IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Joint Stock Company State Savings Bank of Ukraine (a/k/a JSC Oschadbank), Petitioner, v. The Russian Federation, Respondent.	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-00764 (ACR)

RESPONDENT RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION TO CONFIRM AN ARBITRATION AWARD OF JOINT STOCK COMPANY STATE SAVINGS BANK OSCHADBANK

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (2), (4), & (5), the Russian Federation ("RF") moves to dismiss the Petition of Joint Stock Company State Savings Bank of Ukraine (JSC Oschadbank) ("Oschadbank"), seeking to confirm an arbitration award rendered without the RF's participation for lack of subject matter, personal jurisdiction, and service under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611.[1]

Oschadbank is the successor to assets of a Soviet state bank located in Ukraine. Prior to 1992, it owned these assets in Crimea. On March 27, 1998, the RF signed a bilateral investment treaty ("BIT"), entitled "Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments," which applied only to investments made (i) by an investor of one state in the territory of the other, (ii) in conformity with the other state's laws, (iii) "starting from" January 1, 1992, *i.e.,* after the Soviet Union's dissolution.[2] In 2015, Oschadbank filed an arbitration in France against the RF under the BIT, claiming its assets in Crimea were expropriated after the March 2014 accession of Crimea into the RF. The RF did not participate in the arbitration, taking the position that it had not offered to arbitrate such claims under the BIT because, *inter alia*, Oschadbank acquired many assets in Crimea before January 1, 1992, and remaining assets were acquired before March 2014 when Crimea was part of Ukraine.

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[1] Alternatively, the RF has defenses under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("NY Convention"), implemented under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§201-208, which it is not required to raise unless its jurisdictional objections are denied. The RF reserves all non-jurisdictional defenses, including Oschadbank's failure to file its petition within the three-year statute of limitations under 9 U.S.C. §207 after the Award was rendered. *See* Petition, ECF 1, ¶40 (admitting petition was filed outside period).

[2] The MTD uses the BIT attached as Petition Exhibit B, ECF 1-3. The phrase "as of 1 January 1992" in Article 12 is incorrect: it should be translated as "starting from 1 January 1992." Alexandre Ponomarev Translation Report, ¶¶6-8. This distinction implicates an important jurisdictional issue regarding the RF's offer to arbitrate, discussed herein.

The FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. Significantly, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption of immunity by producing evidence that an exception applies. The Court must decide for itself if an exception applies. If not, the Court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court should dismiss here because neither exception to immunity asserted by Oschadbank applies. As explained below:

(I) The FSIA §1605(a)(6) arbitration exception to immunity does not apply to the Award because **(A)** the RF did not offer to arbitrate disputes with Oschadbank over its investments in Crimea under the BIT for numerous reasons, including (i) the RF did not offer to arbitrate investments made in Crimea, absent mutual agreement it was RF territory, (ii) Oschadbank rejected the RF's offer by denying Crimea was RF territory; and (iii) much of Oschadbank's investment was made before January 1, 1992; **(B)** there is no international agreement calling for the recognition of the Award under §1605(a)(6) because the NY Convention does not apply, as there was no commercial relationship between the RF and Oschadbank when its investments were made; and **(C)** the BIT is not for the benefit of a "private party" in this case because Oschadbank is entirely owned by Ukraine;

(II) The FSIA §1605(a)(1) waiver exception is inapplicable because the RF did not waive immunity merely by signing the NY Convention;

(III) The RF preserves asserting that it is a "person" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in order to challenge personal jurisdiction; and

(IV) The RF was not properly served under FSIA §1608(a)(4) because Oschadbank did not attempt to serve the RF under §1608(a)(2), and, alternatively, service on the RF embassy in Washington, D.C., violated an applicable treaty and other international law.

Following discussion of the background, each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.

