evidence; correct?
A. Yes, I confirm that. The sentence, or the law, is formulated as "option", which I consider completely logical, because it is up to the court to consider whether or not the proposed evidence, or even evidence not proposed by parties, will be taken into consideration or not. It's up to the discretion of the court, while in the English version, indicates an obligation imposed to the court.

Once again, allow me to emphasise it is not my responsibility for the English translation.
MR DRYMER: Professor, pardon me. Is the remainder of the bolded sentence in English correct? In other words, the court may exceptionally take evidence "when such evidence is necessary to establish the facts"? Is that part correct?
A. I would translate the phrase, "establish the facts in proceedings" differently.
MR DRYMER: And how would you translate that personally? Yourself, I mean?

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09:49 1 to substantiate their claims. The court shall decide which of the marked evidence will be executed. The court may also exceptionally take other evidence than those proposed by the parties if the proceedings is necessary to make a decision on merits."
Q. Professor Števcek, I apologise, I would ask you to read the last sentence again because there was one important Slovak word which was missed on the interpretation. And this is no criticism of the interpreters; I understand it's not easy.

So please read just the last sentence again.
A. "[As read] The court may exceptionally also take evidence other than that proposed by the parties if its taking is necessary to decide the case."
Q. Thank you very much, Professor Števcek.

I understand that you understand written English; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree with me that the sentence that you can see in bold in the English version is completely different from the last sentence of the Slovak original?
A. If I may, I'll take a minute to read it. (Pause)

Yes, but I'd like to emphasise that of course it was not me making the translation into English.
Q. Yes, Professor Števcek, and I did not mean to suggest
A. I guess, off the top of my head, this as though indicates that "establish the facts", which doesn't necessarily have to be an issue of fact, because the law says about the importance of the decision on the merits.

But I would not dare now to give you an exact translation right away.
MR DRYMER: Very well. Thank you, sir.
MR PEKAR: Well, maybe one last point.
Professor Števcek, would you agree with me that there is an adjective which was translated as "necessary", in Slovak it's "nevyhnutné"; would you agree with me that the best translation would be something like "unavoidable"?
A. Yes. I guess so.
Q. Yes, thank you.

Now, Professor Števcek, I would ask you to turn to paragraph 28 of your first expert report. And for the record, this is one of the paragraphs which is subject to the errata sheet submitted this morning, which saves me two questions. So thank you very much for these corrections, Professor Števcek.

Please let me know when you have had a chance to read the corrected English version of 28. (Pause)
A. I have it.
Q. Thank you very much.

So when you say, Professor Števcek, in the correction sheet, that it's supposed to be "public special purpose road", you referred to Article 1(2)(d) of the Road Act, correct? And we will have a brief look at it. It is Exhibit R-175. And what we can see in Article 1(2) is that:
"Surface roads are divided according to traffic significance, destination and technical equipment on
(a) State highways,
(b) state roads,
(c) municipal roads,
(d) special purpose roads."

So we are in agreement that what you mean in paragraph 28 is "special purpose road" within the meaning of Article 1(2)(d) of the Road Act; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So now going back to paragraph 28 of your report, of your first report, you state there that the character of the field track in Smilno as a public special purpose road stems from Exhibit C-18; correct?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. So can we please have Exhibit C-18 on the screen.

So please, Professor Števcek, review the document, and let me know when you have had a chance to review the document.

10:00 $\quad 1$
screen. And I would like you, Professor Števcek, then to confirm that this is, indeed, the same Slovak original, C-18 and R-156.
A. I can only see the Slovak version, that's the Smilno municipality confirmation, and I see a part of an English translation. However, I'm unable to confirm what translation that is, whether I have ever seen it before. That's something I cannot tell you now.
Q. No, Professor Števcek, apologies, I probably misspoke. I was just asking you to confirm the Slovak original. That the Slovak original is the same as the one you have under C-18, and the same as the one you referred to in paragraph 28 ?
A. Yes, I understand; confirm it is identical text.
Q. Okay. So Professor Števcek, you confirm that this document in the Slovak original refers to "field road" or "field track"; correct?
A. "Field road" yes, it is written there expressis verbis.
Q. It does not use the words "public special purpose road"; correct?
A. Understandably it is not there. I've been explaining that. I think in my second report. It's difficult to expect of a municipal office of a small village to reflect all legal terms. Basically that's unthinkable. I think with each -- every one of our lawyers have

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A. I confirm that I can see that now.
Q. Okay. Thank you very much. And apologies for the technical issues we were resolving here.

Now, later in these proceedings we filed another translation of this document under Exhibit No. R-156. So now I would ask that R-156 be displayed on the
encountered this: that a lay public simply is not using legal terminology.

However, in terms of logical semantics, every term has certain term features, the essentialia negotii, it's called in legal theory. Now, when various certificates issued by the Smilno municipality declare clearly that the road has been used by the public, as number one, I dare say it is the same, that that is a public road. And if it is claimed clearly that it's been used as field road, specifically as a connector, an access road to mines, to mine quartz, that simply is the same term feature used by the legislator to establish the special purpose of a communication, meaning road. That is why I deduced a conclusion that this document, even though it does not feature legal terms and features, however, descriptively refers to all the term features, and in my opinion one can conclude without any reasonable doubt that this is a public special purpose road.

The normative text itself states, if I remember correctly, specifically the mine as one exemplary calculations of what is the purpose of any special purpose road.

So to me the term features have been met, and I repeat, we cannot expect -- I think it was Mr Mayor, or who signed the letter, who I expect does not have

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10:04 1
legal education, we may not expect them to be using
legal terminology and definitions.
Q. So just to summarise, and this is a simple yes or no question, sir, on the basis of this document alone, you are able to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the road is a public special purpose road; correct?
A. Yes. I dare to make this conclusion.
Q. Yes. And now if the letter is addressed to someone who, unlike you, knows the actual condition of the road? And, for example, that person knows that the mine had been closed for 70 years. Would that change your assessment, sir?
A. No, because in that certificate, or letter, there is a present continuous tense used, "is being used". So it continues to be used by the public for decades, or maybe centuries.

If the Smilno municipality wanted to say that this has been some time in the past, I expect they would use past tense. In that letter it says clearly "is being used for decades", 100 to 200 years in parentheses. I understandably am not familiar with the local conditions, I have never physically been in that municipality or on that road, and I can only base my conclusions on what I was given. Meaning from this argument, I deduce my claim that this continues to be

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writing the report. Even now when Mr Counsel is
declaring them, this has no bearing on the meaning of
the text.
    I repeat, this is not a decision issued in
    an administrative proceedings, because no such thing
    exists. No one has ever requested such decision. It is
    a confirmation by the Smilno municipality, and
    basically, I'll tell you frankly, I don't care to whom
    it's been addressed, because the text is so
    straightforward, there are no additive hypothesis that
    are going to change my opinion.
THE PRESIDENT: Can I ask you for a clarification?
            When you wrote your reports, did you have the letter
    requesting the advice of the mayor?
A. Yes, I surely had it at my disposal. However --
THE PRESIDENT: No, stop here. You had it.
A. I don't know if it was right from the start, because
    I did mention that there were multiple versions in time
    of my report. But yes, when finalising my report, I was
    basing my report on this submitted evidence letter.
THE PRESIDENT:Would it change your opinion if I remind you
    that the request specifically used the term "public
    special purpose road"?
A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: If I ask you just --
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10:07 $1 \quad$ a publicly used road, special purpose road, thus: "public special purpose road".
THE INTERPRETER: As the witness put in English. MR PEKAR: Professor Števcek, I would kindly ask you to focus on the specific manner in how I formulate my questions.

My question was, I was asking you to take into consideration the fact that the letter is addressed to a person, which, unlike you, was aware of the actual condition of the road. And, for example -- and you can take that as hypothetical.

So hypothetically, if that person was aware that the mine had been closed for 70 years, would that change your very strong opinion you have of this letter?
A. No.
Q. Would it change your opinion if, hypothetically, the mine had been using the road on the basis of a lease agreement it had with the then owners of the road?
A. No. Due to a simple reason: I judge the text. Counsel is trying to add something into the text which is simply not present in the text. In terms of grammar, in its interpretation of the text, it says clearly that which I've already mentioned, and I am not sure about this additive hypothesis, how to take them into consideration. I did not have them at my disposal when
A. If I try to reformulate the question, if I may. Meaning that if there was mentioned in the letter the legal term "public special purpose road"; is that what you're asking about?
THE PRESIDENT: The request for the opinion says:
"Please confirm that this is a public special purpose road."

Does that change your opinion -- does the fact that the response uses a different term, that is "field track", change your opinion?
A. I understand now.

First of all, I think -- I have not seen this particular request. If I remember correctly, I did not have at my disposal the request of Cesty Smilno for issuance of this confirmation.

Secondly, likely it would not change my opinion --
THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, I must have misunderstood you, because I understood that, just before you answered to me, that you had seen the request when you drafted your final version of your expert reports?
A. I think we are misunderstanding each other. I have seen this respond to the request, what we have on display.
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
A. I guess I have not seen the actual request itself, by somebody asking municipality of Smilno to issue such

10:13 1
information. I have only seen this final information respond to the request.
THE PRESIDENT: Good. That's clarified now.
Now, take it from me that the request says: can you please confirm that this road is a public special purpose road. And then the answer is what we have here. Would that change your opinion?
A. Once again, I'm going to say no, due to the same reason I have said before. I don't think we should assume with the Smilno mayor that he would be aware of legal terms used by legislation. Which means to me, even if to such a specific question, he would formulate this answer we see here. I would equally conclude the same: that yes, indeed, this is a public special purpose road, within the meaning of the legislative term.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. And apologies, Mr Pekar. MR PEKAR: Thank you, Madam President.

Professor Števcek, are you aware of the fact that Mr Baran is a witness in this arbitration?
A. Who is Mr Baran?
Q. Professor Števcek, if we scroll down the document, you will see the signature of the Mayor of Smilno. His name is Vladimir Baran; can you see that, sir?
A. Yes, I see that. But I have no knowledge of him being a witness in this particular hearing.

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10:17 1
instead characterised it as a field track? What was your thinking behind that?"

## Answer:

"Because it's me, I don't need to be, you know, advised or told what to do, and I said it's, as it was, and it is called by the local people 'polná cesta', which means field road. There are no road signs, so it rules out the possibility of it being a special purpose road, in spite of the fact that it has been used for a century and it's known among all villagers in Smilno that it's a road. But you know it's -- the paved works, it's -- you know, it's field road. Field road, yes. We call it field road."

So would you agree with me, Professor Števcek, that the Mayor of Smilno was actually aware of the legal term "special purpose road"?
A. I would disagree with you because the mayor is not a qualified lawyer, and only a qualified lawyer -- and even, I think, only court, is authorised to interpret legal terms.
Of course, this is the first time I see this. I do not know Mr Baran, the mayor. I do not know his thinking. But from what you have read to me, it is completely clear to me that legal definitions are not clear to him, because when I use the term "field road",

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10:15 1 Q. So actually he was heard as a witness on Saturday, and we will show you on screen, and I will read out loud, so that you have it translated into Slovak, his answers to questions asked by Arbitrator Sands.

It starts on page 72 , line 1 of the transcript, and ends on page 73 , line 4 . It is PDF page 22.

I will wait for the document to be on the screen, as this will help the interpreters.

I was referring to PDF page, not internal pagination. So internal pagination 72, and PDF 22.

So we can see there at 11.25 , Professor Sands asked:
"So you carried out the assessment of how to characterise the field road or the track or the path or the road, or whatever it is?"

## Answer:

"Yes".
Professor Sands:
"So you're explicitly asked, with the draft response, to characterise it as a special purpose road, that characterisation, and you don't do that. So you've gone through an intellectual exercise of your own, and you appear to have rejected that characterisation, and used a different characterisation.

Could you explain to us your thinking on why you did not follow the suggestion that was put in the draft, and
it is a component out of a larger amount entitled
"public special purpose road". And that's the term used by legislator.

So if the mayor is using "field road", so it's a sub sum of the "public special purpose road", because in the legal definition there is a demonstrative enumeration of that which is considered special purpose road. That could be public or non-public. Or, special purpose road demonstratively named by the legislator also "field road". So if the mayor claims it's a field road, then he claims it is special purpose road. If he claims it is being used publicly, has been used for decades, he claims it is public special purpose road. This is how I would see this.
Q. But would you agree with me that this is not how the mayor saw it; correct?
A. I don't consider your question correct, because I'm unable to say what the mayor had or did not have in mind when he testified before the Tribunal. This is not the right question to be put to me.
Q. Fair enough, sir.

MR DRYMER: I have a very quick follow-up question on precisely this point. Once again, counsel, you've read my mind. Mr Tushingham has done the same throughout the hearing as well.

10:21 1

Sir, could I ask you to enlarge the transcript on the screen?

Professor, I've heard everything you said a moment ago. I just have a very particular question. You'll see that during -- in the mayor's answer at one point he says:
"There are no road signs, so it rules out the possibility of being a special purpose road ..."
Those are the mayor's own words. Do you agree with that analysis?

You're the first lawyer, other than the parties' counsel in this arbitration, to whom we have the opportunity to put such questions.
A. I would kindly ask again, because we have the same problem, I only see a part of the text. So if it could be put to the left on the screen because of the video windows I have on my screen. Because I do see only up to three-quarters of the text from right to left.
MR DRYMER: I don't know if that --
(Pause)
I don't want to make it more difficult for the witness.
A. I will kindly ask my colleague here in the room if she can do that for me; is that okay?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (Pause)
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term features of special purpose road differently, completely, as to what the mayor perceives.
MR DRYMER: Thank you.
A. I repeat, the mayor obviously is no lawyer, he is no expert, so that is why I would not blame him for not using feature terms as established by the legislator.
MR DRYMER: I assure you, there is no blame at issue here. I am simply taking advantage of your own expertise. Thank you. That's very helpful.
MR PEKAR: Professor Števcek, let's please look at Article 3 of the Road Act. This is, again, R-175.
Subparagraph (2). I will read it out loud:
"Local state administration in matters of local communications and special-purpose communications shall be performed by municipalities on the basis of delegated exercise of state administration. Municipalities shall determine the use of traffic signs and traffic devices on local communications and special-purpose communications and shall permit reserved parking places thereon. Municipalities, as part of the delegated exercise of state administration, deal with misdemeanours under Article 22c in the area of local communications and special-purpose communications."

Can you see that, sir? Thank you. There is the Slovak version on screen. We just need to roll down to

Page 27 screen. Thank you.

Now, when I'm reading this:
"There are no road signs, so it rules out ... of
[this] being a special purpose road ..."
Again, I respect the mayor as a person, but obviously he will not be an expert to administrative law.
MR DRYMER: Of course.
A. Neither am I. I'm no administrative law expert. But as far as I know, and I have studied the Road Act and the executive regulation accompanied to that, there is no mention anywhere of any road sign as a feature of this being a special purpose road.

I think this interpretation of the mayor is invalid, because the act only says that it connects two points, either within an area, or multiple areas, based on which it is then judged whether or not this is a public road.

But it doesn't say anywhere about any road signs needing to be a feature necessary for a special purpose road.

I'll repeat, if I may, once again, the feature points of special purpose road. I'm only a civil lawyer, but I take the liberty of saying that the administrative regulation, the Road Act, has established

Article 3(2).
The English version needs to go further down. We are there in the Slovak version. Oh, we don't have -we have it, yes. Perfect.
So, Professor Števcek, would you agree with me that the Smilno municipality is actually the state organ that has jurisdiction over special purpose roads in its territory?
A. Yes, I agree. It is not a state body, but it acts as a transferred power from public administration, yes.
Q. And it is the municipality which also determines the use of traffic signs and traffic devices on special purpose communications; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So if the municipality and Mayor Baran decided not to put a road sign on the field track, would it actually confirm that he did not consider the field track to be a special purpose road?
A. I think that this shortcut is not quite acceptable, because I personally am familiar with many special purpose roads on which the municipality never erected any road signs -- traffic signs, that is. So from the fact that there is, let's call it a communication, a road, as a working term, there are no road signs on this road, to me logically one cannot assume the
conclusion from that that this is not a special purpose road.

To put it differently, there are special purpose roads where the municipality has decided to place road signs, and there is a number of special purpose roads the municipality has not decided to place any road signs. And I'm quite sure -- I dare to declare -- that there is a number of special purpose roads the municipality is not even aware of its power to do so.
Q. Would you then agree with me that Mr Baran, or the municipality of Smilno, being the body of self-government with the delegated state power to exercise administration in the matter of special purpose roads, that that body is the best placed to answer the question whether a track, field track, in its territory is a special purpose road or not?
A. I think the municipality is that body which knows best the local conditions. It's capable of judging them best. But I dare not say whether at the end of the day the municipality is capable, in legal terms, to judge what the legislator had in mind when enacting the term "public special purpose road", because there is no conclusion from this act or any other that a municipality were to make a decision about what is and what is not public special purpose road. The

10:33 1 A. Yes. Special purpose road is a part of the sum of surface roads.
Q. Therefore the definition which applies to all surface roads also applies to special purpose roads; correct?
A. Yes. As a general clause, definitely yes.

However, right in the Article 4, for instance, there you have an exception for special purpose roads, in my view, from those particulars proclaimed by Article 3, or paragraph 3 , rather.

So by legislator themselves, the special purpose roads are viewed as a specific sub sum, because in paragraph 4 it enumerates what particulars a road must meet, and there is no reference therein to special purpose road. So I deem, if I may, it is because legislator is aware that the special purpose road's operation cannot be wedged into a definition. From that point of view, local conditions must be taken into consideration. To put it in other words, one may not expect from every single municipality in Slovakia to have exactly equal mode of operation, because specifics must be taken into account of that given location. And, last but not least, financial considerations as well, I only speculate, because not every municipality would have funding sufficient to be able to build such road as the majority of the public would expect.

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municipality only executes administration as a delegated power from state administration. But the fact what is and what is not special purpose road, I dare say is derived directly ex lege. The municipality merely executes administration over such road, and I do agree that it has the power to potentially place, or not to place, on such road, appropriate road signs.

And it also has the power to issue sanctions for violations of the appropriate legislation.
Q. Okay. So let's look at the legislation. Let's scroll up this time to Article 1(3) of the Road Act. It states:
"Surface communication consists of the road body and its components. The road body is demarcated the outer edges of ditches, gutters, embankments and cuts of slopes, frame and cladding walls, at the foot of retaining walls and on local roads half a meter behind raised curbs, sidewalks or green belts."

Can you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you agree with me that this is a definition of a surface road?
A. Yes, this is a legal definition of surface road.
Q. And as we can see in Article 1(2), a special purpose road is a subset of surface roads; correct?

That means I expect your question is leading towards whether the road track may be considered a special purpose road. That's when I think yes, because clearly, the municipality of Smilno, I have no idea what is their population or budget, but I expect from their own resources, as the administrator of that road, cannot afford to build up there something meeting the legal definition of "surface road".

Put in other words, if I may, special purpose road is also a road track or forest track. Every one of us naturally understands the term "field track" or "forest track", and we have no doubt that either field or forest track or road, even though it's an inductively correct conclusion, nowhere in the world obviously is nothing else other than trotted out or driven out stretch of ground on which customarily it is driven, which was confirmed by Smilno itself.

This is how I see it. But, I repeat, I'm no expert for administrative law, neither for transport or road law. This is a disclaimer I would like to put on record.
Q. Thank you, Professor Števcek.

I would ask you to really focus on the scope of my question. I'm trying to ask questions that are simple. Obviously if you feel the need to answer more than "yes"

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or "no", you are welcome to do so. But please focus on the scope of my question.

Now, would you agree with me that the legislator in 1(3) speaks of all surface communications; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And in that provision, which you agreed is the
definition, we see the requirement for a surface communication to have a road body; correct?
A. Yes. But then I would ask to give me an answer to the question, what is a road body?
Q. Mr Števcek, we will come to the significance of the road body later on.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Could I just come in here, I'm just speaking personally on my own account, not for any other arbitrator, but can I ask the witness this question.

Is it not the case that we have here two opinions: we have an opinion from the mayor as to the nature and status of this road; we have an opinion from you, sir, as to the nature and status of this road. There is a difference of opinion. You've indicated that ultimately it's a matter for the courts of Slovakia to form a view. We aren't going to be able to get a clear view on this question in these proceedings. So is it not the case that we're stuck between two opinions and it is for us, as a Tribunal, to then form a view as to

10:41 1
answer.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Thank you very much.
MR DRYMER: If I may follow up very quickly on that question, because Professor Sands was not, it turns out, the only arbitrator asking himself that question.

You used the words earlier, Professor, "ex lege". So I'd like to ask you, ex lege, which organ of the state, in your opinion, has authority, including, it may be a delegated authority, to decide whether a particular communication is or is not a PSPR? And I don't mean the courts. The courts obviously control the actions of the state in certain respects. Which state organ has authority or delegated authority in the first instance to declare the nature and status of a particular communication?
A. It's a very good question, indeed, and thank you for that. In my best knowledge there is no such body, in a meaning that there would be a non-existence of a specifically legally proclamated authority of a specific body of public power, public -- which would be authorised to crack this issue.

There only exists provision about that the administration of such road is executed by the municipality. We do not even have normatively resolved the question, who is the owner of the road. We know

Page 35 views of the courts of Slovakia?
A. Clearly I would not formulate it in this way, but I do agree that here exist not even two, I dare to say multiple legal opinions, because the legal modus operandi of special purpose roads in Slovakia is really sort of a field untrodden. It is something no one has ever tackled, this issue in sufficient depth, and it is a problem in Slovakia, I completely agree with you. And since we do not have a sufficiently involved doctrine in this area, and nor the case law of our courts provide a clear answer to that, I agree with the opinion that this question is disputable.

Quite clearly, that is why I think we are debating this by the role of experts here. There are no clear answers to this question, and there are even no clear two opinions; I dare say there are multiple opinions on how to resolve this issue.
PROFESSOR SANDS: So if there are multiple opinions, I'm understanding you, sir, to be saying that there is a multitude of reasonable opinions that go in different directions. Am I correct in understanding you in that way?
A. Yes, you do understand absolutely correctly. It is one of several questions to which there is no clear legal

10:45 1 A. Madam President, this is a more complicated issue.
2 I don't want to go into detail completely, but there is a difference of owning land and there's a difference of owning road body placed upon the land, regardless of what the road body is. This result.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I'll put the question differently: does it make a difference if the road body, assuming there is one, is placed on private land?
A. No, it would not. I have to say here, as the rector of the largest Slovak university, that we have had a huge amount of problems with this. And I'd like to, if I may, complete my explanation: in Slovakia it does not apply what does with the rest of Continental Europe from the times of the Roman law. There is a so-called superficial principle which says that the landowner is automatically the owner of everything placed on that land. This, in Slovakia, may be the only European country it does not apply.

So in Slovakia, customarily or frequently, there are different landowners, and different owner of anything placed upon such land. And I claim that this is exactly this case here, that the road body, no matter what we imagine it be, is a different legal entity and it does not automatically belong to the owner of that land.
THE PRESIDENT: Are roads that are situated on the territory
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10:49 1
2 A. No.
3 Q. Okay. So then I will just scale down on my questions, and I would kindly ask you to go to paragraph 43.

So I represent to you the dispute was about the status of a certain structure, whether it was a surface communication or not.

And here we can read in 43:
"It has been proved beyond doubt by the evidence taken that no building permit has been issued for the 'communication' in question and that the 'communication' is not included in the roads network ... The court of first instance took for the basis also the decision of the Košice District State Office dated 14 August 1964 (Article 77) by which the following structure was approved: Heat Plant Košice -- mesto, facility I. Within the said construction, the area of the facility was delimited by a zoning permit, issued by Košice District State Office - Construction Department, dated 18 September 1963. The area of the construction as a whole was delimited that way, including land plots on which a civil engineering facility was subsequently established to connect between individual facilities. The documents filed by the plaintiff (Articles 142, 143) that are on the court file indicate how the

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A. Yes. But again I have to please add, as you know very well, courts are not capable of concluding a specific question normatively. They only decide a specific dispute and responding to a specific legal case.
Q. Sir, if there were a specific legal case addressing specifically the status of the field track in Smilno, would you accept that decision?
A. Of course I could accept it to a specific case.
Q. Now, just to follow up on one issue that you mentioned, you were explaining the potential for split ownership between the road body, the road as such, and the land on which the road is built.

I would kindly ask you to review Exhibit R-205, which is a judgment of the Regional Court in Košice, in case number $6 \mathrm{Co} / 188 / 2016$, dated 31 January 2017.

So, first of all, have you been able to review this

10:51 $1 \quad$ 'communication' in question looks like. It is clear from the layouts of the 'communication' that it is not... demarcated the outer edges of ditches, gutters, embankments and cuts of slopes, frame and cladding walls, at the foot of retaining walls. It therefore does not meet the definition of a road body, set out in the Road Act. In addition, it is not connected to the land plot by a subsoil that is usual for any structure of surface communication. It corresponds with the defendant's description of it, i.e. a 'concrete pavement layer with the thickness of approximately 20 cm , therefore it became fit for use as an access road to the plaintiff's plant as well as to places of business and real property of further entities'."

And it continues in 44:
"According to the above, we can derive that from the legal perspective, the 'communication' in question is not a surface communication that has an own legal regime. The appellate court is of the opinion that it is more appropriate to use term a 'civil engineering structure (access road)' for that structure that does not have an own legal regime but a legal regulation of the property - land plot on which it is situated. Since the plaintiff is the owner of the land plot on which the civil engineering structure (access road) in question is

10:52 1
2
located, which was not disputed in the proceedings, the plaintiff should be perceived as the owner of the civil engineering structure (access road) [based] on the land plot."

So now I will ask a few questions just on this.
So would you agree with me that what the court was resolving in this case was a communication which used to connect several facilities? Correct?
A. I disagree. Because this is reasoning of the judgment, and as far as I was able to see, the judgment itself, the declaration, this was not the subject matter of the proceedings.
But, forgive me, this is the first time in my life I see this particular judgment, so I will likely be unable to respond to it in a relevant manner.
However, if something is in the reasoning part of a judgment, there is no obstacle to res judicata. And if I only could have glimpsed at what was the subject matter in the declaration of the judgment, the question at hand -- the fact in question was not this. I can only assume that in its justification, the court also has spoken about decision. But again this was not binding, because something binding is only the declaration of judgment, and not its justification which is binding.

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interpretations provided by the court's level which are one level below, can we not?
A. Yes, of course. Definitely I agree. Especially when they convene, it is a part of the procedural tactics.
So I fully agree, of course.
Q. So I understand, sir, that your strong view on -- that it is your view that a field road is always a special purpose road; correct?
A. In principle, yes. If it meets the term particulars that we referred to earlier.
Q. By the "particulars", do you mean the particulars set out in Article 1(3) of the Road Act?
A. I do not remember exactly those provisions of that article. I rather think it's about the executive decree to, accompanying the Road Act, if I'm not mistaken.
Q. So just to make it clear, again, "yes" or "no" would be very helpful.

So if we put back document R-175, paragraph 1(3).
So in your opinion, does a field road have to meet the definitions set out in 1(3) in order to qualify as a special purpose road?
A. A brief answer: yes.

One addition: the executive decree is called executive because it specifies in more detail these

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And if it were a part of the declaration of the judgment, it is not binding to any other legal matter or case, because the declaratory part of judgment, except for defined exceptions in procedure, is only binding inter partes.

I'm not even sure who were the parties to this particular dispute, adjudicated by this court in this judgment. No matter who it was, but in its declaratory part, the judgment is only binding for those two parties to that proceedings. I have no idea, again, who it was. Truly I don't know. So I would not, not dare say, go into expert dispute with the court because the justification part is lengthy, and you understand that I would have to study it thoroughly in order to be able to relevantly answer these questions.
Q. Sir, would you agree with me that we lawyers, when we want to see how courts interpret statutory and other legislative provisions, look precisely at the non-formally binding parts of court decisions to be able to see how courts interpret these provisions?
A. Yes. But most of all we focus on the highest court authority's interpretation, which Košice Regional Court definitely is not.
Q. And if there is no relevant interpretation by the highest authority, we may also look at the
particulars. Meaning that in this case lex specialis, the executive decree says verbis expressis about field tracks, which meet certain point which used to be a mine or a quarry. So I dare say that, yes, it does meet the definition, answering your question.

But my justification would go deeper, going into specifics stated by the executive decree.
Q. Sir, is it your expert opinion that a definition in a decree can overrule or derogate from a definition in the law?
A. It is supposed to clarify definition. It is not an overruling act, because act is a greater strength standard than decree. But it's supposed to, in decree, clarify terms promulgated in act, which in this case I think it has been done so.
Q. But just to make the principle clear, if the law requires A, then that A must be met regardless of even an express provision in the decree that A does not apply?
A. It does apply in light of how it is clarified in executive decree. That's why it's called executive: that some things are being clarified by it.
But I do agree with the fact that it should not go above or against the text of the act.
MR DRYMER: So that I don't have to wait for the lawyers in
their pleadings to interpret your answer for me, Professor, let me ask you a question directly.

If a field road meets the criteria set out in
Article 1(3) of the Road Act, is it considered a special purpose road; yes or no?
A. Yes.

MR DRYMER: Thank you.
MR PEKAR: And then I will ask a follow-up question. If a field road does not meet the criteria set out in 1(3), is it considered a special purpose road?
A. It may still be considered a special purpose road because the executive decree establishes additional particulars when such road may be considered special purpose road.
Q. We agreed, sir, that the decree cannot overrule a definition in the law; correct?
A. Yes, we did agree. Of course. Everything I say is that decree is to provide more detail to act, because it's an executive decree. So some terms we call vague in our logic are clarified further by the legislator through an executive decree, giving it more clear outline to what may and may not be considered field road.

And if I may make an additional comment: I do not think that any field road in Slovakia would not meet a definition in the paragraph 3 of the Road Act, because

11:04 1
body?
A. I don't really know that. And in my view no one at all knows this in Slovakia.
Q. No, no, I apologise. There was an incorrect translation.

So my question was: does this provision address -explains -- the statutory requirement that we see in Article 1(3) of the Road Act for every surface communication to have a road body?
A. I think I've already answered this question several times. I have no reason to change my opinion about this. But let me just point out, I'm no expert to neither transport law nor road law. So I dare not say what is and what is not a road body.
Q. I apologise if there were problems with interpretation. I will ask the question as simply as I can.

Does Article 22 of the decree address what road body is?
A. No, it does not, what is road body. But legally, by a demonstrative enumeration it establishes what is considered special purpose road.
Q. Okay. So is it your opinion that on the basis of this provision in the decree, a field road that does not have a road body is special purpose communication?
A. Yes, I do think so. And I also think that every field

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road does have a road body, even though it's only a trodden dirt, or driven -- whatever foundation there is, to the best I deem this a road body, because it serves to travel from A to B.
Q. Okay. So, sir, let's leave aside the factual question whether there is a road body or not. Just from a legal perspective, what you are telling this Tribunal is that -- and we established that earlier -- in Article 1(3) of the Road Act, every surface communication must have a road body; right?
A. I did not say -- I would have to see it again, but yes, it is a part of the legal definition. But please, once again, it does not say what is road body.
Q. You also agreed with me that special purpose roads are a subset of surface communications; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Therefore, if we look at the text of the law alone, special purpose roads, being surface communications, must have a road body, whatever that is?
A. Yes.
Q. So now would you agree with me that since this is a statutory requirement, this cannot be derogated from or overruled by Article 22 of the decree?
A. That's an incorrect question. I did say on multiple occasions that of course the act has a greater legal

11:13 1

Can you see that, sir?
A. (Answer not interpreted).
Q. Sorry, I was just asking you whether you --
A. From residential zone, give way, vehicle going -- yes, I can see this provision.
Q. So I would draw your attention, sir, on the use of the term "road" at the beginning of the provision, and then the field track that we still have on the first line towards the middle; can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree with me, sir, that this provision distinguishes between "road" as it is defined for the purposes of this act, and a field road?
A. Yes. According to this provision, yes.
Q. So would you agree with me that for the purposes of the provision, a road is something different than a field road?
A. Yes. However, the subject matter of this act is clearly defined differently than the subject matter of what we've discussed until now.
Q. And, therefore, would you agree with me that obviously for the purposes of this act, which is about road traffic, a field road is something different from a special purpose road; correct?
A. No. I cannot see it from this. It doesn't derive, to

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11:11 $1 \quad$ will be needed
I would kindly ask you to look at Article 2 of the Road Traffic Act, which is Exhibit R-174. Now, we can read there that:
"For the purposes of this Act, road traffic shall mean the use of highways, roads, local communications and special-purpose communication (hereinafter referred to as 'road') by drivers of vehicles and pedestrians."

Can you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you agree with me that the term "road" is used to define four categories, namely: highways, roads, local communications, and special purpose roads?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is actually the same four categories of surface communications that we know very well from Article 1(2) of the Road Act; correct?
A. I suppose.
Q. So now if we look at Article 21 of the Road Traffic Act, it states:
"When entering a road from a place off the road, from a field track, from a forest road, from a cycle path, from a residential area or from a pedestrian zone, the driver shall be obliged to give way to a vehicle driving on the road."
me, from this.
Q. So if we go back to the definition that we saw in Article 2. In Article 2(1) we see that roads for the purposes of this act include "highways, roads, local communications and special-purpose communication"; right?
A. I do not have the Slovak text in front of me.
Q. I would ask that the Slovak text be shown to the witness.
MR DRYMER: Please remind me quickly of the exhibit so I can pull it up on my own screen.
THE PRESIDENT: R-174.
MR PEKAR: This is R-174.
MR DRYMER: Thank you. Thank you, madame.
MR PEKAR: So in Article 2(1) we can see a definition used for the purposes of this act, and the term "road" means four things: it means "highways, roads, local communications and special-purpose communication"; can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So if you now go back to Article 21. We don't need to change the screen in the English, but we need to scroll down in the Slovak version. And now if I read it out loud by replacing the definition of "road" by its components, 21(1) would state: when entering a highway,
road, local communication and special-purpose communication from a place off the highway, road, local communication and special communication, from a field track...

## Do you follow me?

A. Yes.
Q. So this is why I put to you the proposition that for the purposes of Article 21 a special purpose road is something different than a field road; correct?
A. Well, may I respond to this?
Q. Yes, please.
A. Dear colleague, I come out of the criterion of a rational legislator. A legislator every time and under all circumstances, call and make relationship between every provision they enact in order for the new provision to be fully compatible with the existing legal system.

Now, that's in theory. But in reality not all provisions enacted are always coherent, and I think this is the very product of Slovak legislator not acting rationally -- I don't want to speak on behalf of the legislator, this is not my place, neither the counsel nor me, but I do not think that the legislator wanted to achieve that what counsel is referring to.

I do not think that the legislator has considered so
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11:21 1
A. Even, I think, not every one is there as a field road, but only the one meeting those term features.
Q. No, sir, there may have been a misunderstanding. The only provision that you referred to as the provision stating that every field road is a special purpose road, is Article 22 of the decree; right?
A. Yes. Because there is no other legal statute addressing this issue in such detail.
Q. And now, hypothetically, if -- and the decree is an act of the Ministry of Transportation; correct?
A. I think so.
Q. The Road Traffic Act and the Road Act are both Acts of the Parliament?
A. Certainly.
Q. Now, hypothetically, imagine the Parliament makes a terrible mistake and they enact a conflicting provision to a decree because they are completely incompetent. As a matter of law, what will prevail: the completely incompetent provision adopted by the Parliament, or the very rational provision in the decree?
A. I can imagine quite clearly such situation, and that has happened on multiple occasions in fact, and based on the doctrine of sovereignty of the legislator result that no matter how incompetent, it will prevail any lower

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referring to But, again, I am no legislator. I dare not respond on their behalf what they had in mind.

But as a minimum, we have a conflict between two acts, because the definition used here is different one to the one used in the Road Act, if I'm not mistaken.

So, again, there is a discrepancy to which Madam President referred to earlier, and also during this hearing we've pointed this out on multiple occasions. Yes, indeed, Slovak legal order briefly is not coherent, is not consistent, and that is why I would not make dramatic conclusions from this, me personally, that the legislator wanted exactly to achieve excluding field road from special purpose roads, when in other piece of legislation they claim that yes, indeed, field road is special purpose road.

I think this is an error on the side of the legislator, and not their intention.
Q. So, sir, you pointed out to an inconsistency, I believe, between Article 22 of the decree and these provisions of the act on road traffic; correct?
A. Yes, but not only the decree, but also the Road Act.
Q. Well, sir, the idea that every field road is a special purpose road, is only stated in Article 2 of the decree, is it not?
statute.
MR PEKAR: Thank you.
This may be a good moment to break, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Good. Do you have an idea how much more time you need?
MR PEKAR: I have covered 70\% of my outline.
THE PRESIDENT: Good.
Fine, then we'll have a 15-minute break now.
Professor Števcek, I would like to ask you not to communicate with anyone about the facts of the case or your testimony during the break. And we'll see you again in 15 minutes. Thank you.
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: I look forward to it. Thank you. (11.24 am)
(A short break)
(11.43 am)

THE PRESIDENT: So, Professor Števcek, are you ready to continue?
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And Mr Pekar is too. Good. Please go on. MR PEKAR: Thank you, Madam President.

Professor Števcek, we will now switch topics and discuss the preliminary injunction against AOG which was issued by the District Court in Bardejov, upon the request of Ms Varjanová.

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Is it still your opinion, sir, that the District Court in Bardejov did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction?
A. Definitely yes.
Q. Now, assuming, just for the purposes of my question, assuming that the field road in Smilno was not a public special purpose road, would the district court have jurisdiction to issue the injunction?
A. Yes.
Q. Let's have a look at the claim which Ms Varjanová filed. It is document MS-5. And it would be helpful to have the Slovak original of the document too. Perfect.

So the Slovak version of this document is actually longer. We only have a partial translation into English.

I would just ask you to confirm, sir, have you seen the full Slovak version of the request?
A. I cannot confirm that because I think I have the motion, and the action was not given to me to my disposal.
Q. So, just to confirm, counsel for Discovery only showed you the motion for interim injunction, but did not show you the action that the motion was in front of?
A. No, I was basing on court decisions only.
Q. Okay. So you did not even see the request for interim injunction, did you?

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Despite the fact that, as is clear from the motion to commence the proceedings, the first defendant has a $1 / 700$ share in the relevant common property, his supposed right to use the property, according to his ideas, he not only claims with the attached letter, but repeatedly uses self-help, and without anything authorizing him to do so, removes from the relevant property the motor vehicle that the plaintiff has on rent. Despite the fact that the plaintiff has repeatedly turned to the police in this regard without immediate intervention by the court, she cannot prevent the first defendant, either alone or through third parties, from repeatedly physically manipulating the motor vehicle that the plaintiff has on rent, and for the condition of which the plaintiff is responsible. In case of repeated removal of the said motor vehicle, there is also a risk of its damage. The plaintiff has the consent of several co-owners with her procedure in using the relevant lot of land."

So this is a factual description provided by Ms Varjanová in support of her request for interim injunction; correct?
A. I expect so.
Q. Would you agree with me, sir, that the way the problem is described here, it is a dispute between co-owners

Page 59 years, so the answer is no.
Q. Okay. I will just then go through that very quickly.

Let's first look at the action, this document MS-5 we have in front of us.

But you are aware, sir, that the action was for declaration of nullity of an agreement that AOG entered into with one of the many co-owners of the field track, and Ms Varjanová was seeking declaration of nullity of that agreement due to violation of her rights of first refusal.

Apologies, there was very incorrect Slovak translation. "Right of first refusal" was translated literally. So maybe if I say "preemptive right".
A. Yes, I'm aware of these factual circumstances.
Q. And the request for interim injunction, which is actually part of that action, states that:
"As follows from the enclosed letter of JUDr Róbert Slamka, the first defendant, after the registration of its ownership rights in the Land Register, requests the conduct from the plaintiff that would, according to his arguments, respect his co-ownership in the lot of land of the 'E' Register No. 2721/780, in the cadastral territory Smilno, registered in the Ownership Certificate No. 1367.
A. If I'm not mistaken, this has been a few months to
regarding use of a land plot that they co-own?
A. Yes.
Q. So one co-owner wants to have a car parked there, and the other co-owner does not want that car to be there; correct?
A. Definitely not. This is not how it's been formulated.

The action and on merits is about relative invalidity of a legal act. That's okay. It's been a dispute between co-owners, and a motion to grant an interim injunction at that time aims, I don't remember exactly -- here it is -- to -- I do not see the very -- request for relief. I cannot see the request for relief in that motion. Can I perhaps see that?
Q. In the interests of time -- we will come to the request for relief -- what I am asking you to confirm is that the way that Ms Varjanová describes the problem here, the problem for which she seeks the interim injunction, is a dispute between two co-owners regarding whether one of the co-owners' car can be parked on the land plot or not?
MR DRYMER: He has already said yes, I believe.
A. I disagree. I don't agree. This is not how it has been formulated.
MR PEKAR: Okay.
A. It was about an action to declare relative invalidity of

Page 60
egal act. And related or not related with that is the issue of an interim injunction. But not on the merits, Madame Varjanová had requested invalidity of a legal act.
Q. Sir, there may be translation issues --

MR DRYMER: May I ask one question, please. I don't mean to interrupt, but so as to correct my apparent misunderstanding -- perhaps I'm the only one in the room who misunderstood.

Do you agree -- no, no, that's not for me to ask you that.

Do you consider, Professor, that the way the problem is described here, it is a dispute between co-owners regarding the use of a land plot that they co-own?
A. Do you think described wherein?

MR DRYMER: Excuse me, is that a question to me?
I will play the witness here and ask you to repeat the question.

In the request for interim injunction, is the dispute, as described in that request, a dispute between co-owners regarding the use of a land plot that they co-own?
A. If it's formulated like this, then yes.

MR DRYMER: Back to you, Mr Pekar.
MR PEKAR: Thank you.
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11:57 1
"that within 3 days of the receipt of this request"
Ms Varjanová is requested to:
"... remove the motor vehicle of white colour, as seen in the attached photo, which is allegedly leased by you personally, as through this unlawful act you are hindering the co-owner, the company ..."

AOG, with its address represented and so on:
"... in the entrance and transit/passing through the plot of land ... 2721/780 arable land with an area of $11,660.00$ [metres squared] registered on the Ownership Certificate No. 1367 ..."

Can you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree with me that the way Dr Slamka puts the issue is, again, a dispute between co-owners?
A. Yes.
Q. So, sir, do you agree with me that civil courts have jurisdiction to issue interim injunctions in disputes between co-owners that regulate relationship between co-owners?
A. Of course. Definitely, yes.
Q. And as we know, on the basis of its request, the other evidence attached to it -- and this letter -Ms Varjanová obtained the issuance of a preliminary injunction; correct?

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The beginning of the description starts with reference to an enclosed letter of JUDr Róbert Slamka, the first defendant. Now, I represent to you that the document that we will now show you on the screen is this letter.

So this letter is Exhibit R-36, tab 8. So what we can see here is the letter sent by Mr Róbert Slamka to Ms Marianna Varjanová on 30 December 2015; correct?

12:00 1
2 Q. And the injunction became applicable immediately upon delivery to AOG; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. AOG had the right to file an appeal against the injunction; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. The appeal, however, did not stay the applicability of the injunction; correct?

Apologies, there was an incorrect --
A. I don't know if it spoke about the enforceability --
Q. No, apologies, there was an incorrect translation into Slovak. I will say that again.
The appeal, however, did not stay the applicability of the injunction; correct?
A. If I understand the question correctly, the appeal has no suspensive force on the enforceability of such injunction. So yes.
Q. Yes. Would Ms Varjanová have been liable for damages caused by the injunction if the injunction had been quashed on appeal?
A. I don't understand the question.
Q. I'm not surprised you don't understand the question.

Would Ms Varjanová have been liable for damages caused by the injunction if the injunction had been

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12:02 $1 \quad$ quashed on appeal?
A. If you now are referring to the diction of the section 77/3 of the former Civil Code of Procedure, that stipulates such responsibility, for damages, of the preliminary injunction applicant.
Q. So would it be fair to say that under that provision there is a certain balance? On the one hand, a preliminary injunction is always issued just on the basis of a request of the applicant without giving the other party an opportunity to say anything about it in the first instance proceeding. But, on the other hand, the other party may file an appeal, and if the appeal is successful then the applicant is liable for any damage caused by the application of the interim injunction that it ...?
A. Yes, I agree, it would be responsible.
Q. And isn't it true, sir, that the same rule applies if the applicant loses the main claim on the merits?
A. Well, the Civil Code of Procedure has not been in force for the past eight years, nearly. But I think back then, that's the way it worked.
Q. So in our case Ms Varjanová would have been liable, not only if the interim injunction had been quashed by the appellate court, but also if she had lost the main claim regarding validity or invalidity of the agreement

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> conditions for granting an interim injunction.
> So would you agree with me, Professor -- and
> I'm speaking obviously with respect to the then applicable legal regulations, so I'm speaking of what we call the Code of Civil Procedure -- that in terms of the then applicable legislation, one of the conditions for granting an interim injunction was a threat of imminent harm; correct?
> A. Yes.
> Q. And now if we refer to Article 75(2) of the Code of

> Civil Procedure, which is LF-4.
> MR DRYMER: Which of course the witness knows by heart from back to front!