BACKGROUND [3]

A. Oschadbank's Crimean Investments Predate The Effective Date Provided By The BIT

According to Oschadbank, it "historically had a strong presence in the Crimean Peninsula. It was created following the independence of Ukraine, when the activity of the Ukrainian branch of Sberbank of the former Soviet Union was transferred by the Ukrainian State to a public law company … It later became known as Oschadbank." Petition, ECF 1, ¶22.[4] "Oschadbank" is the Ukrainian word for "Sberegatel'niy Bank", the Russian abbreviation for state savings bank. The assets were transferred in September 1991 and it was later "registered on December 31, 1991." *Id.*, ¶22, 52. "Its 100% shareholder is the Ukrainian State." *Id.* ¶4. Oschadbank had 294 branches in Crimea. *Id.* ¶22.

In 1998, the RF and Ukraine agreed to the BIT with the goal of encouraging and protecting reciprocal investments. It entered into force on January 27, 2000. *Id.* ¶12; BIT, ECF 1-3, Art. 14(1). The "intention [was] to create and maintain favorable conditions for reciprocal investments" and "favorable conditions for the promotion of economic cooperation." BIT, Preamble. The BIT protects "investments … invested by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in conformity with its laws," *id.*, Art. 1(1), "***[starting from] 1 January 1992***."[5] *Id.*, Art. 12. "[T]erritory" is defined as "the territory of Ukraine or the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as their respective exclusive economic zone ["EEZ"] and continental

[3] Unless otherwise stated, all emphases are added, and all citations, quotations marks, footnotes, ellipses and brackets are omitted. Exhibits are attached to the Thomas Sullivan Declaration, and exhibits with "YN" are attached to Professor Yves Nouvel's two expert declarations.

[4] The U.S. recognized Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, https://history.state.gov/countries/ukraine. The United States recognized the RF as the successor to the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, https://history.state.gov/countries/russia.

[5] *See supra* fn. 2 concerning the translation of Article 12.

shelf ["CS"], as defined in conformity with international law." *Id*., Art. 1(4). The BIT provides for resolution of disputes between an investor from one state over claims for expropriation of investments made in the territory of the other state. *Id.*, Arts. 1(2) (investor), 5 (expropriation), and 9 (arbitration).

B. The Accession of Crimea

On March 17, 2014, the Crimean Republic declared itself an independent state. Petition, ECF-1, ¶23. On March 18, 2014, the Crimean Republic and RF signed a treaty for accession, ratified by the RF on March 21, 2014 ("**Accession Treaty**"). *Id.* Oschadbank alleges that Crimea thereby "became a constituent entity of the [RF] from the perspective of Russian law." *Id.*

On March 21, 2014, the RF adopted the Law On Acceptance of the Crimean Republic into the RF, Federal Constitutional Statute No. 6-FKZ ("**Accession Statute**"), Ex. 1, setting forth a transition period and allowing Ukrainian licensed banks to continue operating in Crimea subject to RF law, and permitting them until January 1, 2015 to apply to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation ("Bank of Russia") for a license. *Id.*, Art. 17(2). It also allowed for continuation of certain banking transactions in Ukrainian hryvnia. *Id.*, Art. 16(1) - (4).

On April 2, 2014, the RF adopted Law No. 37-FZ ("**Transition Period Statute**"), Ex. 2, allowing Ukrainian banks to continue operations in Crimea until January 1, 2015, provided, *inter alia,* that they notify the Bank of Russia by April 17, 2014, of their intention to do so. *Id.*, Art. 3(1), (3). Oschadbank did not do so. Elizaveta Lauts Russian Banking Expert Report, ¶¶51, 69-78 ("Lauts Banking Rpt.").