> MR PEKAR: So this is Article 75(2), please. Okay, so we are there. 75(2) states:
> "Apart from the terms of the petition under
> Section 79 Subsection 1, the petition shall include a description of the decisive facts justifying the ordering of the interim measure, the statement of conditions of eligibility of the claim to which the interim protection is to be provided, and the reasoning of the risk of imminent harm or the need for a temporary arrangement of the minor child's ..."

> And so on.
> So you can see here that what the text of the law

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12:05 $\quad 1 \quad$ between AOG and Mr Tomecek?
A. Yes, in general one can say it this way.
Q. So let's look now at the appeal which was filed by AOG, and this is document LF-17.

Sir, did you review this document when you were preparing your expert reports or in preparation for this cross-examination?
A. No, I only based my preparation on court decisions.
Q. So you would not know, therefore, sir, whether AOG argued in the appeal whether they had the right of general use of the field track under the Road Act, would you?
A. I cannot tell this from this appeal. But from other documents, it resulted that this is not what they were referring to.
Q. So from these other documents, do you know whether AOG stated in the appeal that the land plot on which Ms Varjanová was parking her car was a public special purpose road?
A. As far as I can remember correctly, it was more or less undisputable that they did not refer to this, but this has been the procedural tactics of the counsel, Dr Slamka, so I would not like to comment on that.
Q. Okay. So Professor, let's look now at paragraphs 22-24 of your first expert report, where you discuss the

12:11 1
requires is the risk of imminent harm; correct?

## A. Yes.

Q. So now in paragraph 16 of your expert report, you argue that this actually is a high threshold, and in fact the harm must be "significant, serious and even irreparable"; can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So we will return to the legal standard later on. Now

I would just like to follow your reasoning and turn your attention to paragraph 22 of your first expert report, where you state, broadly, that:
"The threat of ... harm can only be derived from [Ms Varjanová's] description in the application, and hence that the imminent harm arises from the risk of damage to the motor vehicle which the defendant allegedly disposed of physically - moving the vehicle from the place where the applicant had put it."

Can you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And then in paragraph 23 of your first expert report you state that:
"That argument would succeed if the applicant herself did not violate the law ... if she had parked the car in an ordinary parking space and someone would be trying to move her car."

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## Can you see that, sir?

A. Yes.
Q. So, when I am to apply your standard of harm that needs to be certified in accordance to what you say in paragraph 16, the removal of a car from a parking lot would meet that standard; correct?
A. I don't know. I have not considered this. I have been considering specific merits of the situation responding to specific questions put to me.
Q. But, sir, if I read the first sentence of what you have in 23, you say:
"That argument would succeed if the applicant herself did not violate the law ... if she had parked the car in an ordinary parking space and someone would be trying to move her car."

Right? Can you see that sentence?
A. Yes.
Q. So to me, that sentence is very clear: if I park my car in a parking space, someone removes that, I may go and obtain an interim injunction against the person doing so; right?
A. Yes, as long as the vehicle was placed on a road. So the counsellor himself just admitted that this is a special purpose road, because that's where the car was clearly parked. A car may park outside of roads. So

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grow corn, but they were intending to use this land for transit from A to B. So if I place my car on a special purpose road, serving for transport from A to B, clearly by that I am preventing others, even other co-owners, in proper use of that land. And I claim that not only to the co-owners, but since I am fully convinced this was special purpose road, not only to the co-owners, but also to the broader public: I'm preventing them to adequately use such road.
Q. Well, there are several components I would like to address.

So the first component is that you -- assuming it was a PSPR -- apologies, that's "public special purpose road".

Okay, so assuming it is a public special purpose road, so if I see -- so, for example, when leaving this building, I go on back to my hotel and I see that there is a car in the road, do I have the right to tow that car or have it towed somewhere else? Now assuming we're in Slovakia --
A. I don't think one can put it this way, because also in the Civil Code in Slovakia, you have Article 6, which says about self-assistance. Meaning that if you meet the conditions of defensive self-assistance, in that case I think yes. But this would depend on the

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12:19 $1 \quad$ circumstances of the case at hand.
Q. Okay, and it would be for a court to assess whether the conditions for self-help were met or not; correct?
A. Well, there is no accuser, there is no judge, so it is not up to the court ex offo to examine such actions. In the vast majority of cases these things never get to the court because it's usually resolved right on the spot, according to Article 5 of the Civil Code, and the municipality has authority to intervene.

So answering your question: yes, if it ever got to the court, that is that body which in this case is capable of and empowered to judge whether or not this has been done within the legislative framework of self-assistance.
Q. Okay. So we will turn to that later. Now I am interested in the legal standard of the harm that is required.

First of all, there doesn't need to be actual harm; it is sufficient for a threat or risk of harm to be there, correct?
PROFESSOR SANDS: Sorry, can I just cut in here. I mean, this is all obviously for you to decide how to proceed. But if I can just ask the witness: the bottom line is, is it not, your view, your opinion, that the first-instance court got it wrong and it should not have
PROFESSOR SANDS: The case then went on appeal, the injunction was upheld, and your opinion is the Appeal Court got it wrong; is that correct?
A. Yes, I claim it also in my report that also the Regional Court in Prešov was wrongful, due to the reason that ex officio they were supposed to examine their power, their jurisdiction in fact, not only on merits -- there was existing jurisdiction on merits -- but the jurisdiction on granting interim injunction. And that is where I claim, as resulting from all the facts of the circumstance, it is clear that everyone was only interested in transit over that road. Madame Varjanová and everybody else, beyond any reasonable doubt, were only interested in transporting mechanisms, vehicles, if I put it that way, over that road.

So in this case I think that as particulars were met of public special purpose road, the court was supposed to have judged that there was no jurisdiction for the court to grant such interim injunction.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Okay. But the court didn't do that?
A. I'm hearing myself, forgive me, because I have an echo in my headset.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Could you help us poor arbitrators sitting
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courts, above which there is Supreme Court of the Slovak
Republic, and Constitutional Court of the Slovak
Republic, which also has the authority to overrule
decisions of regional courts.
    Hopefully this has been a sufficient explanation.
    Please ask for more to elaborate.
PROFESSOR SANDS:Are the judges on the Appeals Court
    independent?
A. Of course.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Do you have any evidence that the judges
    on the Appeals Court decided as they did on the basis of
    any pressure brought upon them by the state?
A. Definitely I never in my life have heard anything like
    that, sir, no.
PROFESSOR SANDS: So your opinion would be, although the
    court got it wrong, the Appeals Court got it wrong, it
    exercised independent and impartial judgment?
A. No doubt, yes.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Thank you very much.
MR PEKAR:Thank you. So I'll go back to my now
    significantly reduced line of questioning.
    Please let's assume that the land plot on which
    Ms Varjanová was parking her car was not a PSPR. We
    already established that in that case the courts would
    have jurisdiction. But now my question was: was the
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in London, who have no background in Slovak law, know nothing about the status of Slovak courts, could you tell us something about the status of this Appeals Court in the Slovakian court system? How significant a court is it?
A. Every court is ipso facto an important body of protection of law. If you are asking about the structure and hierarchy of the Slovak judicial system, a regional court is a typical appellate court, meaning that it is to serve to remedy any wrongdoings of those district courts, or now even municipal courts we have, placed within their jurisdiction territory. The regional court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate general conclusions. And its precedence effect of its judgments only relates to specific matter or case within the instance process.

Above the regional court there is another court, called the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, even Constitutional Court, which both have the authority to correct their decisions and judgments, but only based on initiative -- it's a remedy, either called an extraordinary appeal in civil proceedings, or constitutional complaint in constitutional law concept.

So that means the regional court is a middle level of the judicial system under which there are district
granting of an interim injunction justified in that case on the facts certified by Ms Varjanová in her request for interim injunction?
A. If on that land there was no PSPR, Madame Varjanová was not supposed to be placing her vehicle there whatsoever, because she would have violated the law, because motor vehicles may only communicate over surface roads. If Madame Varjanová drove on field road or forest road -I take it back. Only driving on her own land, which would be a forest or arable land, she would then I think violate -- it would be a misdemeanour.

I don't know if at that time back then this was legislated. I really don't remember. But from a certain point on, it is even a misdemeanour driving off cleared roads. So from this point of view I deem that equally the principle would apply, nemo turpitudinem suam allegare potest. So if I myself violate law, I may not expect anyone else to be -provided to me relevant protection.

So if Madame Varjanová parked on a public special purpose road or parked on her land, however, which would be either forest land or field road, in both cases she would be violating the law. So in this way I deem that in neither one of the modalities an interim injunction should not have been granted.
Q. So when people in Slovakia park their cars in their gardens, which are registered as gardens, all of them violate the law; isn't that your testimony, sir?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Okay. So now let's look at the decision of the District Court in Bardejov which granted the injunction. So this is document C-125 and I'll draw your attention to what is on page 7 of the English translation.

So in the middle of it now, that would be the 10th line -- 12th. On line 12 it states:
"All the more that it is inadmissible for one of the co-owners to interfere with the rights of other co-owners, or to damage the rights or things belonging to the other co-owners without a legal reason and to use the self-help institute in such a way (please see the wording of Article 6 of the Civil Code, the question: what was the immediate threat of unlawful infringement of a right of the first defendant to avert the interference himself in an appropriate way?, or, if there was an interference with his co-ownership rights, why did he not demand their protection from the relevant authority, e.g., before the court, etc.). If there is any disagreement between the co-owners regarding the management of the joint property, it is necessary to submit a proposal according to Article 139 [paragraph] 2

12:33 $\quad 1 \quad$ A. Yes, definitely they were not proven.
2 Q. But would you agree with me that if it were actually, you know, factually correct that AOG had towed Ms Varjanová's car away several times, exactly as Ms Varjanová described it in her request for interim injunction, then the court's disapproval of such actions by AOG would be perfectly valid; right?
A. I'm a little lost in your question, I have to admit. But if I may respond before you clarify. I would definitely, in this case, not use self-help as a private legal institute, because I claim that this is the public law regulative since this was a case of public special purpose road. And in this case I would refer, I myself, back then, if I had been involved, I would refer to the municipality as the body with jurisdiction to issue even sanctions for blocking public special purpose road.

I am not certain or sure why AOG back then has reverted to self-help. In any event, I think it would be more correct to refer to the municipality whose power it is to administer public special purpose roads.
Q. Sir, would you agree with me that precisely because self-help is an institute of private law, it is not acceptable for anyone to use self-help to enforce his or her putative public law rights?
A. I guess this is for a full expert book, but in

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the rights of other co-owners in this way, in this case of the applicant."
So would you agree with me, sir, that what the court expresses here is the court's opinion that the resort to self-help by AOG, by towing away Ms Varjanová's car, was inappropriate?
A. I would not agree with that, because the court, in its resolution on granting preliminary injunction, did not conduct any evidencing. Meaning that this claim is based on, likely, I can only assume, from the claims of the claimant. But this is not what the court states, and I'd like to remind you on the fact, on decision justification and the reasoning, because only the judgment part of a decision is applicable when there has been no evidencing. The court then did not have established facts whether self-help or not has been eligible.
Q. Okay, so I appreciate you state this is what the courts said on the basis of the description provided of Ms Varjanová only; right?
A. I did not say exclusively. I said "likely".
Q. Okay. But -- so you take issue with what the court says because you say facts were only certified instead of proven; right?
principle, if we base this on the thesis of relative independence of, in the continental legal system, independence of private and public law. So the overlaps of one into the other should be quite rare, relatively.

However, at this moment I would have to think deeper about the question whether I may, as a self-help, defend public subjective law. I would lean towards saying yes. But, again, I repeat, this would require much deeper pondering other than responding like this ex abrupto.
Q. Okay. So we may look at what the Appellate Court had to say about the conduct of AOG. We have it in document R-063. And if we look at what is the third paragraph in the English version on page 6. So it also happens to be the third paragraph in the Slovak original, so we can just see there that the Regional Court says:
"Defendant 1 must have expected from the very beginning that a legal construct allowing it to carry out geological exploration on a third party land through a (already invalid) purchase of a tiny co-ownership interest may fail. As to whether Defendant 1 acted in good faith, it can be reliably stated that the conduct of Defendant lacked elementary caution. Defendant 1 could have been well aware that purchase of a minuscule co-ownership interest without respecting the pre-emption right is very close to violation of ownership rights.

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It is evident that business activities of Defendant 1 were based, from the very beginning, on mala fide manner of communication with owners of the affected land. From such a point of view, the conduct of Defendant 1 lacks any bona fide trait."

Can you see that, sir?
A. Yes, I can see it, but I don't agree with it.
Q. But I think we have established here that the court disagreed with the acts of AOG; correct?
A. Is this a resolution on the interim injunction?
Q. Yes, it is.
A. This is not a judgment on the merits?
Q. Well, no, this is the decision of the Appellate Court, the Regional Court in Prešov, on the request for interim injunction.
A. In that case it applies what I've said before: that definitely the merits have not been established. Quite definitely. But I dare to say here that the regional court made a gross violation, even legally. If I may spend a minute to explain why, I'd like to do so.
The concept of -- apologies to interpreters.
The concept of relative invalidity of a legal act does not mean at all something which is not acting on good faith. That's a gross misunderstanding of the principles Slovak private law is based upon. Because

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12:42 $\quad 1$
aware of that. So that is why I disagree.
Q. Well, sir, I believe this regional court decides on the basis of the procedure that had been conducted both before the Court of First Instance and then the Regional Court, right? So we are not at the moment when the request for preliminary injunction was filed; right?
A. Well, I'm not certain I understand, but, granting an interim injunction is one thing, but deciding by court on merits is a different matter altogether.

I apologise if I'm wrong, but if I remember correctly, at the time of Prešov Regional Court making the decision on appeal against the injunction, no merits have been decided yet whether the legal action is invalid or not. This is what I'm talking about.
Q. Okay.

Now if you look at the last two lines, actually, what the court says was mala fide is the "manner of communication with the owners of the affected land"; correct? The court here does not refer to the conclusion of the agreement with Mr Tomecek, but to something different, broader, to the communication with the co-owners; can you see that, sir?
A. If you mean the second-last sentence:
"It is evident that [from the start of the] business activities of [the other] ... mala fide manner ...

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relatively invalid legal act is considered valid until someone will doubt it. So at that time it has been a normal, valid act. Even at the time of granting interim injunction, this has been a normal, valid legal act.

When this judgment was made by a court on the merits, one could say this has been invalid. Until then, it's considered valid. And unfortunately -- or maybe fortunately, in the Slovak jurisprudence there are a number, maybe hundreds of cases when a relatively invalid legal act is not disputed by anyone.

So then it becomes a normal, relevant, legal act, meaning that the court here assumes the right to decide how at the time X to consider, I don't know how many hundred co-owners. I think simply with, even with the most benevolent interpretation of statutes, cannot hold no thesis of a lack of acting in good interest or on good faith, couldn't exist, because at that time that legal act has been a normal, valid legal act, and that is the substance of the concept of relative invalidity of legal act. It is not unlawful ex lege or absolutely; it only becomes invalid, based on court's judgment, when someone, I understand a different co-owner, would ask for such invalidity to be judged, by when the preliminary injunction motion was filed, court was not
communication with owners ... affected land." I can see that, and I've already responded to that in my previous remarks.
Q. Well, sir, I apologise, but you have not, because in your previous remark you were commenting on the conclusion of the agreement in violation of preemptive rights, and you were stating that that agreement had to be seen as valid until it was declared invalid by the court, as a part of Ms Varjanová's claim on the merits.

But what I am telling you here is that the court refers to the communication of AOG, with the owners, in plural, of the land plot. So the court here does not comment on the conclusion of the agreement, but on the much broader issue of AOG's communication; isn't that right?
A. Yes, I understand now what you are asking about.

I don't remember exactly how many co-owners there were. But I suppose from my own professional background that in many cases it is basically unthinkable to communicate with all co-owners, because very often it happens that several co-owners cannot be found, they are instead represented by the Slovak land fund, or they could be forest owners, co-owners. I'm not specifically familiar with the specifics of this particular case, but to say -- to blame someone with a lack of bona fide that

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they did not communicate with all co-owners is not, or doesn't always have to be, valid, as this claim.

Once again, I do not remember the number of the co-owners, but if I remember correctly there were in the order of dozens of co-owners, and it's going to be quite difficult for anyone to communicate with all at once, as it seems to me it is stated here by the regional court in this document. Because, as you put it rightly, they use plural, so to communicate with all co-owners. With the best of intentions, I cannot imagine realistically to be done.
Q. Well, just one very last question: do you agree with me that the extracts from the Land Registry in Slovakia, which show the title deed for any plot of land, also show the registered address of each of the owners?
A. Yes, they should include the address of residence of each co-owner.
Q. Therefore, if I want to give people a fair opportunity to exercise their preemption right, as I'm required under the law, I just send them a letter to the address which is stated in this publicly available register, don't I?
A. It doesn't always necessarily have to be that way. I apologise, but even I don't live on my permanent residence address, I am perhaps violating some small

12:49 $\quad 1 \quad$ Q. Okay. So, sir, under your interpretation, the preemptive right under Slovak law is a "catch-me-if-you-can" type of provision?
A. I don't consider this worth commenting.

MR PEKAR: Well, then I don't consider it worth asking you further questions.
A. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Any questions in re-direct?
MR TUSHINGHAM: A couple. They will be very short, I promise you, Madam President.
( 12.50 pm )
Cross-examination by MR TUSHINGHAM
Q. Professor Števcek, this is for the reference in the transcript at 11.47. Do you recall being asked whether you saw a copy of the request for an interim injunction that had been filed by Ms Marianna Varjanová before you signed your expert reports; do you recall that? (Page 57, line 24)
A. That what occurred today, do you mean?
Q. Alright. Perhaps I could do it in this way instead. If you could be shown, please, Exhibit MS-5. And if you could -- yes, exactly. And in the Slovak, if you could move forward, please, I think it's to page -- if we go forward a couple of pages. And again. Yes. There.

So, Professor Števcek, you were asked whether you
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misdemeanour towards my municipality, but not really because I've registered for temporary residence. But the regular -- it happens quite commonplace, but people do not live at their permanent residence address.

Secondly, I'd once again like to dispute the thesis that I'm acting against the law, in violation of -- with law. I do act in accordance with the law until otherwise is proven to me. I'd like to emphasise that.

Once again, statute does not give me the obligation to approach every one co-owner -- the Civil Code, I mean; only establishes the right of the co-owners to dispute transfer by motion on a -- deciding on relative nullity of such act.

So it's not me having the initiative, that one purchasing the share of land, but it should be other co-owners having the initiative, and also, this is only an inductive argument and not deductively valid argument. From all the co-owners, only one disputed such legal act, so all the others are satisfied with the act. I cast no doubt on the fact that even one such co-owner has such right.

But I'm disputing the thesis that I was supposed to approach every one, because they all were interested on obtaining that one small share of the land. I'm quite certain this cannot be claimed.

12:52 1 MR TUSHINGHAM: That's Professor Fogaš. So Professor Števcek's, please. Thank you. And page 9 of the English, please, and then the equivalent. And then over one page in the Slovak --
THE PRESIDENT: It's further down.
MR TUSHINGHAM: -- in the Slovak. Yes.
Professor Števcek, do you see in footnote number 6 a document MS-5, and it's referred to in the paragraph as "the Request for granting the Interim Injunction". Does that refresh your memory about whether you saw this document before you signed your second expert report?
A. MS-5? Oh, MS-5 is the document you have shown earlier. Of course, no doubt about it. Please do consider that it has been at least a year and a half since I have seen it, so please, this is what you should attribute it to.
THE PRESIDENT: I think I understand the answer that you had seen the request?
A. Yes, no doubt. From this evidence it becomes clear.

MR DRYMER: Well, you even refer to it in paragraph 25, in the ninth line from the bottom.
A. It could be. Please ...

MR DRYMER: Yes.
A. There were an extreme number of documents and not every one I remember exactly.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think we've resolved this. Let's

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12:56 $\quad 1$

12:55 $\quad 1 \quad$ carry on.
MR TUSHINGHAM: My second question in re-examination, and this is transcript at 10.48 (page 38, lines 14-16), you were asked:
"... if there were a specific legal case addressing specifically the status of the field track in Smilno, would you accept that decision?"

Do you recall that question?
A. Yes, I remembered, it was about the Košice Municipal Court.
Q. Yes. Could you -- are you referring to the decision of the Košice Municipal Court there? Is that what you're referring to?
A. I'm not sure we're speaking about the same thing.
Q. Are you aware of any case --
A. Mr Counsel this morning has shown me some judgment and I remember that being Košice Municipal Court judgment.
Q. Yes.
A. But this was a Regional Court Košice, but I'm not sure of the question.
Q. Perhaps I could do it this way, then. Could you be shown Exhibit R-059, please.

Professor Števcek, have you seen a copy of this decision before?
A. Of course, this is the Prešov Regional Court resolution

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on appeal against, if I'm not mistaken, the interim injunction motion. Yes, of course, I have worked with this particular document.
Q. This document is different from the resolution of the regional court in the proceedings that were originally brought by Ms Marianna Varjanová. This, I will represent to you, is a decision in connection with an application for an interim injunction that was brought by AOG against Ms Marianna Varjanová in late 2016. And my question is: have you seen a copy of this decision before?
A. Once again, if we are speaking about the Prešov Regional Court resolution, by which it dealt with appeal against decision of the Bardejov District Court, and, if I remember correctly, on granting interim injunction, then yes, I have been working with this particular resolution.
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Števcek, this is a different application for a different injunction, and this application is brought by AOG, not against AOG, and this is the appellate decision on this other application.
A. That is in the vice versa.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
A. So AOG was the applicant.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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A. And Madame Varjanová was the defendant in this case.
This is what we're discussing, yes?
THE PRESIDENT: And others, yes.
Now, I don't know what the question is.
MR TUSHINGHAM: The question was, because Professor Števcek
said:
"... if there were a specific legal case addressing
specifically the legal status of the field track in
Smilno, would you accept that decision?"
And the Professor was not taken to this particular
decision, so I was just going to ask him a few short
questions about it, with the leave of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: That's fine. Yes.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Professor Števcek, just take a moment, if
you would, to familiarise yourself with this decision,
and I will ask you whether you agree with the court's
analysis in this decision.
A. Do you want me to read it now?
Q. Well, perhaps we can do it by coming to paragraph 11 and
onwards. So on page 4 of the English.
So if you could read paragraphs 11 through to 15 ,
please.
A. Yes. (Pause)
The court only quotes applicable legislation. One
may not either agree or disagree with it; one may only

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So if you could read paragraphs 11 through to 15 , please.