C. Oschadbank Terminated Its Operation in Crimea

On April 15, 2014, Ukraine enacted a law stating that Crimea "is an integral part of the territory of Ukraine [and] the laws of Ukraine shall extend to such territory" ("**Disputed Territory Law**"), Ukraine Law No. 1207-VII, Art. 1, Ex. 4. On May 6, 2014, the National Bank of Ukraine

("NBU") "issued Resolution No. 260 ["**NBU Resolution**"] that prohibited the Ukrainian banks from … conducting any banking activities in Crimea … ***To this end, the Ukrainian banks were obliged to immediately cease any activities of their existing Crimean branches and to close them by 6 June 2014.***" Oschadbank Statement of Claim, Ex. 9, ¶200. On May 8, 2014, Oschadbank stated that because of its inability to comply with Ukraine law and the NBU's requirements, it would close its operations in Crimea, which it did on May 26, 2014. *See* May 8, 2014 Oschadbank Resolution 286, Ex. 5; May 13, 2014 Oschadbank Minutes, Ex. 6; May 26, 2014 Oschadbank Email to NBU, Ex. 7.

D. The Default Arbitration Award

On January 16, 2016, Oschadbank initiated BIT arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA"), seated in France. It submitted its Statement of Claim on August 26, 2016. Statement of Claim, Ex. 9. The RF did not participate in the arbitration, having sent a letter dated December 24, 2015 to Oschadbank denying it had offered to arbitrate claims involving investments in Crimea before January 1, 1992 as well as before its Accession. On November 26, 2018, the Tribunal issued the "Award" in favor of Oschadbank, finding, *inter alia*, RF and the Bank of Russia regulations put Oschadbank's offices in Crimea "in direct violation of their obligations under Ukrainian law." *See* Award, ECF 1-2, ¶¶293-305. *See also* Petition, ECF 1, ¶¶2, 24-27 (citing the Award).

E. The French Court Decisions

The RF then sought to set aside the Award in France, the seat of the arbitration.

1. The Paris Court of Appeal Decision

On July 18, 2019, the RF commenced a Set Aside Action in the Paris Court of Appeal ("Paris COA"), pursuant to French Code of Civil Procedure ("FCCP") Art. 1502, on the basis that the Tribunal wrongly determined it had jurisdiction. On March 30, 2021, Paris COA set aside the

Award, agreeing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute over investments made prior to January 1, 1992. *See Russian Federation* v. *Oschadbank*, Paris Court of Appeal, Case No. 23/2021 Judgment of March 30, 2021 ("COA Judgment"), ECF 1-4, ¶¶70, 71, 75, 76, 81-89, 93, 101.

2. The Court of Cassation Decision

Oschadbank appealed to the Court of Cassation, the highest court in France for this purpose ("Cassation Court"). On December 7, 2002, the Cassation Court reversed the Paris COA without substantive analysis, narrowly holding that (1) Articles 1 and 9 on their face contained no temporal restrictions, and (2) Article 12's temporal limitation of January 1, 1992 was not jurisdictional. Accordingly, it held the Paris COA was only required to ascertain that the dispute had arisen after the BIT entered into force in 2000. *See JSC Oschadbank v. The Russian Federation*, French Court of Cassation, Appeal No. 21-15.390, Judgment of December 2, 2022 ("Cassation Judgment"), ECF 1-5, ¶13. The Cassation Court remanded the case to the Paris COA, for consideration by a different set of judges. *Id.* at 6.

3. The Remand Proceedings

Under the FCCP, the RF intends to move again before the Paris COA to set aside the Award on all grounds. The Paris COA can "resist" the Cassation Court decision and make its own determination on all matters raised.

F. Oschadbank's Out of Time Petition

On March 21, 2023, Oschadbank filed its Petition to Confirm the November 26, 2018 Award, ECF 1. This was, by Oschadbank's own admission, beyond the permitted three-year time period for seeking confirmation of a foreign arbitral award under 9 U.S.C. §207. *Id.*, ¶40.