The court only quotes applicable legislation. One may not either agree or disagree with it; one may only

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13:00 $\quad 1 \quad$ acknowledge it.
Q. Well, let's look at paragraph 15. In paragraph 15 of the judgment, the court says:
"If the claimant claims that the access field road is a public special purpose road, it is necessary to point to the fact that the Communications Act puts certain restrictions on the roads use. When using a road, users must adjust themselves to the construction-technical condition of the road which the appellate court does not perceive as fulfilled in this case with regard to the field road condition ..."

And my question to you is, do you agree with the analysis there or not?
THE PRESIDENT: But do we agree that the analysis is hypothetical? It adopts the standpoint of the claimant.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Exactly. Exactly, yes.
MR PEKAR: Madam President, I'm sorry to interrupt, I believe this actually is a misrepresentation because it's not the analysis of the court; it's just a recital of what is stated probably in the request. In other words it's not clear to me whether 12,13 and 14 refer to what the court says, or if it just follows from 11 and repeats what the applicant had said.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we'll have to read this carefully, but that seems to be the case at first sight, at least, yes.

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13:05 1

I'm far from that. But the sentence saying that even single co-owner would express their dissent simply is not in line with the current legal system of Slovakia. That's all I can say to that. I'm sorry about that, but I under no circumstances can agree with this.

Well, just to understand me, please, co-owners in the mode of co-ownership in the Slovak civil law, there is a majorisation principle applicable. So the size of the share is important. So it's not thinkable, forgive me, for anyone to claim that even a single shareholder or co-owner of such share of land would have legal consequences. It would apply if a single co-owner would have a majority share compared to all the rest of the co-owners, which in this case was not the case.

So the sentence logically cannot be true.
Q. Can I ask you one final question about this decision. Could you move forward to paragraph 29, please. Could you just read that paragraph to yourself?
A. Yes, yes, I'm trying. (Pause)

I cannot agree with that. Then again, this ignores applicable legislation, the last sentence, regardless of whether this is or is not public road, because non-public special purpose roads are only within a single enclosed area. Everything else are, by default, public special purpose roads. So the last

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13:02 1 MR TUSHINGHAM: Could we move on, possibly, then, just to one further paragraph in the judgment. This is paragraph 24. And my question is whether you agree with the court's analysis in this paragraph?
A. I disagree. I think I've quite broadly tried to explain it over the past hours. So, once again, I cannot agree with this because the court claims that the land and any other road on it is a single unit, with which I disagree. These are two legal entities, which could have and do have different legal mode.

In other words, if I may add, right the first sentence saying:
"The owners of land ... are also the owners of the field road, located on the land ..."

Forgive me, but this is a gross disrespect to the Slovak legal system. There is no such superficial principle enacted, meaning that in Slovakia it's very commonplace that the landowner, entity A, and any entity owner, such as shrubs, structure, could be entity B on the same land.

So I cannot, as a civil law professor, subscribe to this particular claim here.
Q. And what about paragraph 26: do you agree with the court's reasoning here?
A. No. Definitely not. I don't want to offend anyone.

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sentence is completely ignoring the applicable legislation.
Q. And one final question --
A. In the first sentence, if I may --
Q. One final question --
A. That the -- on the access field to Smilno has no -where is the legal certainty in Slovakia? Who else would have the power to decide whether or not this is a public special purpose road, if not either the Ministry of Transport which, based on the Competence Act, is authorised to interpret this law -- this is a non-binding interpretation, mind you -- and the municipality of Smilno, who equally empowered the municipality by applicable legislation.

Now, what is binding legal act? Then I think we resign completely on the fact that the public administration and self-administration bodies to people, but to entities, they are supposed to help them. So, based on this interpretation, it would mean that the public power bodies must do all they can. For people to be confused about this, that entity who are supposed to tell them how it is would not, and how can one then live in such country? When someone else: it is not my jurisdiction, I take my hands off of this, well, then the rule of law would have to cease to exist in

Slovakia.
I'm sorry, I apologise, I'm kind of in disagreement with this. Public power bodies are here to make easier the lives in complex legal relationships to people and other entities. If we were to adopt this thesis, we would then resign to such system. That is why, forgive me, I must not agree with this.
Q. And my final question is, my understanding is that this decision was issued in connection with an application for an interim injunction. Does any part of the decision establish a binding legal precedent under Slovak law?
A. Now, the term of precedent, I know we are formally on British soil, but the precedents in continental law is very doubtful. We do have in the Slovak legal system precedental binding, but within the instance procedure on a specific case without general binding effect.

So neither Prešov Regional Court or Bardejov District Court do not have the power, authority, to formulate legal precedents. Even the Slovak Supreme Court or Constitutional Court, in their case it would be theoretically very doubtful whether they can formulate a precedent.

So definitely not a precedent, but with the highest court authorities, the judgments have a very powerful

13:13 1
interpretative effect. But, once again, these are not binding precedents.

So no Prešov Regional Court or Bardejov District
Court are capable of formulating such precedent.
MR TUSHINGHAM: I have no further questions. Thank you, Professor.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Do my colleagues have questions? I have just one.
( 1.11 pm )
Questions from THE TRIBUNAL
MR DRYMER: One very quick question, one particular and quick question, Professor, and in the interests of time I would ask you to try and answer it as specifically and as quickly as possible.

At paragraph 20 of your second report you referred to the nemo turpitudinem principle, what some of us might call us the "nemo dat" principle or, poor English speakers, the principle that one may not be heard to invoke his own turpitude; correct? That is one element of your critique of what the courts have done here.

If one looks, however, at R-63, which we saw earlier, at page 6 , could I ask the technician to turn that up? For the benefit of the witness in particular, on the screen. I have it on my own screen. Right, page 6. Fifth paragraph, it begins in English:

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"Nonetheless ..."
Could you highlight that, please? Professor, you
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see the paragraph? I know you might not see the Slovak
version -- ah, there it is -- but I understand you read English.

When I read this several weeks ago, it occurred to me that this is the court's attempt in fact to balance rights and to consider the fact that Ms Varjanová ought not to have obstructed this access road. Do you agree with me?
A. Yes.

MR DRYMER: In other words, this is the court's attempt to wrestle with the very principle that you say they ignored?
A. Well, at the same time -- thank you, Madam President, for the argument -- a simple answer is yes.
MR DRYMER: I'm not arguing, and I'm not the President.
A. And it says even here that it was an access road, so as though the court agrees with the fact that this is an access road and it was not appropriate to block it.
MR DRYMER: Right, so the court did, if you will, consider whether, or attempt to consider, or commenced to consider, whether or not Ms Varjanová acted contrary to the law, and took that into consideration in its judgment, it seems to me?

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A. Of course. It is a very legitimate legal impression.

MR DRYMER: Thank you.
A. But let me emphasise, it is still a resolution on granting preliminary injunction where the court does not exercise evidencing; in fact, you do not evidence, you only certify fact.

And semantically appropriate to that is the careful language of the court in its document, in its judgment, pointing out that this could be a problem; since they have not conducting evidencing, they have no authority to provide more detail, or more depth. This is how I would read it. But, in principle, one cannot disagree with what you just said.
MR DRYMER: Thank you, sir. That was my sole question. The rest has been very comprehensively covered by counsel, and by previous questions that we've asked you.

Merci, madame.
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Števcek, I would simply like to make sure that I understood you correctly. At 13.07 (page 96, lines 7-13) approximately -- and I'm saying this for reference to the transcript, it should not concern you -- you were calling for more legal certainty in Slovakia. And you then said:
"Who else would have the power to decide whether or not this [road] is a special purpose road, if not either

13:16 1
the Ministry of Transport ..."
And then you referred to the basis for its powers:
"... and the municipality of Smilno ..."
And you also referred to the basis for the power.
Is that -- do I understand you correctly? It's the Ministry, and you explained that this is not a binding interpretation, but still it has the competence to give it, and the municipality?
A. Yes. But neither one of those two are binding. But in this case not even the court interpretation is binding. And that's absurd. Court interpretation is only absurd inter partes, in this particular case.

But in order for this issue to be resolved once and for all, I think it should be in the power by bodies of public power different than court. For instance, Ministry of Transport should issue a methodological guidelines. No matter how unbinding, but it would bring much more light into this area, while the court, no matter how high or superior it is to the protection of legality, may not issue any generally binding guidelines, only mediate inter partes case. This is what I had in mind.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. I think you've clarified that fact.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Could I just raise one point on the
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assistance this morning. And that ends -- we can now
disconnect the connection.
PROFESSOR ŠTEVCEK: I'd also like to thank you very much for
your patience. It's been very beneficial to me, as
a professional experience. So I equally thank you, and wish you a nice day. Goodbye.
THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. Thank you.
So this is obviously a good time for us to break.
But I should say that we were a little concerned by the time that was taken for the cross-examination. Of course on both sides you know that you're in charge of the allocation of your time, and there will be no time for extensions. I think we've been clear about that, and that is what it will be.
MR TUSHINGHAM: We certainly understand, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Good. Excellent.
Then have a good lunch, everyone. Should we be back at 2.15 ?
MR TUSHINGHAM: That would be fine.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that fine? Good.
( 1.21 pm )
(Adjourned until 2.15 pm )
(2.16 pm)

PROFESSOR DR JUDr L'UBOMÍR FOGAŠ (called)
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, although you have been with
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7 MR DRYMER: Yes, indeed. I heard "absurd". THE PRESIDENT: Can the interpreter refer back?
A. I'm sorry, I don't remember. I would have to be made familiar with the context of the sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: The interpreter could refer back to the word that was used then, and ask in Slovak what word was used, and then translate it back to us? (Pause).
A. I truly don't remember exactly, but I have no doubt about this. I guess I have used this word. If I meant the situation of the state of law, or rule of law in Slovakia, I think it would be a quite appropriate word.
THE INTERPRETER: Now a comment by the interpreter, if I may? The interpreter remembers a word "absurd" has been used.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Števcek, this was a long examination, but we are now getting to the close of it. So we would like to thank you very much for your

號 is that correct? It may be an interpretation ...
us this morning already.
Do you hear the interpretation?
PROFESSOR FOGAŠ: Yes, I can hear it well, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you please confirm that you are
L'ubomír Fogaš?
PROFESSOR FOGAŠ: Yes, I am.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are a practising attorney. You have also taught civil law as a professor?
PROFESSOR FOGAŠ: Yes, this is true.
THE PRESIDENT: You have submitted two expert reports, the first one of 31 March 2023 and the second one of 11 December 2023?
PROFESSOR FOGAŠ: Yes, indeed, that is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: You're heard as an expert in this arbitration. As an expert, you are under a duty to make only statements in accordance with your sincere belief. Can you please state this by reading the expert declaration?
PROFESSOR FOGAŠ: I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that my statement will be in accordance with my sincere belief.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Can I turn to you first, Dr Pekar?
MR PEKAR: Thank you, Madam President. We have no questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Good. That was fast! Then I turn to Mr Tushingham.
( 2.19 pm )
Cross-examination by MR TUSHINGHAM
Q. Thank you very much, Madam President.

Dr Fogaš, good afternoon.
A. Thank you, the same to you.
Q. Would you prefer if I referred to you as Dr Fogaš or
"Sir"; what would be your preference?
A. I'll leave it fully up to you. Both is pleasant.
Q. Thank you very much.

I was reading through your CV and I wanted to just ask some very brief questions about your background.

As I understand it, you obtained your doctorate in law in 1976; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. In 1985 you then became an associated professor of civil law at PF UK; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then I also read with interest that between 1990 and 2002 you spent 12 years as an elected politician in the Slovak Republic; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. In both the National Council and then also as a Deputy Prime Minister of the Government for legislation; is

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the English it is page 22, and in the Slovak it should be page 15 .

So in the English it should be page 22, not Article 22. Yes. And in the Slovak it should be page 15 .

Sir, do you see Article 74 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CCP, on the screen?
A. Yes, I can see that.
Q. And that provision, as I understand it, empowers the court to grant an interim injunction before proceedings are initiated; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct. This was the possibility to a higher degree of flexibility in the Code of Civil Procedure, to impose an interim injunction before the proceedings, or at the same time as the proceedings have begun, or during the course of proceedings.
Q. Could you please move forward to Article 102, which should be at page 37 of the English, and page 26 of the Slovak. And if we could scroll down to the bottom, Article 102. If we could scroll down on the English just slightly, please. Yes.

Is it correct that Article 102 is the provision which empowers the court to grant an interim injunction after proceedings have been initiated?
A. Yes.

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14:20 1 that correct?
A. Yes, this period covers both mandates when I was part of the supreme constitutional authorities, or elected positions.
Q. And do you accept, therefore, that as a result of your 12-year career in politics, you have a past affiliation with the Respondent in this arbitration?
A. After 12 years in politics, I came to the conclusion that Slovak legal order is fully adaptable and adapted to the conditions of the European Union law, and I have decided to return back to my former profession.
Q. I understand. And as I understand it, after you retired from politics, you then became an attorney at law, and later a professor at PF UK?
A. Yes. I have returned back to my alma mater and I have taken over the department of civil law as the head of the department.
Q. And is it correct that since 2017 you have not held any academic position at that university; is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Thank you.

I would like to begin, if I may, by looking at the conditions for granting an interim injunction under Slovak law.

Could I ask that you be shown Exhibit LF-4, and in

[^0]substantive action, she also filed a request for an interim injunction against AOG and you refer to that at paragraph 15.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree that Ms Varjanová's claim for substantive relief nullifying the purchase contract did not automatically entitle her to obtain an interim injunction restraining AOG from using the land plot?
A. I believe that the procedure was such that the request for interim injunction was submitted, and as a follow-up, I don't know whether this was the case of days or week -- apologies. So first the action was submitted and then the request for granting the interim injunction was submitted.
Q. Yes. My question is just slightly different, which is: do you agree that the claim for substantive relief that Ms Varjanová was seeking to obtain in her action did not automatically give her an entitlement to request an interim injunction? She needed to satisfy additional conditions in order to obtain an interim injunction; do you agree?
A. The act clearly promulgated the conditions under which the request for an interim injunction can be submitted, and I am deeply convinced that these conditions were fulfilled at that time.

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A. This was the issue of a dispute between co-owners, and the immediate injunction is a measure of securing -guaranteeing of a situation where, during the course of the dispute, or before a ruling is made, rights of one of the parties shall not be violated. So I believe this is a common practice.
Q. Perhaps you could just be shown your first expert report, please, at paragraph 29. Do you have that in front of you?
A. In print?
Q. Yes. In your first expert report at paragraph 29.
A. Yes. What I have in front of me is my second expert assessment, and there I insisted on the fact that the court should have considered the nature of the landlord. This is the text of the second expert assessment.
Q. Perhaps if you could do it by reference to the document that is on the screen, sir. Ah, you have it there.

Do you have paragraph 29 in hard copy in your first expert report; do you have that in front of you?
A. [Yes].
Q. And the sentence which begins:
"Such situation occurs if there is a substantiated need to temporarily regulate legal relationships of the parties due to a threat of damage and/or increase of damage."

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14:30 1 Q. Could you please be shown Exhibit MS-5. And in the
Slovak it's page 4, in the English it's page 1. This, as I understand it, sir, is Ms Varjanová's request for an interim injunction; do you see that?
MR PEKAR: Objection: mischaracterisation. The document is both the claim and the request.
MR TUSHINGHAM: That's entirely fair. I will rephrase. This part of the document is the request for an interim injunction; do you agree?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you can see that Ms Varjanová relies on Article 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure; do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. So, in order to obtain an injunction, Ms Varjanová needed to establish that there was a substantiated need temporarily to adjust the situation of the parties under Article 102(1); do you agree?
A. I think that's what she did.

MR DRYMER: Have you seen this document before, sir?
A. Yes, I have.

MR DRYMER: Very good.
MR TUSHINGHAM: By contrast, if there is no substantiated need temporarily to adjust the situation of the parties, do you agree that, hypothetically speaking, the court cannot grant an interim injunction under Article 102?

And as I understand it, you were referring there to Article 102(1) of the CCP?
A. Yes.
Q. So if there is no substantiated need, hypothetically speaking, temporarily to adjust the situation of the parties, the court cannot grant an interim injunction; do you agree?
A. Well, yes, because the condition for issuing the immediate injunction needs to satisfy certain conditions first.
Q. Yes. Thank you.

Could you go back now, please, to Exhibit LF-4, and if we move on to Article 75 of the Civil Code, which is at page 22 of LF-4 in the English, and page 15 in the Slovak. So it's page 22 in the English of LF-4, and page 15 in the Slovak. (Pause)

I don't think we have the right document on the screen. It's an exhibit to Dr Fogaš' expert report, Exhibit LF-4. Yes, that's it. Exactly. Great.

And if we could just scroll down slightly on the Slovak.

Dr Fogaš, do you see Article 75 of the CCP on the screen in front of you?
So do you see in Article 75(1) it provides that:
"The interim injunction shall be ordered by the
court upon a petition."
And then 75(2) provides that:
"... the petition shall include ..."
And then the words I'm interested in are:
"... the reasoning of the risk of imminent harm ..."
Do you see those words, "imminent harm"?
A. Could I please see the whole text of the article?

Because I can only see the first half of it in the Slovak version. (Pause)

Yes.
Q. Yes. And do you recall Professor Števcek's opinion in his expert reports (page 6, para 16, first expert report) that the words "imminent harm" mean:
"... that the applicant must certify that, without an injunction, significant, serious and even irreparable harm could occur."

Do you recall his testimony, or his opinion, in that regard?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your first expert report at paragraph 37, do you recall saying that Professor Števcek did not provide "any court decision that would properly justify that conclusion"; do you recall your opinion in that regard?
A. You are asking at a different issue. In point 37 of my expert report, I debate with Mr Števcek the case whether

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14:41 1
characterises the conditions for issuing the immediate injunction.

This is also stipulated in my report. It says the risk of imminent harm, not serious, irreparable or significant harm. So I cannot consider such conclusion as a correct one.
Q. Can you please be shown Exhibit MS-2. In the Slovak it is on page 4. Perhaps if we just start, please, on page 1 of the Slovak, in fairness.

Sir, this is a resolution of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic dated 12 May 2012, as I understand it. Have you seen this resolution of the Supreme Court before?
A. I don't know if I have seen it, but I think I know it.
Q. Could you please turn to page 4 of the Slovak and the highlighted passage? And in this passage of the Supreme Court's resolution, the court says:
"It follows from the provisions of Article 75 [paragraph] 2 ... governing the requirements of a motion for an interim injunction that one of the preconditions for granting the interim injunction is that the applicant justifies the threat of imminent harm ... This means that the applicant must certify that, without an injunction, significant, serious and even irreparable harm could be caused to the applicant."

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the imminent or irreplaceable or other type of harm is to arise. This is something totally different than what your question aims at.
Q. Well, as I understood it from paragraph --
A. I suppose then you refer to point 36 of my expert report.
Q. I'm looking at paragraph 37, where you say --
A. Yes.
Q. "... the author does not provide any reference to any provision of the CCP, any professional literature or any court decision that would properly justify that conclusion."

And what Professor Števcek is discussing there is the concept of imminent harm; that's right, isn't it?
A. The act at the time when the court proceedings were held included wording that one of the conditions for imposing the immediate injunction is the imminent harm. Not as Professor Števcek has stated, where he claims that serious, significant or even irreparable harm can occur.

In my expert assessment, expert report, I have referred to the single document which has been written in Slovakia regarding these -- I reminisce this was a book by Professor Mazák, the former President of the Constitutional Court, at the moment the head of the Judicial Council of Slovakia, where in his book he

So even in the period from which this document originates, it couldn't have been generalised for all courts in Slovakia ruling on similar cases, because they, first of all, might have not been familiar with it, as it has not been published in the collection of rulings of the Supreme Court.
Q. Could you please be shown Exhibit MS-3. As I understand it, this is a judgment, or resolution, of the Supreme Court dated 29 April 2011. Have you seen a copy of this resolution before?
A. I have not seen it but I've heard about it.
Q. Could you please turn to page 8 in the Slovak. And again here we see exactly the same language being used by the Supreme Court as in the earlier decision that we saw just before, don't we?
A. It's not exactly the same wording, but it is a similar wording, and it is from the same period. Nor this case law has ever been published in the collection of rulings and opinions of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, therefore it has not became a basis for the ruling of the courts in Slovakia. The practice has always been such that the part of ruling has used one legal sentence to be published, which then included also a detailed commentary, which helped the courts in their rulings.

14:49 1

> we need to immediately resolve the relations between the parties. All literature which has been published on this, including case law, stipulates that before an immediate measure, or injunction is ordered, no other examining is ordered other than those that was present in paper form, together with the action to the court.
> So at that point it is not even possible to settle what is an imminent or significant or even irreparable harm. At that time it is not possible to define that.
> My opinion, my personal opinion, is such that the original law, which stated that we need to first of all demonstrate at least an imminent harm, any form of imminent harm, that was a more correct wording than the present wording, which doesn't refer to any such harm.
> I believe that our Civil Procedure Code has been in practice for a rather short period of time, and we will definitely see its amendment, and this will be one of the issues addressed. Namely, to conclude, I'd like to state that it shouldn't refer to "serious" or "even irreparable harm". I wouldn't say that this should be in the present wording, because this would need to be proven. This would need to be proven. But referring to "imminent harm" is something I could live with. But, as I have said, today we have no such references there.
> MR DRYMER: Right. Even imminence would need to be proven,

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None of the case laws, none of the rulings that you have shown to me have ever been published in such a collection. Therefore, it has never became the basis for a ruling of lower courts in Slovakia. Since these readings have not been adopted in practice, the current wording of the law does not include any reference to it.
MR DRYMER: Doctor, if I may, I'm not trying to put any formal characterisation on these legal texts, alright, we haven't discussed it, we're not there yet. But on their face they stand for the proposition that an applicant for this sort of injunction must certify that absent the injunction, significant -- I'm quoting:
"... significant, serious and even irreparable harm could occur."

I understand your point that these particular judgments, for various reasons, have not formed part of the body of law applicable to lower courts.
I understand your comments on that. But are you telling us that this proposition, regarding the need for
"significant, serious and even irreparable harm" is not a proposition known to Slovak law, related to this sort of injunction at all?
A. The construction of the procedural code, whether this has been the CPC or CCP, so both whether this is Civil Procedure Code or Code of Civil Procedure, is such that
though, I suppose? That's a factual question.
A. I believe that if I understand the broad scope of civil proceedings, sometimes it is sufficient for the harm -for the threat of the harm to loom. It doesn't have to be characterised by a certain scope or size. For example, when we talk about minors, or when we talk about payment of damages, or when we talk about disputes between co-owners, as is this one. In any case, the longer the illegal state were to continue, for example, an invalid agreement, the longer it lasts, the higher the damage that might occur. Therefore, I think that a referral to a threat of harm had its place in the wording of the law.
But, as I have said, there was no serious, significant or even irreparable harm -- this was not the degree of the harm to be demonstrated, because at the time when the court is ruling, we need to consider the real situation.

An action is submitted; even if you submit the proposal for the immediate injunction a week after, it's still an insufficient amount of time for the court to examine the individual evidence, because this requires an immediate action on the side of the court, whether this is meant to protect the ownership, or a child, or a legal capacity, or any basic rights of citizens.

14:52 1 MR DRYMER: Thank you, Doctor.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Sir, thank you very much. Could you please
be shown now Exhibit MS-4. And as I understand it, this is an extract from a textbook edited by authors, including Professor Števcek, entitled "The Code of Civil Procedure" published in 2012.

Have you seen an extract -- this extract before?
A. I don't know which specific text you refer to, but I know the textbook. Yes, of course.
Q. The right-hand side of the screen, could you just scroll down to the bottom, please. And do you see in the highlighted passage there; could you just read that to yourself, please. (Pause)
A. Yes, I've read that. This refers to one of the rulings of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, probably the same one. The author is a member of a department who is the single one, or she has been left alone with this legal opinion.

At the same time, I'd like to state that no other commentary during the validity of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the 1960s until 2012, no other ruling has ever had such a commentary, whether this was the author of the former Code of Civil Procedure, Mr Rubeš or other following scholars like Madame Winterová, or, for example, Mr Ceska(?) or other professors, would ever

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14:55 1
and a defendant about who is the owner of a priceless painting. And assume that the defendant has threatened to physically destroy the painting. You would agree with me that that would provide evidence of significant, serious and even irreparable harm; do you agree?
A. Speaking honestly, this measure in the civil law is to provide a fast method of protection. Irrespective of whether we are talking about a priceless painting or a less valuable painting, it can still have an exceptional value to the owner. For example, this can be painted by the father, or a brother of the owner, or someone to whom this painting will commemorate and remind the personality until eternity; and it would be very difficult, apart from specific material estimate, it would be very difficult for us to estimate what does it mean for a specific person.

In case of a piece of art which has -- which is from a known author, it could probably be possible to have a specific number, to put a price tag on that. But in that case, for different parties -- the different parties to the dispute would have different weapons. Someone would be asked to demonstrate more. Someone would be asked to demonstrate less. And the court, even in civil disputes, especially in ownership disputes, the court is expected to provide the same level of

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14:57 1 protecting basic rights and that is why this has not been adopted in our civil law.
Q. Sir, I would like you to assume in my favour, for the purposes of this discussion, that an applicant must certify that without an injunction, significant, serious and even irreparable harm could occur. I would like you to make that assumption for the purposes of this question.

Assume that there is a dispute between a plaintiff
protection, irrespective of whether we are talking about valuable or less valuable things, if these items have other values that cannot be accounted for or that cannot be defined at that particular moment.

So even for the future to define that there is a significance here of possibly even irreparable harm, that would require a totally different approach to immediate injunctions and, from the very outset, admit a certain evidencing. That, however, is not admitted, or not considered in our Civil Code.

The Constitution, and even the Bill of Rights, even the International Conventions on Human Rights, they protect life. And also ownership. And also ownership. Protection of life cannot depend from the fact that whether we are protecting a rich or poor individual. Protecting ownership also cannot depend from protecting a vast fortune or a small fortune, small property. The protection has to be provided immediately, and also to the best extent possible, in order to avoid future damages, future harms.

If this is to happen, if this is to be safeguarded, we have the immediate injunction, which is of a temporary nature only. And practically, it always lasts only until a valid court ruling on the case. Only until justice is being served, if we consider the
rulings of the court something that philosophically embodies justice in society.
Q. Dr Fogaš, we have a limited amount of time this afternoon and I would appreciate it, if you could, just to listen carefully to my question and try and keep your answers succinct.

I'm going to change the hypothetical now. Assume that the dispute before the court relates to the right to use a land plot. I'm talking about real property here. Unless the defendant has made a threat --
A. [Yes].
Q. -- that results -- relating to the physical condition of the land plot, the condition in Article 75(2) of the CCP will not be satisfied, because there is no risk of either imminent harm or even irreparable harm to the land plot itself; do you agree?
A. Again, I repeat that the law doesn't require the presence of a significant, serious or even irreparable harm to be present. The act, the law says that at a given point in time, the valid Code of Civil Procedure stated that we need to demonstrate imminent harm.

If you want me to respond to the degree of protection to the land parcel, I believe that every time when a land parcel is being used by someone who is not entitled to it, whose ownership rights are at least

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15:02 1
the merit. If there would be a ruling on the merit, such immediate injunction would be useless.
Q. And in her request for an injunction that we looked at earlier, Ms Varjanová advanced two separate claims for relief: the first was an order against AOG refraining -an order requiring AOG to refrain from using the land plot itself; and the second was an order requiring AOG to refrain from removing things placed on the land plot by Ms Varjanová; do you agree?
A. I believe that the immediate injunction aimed towards preventing the use of a piece of real estate that has been characterised as an arable land.
Q. Could we just look, then, please, at the request, which is at MS-5. And on to page 2 of the English, please. And in the Slovak, if we could turn to page 4.

So do you see on the page there that:
"... the plaintiff claims that the court should order this [interim injunction]."

And then there were two prayers for relief. The first, that the "defendant is obliged to refrain from using the real property", and that's what you have referred to as the land plot in your reports; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the second, in the second paragraph, was an order

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being used by someone who is not entitled to it, whose ownership rights are at least dubious ..."

Do you agree with me that as at the date of the decisions by the Bardejov District Court and the Prešov Regional Court, there had been no final ruling on the merits about the validity or invalidity of the purchase contract between AOG and Mr Tomecek?
A. The ruling on the merit is a ruling which is conducted only once evidence is being examined, after all the individual procedural steps are taken. The immediate injunction is issued for the interests of safeguarding the rights of the party whose rights are to be protected before the evidence is being examined. So, yes, at the time when the immediate injunction has been issued, there doesn't have to be a final ruling on the case on
that:
"The first defendant [be] obliged to refrain from removing things placed by the plaintiff on the property."

On the land plot. Do you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. So unless there was a risk of imminent harm to the land plot itself, in other words the physical condition of the land plot, the condition in Article 75(2) of the CCP would not be satisfied; do you agree?
A. If there was no imminent harm, I would agree, yes, that the conditions would not be there. You are asking a theoretical question here.
Q. Well, it's not entirely theoretical, sir, because if you look back at the request on the previous page.
A. Yes.
Q. And in the English as well, please. I'm going to suggest to you that the only evidence that was before the court related to a threat of damage to the motor vehicle. There was no evidence of a threat of imminent harm to the land plot itself, in other words the physical condition of the land plot; do you agree?
A. But such an evidence had no need to be submitted. There was no need to submit anything like that. It could have been submitted in the proceedings on the merit.

15:06
Q. But in order to obtain an injunction restraining AOG from using the land plot, Ms Varjanová needed to certify that there was a risk of imminent harm to the land plot itself; don't you agree?
A. Well, I ask for forgiveness for a slightly longer intervention, but if the land lot was used, for example, by heavy machinery, if it was to be used by such vehicles without the adoption of necessary measures, a possible damage and threat, harm to the land lot, could occur.

The court had the possibility to ascertain and to consider whether damage, or whether harm, is present to the whole piece of real estate or only to the items which are placed on the land lot.
Q. Do you see any reference in the request, though, to any evidence of damage to the physical condition of the land plot by heavy machinery?
A. I believe that the court needs to ascertain -- needs to consider the whole proposal as such, and in the broader context -- and this is only my theoretical consideration -- that it came to the conclusion that as it relates to the protection of ownership rights, because this was a dispute between co-owners, the real estate itself has to be protected as well.
Q. But I am afraid I'm going to have to ask my question

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be enjoined?
A. Yes, there is a potential harm, potential threat.
MR DRYMER:And is that an imminent harm, in your view, such
    as might allow for a temporary injunction, or interim
    injunction of this sort?
A. If such person, which is not in legal standing, whose
    ownership title is dubious, enters such a land lot --
    for example it would park its vehicles there, it would,
    I don't know, carry out certain activities on the land
    lot -- there is a threat to the land lot itself. So
    there is a possible harm.
    MR DRYMER: So is the nature of the trespassers trespassing
    relevant? Does it matter if he parks a car or drives
    heavy machinery, or just purports to go walking on it?
    Does that have any impact on the court's consideration
    of an interim injunction?
A. I believe that what needs to be considered is the
    specific situation, the specific case, individually,
    case by case.
    At the same time, what we need to consider is the
    length and mode of use of that given land lot. Imagine
    that someone becomes an owner of a garden, without legal
    title. For example, you cut the trees and you replace
    them with new ones. Or, for example, you proceed with
    other steps, you start to carry out other steps which
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15:08 $1 \quad$ again: is there any reference in the request to evidence
of damage, or a risk of damage, to the physical condition of the land plot?
A. I think that in the action, the action describes the situation on the ground to a sufficient degree for the court to come to a conclusion, even for a formulation of the immediate injunction.

From the text that you have submitted to me, it also stems that, as it is referred to in the letter of Dr Slamka, the defendant, since its entry of its ownership into the cadaster, has been asking for actions on the side of the plaintiff, which is to respect his or her ownership on the land parcel. Which basically says that: on the basis of a purchase contract, I am the owner and I can use the land lot in any way I see fit.

The ownership right or the use right, the rights of use to the land lot, are determined from the ownership right, it's basically defined by the ownership title to the land. Therefore I think that the description of the situation on-site is sufficient for the court.
MR DRYMER: Are you suggesting, Doctor -- no, I won't be so coy. My understanding of your testimony earlier was that any time a person who is not entitled to a parcel of land threatens to enter onto that parcel of land, there is a risk of imminent harm to that land that can
can, in his or her opinion, be oriented towards future, it can be for the benefit of the future.

But the original owner, who is entitled, who was either bypassed or tricked or in any other way, his ownership rights remain, he may not wish for such actions, and there is a potential of harm.

We always need to consider the special situation or the cases case by case, and the court is entitled to adopt its own assessment and to adopt a ruling on a basis of its own understanding of the situation, and assess the potential for the imminent harm.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Thank you, sir. I'm going to move to a slightly different aspect of the injunction now.

So, do you agree with me that in deciding whether there is a need, temporarily, to adjust the situation of the parties, and I'm thinking back to Article 102(1), do you agree that the court must consider whether disproportionate damage would be caused to one of the parties as a result of the granting of the interim injunction?
A. Could you please repeat the question again? What should I agree with?
Q. Yes, I will repeat again.

Do you agree that in abstract terms, in deciding whether or not to grant an interim injunction, the court

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must consider whether disproportionate damage would be caused to one of the parties, for example the defendant, as a result of the grant of the injunction?
A. The law had these situations in mind, and in one of the stipulations it obliges the proponent of the immediate injunction, in cases where such immediate injunction had not a legal standing, has been improper one, to compensate for the damages. So yes, the defendant is protected. In the end, the damages will be compensated. The plaintiff is not the one who is protected.

So the court has to also consider all issues, all matters at hand. Quite clearly, we have provided for the protection of the defendant by means of the stipulations regarding the compensation of damages. Even the defendant is protected in a way that even if an immediate injunction is quashed, even if the defendant wins the trial and the action is refused, even in such cases he or she is entitled for compensation of damages.

Therefore, in a situation when the court is to rule, all these issues are to be considered and the ruling has to be done in line with the law, and I believe that an impartial judge will do so.
Q. Could you please be shown Exhibit C-125, and it should be page 7 of both the English and the Slovak. This is

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order not to have any damage on it. In such way I would protect both parties to the dispute. And I would also consider the fact that I will not be causing an irreparable situation. The painting would continue to exist, it would be protected, and in the meantime the parties would sue who is the true owner of the painting. In this line, I would also read the text that you have just highlighted to me.
Q. Do you agree that in considering whether disproportionate damage would be caused to one of the parties to the proceedings, the court could consider a wide range of circumstances, including the size and monetary value of the property, whether the injunction might prevent the defendant from carrying on its business, whether the defendant's business activities are in the public interest, factors of this kind; do you agree that those would be relevant to the assessment of disproportionality?
A. I agree with you that the court needs to assess all aspects.

However, as I have said, ownership is protected from the convention on basic human rights all the way through the Constitution, and specific laws, as is the case in Slovakia, and I would not reduce it to wealth. I would rather, instead, link it to measures that would prevent

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injunction proceedings and it's page 7 .

Do you see the top paragraph there that begins:
"The preliminary measure is admissible and justified
if ..."
And then:
"... e/ the legal relations between the parties are not interfered with in an unreasonable manner. The court must consider whether, as a result of the preliminary measure, disproportionate damage will be caused to one of the parties to the proceedings."

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I can see it.
Q. And this is a decision that you say was justified. And so you must agree that the court must consider that in deciding whether to grant an injunction; do you agree?
A. A while ago you asked a question relating to a painting and whether we can define what degree of protection should be provided by the court. Well, to perhaps explain my position, I'd like to use a similar situation.

If we had a painting, the immediate injunction, in order to prevent any further limitations to its use,
I would forbid any further sale of the painting and
I would order for it to be stored somewhere safe in
the arising of damages to one or the other party in an adequate manner. And at the same time I need to protect the owner.

So in this I mean, in order to protect the owner from actions of the other side, meaning the side which is not -- which is acting illegally.
Q. Well, do you also agree that in the court's consideration of those aspects, the court should consider whether alternative relief, short of an injunction, would be more proportionate? For example, an order for monetary compensation, rather than a prohibition on the use of the property?
A. I think you refer to -- are you referring to a case which is subject to the considerations of this Tribunal? Or are you talking in general?
Q. Well, I'm referring to this specific case, and I'm only just going to ask you this. It appears from the district court's judgment that the court did not consider whether disproportionate damage would be caused to AOG's business activities by the grant of this injunction; do you agree?
A. I don't think I can answer this question, because I cannot see inside the heads of the judges, what everything was considered in their ruling.

On the other hand, if you are referring to

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1C/29/2016 what we also need to take into consideration is whose right is superior, whether the right of those who have a legally acquired certain item, as was the case here, or whether we are talking about protecting the right of the potential owner who clearly, according to the law, is entitled to his or her rights.

This is what you can see from this action, you know, who is on a firm legal standing, because the call for declaring relative invalidity of the agreement has been exercised, and since this was a relative invalidity it was quite clear since it was exercised that in the end, the purchase agreement will be nullified, will be invalid.

Therefore, to respond to a question whether the court was to protect more the interests of AOG or should have leaned more towards protecting the rights of Madame Varjanová, I mean, we cannot provide you with a single clear answer. I'm not a judge.

If I was a judge, I would definitely protect the owner, the one whose ownership rights are at risk. To a higher degree, at least.
MR DRYMER: Is proportionality an element of the law on this point? Is a court obliged to consider what in the common law, and certain civil law jurisdictions, would be called the balance of inconveniences?

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situation can be irreparable, and there is no other way of preventing that other than creating or adopting a means of safeguarding such as this immediate injunction.
Q. So are you accepting there, sir, that the damage needs to be irreparable?
A. I never said that. I never said that. You asked whether other compensation is permissible, and I replied that if there was no immediate injunction and the piece of real estate would be used until the decision on the merit of the case, the court could also oblige to pay a certain compensation. This was not the case, because the immediate measure, the immediate injunction has been stipulated.

However, in no case have I said that the condition of irreparable or significant harm needs to be satisfied first. Here, the only thing that had to be satisfied was the imminent harm.
Q. I'm going to move to a new topic now.

Sir, unless I am mistaken, in your two expert reports you do not express any opinion either way about whether a field road is a type of special purpose road within the meaning of the Road Act; have I understood your expert reports correctly on that point?
A. In relation to my expert reports, I was never given this

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15:23 1 A. Yes, there are situations when the court needs to consider this. But this was not the case.
MR DRYMER: Thank you. Thank you. Not in the context of this sort of interim injunction, is that what you're telling us?
A. No.

MR DRYMER: Thank you. "No" I am right, or "No" I'm wrong?
A. I'm correct simply because in this case it is impossible to provide any other form of protection for the real estate other than preventing its use. What other possible remedy do we have?
MR TUSHINGHAM: Well, another possible remedy, sir, would be an order for the payment of damages if it is later found that the land has been wrongfully used; do you agree?
A. If there was a situation where the court would rule too late in the case, there would be a delayed ruling, I can imagine that, together with ruling on the ownership, a certain compensation of damages would be also implied that would, for example, include a calculation of rental fees for the period over which the piece of real estate has been used wrongfully, or without a legal title.

But we still need to return back to this stipulation that in the meantime the piece of real estate can be damaged to such a degree, or its character can be changed, or its value can be reduced, that such
question. I can comment only in general terms.
Q. I'm going to now turn to the question of jurisdiction of the court to grant an injunction, and this will be my final topic.

I want to try and see if you agree with some basic points with me in relation to the court's jurisdiction.

First of all, do you agree with me that jurisdiction is one of the conditions for the conduct of a court proceeding?
A. Civil disputes, civil cases are administered by a specific set of conditions and one of them is also the jurisdiction of the court. That's what I think you referred to, the jurisdiction of the court.
Q. Exactly, sir.

My second question is: do you agree that under Article 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court must constantly monitor whether it has jurisdiction?
A. Yes, the jurisdiction of the court has to be continuously examined throughout the proceedings.
Q. And that examination has to be undertaken by the court itself; do you agree?
A. The lack of jurisdiction can be underlined or pointed by one of the parties to the dispute. Yes, but this is also one of the ex-offo obligations of the court.
Q. And this ex-offo obligation applies at all stages of the
proceedings including when a party applies for an interim injunction; do you agree?
A. Yes, I'm convinced about that.
Q. And the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law; do you agree?
A. Could you please repeat, because we couldn't understand the last part of your question? If you could please rephrase that?
Q. I'm sorry, I'll try and rephrase.

The question of whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular dispute is a question of law; do you agree?
A. Yes, this is a procedural problem.
Q. And if the court concludes it does not have jurisdiction, it must terminate the proceedings under Article 104 of the CCP; is that right?
A. If there is a situation that it is established that the court does not have jurisdiction or loses its jurisdiction, yes, in such case the proceedings have to be stopped. And it has to be submitted to the responsible or corresponding authority.
Q. Do you agree with Professor Števcek that the iura novit curia principle forms part of Slovak law?
A. Well, that's an ancient Roman principle and I think it's respected in all legal orders, including the Slovak one.

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of public interests, for example, well, in such case the submission to the court might not be successful.

However, in principle it applies that the citizen doesn't need to be familiar with the articles and the law. This is what the court should be familiar with.
MR TUSHINGHAM: And so do you agree that at the time when
the Bardejov District Court and the Prešov Regional
Court issued their judgments in 2016, they should be
familiar with the contents of the Road Act, a statute?
A. If I understood the submitted documents well, Madame

Varjanová has been asking for the protection of her co-ownership rights. This was a dispute between two co-owners. Precisely this was the validity or invalidity of a purchase agreement which was concluded without her being offer[ed] the rights to buy that share of the land.

This has been supported by a document, by an ownership bill. The ownership bill referred to the specific land cadaster parcel where it also included a reference to the arable land at hand. This was the content of the proposal.

To that, we need to also add that the general principle of reliability of texts, of decrees, of documents, needs to be respected, of title deeds issued by the cadaster. It's also called material declaration.

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15:30 $1 \quad$ Q. And so that principle means that in legal proceedings, parties are not required to prove the contents of a law published in the collection of laws of the Republic; is that right?
MR PEKAR: Apologies, I hear that the translation was not done properly, so please repeat your question.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Of course.
In a legal proceeding, a party is not required to prove the contents of a law that has been published in the collection of laws of the Slovak Republic?
A. Well, I don't know if I understood the question properly. If I could ask you for the third rendition, because we've grasped only half of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think the question is: does a party have to prove the content of the law, like you would prove the facts of one's case. It's a question asked by a common law lawyer. Because for civil law lawyers, in principle we do not prove the law, and that is probably the difficulty with the question.
A. A party to the dispute needs to describe the case and it needs to formulate the request for relief, so what the party's asking for, and the request for relief is the defining for every further step of the proceedings, including the jurisdiction of the court. If the request for relief is formulated as it aims towards protection
A. Yes, this is the case.
Q. So the type of land registered as a parcel of the E register is not deemed to be binding cadastral data, is it?
A. Yes. The act says that the binding data is not the type of land. It doesn't however mean that the court is obliged to investigate the type of the land parcel, unless the party to the proceedings as dominus litis requires such an examination, it does not need to prove otherwise but it may seek such issue to be examined. Of this data.
Q. Could you now be shown Exhibit MS-1, please. Have you seen a copy of this judgment of the Supreme Court from April 2021, to which Professor Števcek refers in his expert report; have you seen that before? (Pause)
A. If you could please formulate a question?
Q. Sure. My question is whether you have read a copy of this decision of the Supreme Court before coming here to give evidence today?
A. I don't think I've read the full extent of it.
Q. Okay. Perhaps I can refresh your memory, to be fair.

If you could go to your first expert report, please?
MR DRYMER: Paragraph?
MR TUSHINGHAM: I'm just getting the exact paragraph number. (Pause)

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It is at paragraph number 68. It starts at 66 , to be fair.
A. Oh yes, I do recall now.
Q. And I'm going to just start with some basic questions which I hope you may be able to agree with, in which case we can take this kind of questioning a bit more quickly.

Do you agree that in this case, the case began in the first-instance court as a private law dispute about whether the defendant was obliged to refrain from using the Claimant's land plot?
A. First of all, it has to be said that the scope of this dispute had a different dimension, it has public interest dimension, because this was a special purpose road, a public road, and the action aimed towards establishing whether on the basis of applicable law the use of road should be prohibited.
Q. Okay. Maybe we can do this by reference to the decision, then. If you could be shown, please, Exhibit MS-1. And in the first paragraph, beginning with the word "Resolution" in English, and in the fifth line in Slovak, the seventh line in English, the judgment records that:
"... the dispute concerns the obligation to refrain from the use of real property."

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I can see that.
Q. And in the next paragraph beginning with the words
"Grounds of the Judgement", in the English translation, you can see that the claimant sought a judgment ordering the defendant to refrain from passing through a land plot which the claimant owned; do you see that?
A. Yes, I can see that.
Q. And the claimant argued that the defendant was passing through that land without the claimant's consent; do you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. So, as formulated by the claimant, this was a private law dispute about the use of the claimant's real property; do you agree?
A. But this is a totally different merit because here the party to the dispute was not the owner. This was not a dispute between owners. Therefore, we cannot apply this stipulation of the law to this case, because as long as I remember, this dispute was about a prohibition of entry or the prohibition of use of a private road, which for many years was used for access, for entering. However, here, the jurisdiction of civil courts has not been established to act in such a matter.
So this is clearly based on other merits and also on
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other legal situations. So I don't think that this case law can be used in this case as well.
Q. But, sir, do you see in the paragraph beginning with the words "Grounds of the Judgement", and then it is in the English seven lines down -- six lines down:
"The Claimant sought that entitlement on the basis of a statement that a road had been built on the land in question of which the Claimant is the owner ..."