G. The *Notes Verbales* of Major Western Countries Affirming Jurisdiction of RF BITs Does Not Extend to Crimea

In August 2023, the RF sent diplomatic notes to 13 states and the European Union,

regarding application of their respective bilateral investment treaties with the RF, in relation to Crimea. *See* RF *Notes Verbales* Chart, Ex. 20. For example, the August 21, 2023 *Note Verbale* the RF sent to France stated, in part, that the "the Russian Federation confirms that [their bilateral investment treaty] shall apply similarly to the Republic of Crimea and federal city of Sevastopol." August 21, 2023 RF-France *Note Verbale*, Ex. 21. France's response denied application of their treaty to Crimea because France believes that their treaty's territorial application corresponds to alleged internationally recognized territory of the RF, which excludes Crimea as per U.N. resolutions. November 3, 2023 France-RF *Note Verbale*, Ex. 22.[6] Similar responses were forthcoming from Austria, Belgium, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. *See* RF *Notes Verbales* Chart, Ex. 20. As explained below, these communications are significant under international law because they establish that the term "territory" in BITs does not include Crimea because of its disputed sovereignty.

ARGUMENT

FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court." *Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.*, 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). "FSIA begins with a presumption of immunity, which the plaintiff bears the initial burden to overcome by producing evidence that an exception applies[.]" *Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 734 F.3d 1175, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2013). "Unless an enumerated exception applies, courts of this country lack jurisdiction over claims against a foreign nation." *Belize Social Development, Ltd. v. Belize*, 794 F.3d 99, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

FSIA guarantees the "resolution of an immunity assertion before the sovereign can be

[6] For avoidance of doubt, the RF does not agree that international law recognizes that Crimea is not the sovereign territory of the RF.

compelled to defend the merits" under the FAA (NY Convention). *Process & Industrial Developments, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,* 962 F.3d 576, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Under FSIA, this court must resolve any disputed issues of fact related to subject-matter jurisdiction, even if it overlaps with the merits. *See Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co.*, 581 U.S. 170, 178 (2017) ("We recognize that merits and jurisdiction will sometimes come intertwined. … [T]he court must still answer the [FSIA] jurisdictional question. If to do so, it must inevitably decide some, or all, of the merits issues, so be it."). Neither the FSIA arbitration nor waiver exceptions, as asserted by Oschadbank, apply.

I. FSIA'S §1605(a)(6) ARBITRATION EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY UNDER THE BIT

As pertinent here, the FSIA arbitration exception applies when:

> the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration ... or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate ... [and] the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards ....

§1605(a)(6).

In order to determine whether the exception applies, the Court makes "two jurisdictional inquiries—namely, [i] whether the award was made pursuant to an appropriate arbitration agreement with a foreign state and [ii] whether the award is or may be governed by a relevant recognition treaty." *Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador*, 949 F.Supp.2d 57, 63 (D.D.C. 2013), *aff'd*, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015). According to *Chevron*, the petitioner "bears the initial burden of supporting its claim that the FSIA exception applies," and then "the burden shift[s] to [the respondent sovereign] to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the [treaty] and the notice to arbitrate did not constitute a valid arbitration agreement between the parties." 795 F.3d

at 204-205.[7]

An investment treaty (like the BIT) is not a typical agreement to arbitrate between disputing parties, but instead constitutes a state's "offer to arbitrate," which the claimant may "accept" by submitting a notice of arbitration. *BG Group, PLC v. Argentine Republic,* 572 U.S. 25, 42 (2014). In interpreting offers to arbitrate under BITs, as with all arbitration agreements, "[d]isputes about 'arbitrability' … such as 'whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause' or 'whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy'" are decided by the "courts." *Id.* at 34.[8] *See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.*, 850 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court has held that it is generally for the courts to determine whether an arbitration clause is broad enough to cover a particular dispute."); *First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) ("arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts"). As *Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters*, 561 U.S. 287 (2010), explained: "[O]ur precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement *nor* (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue. Where a party contests either or both matters, the court must resolve the disagreement." *Id.*,

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[7] In a February 2, 2024, *Amicus Curae* brief in *Blasket Renewable Investments, LLC v. Spain*, No. 23-7038, D.C. Cir., Case No. 23-7038, Doc. # 2038663, Ex. 16, the United States objected to this standard and argued based on Supreme Court decisions that the burden always rests with the plaintiff to establish that the FSIA exception applies. *Id.* at 8-9 (citing *Kingdom of Saudi Arabia v. Nelson*, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993); *Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria*, 461 U.S. 480, 493, n.20 (1983) (even if "the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a district court still must determine that immunity is unavailable under the Act")). The RF agrees, and preserves this issue to the extent relevant in this case.