So the claimant was the owner of the land on which the road was located; do you agree?
A. But who was using it? That person who was using it was not the owner. So that is not a dispute between two co-owners.
Q. The defendant's defence was, it had a public right to use the road.
A. But in our dispute, the one which is submitted to this Tribunal, this was the case of two co-owners, one supposed co-owner and one factual co-owner. So we are focusing on solely a private property dispute. This has a different public law dimension. Therefore, it is unapplicable in this case. I have also argued along the same line in my expert report.
Q. Okay. Well, let's go on a few more paragraphs in the judgment. So if you could turn to page 3 in the English text, please, and page 2 in the Slovak. I am afraid the
paragraph numbering does not entirely correspond and it
is rather dense, so I will try my best.
Do you see a paragraph in the English beginning with the number " 5 " in the middle of the page beginning:
"The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic (the 'Supreme Court' or 'Court of Final Appeal') ..."

Does the Tribunal have that part of it, and, sir, do
you have that section?
A. I can't see it.
Q. Yes, I am afraid it's very difficult. If you scroll down slightly -- if we could scroll down in the Slovak slightly, please. And there should be a number 5.
MR DRYMER: Somewhere between the 4 and the 6 . It doesn't seem to be there.
MR TUSHINGHAM: I wonder whether our friends on the other side could help us locate the right paragraph. It's the paragraph beginning:
"The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic..."
MR DRYMER: "Najvyšší súd..."
However that's pronounced.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Yes, 5, there we go, we've got it. Do you see that section?
A. [Yes].
Q. So the Supreme Court:
"... concluded, that the subject matter of the case
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between AOG and Ms Marianna Varjanová, was required to assess whether it had jurisdiction, don't you agree that the court's decision in this case, about whether a court had the jurisdiction to pronounce upon the status of a road, was relevant?
A. Well, I'm now trying to find a way of how to respond shortly.

Disputes between co-owners and ownership disputes cannot be resolved by anyone else, according to the Slovak legal system, other than a court. In this case, as this was a dispute on co-ownership, it's always a civic dispute, because it's a civil dispute and this was specifically covered by paragraph 48 and following.

So in that case, the transfer of ownership rights or preemptive rights are being discussed. Such disputes simply cannot be interrupted, and forwarded to some other proceedings, especially if we base the decision on the fact that the submitted evidence testified towards a civil character of the dispute.

If we had a dispute between two co-owners of a land lot where, for example, the body of the highway is built, irrespective of what is on the land lot, it is still an issue of a dispute between two co-owners and no one else would rule on that, only a civil court.

A different issue is the fact that a highway body
Page 151 general courts and ... cancelled the judgements delivered by the courts in the [proceedings below], stayed the proceedings and referred the case to the [competent authority]."

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I can see that. I've read that.
Q. And so that order would only have been made if this was
a dispute between two private parties, which the court was granting a stay of in favour of the competent authority; do you agree?
A. I believe that there were strong items of public law interest. Therefore the lack of jurisdiction of the court has been mentioned here.
I think, again, that the merits of the case were totally different. In our case we talk about the dispute between two co-owners. In this case, however, this was a dispute between the owner, who wanted to prevent his road to be used as public road against others.

So this is a totally different situation, and a different case. I'm not -- I don't want to assess the merits of this case, but, again, this ruling is inapplicable to the case presently being discussed.
Q. But if the court in the case at hand, in other words
has its own road body, which has been certified, it has been legally introduced into operation according to the valid legal norms. That's a different situation. However, a field road, which has no body of road, is simply to its full extent in the ownership of the co-owners, and no one else can rule other than the court.

That's what is the main difference here, that this is a dispute between two co-owners, and what we see here is an issue in public law and public interest.

Apologies for sharing my own personal opinion, but I think that in order to resolve the ownership dispute, it's irrelevant what is built or what is present on the piece of real estate. The land can be bought as it is --
THE PRESIDENT: I think your position is very clear.
MR TUSHINGHAM: I have no further questions in cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Questions in re-direct, Mr Pekar?
( 3.51 pm )
Re-direct examination by MR PEKAR
Q. Yes, we have just a few.

Dr Fogaš, you remember being shown to decisions of the Slovak Supreme Court regarding the qualifications to the requirement to show the threat of imminent harm, do

15:51 1 you?
A. I think that ad hoc such decisions are present.

MR DRYMER: But you remember being shown them?
A. You think those that have been shown here ... yes, I've seen them, yes.
MR PEKAR: And these were Exhibits MS-2 and MS-3. In the interests of time I will represent to you that these decisions are dated 23 May 2012 and 29 April 2011 respectively.

Now I would like to show you an exhibit to your first expert report. The Exhibit No. is LF-10.

Do you recall having opined on that decision in your first expert report, sir?
A. I don't see the description of the case here, the minutes of the case.

I think so, yes. I think I did.
Q. And I would kindly ask you to look at the date of the decision. It's not translated into English, but if you read it out loud in Slovak, it will be.

No, the date is on the last line of the first paragraph, sir.
A. 2012, I can see it now. Yes.
Q. Sorry, sorry. That's my mistake. Please scroll down to the very end of the document. So we need the last page of the Slovak document.

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cannot be granted without certifying imminent harm.
MR DRYMER: Thank you.
A. May I --

THE PRESIDENT: What does "certify" mean? Who certifies?
The applicant states that, is that what it means?
MR PEKAR: No, Madam President. So in the Slovak language
there are two different levels of proof, which is very imprecise.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR PEKAR: One lower, which is used for interim injunctions,
and higher, which is used for the decision on the merits, and in Slovak there are two different verbs to explain these two.

So we just propose to use "certify" because --
THE PRESIDENT: For the lower.
MR PEKAR: For the lower standard of proof.
THE PRESIDENT: Which just shows a likelihood.
MR PEKAR: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so it is the general standard that is well known for provisional remedies.
MR PEKAR: Yes.
So, Dr Fogaš, you would agree with me that the court here only refers to imminent harm, without any further qualifications; correct?
A. Yes, this is the case.

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15:54 1 A. Yes.
Q. Now the interpreter said something I didn't say. The interpreter actually said "26 November 2012", so that's why the witness answers "Yes".

Do you agree that the decision is dated 26 November 2012; correct?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And now if we look at page 5, please. Does the Supreme Court opine on the standard of harm which is required for the issuance of an interim injunction in its decision?
A. Well, I can see that the court assesses the conditions that need to be satisfied for the issuance of immediate injunction, that the certain basic facts allowing for the conclusion about the probability, about the imminent harm, need to be certified first. So this is the term that we have been using so far.
MR DRYMER: Imminent harm needs to be certified? That's not what the English side says.
A. All conditions need to be certified before issuing the immediate injunction. This is what it refers to.
MR PEKAR: If I may?
MR DRYMER: Please help.
MR PEKAR: This is a very strangely formulated sentence. It is in the negative. So: even the interim injunction
Q. And if you remember, we saw that this decision post-dates the two decisions that were shown to you by counsel for Claimant; correct?

It "post-dates". Sorry, there was an incorrect translation.
A. Yes, this is the case. May I perhaps explain one mechanism?
Q. Yes.
A. Since I was also part of the meeting of the college of
the judges of the Supreme Court in relation to adopting measures that shall be published in the collection of the rulings and the case law of the Supreme Court, often the situation occurred where some of the tribunals ruled and the different senate would rule in a different way. In such case, the college of the judges ruled that, given the case that the cases were highly specific and highly different, which are rare, and seldomly replicated, such rulings would not be published in the collection of case law. In order to make sure that an exceptional case would become a rule, rather, the college of judges decided to wait for the new Civil Code.
MR DRYMER: What about this case? Was it published? Do you know?
This particular judgment we're looking at

3 A. I think that this is one of those rulings that were not published. It only shows that the terminology was later used as a legal terminology.
MR DRYMER: Yes.
A. Perhaps could we return it back to the beginning?

This is the case, as I have said. (Pause)
MR DRYMER: For the moment, does either counsel have further questions?
MR PEKAR: I was not sure if the Tribunal had any.
THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, I didn't understand you had no questions.

Any questions?
No, no questions either from my side.
So, Dr Fogaš, thank you very much for your assistance. This ends your examination.
PROFESSOR FOGAŠ: Thank you also very much for having me here. Have a nice evening.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
We should now take a break, is that fine? And then we will hear Mr Atkinson.
MR PEKAR: I think we need to rearrange on our side a little bit. Five minutes will be enough.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think we can take 15 because we have
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15 September 2023.
MR ATKINSON: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have them there?
MR ATKINSON: I do, thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, good. You are heard as an expert. As
    an expert you are under a duty to make only statements
    in accordance with your sincere belief. Can you please
    confirm that this is what you will do.
MR ATKINSON: Yes, certainly. I solemnly declare upon my
    honour and conscience that my statement will be in
    accordance with my sincere belief.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. And now you have a presentation,
    as we understand.
MR ATKINSON: I do.
THE PRESIDENT: As you know, you have 15 minutes for your
    presentation.
(4.21 pm)
            Presentation by MR ALAN ATKINSON
MR ATKINSON: Alright, thank you very much.
    Well, good afternoon, everyone.
    The clicker is not working. (Pause)
    Okay. Good afternoon, everyone, my name is Alan
    Atkinson, I will describe the geological and geophysical
    work undertaken for this arbitration.
    My instructions are shown on the left of this
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(A short break)
( 4.19 pm )
THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon.

## MR ALAN ATKINSON (called)

THE PRESIDENT: Can you please confirm to us that are Alan Atkinson?
MR ATKINSON: That is right. I am Alan Atkinson, sorry.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that's what I understood. You're from Rockflow Resources?
MR ATKINSON: That's correct.
THE PRESIDENT: You are one of the three experts that we will hear from your firm.

You have provided us with two reports, the first one dated 28 September 2022; the second one
slide -- oh, sorry, no they're not. This is a summary of my experience for your later reference (Slide 3).
(Slide 4) My instructions are shown on the left here. They were to identify prospects on the Claimant's licence area, calculate petroleum volumes in those prospects, and calculate the geological chance of success of finding petroleum in those prospects.

The work I undertook is listed on the right-hand side there, which addressed those instructions. In addition, I undertook some benchmarking exercises to check my volume estimates were reasonable and to check my geological chance of success was supportable.

I will now go through all of those on the following slides.
(Slide 5) So, starting with assessing prospectivity. The prospectivity of the area is indicated by nearby oil and gas fields in southern Poland shown as red and green spots on this geology map. They line a similar geological basin to the Claimant's licence area. The Claimant's licence area itself contains lots of evidence for the presence of oil and gas, including oil seeping out of the ground, oil and gas shows in every well that has been drilled in the area. It also contains one old oilfield, Mikova, which was providing oil to the Germans during the Second World War.

I'll draw your attention just to one other well, this was drilled in 1900, Vysny Radvan 1, which, shortly after commencing drilling, oil spurted 12 metres into the air, as drawn to scale on that photograph of the Mikova field. Anyway, with all that evidence I concluded that the area was prospective for oil and gas.

So I just mentioned a moment ago that I thought there were some similarities between southern Poland and the Claimant's licence area in Slovakia. So let me -there are also some differences, and I will describe them on this next slide (6).

So Polish oil fields are found on the Silesian nappe, the Dukla nappes and the Magura nappes, which are geological provinces. That's in Poland. In Slovakia we only have the Magura nappes and the Dukla nappes, so there's immediately a difference. And a lot of the oil and gas is found in the Silesian nappes. It's found in the other nappes too, but on the Silesian nappe.

So I would suggest that the Silesian nappe is analogous but not identical to the Magura nappe, because it shares very similar geological history. Depositional mechanisms, how the rocks got into the sea or the ocean that was formerly the Magura nappe. It was largely shale. Occasionally sands were deposited in there, so

16:26 1
in the thousands. In contrast to the white spots, which you may or may not be able to see in Slovakia, you may not be able to see them because they number in the tens, there's not very many of them.

It's very clear from this map that the Claimant's licence area clearly needs more drilling before it can be said to be fully appraised.

Why are there fewer wells in Slovakia? Well, it's a different country, it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of the First World War, and in southern Poland and in Slovakia you can see from the elevation map that it's hillier. Those hills are covered in trees and back in the 19th century/early 20th century, access would have been more difficult, as it is now, meaning there's just generally less oil and gas activity.

Another thing to note is, even to the untrained eye, if you look at the shapes on the left-hand map, which is the geology, on the right-hand map you can see the hills, and the hills and the geology line up to one another. So back in the 19th century/early 20th century, it was fairly easy to link an oil seep with a hill: ah, I'll dig a pit there, drill a well there, find some oil. And you can do your exploring on a surface map, on a structure map.

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we have underwater avalanches of sand shooting into the basin, creating turbidites. It had the same tectonic history, so as Africa moved north and smashed into Europe it created mountains, the Alps, the Carpathian Mountains, and these same forces created the structures that are -- form my prospect. So it has many similarities.

There are differences. A key difference is that in the Silesian nappe there were better sands. There are lots of wells, there's proven to be better reservoir sands. So they're thicker, maybe up to 50 metres thick. They're good porosity, they're $11 \%$, that's just an indicator of how good they are. In the Magura nappe by comparison they're $7.5 \%$. Lower number, less good sands. So there's some basic rock differences there, but enough similarities for me to be able to use it as an analogy.

Another difference is that there are many more wells drilled on the Silesian nappe (Slide 7) and so because of that it's yielded more oil and is better understood, as I'm showing you here.

So on the right-hand side I've displayed an elevation map, just showing you the height of the hills in yellow there. All the pink spots there are the wells drilled in Poland and, as you can see, they number

In southern Poland and Slovakia it's that much more difficult. It's hillier, it's a little less clear the linkage between the underground geology and the surface, and you need modern techniques like seismic to help you find the oil and gas. So there's some differences.
(Slide 8) Moving on to defining prospects then, having established the prospectivity of the area. So based on all the evidence I would expect to find petroleum in folds, and this is, as I mentioned, created by Africa colliding with Europe, rumpling the surface rocks, like if you are pushing a table cloth and it all gets folded over; that's the sort of fold I'm looking for in the geological record.

So I'll show a seismic section (Slide 8). What that is is a vertical slice through the earth, just imagine slicing down a few kilometres into the earth, and the different rock strata are indicated by different colours there, and what you do is interpret horizons. These are boundaries between the different rock strata. And to the trained eye you can see some folds on there. Now, I'm not going to expect you to spot them. Even to an expert they are rather difficult to see on this seismic. The seismic itself doesn't reveal the detail of the folds. So I've indicated where the folds are on that seismic section.
seismic lines every 25 metres, regular over the whole area.
If you've only got 2D seismic, quite often the seismic is acquired maybe every 250 or 500 metres, and you make maps from this data.

Our seismic sections here are separated by 3,000 metres or 6,000 metres depending on where you are. So what we've got is not very much seismic. It's not a seismic-led exploration area, and the surfaces are rather poorly constrained between the lines.

Even on the lines, as you can see on the left-hand side, this is a section taken from Dr Longman's report, and that white arrow indicating uncertainty in where the green horizon goes, that's his arrow. And I would quite agree with him, it's somewhat uncertain where the horizons go. So that horizons could be shallower or deeper. And what that means, if I just draw on there that blue horizontal line, that maybe suggests that's an oil/water contact, then you can see that the uncertainty in the horizon, the green line, leads to uncertainty in what the area, the extent of the prospect is, and that leads to uncertainty in the volume too. It might be a little tiny volume. It might be a middle-sized volume. It might be a big volume. And you can see that this considerable structural

16:32 1
uncertainty can lead to significant volume uncertainty, and you can have half the volume, you can have double the volume. It depends on what the true nature of the underground strata are.

So Dr Longman took the prospects that I'd mapped and he said that the areas of my prospects are the largest they can be, pretty much as large as they can be, and when he went through the complicated process of calculating volumes, he said: make that the P10. In other words, in all the different combinations of area and thickness and all the complicated volume calculation, the area will only be bigger than I, Alan Atkinson, have mapped, $10 \%$ of the time. Most of the time the area will be smaller than that (Slide 9).

When I ran the volumes, I said, well, my mapped areas, there's uncertainty here, so I think half the time the area of the prospects could be larger, half the time it could be smaller. So I put it as what they call the P50 in the volume calculation. And I did that because I thought that was a fair representation of the uncertainty in the prospects that I'd created.

So this is a critical difference, because with Dr Longman's approach, it causes the hydrocarbon volumes, the petroleum volumes, to be $40 \%$ lower than the ones that I've calculated, and it's down to whether you

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say the areas are the P10 or the P50.
Of course I stand by my own numbers. I think Dr Longman is wrong to pin them at the P10 because basically he's saying that the prospect area essentially can't be very much larger than I have mapped, and I think that underestimates the uncertainty in the structures.

So there we are. That's volumes.
(Slide 11) Now, with all that uncertainty, even I, when I run through the process and try and apply best practice to generate these volumes, I need to check that I've not gone very far wrong. So I did some sense-checking. I undertook a benchmarking exercise, I contrasted the volumes to the next-door oil and gas basin in Poland, and this is a figure from one of my earlier reports, and one can go through it in detail. But it shows that the volumes I calculated were conservative compared to Poland, 13 million barrels compared with 51 or 63 , however you want to compare it.

So Dr Longman undertook his own benchmarking exercise, and his results led him to the opposite conclusion, shown by the orange bar on the right of that graph there, that my volumes were much bigger than you would expect in Poland.

So the process that he did was to, if you look at

16:35 1
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the right-hand map, which is taken from his report, you see there's the pink-hatched area in the middle, and that's the Silesian nappe. So he's got a database that tells him how many millions of barrels of oil are in that area, divided those millions of barrels of oil by the area of the pink polygon, and came up with a resource density which is plotted on the graph as the green bars there.

I would suggest that Dr Longman has taken the wrong areas here. If, actually, he used the correct areas, he would come up with some different results.

So as you can see, the green spots are the oil fields, and the green spots only occupy the bottom right-hand third of that pink area. So if you take the number of millions of barrels in there and divide it by a third of the volume, if gives you three times the resource density. So really the resource density isn't that green bar; it's that star in the middle there.

Similarly, the Magura nappe, the oil occupies a fifth of that blue polygon area and actually the resource density is five times what it says there. And if you take the whole, all of the oil in all of the nappes, it ends up looking a bit like that. So it's four times bigger.

So now by comparison, my orange bar, which is

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rely on fault seal, and so gives them a low chance of success. And by that, if you look at the right-hand seismic section there, I've got a green arrow wiggling up with "Leak". So there's not a folded upturned basin shape there, is there; it keeps going up and the idea is the oil sneaks out of that black line, which is a fault, and gets to surface, so it's leaked.
So that, the chance that that black line seals is what he's risked, he's given.
Now, in fact, as I discussed earlier, the traps are actually folds, they're just the seismic doesn't show them, it hasn't got that degree -- that quality.

Now we've got plenty of wells which tell us that there is seal sitting on top of the sands, it goes sand, shale, sand, shale, sand, shale, and they are in this upturned bowl shape. So really you are relying on the shale presence for your seal, not on the fault sealing. And, as you saw, you come up with a different number. I've come up with 0.85 rather than 0.5 .
Just before I move on from this slide, I'll just point out these two red blobs there. Again, I'm sorry about this. Unless you are a trained geologist all of this is a lot of information in a very short space of time. But those aren't upturned bowls; they are what Dr Longman was saying, that's a fault-sealed trap: the

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in the Claimant's licence area, is starting to look
a little bit more reasonable, compared with Poland.
Because I already think that you would find less oil than Poland because of the difference in the reservoir quality.
There you go. So that's the sense-check on the volumes.
(Slide 12) My final task was to calculate the geological chance of success, and Dr Longman and I both took essentially the same approach, and I've compared the results here.
Now, for the five prospects that Dr Longman did the evaluation for, you can see that his estimate on the right-hand side there of the geological chance of success was $7.5 \%, 0.075$, and I came up with $19 \%, 0.19$. So his estimate is $61 \%$ less than mine.

I haven't got time, I don't think, to go through all of the elements of the chance of success, so I'll just focus on the biggest contributor, which is seal, which accounts for two-thirds of that difference.

So I understand from a detailed review of appendix C of Dr Longman's second report that he's not really recognised the prospect style of folded strata that I discussed earlier on, and I think he believed the traps
sands go up, you come across a fault, if that fault doesn't seal, whoosh, off your oil goes.

But you can see from there that in those Polish fields the oil is trapped. So that fault is sealing, and I've seen that in many examples of Polish data, that a lot of the faults do seal. So even if they aren't(?) faulted, these traps are likely to seal, there's a lot of shale in the system.

Okay, try not to take my word for it. As another thing, calculating geological chance of success is a notoriously difficult thing to do and prone to bias and subjectivity (Slide 13). We understand that, all the geoscientists working with this sort of data, and we do what we can to make the process systematic and objective. I made an attempt in my first report on there, but let me just show you. On the right-hand side here --
THE PRESIDENT: I think you're --
MR ATKINSON: Am I over?
THE PRESIDENT: -- over the time, unless the secretary corrects me, by two minutes. But you can, of course give the conclusion.
MR ATKINSON: That's fine. That was the last slide, really. It was just showing that the published tables show, they back up my 0.85 number for upturned bowl type prospects.

16:40 1
2

And there you go, my conclusions.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
To whom do I give the floor?
Cross-examination by MR PILAWA
Q. Excellent, thank you so much.

Hello, Mr Atkinson.
A. Afternoon.
Q. My name is Douglas Pilawa and I will be conducting your cross-examination today.

You started the presentation with your instructions, and I'm going to start there as well. So if you can open up to paragraph 6 of your first expert report, you should have a copy of it there?
A. I do.

Okay. Yes.
Q. Great. So in paragraph 6 you state that you were:
"... instructed to provide an independent assessment of the hydrocarbon exploration prospectivity of the licence areas, including an independent estimate of the hydrocarbon volumes in place attributable to the licence areas, and estimating the chance of finding them."