[8] "Arbitrability" is a term with many meanings, including "whether the parties are ***bound*** by a given arbitration clause," that is, disputes over "formation of the parties' arbitration agreement". *BG Group*, 572 U.S. at 34.

299-300 (italics in original).

In accord with this precedent, FSIA "requires the District Court to satisfy itself" that there existed "an agreement between the parties" to arbitrate. *Chevron*, 795 F.3d at 205 n.3. "The jurisdictional task before the District Court [is] to determine whether" the parties have "an agreement to arbitrate." *Id.,* at 205. Thus, whether the investor's request to arbitrate falls within the host state's standing offer to arbitrate under a foreign-investment treaty is a jurisdictional question under FSIA. *Id.,* at 206. This includes whether the claimant validly accepted the offer to arbitrate, *id.* at 205 n.3 (holding Chevron met its initial burden of proof), as well as whether the claimant satisfies other jurisdictional requirements. For example, in *Chevron*, "to prevail on its jurisdictional argument, Ecuador would have to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Chevron's suits were not 'investments' within the meaning of the BIT." *Id.,* at 206 (holding Ecuador failed to meet its response burden of proof). "[A] court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate ***that dispute.***" *Granite Rock,* 561 U.S. at 297. For a court to "eschew[] making this determination as part of its jurisdictional analysis" constitutes "error." *Chevron*, 795 F.3d at 205 n.3..

Where a court concludes that no agreement to arbitrate existed under the FSIA exception, it must dismiss the petition to enforce. *See Al-Qarqani v. Saudi Arabian Oil Co.*, 19 F.4th 794, 802 (5th Cir. 2021) (dismissing petition for lack of jurisdiction because "there exists no agreement among these parties to arbitrate"); *First Investment Corp. v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd*., 703 F.3d 742, 756 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of a petition against China where petitioner did not establish that China was bound to the arbitration agreement). The multiple independent reasons the RF did not offer to arbitrate Oschadbank's investment in Crimea are discussed below.

A. FSIA §1605(a)(6) DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE RF DID NOT AGREE TO ARBITRATE OSCHADBANK'S CLAIMS UNDER THE BIT

Article 12 defines the "Application of the Agreement" as follows: "This Agreement shall apply to all investments, made by the investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party [starting from] 1 January 1992." As explained by international law expert Professor Yves Nouvel, "Provisions in an investment treaty which define the application of the treaty establish the limits of the offer to arbitrate." Yves Nouvel International Law Expert Report on the BIT ("Nouvel BIT Rpt."), ¶23; *id.* ¶24 nn. 2 & 3 (citing treatises, commentary, and arbitral decisions).[9] FSIA §1605(a)(6) does not apply because the RF's offer to arbitrate under Article 9 did not extend to disputes over Oschadbank assets in Crimea under Article 12 and other provisions of the BIT for seven individually dispositive reasons, as explained in Professor Nouvel's BIT Report, and discussed below.

1. The RF Did Not Offer To Arbitrate Disputes Over Investments In Crimea Because Crimea Was Considered Ukrainian Territory When The BIT Was Executed in 1998 and Entered Into Force in 2000

"[A] treaty is a contract, though between nations. Its interpretation normally is, like a contract's interpretation, a matter of determining the parties' intent." *BG Group,* 572 U.S. at 37.[10] Consent is the cornerstone of all treaty commitments. In *Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic*, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1 (2012), Ex. YN 106, the Tribunal stated:

> ***In interpreting dispute resolution provisions in BITs – just as with any other treaty provision – the ultimate goal is to determine what the contracting parties actually consented to. Thus, the fact that dispute resolution clauses should be construed neither liberally nor restrictively does not authorize international***

[9] The Nouvel BIT Report references several types of jurisdiction typically considered by international arbitration tribunals: *ratione materiae* (subject matter); *ratione loci* (territorial); *ratione temporal* (temporal); *ratione voluntatis* (consent); and *ratione personae* (person).

[10] U.S. courts recognize the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (January 27, 1980) (VCLT), Ex. 10, "as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties" and "a codification of customary international law." *Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp.*, 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001). *See United States v. Ali*, 718 F.3d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing VCLT as authority on "[b]asic principles of treaty interpretation"); Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶16-21 (discussing sources of customary international law and the VCLT).

> ***tribunals to interpret such clauses in a manner which exceeds the consent of the contracting parties as expressed in the text. To go beyond those bounds would be to act ultra vires.*** … The Vienna Convention itself unequivocally emphasizes the foundational role of State consent in the law of treaties. … [I]t is not possible to presume that consent has been given by a state. Rather, the existence of consent must be established … Non-consent is the default rule; consent is the exception. Establishing consent therefore requires affirmative evidence. … [S]tate consent is the incontrovertible requisite for any kind of international settlement procedure. … ***[It] is also true as far as the scope of this consent is concerned.***

Id. ¶¶172-175 (holding Tribunal could not interpret the "German-Argentine BIT in an evolutive way so as to achieve the enlarged meaning desired by the Claimant," *id*. ¶278).

Under the well-known principle of contemporaneity, a treaty, like any other contract, is interpreted in light of the circumstances known to and agreed by the parties at the time of its formation. *See* 11 Richard A. Lord, *Williston on Contracts* § 32:7, at 434-35 (4th ed. 1999), Ex. YN 111 ("In construing a contract, a court seeks to ascertain the meaning of the contract at the time and place of its execution."); Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶28 & n. 5 (citing numerous authoritative commentaries). The principle of contemporaneity is routinely applied when interpreting treaties. For example, in *Decision regarding delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia*, 25 Rep. of Int'l Arb. Awards (2002), Ex. YN 112, the Tribunal held that "in interpreting the Treaties it should apply the doctrine of 'contemporaneity.' … ***[A] treaty should be interpreted by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded. This involves giving expressions (including names) used in the treaty the meaning that they would have possessed at that time.*** The [Tribunal] agrees with this approach and has borne it in mind in construing the Treaties." *Id.* ¶3.5. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶29 & n. 6 (citing additional decisions applying principle of contemporaneity).

Here, the BIT was executed in 1998, coming into force in 2000. At that time, the RF and Ukraine both considered Crimea as Ukrainian territory and not within the "territory of the Russian

Federation" under Article 1(4) and the other Articles related to "territory." Ukraine unequivocally continues to hold this position, despite the accession of Crimea to the RF in 2014. Under the principle of contemporaneity, the RF did not offer to arbitrate disputes regarding Ukrainian investments made in Crimea. No consent of the RF may be presumed. *See Daimler Financial Services AG, supra.*

First, the "territory of the Russian Federation" was not understood to include Crimea under Article 1(4) and the other Articles related to territory. To the contrary, when the BIT was executed in 1998 and entered into force in 2000, the RF and Ukraine considered Crimea to be Ukrainian territory. Absent clear evidence of the parties' current consent as to the plain meaning of territory, departing from the plain meaning of the term "territory of the Russian Federation" as understood by the parties when the BIT was entered is tantamount to amending the BIT, which requires a written instrument. *See* BIT, Art. 13 ("By mutual consent the Contracting Parties may make necessary amendments and addenda to this Agreement … after each of the Contracting Parties notifies the other Contracting Party in writing on the completion of the intrastate procedures …"). This did not happen.

Second, no principle of customary international law, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"), authorizes interpreting a bilateral investment treaty in a way that is expansionist or revisionist, or based upon fictitious, "***as if***," assumptions contrary to the contemporaneous understanding of a treaty.[11] Simply, "it is not the function of interpretation to revise treaties or to read into them what they do not, expressly or by implication, contain."