Now, you understood that instruction to give you a certain level of autonomy in your assessment; right?
A. I did, yes.
Q. Yes. You weren't confined to what Discovery Global

16:43 1
have a certain risk, and I think Poruba, just the risk was so low that I chose not to describe it as a prospect.
Q. Right, so you don't give it a number?
A. Yes.
Q. In your opinion, had Discovery drilled, had it moved forward, had it drilled a well there, it wouldn't have found an accumulation of oil or gas?
A. There would be a low chance that that would happen.
Q. Right. It's not included in your model so I think it's safe to say you don't believe that it would have found oil or gas there, right?
A. I think it would be accurate to say that I think there would be a very low chance that they would find oil or gas, not zero.
Q. Yes, low enough for you to exclude it from your model, right?
A. That's correct yes.
Q. Now, I can take you to this document and I'm sure you have seen a few of them, but you're generally aware that Discovery Global was presenting its own version of prospects to investors and to its JV partners. You're aware of that, right?
A. Yes. I saw documents to that effect, yes.
Q. Okay, I'll pull one up for you, just to help you. If we

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might have planned to do or what it was doing in Slovakia; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Right. So just as an example, Discovery Global had three authorisations for expenditures for the first three wells. You know that, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. So it was going to drill at those three wells, but your assessment goes beyond that; fair?
A. Yes.
Q. So those first three wells, and I'm happy to take you to the specific paragraphs in your expert report, but I'm starting at 109 of your first expert report. That first well was Smilno.
A. Yes.
Q. And I see that in your modelling you assign that prospect number BM01?
A. Yes.
Q. And the second well was the Stromy prospect at Krivá Ol'ka and that's equivalent to LU07D?
A. Yes.
Q. And the third well was Ruská Poruba and I understand that you don't think there's an accumulation of oil or gas there?
A. That's correct. I think that all of these prospects
can pull up C-180. Right, and we'll scan this real quick.

This is an October 2017 investor presentation. And if we can go to page 29 .
Thank you. You can see that, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So for example here we have Discovery telling investors that it was targeting these seven prospects, and as part of your independent assessment you were not asked to perform any validation of these figures; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. You weren't asked to say whether these prospects in particular would have succeeded; fair?
A. That's correct.
Q. Correct.

And I also understand that as part of this, with the data that Discovery had, you were able to select the data that you felt was most appropriate for your analysis; fair?
A. I'm not sure if that's accurate, actually. I used all of the data that I was given.
Q. I'm not sure about that. So let's go to paragraph 207 of your first expert report. Page 63.
So paragraph 207 starts with a discussion about MT data, or an MT technique that Discovery Global was
using; does that sound familiar to you?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. Right. So if we go down to paragraph 208 you state that you were:
"... unable to obtain a detailed description of the theory or application of the MT method used ... on the Claimant's licence areas."

And your ultimate conclusion is then, if we go to the next page, in paragraph 211. Right, so here you say:
"... since there is a lack of peer reviewed evidence for this implementation of the MT technique, and I was not able to establish a strong empirical basis for its predictions of pay, I would not rely on it in my assessment of prospectivity and did not use MT data to help estimate PIIP or prospect GCOS."

You recall that now, right?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. Now, you understand that Mr Lewis of Discovery Global was a big fan of using this technique; fair enough?
A. He uses it a lot and has trust in it, yes.
Q. So he is a fan of it?
A. Your words, yes.

MR DRYMER: The "technique" being MT?
MR PILAWA: MT, yes.
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16:48 1
analysis, so you're quite right.
Q. Yes. And one of the reasons why you didn't feel comfortable using it is because of the lack of peer-reviewed evidence on it; right?
A. That's right. There's all sorts of interesting new lines of research in our business. There's a lot of money to be made, so people try new things all the time. Sometimes they catch oil and they become mainstream; other times they don't catch oil and they just fall by the wayside. I think this is probably in the middle at the moment, this one.
Q. Yes, I'm just quoting paragraph 211 of your first expert report, that's it.
A. Yes.
Q. So I think we've already discussed the fact that it's not really a mainstream tool; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

Now, from the date of its purchase of AOG in 2014 until it left Slovakia, Discovery did not acquire any new data on the licence areas apart from this MT data; correct?
A. I believe you are right. I think they reprocessed seismic data but didn't acquire any new seismic data. Yes.

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16:47 1 MR DRYMER: For the record.
MR PILAWA: For the record.
A. Single point MT. MT is used across -- throughout academia and by all sorts of people. But this particular application of multi -- magneto-tellurics is --
Q. Yes, this particular technique.
A. -- not as widely employed.
Q. It's not as widely employed, yes.

So you have no reason to doubt that Discovery Global would have continued to use this had it continued its prospecting activities; right?
A. I think that's likely.
Q. Yes. One of the advantages, for example, of the MT data is that it's relatively cheap to acquire; right?
A. Compared with seismic data for --
Q. Yes, compared to seismic data.
A. When comparing with drilling wells, yes.
Q. And compared with drilling wells.

So I come back to the original question: even though that this was Discovery's -- one of its methods of prospecting for oil and gas, you excluded it from your analysis?
A. Yes. That is correct. I evaluated it, so I didn't
ignore it, but I evaluated and didn't use it in my

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Q. Yes. So there is magnetic data, for example, gravity data that Discovery had inherited, and seismic data. But from the date of its purchase until the end of Slovakia it had only reinterpreted that data; you agree with me there?
A. No, they had done some reprocessing as well, I think the seismic was reprocessed, the gravity was reprocessed, the magnetic was reprocessed. So that level of work.
Q. Yes, so there was some reprocessing, some reinterpreting. But in terms of brand-new data, from 2014 until the end of its time in Slovakia, it did not acquire any new data on the licence areas; right?
A. Apart from the MT data.
Q. Apart from the MT data.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

So there was a little bit of a discussion in your presentation, and I thank you for that, about seismic data and how it's used. That's actually what you are using to interpret and map new prospects, or leads. I know there's a debate between the experts on that, but I'll use "prospects" for you.
A. It was part of the information used. It's an important part. But I also used surface geology. In fact, as I said in my first report, this is a notoriously

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difficult place to work, onshore in a thrust environment. If you look at the seismic data, very experienced people like myself, they can still find it challenging to understand what the seismic is telling them, and a good way forward is to actually do what Discovery Geo(?) did, which is to ask someone like EGI to undertake a structural restoration study, because they can incorporate the seismic with other data, like gravity and magnetics, and they can form an integrated understanding.

So they did that piece of work and I, like I think Dr Longman, took a look at that and said: well, we can't better that, that's as good a piece of work as you are going to get and it makes the most sense of the seismic data, so --
Q. If I can, Mr Atkinson, I was again just reading from your expert report at paragraph 72 .
A. I was just responding.
Q. Yes. I'm just trying to confirm where you say:
"I have used this seismic data to audit existing structural interpretations, and to map new prospects."
A. Oh, yes, to audit, yes. So I had to audit what EGI did. They did a nice piece of work but I wasn't going to take that on trust, so I looked at the seismic data, looked at the gravity data to check what they have done, or

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just to orient Mr Atkinson, apologies for that.
Right, so this is the qualitative and quantitative interpretation of full tensor, the gravity data that Aurelian had procured and which Discovery had interpreted. You are familiar with this; correct?
A. Yes, I read that report.
Q. So if we can go to page 10 of the PDF itself. Yes, right there. And I think this is actually the geophysical problem that you were just talking to me about at section 1.2, if we could zoom in on that to help Mr Atkinson see.
A. I think that -- yes, I think that is what I just said, yes.
Q. Yes, so the seismic data has generally been of poor quality in the area, and a reason for the poor quality of that is indeed, as you noted, the structurally complex geology, the intense thrusting, et cetera.

I think it's uncontroversial right here and you would agree that those problems can lead to difficulties in interpreting that seismic data; right?
A. I would definitely agree with that.
Q. Right. Thank you.

And I just want to come back real quickly to the way that you identified "prospects" -- I'll say that for you.

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audit what they'd done.
Q. Yes, and so, just from this paragraph again, you are using that seismic data to map new prospects; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So obviously the quality of that data is important; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And generally speaking, the 2 D seismic data that Discovery was interpreting at the time, to map new prospects, was of poor quality; right?
A. You've always got to be careful in making that judgment: is the data poor quality or does the geology make it -mean that you can't see very much on the seismic. And I think it's probably a combination of the two things.

So the geology and the structures are very complicated. That reduces the quality of the seismic. And then there's a separate question: was the data acquired in the right way and processed in the right way. It's not an area which lends itself to good seismic, I think.
Q. Right. So why don't we just pull up C-46. For your help, Mr Atkinson, you cite this document at 44 of your first expert report, footnote 44. And if we can just go to page 10, please.

You know what, we can stay here on this front page
A. Thank you.
Q. So if we can go to page 45 of your second expert report.
A. Okay, I'm there.
Q. I'm not -- oh, there we are.

Right, so just above this image is paragraph 112.5, and you explain that when you were first instructed, "the Claimant provided a map of 38 leads and prospects". Can you tell me why you didn't include this in your first expert report?
A. Why didn't I include that ...

I included it in the second report because there was -- that's right, there was reference made to the number of prospects I'd created.

Well --
Q. Maybe this will help you. Also in that paragraph 112.5 you state, referring to when you were first instructed:
"This map informed my understanding of the Claimant's views on prospectivity, and informed my own independent view."

What did you mean by that?
A. Ah. Good question. What I meant by that was that if you look at the site -- they were going for a structural place, for starters, and not stratigraphic, which is a different thing. So we're looking for folds. You can look at the seismic, and wherever there is a blob on
this map, figure 5.2, you can see on the seismic that
there's potentially -- there's a thrust or a good likelihood of a thrust, you can link them back to the surface geology, and they are areas where, if you just take a first look at the seismic, you think: there's potentially a trap there.

When I did the same process using EGI's report, which is a more advanced piece of work, not surprisingly many of the prospects sort of broadly coincided, because they're based on seismic.
Q. Right. So did you generate your prospects before or after you received this map?
A. After.
Q. After. Okay. And was the goal to plot roughly the same amount as this map?
A. No. No. In fact, I ... I've got to say, I generated a lot more than 40 , but they were outside this licence area and so we had to cut them back. So I had many more than this.
Q. Well, yes, if they were outside the licence area you wouldn't put them in, right?
A. They were inside an earlier version of the licence area.
Q. Understood. Thank you for clarifying that.

So when you wrote your first report, did you have access to or did you know about the competent person's

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probably the answer --
Q. No, that's fine, I understand that you didn't --
    I'm just going to wait for the transcript because
    I don't want to put words in your mouth. But you said:
            "... I was doing an independent piece of work.
        I really didn't care what anyone else thought. I was
        giving my own opinion."
            That's right, from the transcript.
            So can you open your second report to page 45.
A. Yes.
Q. And if you can go to footnote 107, please.
            I'm just a little intrigued because here you're
        using apparently a competent person's report that's on
        the Slovakian licences from 2009 to corroborate your
        results. And now you just told me that you didn't use
        the Aurelian CPR because you were doing an independent
        piece of work. And I'm just trying to understand how
        you chose to use which one?
A. Well, I didn't really use that, did I? I commented on
        it in a footnote.
Q. Well, I don't know. I think you state here in 107, you
        say this is "in line with my estimate", and I read that
        to be you were using that to support your estimates; is
        that a fair reading?
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report that Discovery had inherited from Aurelian that covered the Slovakian licences?
A. I saw that at one point. I think -- I can't remember the exact timing. I suspect it was after I did my first report.
Q. Right. And you didn't mention -- well, let me ask you this, in fairness: did you see it before you wrote your second expert report?
A. Yes. I might need someone to confirm this, but I think that came up in document discovery.
Q. Good memory.
A. Yes.
Q. Indeed. So --
A. I think that was before my second report?
Q. That was.
A. Just to get the timelines right.
Q. Can you say with confidence that you reviewed it?
A. Yes. Yes, briefly at that time, and then more carefully when Dr Longman presented it as an exhibit.
Q. And is there a reason you didn't mention it in the second expert report?
A. I can say that it broadly supported what I've done, when I've looked at it after Dr Longman's report.

Again, it was -- I was doing an independent piece of work. I really didn't care what anyone else thought.
A. How would you describe that ... I think I was -- is ... "CPR produced by Gaffney Cline". Which CPR is that? It's obviously not the RPS CPR.
Q. No, I was asking myself the same question, because the CPR is --
A. Yes, yes, no, it's a different one.
Q. It's not actually in the record. It's simply referred to in that document, which raised some questions for me.
A. Okay, yes, I think that CPR was shown to me late in the -- this is the second report we're talking about. I think late in the day I probably saw that and, because it was new information to me, I thought: make note of it, as it was information I'd seen --
Q. Yes, so it was new information to you, so you included it in the second report.
A. Yes.
Q. The Aurelian CPR was new information to you but you didn't include that in the second report?
A. Ah. Yes.
Q. That's fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what about the draft 51-101 that Discovery Global had acquired as part of its fundraising efforts; were you aware of that document?
A. Again, I think that one came up during document

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discovery, so I had a look at it then and then had a closer look when it was presented in Dr Longman's second report.
Q. And is it fair for me to assume that you didn't include that document either because you were conducting an independent assessment?
A. I struggle to remember quite what I thought when I first saw it, but I certainly, after thorough review, I just thought it was a very poor piece of work and really didn't contribute to my understanding or anyone's understanding of the prospectivity of the area.
Q. Right. So the CPR from 2009 that you reviewed but didn't attach to your report was a better piece of work, and that's why you relied on it?
A. The footnote 107 ?
Q. Yes.
A. The single reference to the CPR in my report we're talking about, yes, the GaffneyCline --
Q. Yes, the one you used to support your estimates, that one.
A. Alright. I think I'd call that footnote 107 an off-the-cuff comment, that someone else had produced volumes which were similar to mine. What I could have done in there was also mentioned the RPS CPR, which supported my chances of success estimates, and volumes

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17:04 1
is because the geological chance of success in it is two times yours?
A. You mean two times smaller?
Q. No -- I'm sorry, two times smaller, yes.
A. Okay, yes.
Q. The difference is two times.
A. I'm sorry, but you've just ...

Dr Longman has actually not taken the correct information from the RPS CPR. If you look at the next page in his -- the true chance of success for Zborov A and Zborov B , and instead of being 6,6 or $8 \%$, it's actually $16 \%$. I don't know if anyone can confirm that, or $32 \%$.
Q. Right.
A. He's just not read the CPR properly and misunderstood the chance of success.

So when you drill a well and it has three reservoirs in it --
Q. I understand --
A. -- you have three bites of the cherry, so the chance of success is only limited(?) to one reservoir.
Q. Mr Atkinson, please.
A. So that's actually wrong.
Q. Mr Atkinson, you'll get the opportunity on re-direct.
A. Okay, no problem.

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17:02 11 are quite similar, and if I had mentioned the 51-101 document I would have said that that was a poor piece of work and wasn't worthy of comparing with --
Q. Right, so you could have done all that --
A. I could have done all that.
Q. -- but you didn't do that, right?
A. No.
Q. Maybe we should take a look real quickly at the SLR report, maybe just to get your thoughts on something. If we could pull up Dr Longman's second report, it might also be referred to as the SLR report, the second one.
And if you can go to paragraphs 24 and 25. Right, and if you can zoom in on those.

So I think you had said earlier that you had
reviewed the RPS CPR before your second report. You believe that it supported your estimates, but you did not attach it to your second expert report; is that fair?
A. Just -- just to be absolutely precise, I remember looking at it, we had a discussion about it, about its significance, and moved on. I then took a closer look at it in response to Dr Longman's second report, so I think we just didn't attribute too much significance to it.
Q. Right. Is the reason why you didn't attribute too much
Q. Okay. Thanks. You could have said all of that in your second report, right? Because you had reviewed this document. I'm just trying to understand why you included some and didn't include others.
So your testimony right now is that you reviewed this, you made some conclusions about it, and you excluded it; that's fair, right?

Yes or no?
A. I think my statement is that we fairly superficially reviewed it, gave it a read through, discussed the contents and moved on. Which is a different level of review to that which I gave it when Dr Longman included it as an exhibit in the second report.
Q. Yes, did you undertake the same level of review for the 2009 CPR that you included in footnote 107 ?
A. Yes. Superficial, I guess.
Q. Superficial, but good enough to include in the report?
A. As a footnote to my report, yes.
Q. To support your estimates; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

Okay, moving on to PIIP, and just a brief --
MR DRYMER: It's always dangerous to try to imagine what's in counsel's mind. I know that since that's where I spent much of my life. But I wonder whether in due

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course the suggestion is going to be made to the Tribunal that you included reference only to studies or estimates or reports that you decided were in line with your estimates, and excluded those which weren't.

I don't know if that's what we're going to be told, but just in case it is, what would be your answer to that?
A. No, is my answer. Everything I looked at, thoroughly, contributed to my report and has been mentioned. I've been very open about what's -- yes. So nothing has been excluded.

The only things that haven't been heavily incorporated were things that I looked at briefly, and there were things that weren't at my disposal when I was doing the majority of the work.

But, for example, in document discovery, we had a quick look at some reports, and I can barely remember this GaffneyCline report which was brought to my attention, and we had a look at it and thought: well, that's not going against what I've said, so I'll include a reference to it.
MR DRYMER: Very good. Thank you.
A. And the same with the RPS CPR report. I should have included that because that was actually quite supportive.

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reports are within the Magura and the Dukla nappes; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. So when it comes to your petroleum initially in place calculations, those amounts represent the estimated volume of hydrocarbons that are potentially available within each prospect?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. And obviously these are still only potential amounts, but with all of your prospects being within the Magura and the Dukla nappes, the PIIP estimates represent potential amounts of oil and gas within those areas of the Magura and Dukla nappes?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, I think you said it earlier, but if you could just confirm, historically, the Silesian nappe has been more productive than the Magura and the Dukla nappes?
A. That is correct.
Q. Now, I want to walk through, briefly, the three benchmarking exercises that you undertook. So we're going to start with the first report. I know you've updated it, so we'll get to the second report. I'm just saying that now in case you feel compelled to take me

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MR DRYMER: Thanks. Please continue.
MR PILAWA: No problem. Thanks.
Just talking in broad strokes about what PIIP estimates are, your instructions are to calculate an independent estimate of hydrocarbon volumes in place, and then estimating the chance of finding them. There is a level of uncertainty in this, you acknowledge that; right?
A. Very much so. Yes, in fact our job is to capture the range of uncertainty.
Q. Right, so there's a level of uncertainty in this.

Now, without drilling an actual exploration well you don't know actually if there's oil or gas at that specific accumulation; fair?
A. That's correct, right.
Q. And the estimates, of course, are only as good as the data you have on hand?
A. Yes.
Q. Fair statement?
A. Yes.
Q. Good. So you talked about this a little bit in the presentation you just gave, but Discovery's licence areas lie within the Magura and the Dukla nappes; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And all of the prospects that you've created in your

## there.

So if we could start with the first benchmarking exercise and we'll go to paragraph 175 of your first expert report on page 74 .
A. Oh, sorry, say that again? First report?

MR DRYMER: 175.
A. Paragraph 175.

MR PILAWA: Correct.
A. Sorry, I misheard you.
Q. Totally fine.
A. Yes. I'm there.
Q. Okay. So here this is your benchmarking exercise to show that your PIIP estimates are reasonable. And you benchmark your results against three anticlines in the Silesian nappe in Poland; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And we can see those in the image there after paragraph 178. The average of those three anticlines in the Silesian nappe is 49 MMboe, and the average of each fold that you analysed in Discovery's licence areas are 11-14 MMboe per fold; you recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay. And I understand that because that analysis showed that the Claimant's license area contained lower amounts than the benchmarked amounts, you concluded that

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this was reasonable; is that fair?
A. That's fair.
Q. Okay. But you do agree with me that it's expected that the Silesian nappe contains more oil or gas than the Magura and the Dukla nappe; right?
A. No. No, I don't agree -- I don't think that. It's proven to have more oil and gas.
Q. Yes.
A. Because it's been drilled. I think on the basis of the wells that have been drilled in the Magura nappe to date, it's fair to expect the Silesian nappe to have more.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. That's not to say that in the future we won't find that more wells are drilled in the Magura nappe and we'll find better sands.

I think the basic point that the Silesian nappe has probably generally got more oil than the Magura nappe is a fair point.
Q. Okay. I realise there's a lot of uncertainty in the oil and gas world and in figuring out what will happen in the future, but I think I heard you say that generally we would expect the Silesian nappe to have more oil and gas than the Magura and Dukla nappes?
A. Yes. Based on current data.

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area, you may find the same small oil fields. You may find bigger; you may find smaller.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, that's fair. But you were very specific to choose three anticlines in the Silesian nappe and nothing prevented you from doing that exclusively within the Magura nappe; correct?
A. Ah, I can explain why I chose those ones. It's because --
Q. No, I just want to -- you had the ability to undertake a benchmarking exercise exclusively within the Magura nappe. You had that ability, right?
A. No.
Q. I think you just did it on your slide earlier today?
A. It's because the folds are less easy to identify because they are a little more complicated in the Magura nappe. So the Silesian nappe, you can see the folds that are on the map that -- you are seeing that there now. The surface geology map allows you to identify where the folds are, so they are just easily identifiable.
Q. Okay.
A. So I went for the easy -- folds that were easiest to be able to be identified.
Q. But there is oil production in the Magura nappe; right?

Page 199 says nothing about whether the estimates are reasonable in relation specifically to the Magura and the Dukla nappes, does it?
A. I think what I was attempting to do with this was just to say, if my volumes had come in higher, or the same as the Silesian nappe, I would have been worried. Well, in fact I wouldn't have been worried, I would have redone my analysis, and changed some assumptions to get to a lower number.
Q. If I can ask you about that right there.
A. Mm.
Q. Sorry, but if it would have been higher that would have caused concern because historically the Magura and the Dukla nappes have produced less oil; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So you're going over to three anticlines in what has historically been a more productive nappe. But that says nothing about what's taking place within the Magura and Dukla nappes in relation to themselves; do you agree to that?
A. I'm not sure I do. Where the Magura nappe has been drilled so far and is in Poland, it's -- this very smallish oilfield has been found, there's nothing -- if you come 50 kilometres south to the Claimant's licence
Q. Okay. And we'll come back to the third benchmarking exercise that you've done, but that was done, part of that, exclusively within the Magura nappe; right?

In fairness, Mr Atkinson, we'll bring it up and we'll come to that.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Okay, so let's go to the second benchmarking exercise you did in your second report. And if we can keep this image from the first report -- sorry, should have told you before.

Okay. Are we able to go back to the original page that we were just looking at? I believe this was page 74 of the first report.
THE PRESIDENT: It's actually page 53.
MR PILAWA: Yes, that one right there. Keep that one up.
And then in the second report, page 33 of the second report. Right. Right there.

So, this second benchmarking exercise, and if we can zoom in on the top one. I'm just interested in the area that's selected.
EPE OPERATOR: The one on the right-hand top?
MR PILAWA: That would be great, thank you very much.
I think the one above that, sorry. Yes, thank you.
So you have selected two 1,245 square kilometre

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areas. It's the same size as Discovery's licence area.
But if we look at these pictures, this new benchmarking exercise still captures almost the entirety of the two larger anticlines from the first benchmarking exercise; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And if we look at both images closely, if you can kind of zoom out on that one a little bit, this second benchmarking exercise only extends into the Magura nappe just the slightest bit. I notice the borders are removed on the right, but if you're looking at the images, it just touches the Magura nappe the slightest bit. Is that a fair characterisation?
A. Are you talking about the blue polygon?
Q. Right.
A. Well, it captures a lot of the oil fields on the Magura nappe, I believe.
Q. Right. It captures that tiny little pocket.
A. Well, yes, where the oil is on the Magura nappe.
Q. Yes, where the oil is.
A. Yes.
Q. That little sweet spot. Okay.

So what I'm struggling with is, why didn't you just draw this area exclusively within the Magura nappe? A. Ah. Because at this stage I think my -- I have oil and

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resource density in the Magura nappe using the Silesian nappe data. I'm saying how much oil per square kilometre is there in Poland. I would expect to be below that. I'm contrasting, I'm benchmarking, I'm not saying they're the same.
Q. I understand that, but I don't understand benchmarking to be the same or necessarily what the purpose of this is. The ultimate purpose of your expert report is to give an amount that is found within the Magura nappe. You are giving the Tribunal an amount that's either in the Magura nappe or the Dukla nappe. Those are where all your prospects are; right?
A. Exactly.
Q. Those are where all the prospects are, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Exactly. So the purpose of the PIIP estimates are to tell the Tribunal that: we should expect a certain amount of oil and gas from the Magura nappe and the Dukla nappe. And my question to you is, why go looking for an analogous basin when you can just look in the Magura and Dukla nappes themselves?
A. The reason is because in the Dukla nappe, let's start with the Dukla nappe, it contains certain reservoir sands, the -- I call them Menilite type sands, the better quality type sands, and they are found in the

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17:19 $1 \quad$ gas fields in the Magura nappe and the Dukla nappe in the Claimant's licence area.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. So not exclusively in the Magura nappe, and I was just estimating average properties across those two nappes. And I was just choosing areas from Poland, in the blue polygon, which incorporated two of the nappes as well. I wasn't -- yes. It's not just the Magura nappe in Slovakia, I think is what I'm saying.
Q. I understand that. But if you want to look at what's in the Magura nappe, isn't the best place to start the Magura nappe?
A. I wasn't looking just at the Magura nappe. I was looking at the Magura and Dukla nappes.
Q. And Dukla nappe. So if you want to look at what's expected from the Magura nappe, you look at the Magura nappe; if you want to look at what's expected in the Dukla nappe, you look at the Dukla nappe?
A. I see that the basins are analogous, and that I can use the Silesian nappe to compare with the Magura nappe.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. With the caveat that there was less good reservoir there, and that there would -- and so any estimates I make from my -- and remember this is a benchmarking exercise so I'm contrasting; I'm not trying to find the
reservoirs.
But the poorer reservoirs, the flysch, the -there's the stuff where there's just shale and then a bit of sand, shale and then a bit of sand, the not so good reservoirs, that's everywhere. That's in the Silesian nappe, the Magura nappe, the Dukla nappe. So some of the oilfields in Poland have sands which are -they're more similar to the Magura nappe. The opposite is not true. The Magura nappe does not have sands similar to the best ones in the Silesian nappe.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That may be the issue, no?
A. Yes. So when I started this whole exercise there was -I thought: I can keep things simple, I can work out the resource density in Poland, or somewhere, the millions of barrels per square kilometre, and just multiply by 1,245 square kilometres. And I immediately hit the problem that I indicated that Dr Longman had run into: what is the resource density, what is the area that I should consider, how many barrels do I put in that equation. It's a very difficult thing. So I went down the traditional route of mapping specific project prospects, and I thought that would be more defendable, more transparent, to everyone. So I took that approach.

And so I did that, I came up with a number, the amount of oil in place. But as you've seen, this really

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So there's a bit in that corner where the blue is present and the pink isn't. It's Magura and a bit of Silesian as well. It comes back in, doesn't it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so there's not much Magura nappe. Or do I misunderstand?
A. And that is one of the points, and to come back to your question, there's just not as much data. There's a few oilfields there, but as I tried to show in my presentation earlier, you move south, it gets hilly, it's wooded, there's just been less oil and gas exploration. So there are fewer oilfields.

So I think our database of oilfields, just using that -- I think I also showed Dr Longman's graph, even with my changed area -- it's still quite a modest amount of oil per square kilometre.

But it's based on a small amount of data. As is my orange bar. Or it's based on three fields, that orange bar on that graph. If one of them didn't succeed, it would be two-thirds of the height. If two of them didn't succeed, it would be one-third of the height.
THE PRESIDENT: Apologies.
MR PILAWA: No problem.
I have no further questions, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Questions in re-direct, Mr Newing? ( 5.28 pm )

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THE PRESIDENT: -- then it's a little bit ...
A. Yes, there you go. That area there.
THE PRESIDENT: That I understood, yes. Is this in the
Magura nappe, when I look at the map on the left? It
seems to be further up, no?
A. Oh yes. There we've got it on there, haven't we?
is uncertain, so I've got to make sure that I'm not really a long way from reality, and hence -- well, how much oil and gas is there in Poland. I'm expecting there to be less here proportionately than Poland, and that was the exercise I was undertaking.
THE PRESIDENT: And can you show me on these maps what, in your benchmarking, is on the Magura nappe? Because I'm not sure I understand this.
A. Yes, I think -- can you see the pink polygon and the blue polygon at the top?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
A. Where you've just got blue polygon and no pink polygon, that's probably largely Magura nappe.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
A. One more thing, and to come back to the question that was raised earlier --

THE PRESIDENT: If I'm trying to look at the broken line, whatever it is --

THE PRESIDENT: -- then it's a little bit ...
A. Yes, there you go. That area there.

THE PRESIDENT: That I understood, yes. Is this in the Magura nappe, when I look at the map on the left? It

## 17:28 1

## Re-direct examination by MR NEWING

 Q. Yes.Mr Atkinson, you were discussing earlier, there was a discussion about whether there had been any reinterpretation of data after Discovery purchased AOG; do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you referred to it as having been reprocessed.
A. Yes.
Q. For the record, that was at transcript 16.50 (page 180, line 3).
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Can you explain what you mean, what's the difference between reprocessed or reinterpreted?
A. Oh okay, yes. Certainly.

So seismic data is acquired in the field and you end up with some tapes, digital tapes of data, and it is a big process to take that raw data and create the images we've been looking at, with the seismic sections. There's quite a bit of seismic processing goes on. So that is done. It gives you a seismic section. You can look at that, interpret the horizons, do what you do. So that's an interpretation exercise.

Quite often you go back to the raw data that's been acquired, those tapes, digital tapes of data, and you
$17: 32 \quad 1$ that; that would be a reinterpretation of the reprocessed data.
Q. Thank you.
A. So is that -- yes?
Q. And you mentioned, when you were discussing the quality of the seismic, you mentioned -- and again, for the record, this is transcript 16.53 , (page 182 , lines
14-17) -- there was a question as to whether data was acquired in the right way and processed in the right way.
So, bearing in mind how you've just explained the difference, does the way that something is processed affect how useful that data is?
A. That is -- yes, if the seismic data has been processed poorly it will be hard to interpret it. If it's been processed well, it will be easier to interpret.
Q. Thank you. Could we please now turn to ...

MR DRYMER: Who did -- you mentioned reprocessing of the data. Who did reprocessing in this case?
A. The -- I think, and someone may be able to correct me, but I think the last --
MR DRYMER: Your counsel is not allowed to.
A. Oh. I'm pretty sure that the last phase of processing

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have vast volumes, but this is 2D data, so it's a little different. Actually, probably the most significant thing is experience, so the first guys who acquire the data would have processed it, come up with a result, and then every succeeding person will have built on that and done a slightly better job, based on what the previous people did. So it's an evolutionary thing.
It's more of a human thing than a computer thing, to be honest, with 2D seismic.
MR DRYMER: So when Mr [Newing] asked you: does the way that data is processed affect how useful that data is, what you're saying is it depends on who is doing the interpretation? Or the processing of the data.
A. Both of those things. Both of those things, yes. So you would like to think --
MR DRYMER: Not the manner in which the technique is used,
or it is that -- it's all a question of know-how is what you're saying?
A. I think so, yes. And, in fact, in the reports I think

I might have written it somewhere, or I read it, that actually each succeeding seismic acquisition in the field improved. So there was one -- I think there is a mixture of companies: there was a Hungarian company, a Polish company, maybe a Slovakian company. They acquired the first data, that was --

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17:30 $1 \quad$ was done by a company based in Aberdeen called Seismic
Image Processing Ltd, SIP, and I definitely recall seeing some seismic processing reports from them, and I think, you know, if -- they are a well-established company.
MR DRYMER: When would that have been done, do you recall? And on whose behalf, is what I'm getting at?
A. I believe for the Claimant. I think I was -- it was either -- 2012, maybe? I would have to -- I would probably refer to my notes and find the answer, but I think around about 2012. There was some processing going on as late as 2014, so I've heard anecdotally.

I think actually my colleague has -- Colin Howard has a timeline which he has created as an exhibit.
MR DRYMER: My mic is not working -- I'm going to speak loudly and try --

I don't mean to be obtuse, but I will ask this question as neutrally as I can: have processing or reprocessing techniques advanced over time? I don't know if it's a function of computer power or not.
A. No, they have. But I think possibly more significant -this is very --
MR DRYMER: Computing power, I meant.
A. -- fairly straightforward to the seismic processing.

Computing power comes into play with 3D data when you

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MR DRYMER: Yes.
A. Then the next guys came along, acquired some more data.

They learnt from the previous lot and changed the way
they acquired.
MR DRYMER: I see. I see.
A. So it was an evolutionary thing.

MR DRYMER: Thank you.
Back to you, Mr Tushingham -- Mr Newing, pardon me. Excuse me, sir. I didn't see who was talking.
MR NEWING: That's okay.
MR DRYMER: I just heard. Pardon me.
MR NEWING: Mr Atkinson, you were taken earlier to footnote 107 in your second report. If we could please have that up on the screen, it's at page 45 .
A. Say that page again, please?
Q. Page 45.
A. Of the second report?
Q. Of the second report.
A. Ah, okay.
Q. Do you have that?
A. I do, thank you.
Q. This says:
"I also note that a 2009 CPR produced by Gaffney
Cline \& Associates for a previous operator of the
Claimant's licence estimated a gross gas resource ..."

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And at the end you will see it says:
"See CH065 ..."
A. Ah, yes. Yes.
Q. Is that a reference to one of your exhibits?
A. Ah yes. That's to one of my colleague's exhibits.
Q. That's to, indeed, Mr Howard.
A. Yes.
Q. Can we please pull up $\mathrm{CH}-065$. Is this the document that you were referring to that you had seen that referred to the Gaffney Cline \& Associates CPR?
A. Right, okay. That looks familiar, yes. Yes, it's coming back to me now.
Q. Thank you.

You were also asked some questions about the geological chance of success in the RPS competent person's report that were referred to in Dr Longman's report; do you recall that?
A. I do.
Q. And do you recall that you said that you believed that Dr Longman had misread the document and that the true chance of success was higher? Do you recall that?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. Can I ask for Exhibit CDL-008 to be pulled up, please.

This is the RPS competent person's report, isn't it?
A. That's correct, yes.

17:38 1
difficult to communicate, difficult to implement, we made a simplifying assumption that we find a single sand in a success case and the thickness would vary, which made it easier to estimate my chance of success. Which was, I think -- I did compare it with Zborov B, it's not dissimilar to my chance of success on a similar prospect.
And I think the same is true for Zborov A.
MR NEWING: Thank you, I have no further questions. ( 5.38 pm )

Questions from THE TRIBUNAL
MR DRYMER: One general question about something you said near the outset of your -- I think in your presentation, or maybe later on in your examination, the concept of this not being a "seismic-led" exploration area.

I think I understand, and I think that this wasn't seismic-led by virtue of the geology and by virtue of the fact that there just wasn't much seismic data available, could you just expand briefly, or explain briefly what you mean by "seismic-led exploration". Is that a critique or is that just an observation?
A. Just an observation. The opposing expert and myself, we work in parts of the world where we have lots of seismic and everything is very seismic focused. I spend most of my time on my day job interpreting seismic data.

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17:36 1 Q. Could I ask for us to turn to PDF page 92, please, internal page 84. Is this the document that you were referring to?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Would you like to explain your position?
A. Yes. So looking at the top table, the Zborov B prospect, the RPS evaluated that -- a well drilled on that prospect as having five sands in it, on the left-hand side: Palaeocene, Eocene, et cetera, et cetera. So each one of those sands individually, they give a chance of success of finding, as high as 13 and as low as 6 .
It's a slightly complicated way of doing it, but if you have five bites of the cherry, you're increasing your chance of finding one of those sands. So all told, even though one sand has a $13 \%$, another one has 9 , another one has 6 , overall the chance of finding a sand with a well at that location, just one, is $30 \%$. So that there says "STOCHASTIC TOTAL (given at least 1 success)", and on the right-hand column GPoS of 30 . It's a complicated bit of statistics, but -- so that prospect itself has a $30 \%$ chance of success, not a $6 \%$ chance of success.
We had conversations amongst the team about whether we should do this, and because it's rather complicated,

Occasionally you work in an onshore environment like this and the data is poorer quality, there's less of it. This is a bit of an extreme. I have worked in areas in Kurdistan, in northern Iraq, where there was no seismic and I had to come up with -- I authored a competent person's report on a thing called Sangaw North, which was a Sterling Energy prospect.
MR DRYMER: Just out there no seismic because nobody bothered or because seismic wouldn't have revealed anything.
A. They hadn't got round to it yet. There's just a hill, just like those ones in the Silesian nappe when you look at the map and there's a hill, and you can just work out that that hill means under the ground there's a structure which you might be able to drill and find oil. So I had to try and come up with prospective resources on the basis of a hill.

We're a stage further on from that. We're still very frontier, we've got 25 , I think it is, seismic lines, so we're better off than I was in Iraq.

The next stage, and I think, as I understand it, they would try and drill a well, find some oil, get some -- you know, build on that and when you've got enough confidence, and probably ability to borrow money, I suppose, spend some more money on the seismic and

17:43 1 THE PRESIDENT: Or potentially available oil.
A. Yes. Yes. It's a very early stage, it's exploration, so we haven't proven it yet, so it's what we expect to be there.
THE PRESIDENT: And it's to be sure whether oil is in the ground you must drill?
A. That's correct.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
And you work with probabilities, and you do the P90, P50, P10 probabilities; is that right?
A. Yes, that's correct. Actually, my job is really to capture the range, because it's very difficult to say how much is actually there. So if you capture the -you say how little there could be and how much there could be and then in the middle is the best estimate.
THE PRESIDENT: But still you're not sure that there is oil: it's not only a matter of quantity, it's a matter of principle, of fact; is that right?
A. That's right. That's correct. So in the terms that you're describing it, if I say there's a $20 \%$ chance of success, there's a $20 \%$ chance of success of there being oil there.
THE PRESIDENT: But there could be one drop?
A. There could be just a little drop, and then you're at the start of the curve. There could be very little and

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define the prospects better.
So I should probably qualify what I said. It is -it's right on the cusp. A lot of these prospects exist because there's seismic there. But they're not completely described by seismic. It's right on the cusp between having no seismic and having a reasonable amount. It's up in the middle.

I think one -- I created one prospect, which was -oh no, no. It had one seismic line on it. But mainly I created it because the surface geology map, the geology map told me there was a fold underneath, and therefore I could expect to drill there and find some structures. I think there probably was at least one seismic line.
MR DRYMER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: If I take a big-picture view, I understand what you have done is looked at the volumes -- at estimates of volumes in place, and geological chances of extracting these volumes; is that what it is?
A. Yes, the geological chance of success, let me just explain what that is. It's if we drill the well on a prospect, what is the chance of encountering oil or gas which you could -- would flow to surface, and you think: ah, yes, if there's enough down there I could probably make a successful oil or gas field here.

Page 217 is down there. It just says that I've found some, I don't know how much, just some, which is capable of flowing up to surface.

So that says I've made a discovery, and then you drill a few more wells and you hope you're on the curve and that you've found a lot of oil. It may be you've found a small amount. So I would call that a success -I'm a technical person; it's a technical success. My commercial friend --
THE PRESIDENT: But it's not necessarily a commercial success.
A. Yes, it requires --

THE PRESIDENT: And that is what your colleagues reviewed?
A. Yes. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So you have calculated the volumes of resources, we're at the level of resources, we're not speaking about reserves; right?
A. I shan't pick you up on the picky terminology, but I think you're right: oil that's in the ground, not the amount of oil that will eventually end up on surface, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And this is oil that not is in the ground but may be in the ground. It's a potential ...
A. That is absolutely correct, yes.
then it could be quite lots, or it may be really a lot.
So -- but you just get on to that range of volumes.
That's where the chance of success is.
THE PRESIDENT: Right. Thank you. I just wanted to be sure that I had understood this correctly.

Thanks, I had no other questions.
So no further questions? So that leads us to the
end of your examination. Thank you very much,
Mr Atkinson.
MR ATKINSON: Thank you, Madam President. Thank you, Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: So, looking forward to the continuation tomorrow, we will hear Mr Moy and Mr Howard; is that right?
MR NEWING: That's correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Then Mr Longman, and Mr Duarte-Silva and Mr Acklam most likely Wednesday morning? Or how is this -- I'm first looking at you, because you -- no,
I need to look at you because you are first doing the cross-examinations.
MR PILAWA: Right. So I think that we could be done with Dr Moy and Mr Howard in the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: And then we would take Mr Longman in the afternoon?
MR NEWING: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And that can certainly be completed?
MR NEWING: Yes, I intend to complete -- if it works that
way I intend to complete Dr Longman tomorrow afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: So we would have for Wednesday morning left
Mr Duarte-Silva and Mr Acklam, I mean together.
MR NEWING: Correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Does this sound like a reasonable plan?
MR PILAWA: Reasonable to me, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Good. Is there anything that we need to discuss?

As we said, tomorrow at the end of the day we will give you some either questions or indications of topics that we were more interested in your addressing on Wednesday afternoon.
MR NEWING: Thank you, Madam President. (Pause)
THE PRESIDENT: Can we start earlier tomorrow, at 9 o'clock, or is this a difficulty?
MR ANWAY: I think that's fine with us.
THE PRESIDENT: That's fine with you?
MR NEWING: That's fine with us. I was just checking with Dr Moy that he would be available, that was all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, good.
MR NEWING: That's fine.
THE PRESIDENT: Then let's start at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

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17:49 1

17:48 1 MR ANWAY: Madam President, if I might just inquire, or just confirm, what the Tribunal's plans are with respect to Wednesday? My recollection was, was that the Tribunal said it did not wish to have closing arguments, but instead that there would be sort of an hour or so, understanding that timing is flexible, of questions and answers with the parties.
THE PRESIDENT: What we have in mind is that tomorrow before we close for the day, we will give you a few indications of what we would like to hear on Wednesday. For instance, we would say, I don't know: we have not heard much about Krivá Ol'ka, for instance. And then: can you please emphasise this rather than Smilno, which has been discussed a lot.

I'm not saying this now. I'm just -- this may be a possibility, or there may be a particular legal issue that we would like to hear more about. And then we may have questions on the spot as well, of course.
MR ANWAY: Sure, okay.
THE PRESIDENT: But the idea is more to give you some indication, and then you have an hour to wrap up; whatever else you think is important to say, of course you will tell us.
MR DRYMER: Do you think they should expect questions from the Tribunal during the wrap-up, or is this more of
a pleading? That's what Mr Anway was asking.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it will essentially be a pleading that can be interrupted by questions, because -- yes, that may well happen. So I'd better say it like that.
MR ANWAY: I certainly expected the questions. I guess what I was trying to ascertain -- we had some discussion earlier today about this too, I don't want to speak for both parties, but I think this is very helpful -whether we should be preparing a presentation as such tonight. But it sounds like we should be waiting to hear what your concerns are first tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, yes, it might be a little premature to prepare something tonight because it may be besides what we are really interested in. So if you can reserve the preparation for tomorrow night --
MR ANWAY: And that's what we have planning on.
THE PRESIDENT: -- that would make more sense, yes.
MR DRYMER: But nor are we asking you to spend all night tomorrow preparing 100 pages.
MR TUSHINGHAM: That was what I was just going to ask! I think certainly -- sorry, Professor Sands.
PROFESSOR SANDS: And it may be there are very few questions. It may be there are very short ailments.
MR TUSHINGHAM: I think, I'm speaking for myself here, but I may speak for Mr Newing as well, we are unlikely,

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17:51 $\quad 1 \quad$ Tribunal had originally told us.
MR DRYMER: I should say we're sensitive too to the fact --
I'm always sensitive to the fact that it's somehow oddly easier living out of a suitcase and a war room, than it is for people who are in their own cities with other obligations close at hand, to be working through the night. So, I just mention that for myself.
PROFESSOR SANDS: Following on from my friend, since neither of these sides have appeared before me before, people who have will know that I am constitutionally opposed to slides.
MR DRYMER: Now you tell them!
PROFESSOR SANDS: I want advocacy. Slides are a complete distraction to advocacy.
MR ANWAY: Then we apologise for our opening statement!
PROFESSOR SANDS: That is my personal view.
THE PRESIDENT: I would beg to differ in the sense that
there are slides that are helpful. It all depends how
you do them.
That allows us now to close for the night, and we'll
discuss slides later on!
See you tomorrow. 9 o'clock.
MR TUSHINGHAM: Thank you.
( 5.53 pm )
(The hearing adjourned until 9.00 am the following day)
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[^0]:    Q. And in the present case, is it correct that Ms Varjanová relied on Article 102 in her request for an interim injunction, which was filed in January of 2016?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, I hope this is going to be uncontroversial, but would you agree that Ms Varjanová substantive action was for a declaration nullifying a purchase contract which AOG had concluded with Mr Tomecek in December of 2015?
    A. Yes. This referred to an action with the purpose of declaring a nullity of such an agreement.
    Q. Yes. And in that regard, Ms Varjanová relied upon provisions in the Civil Code, specifically Article 40a and Article 144; do you recall that?
    A. If you could please repeat that question again.
    Q. If I could just show you, perhaps it might be easier, by reference to your first expert report, at paragraph 14. That's the second expert report, I am afraid. It's the first expert report.

    Do you see in paragraph 14 you refer to the action:
    "... which had its substantive law basis in private law under ... the Civil Code ..."

    And you refer to Articles 40a and 140 of the Civil
    Code; do you see that?
    A. Yes, I can see that.
    Q. And on the same day that Ms Varjanová initiated her