[11] Specifically, Oschadbank's Notice of Arbitration, Ex. 8, "reject[ed] entirely the grounds, legal or otherwise, on which Russia purports to have annexed Crimea and proclaimed it to be part of its sovereign territory," *id.*, ¶16, asserting the BIT should be interpreted on a fictitious basis, such that its "investments must be treated ***as if*** they were located in Russian territory for purposes of the Treaty." *Id.*, ¶18.

Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1964, Vol. II, Ex. YN 116, at 202, ¶9. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶31 & n. 7 (citing additional authorities). Thus, under the contemporaneous understanding of the BIT term "territory of the Russian Federation," and as confirmed by Ukraine's refusal to recognize Crimea as RF territory, the RF never offered to arbitrate claims of Ukrainian alleged investors like Oschadbank in Crimea.

Accordingly, there is no agreement to arbitrate under FSIA, §1605(a)(6).

2. The RF's Offer to Arbitrate Was Rejected By Oschadbank's "Notice of Acceptance"

"[A] treaty is a contract, though between nations. Its interpretation normally is, like a contract's interpretation, a matter of determining the parties' intent." *BG Group,* 572 U.S. at 37. "[T]reaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writing between individuals." *Sullivan v. Kidd*, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921). "It is axiomatic that formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange – offer and acceptance – and consideration." *United States ex rel. D.L.I. Inc. v. Allegheny Jefferson Millwork, LLC*, 540 F.Supp.2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2008). "[A]n acceptance, upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer, and puts an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made the original offer … assents to the modification suggested." *Iselin v. United States*, 271 U.S. 136, 139 (1926). *See also* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶33-35, 39 (discussing international law authority applying these rules to arbitration under investment treaties). *Chevron* expressly held that courts must decide whether an investor's notice of arbitration accepted the state's offer. *Id.* 795 F.3d at 205 n.3.. Here, Oschadbank's alleged acceptance did not match the RF's offer to arbitrate and, therefore, no agreement to arbitrate was formed. *See Dynamo v. Ovechkin*, 412 F.Supp.2d 24, 29 (D.D.C. 2006) (declining to enforce arbitration award where there was no acceptance of offer to arbitrate).

First, Oschadbank purported to initiate arbitration pursuant to Article 9. *See* Notice of Arbitration, Ex. 8, ¶7. But Oschadbank rejects that Crimea is RF territory: "Oschadbank … rejects entirely the grounds, legal or otherwise, on which Russia purports to have annexed Crimea and proclaimed it to be part of its sovereign territory." *Id.* ¶16. Recognizing that the RF only offered to arbitrate investments in its territory, Oschadbank sought to have it both ways, by specifying that its "***investments must be treated as if they were located in Russian territory for purposes of the Treaty.***" *Id.* ¶18. Oschadbank's attempt to mask rejection is too clever by half.

Second, the RF did not offer to arbitrate claims relating to investments that were in areas which were considered its territory for some purposes, but not for others. Instead, it only offered to arbitrate claims arising from investments that were mutually agreed to be in its territory. *See* Art. 1 ("in the territory of") (three times); Arts. 2(1), 3, 4 ("in its territory"); Arts. 5(1), 6, 8 ("in the territory of"); Art. 9(2) ("in whose territory"); and Art. 12 ("in the territory of"). *See also* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶36. Oschadbank's acceptance did not match RF's offer to arbitrate, but was instead a counter-offer, which constitutes a "rejection." *Iselin*, 271 U.S. at 139. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶39, 40 (no valid acceptance of RF offer, citing international authority). *See also Dynamo*, 412 F.Supp.2d at 29 (confirmation petition dismissed where there was no agreement to arbitrate); *Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate*, 358 F.3d 1286, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2004) (same).

Accordingly, because the RF's offer was rejected, no agreement was formed under FSIA, §1605(a)(6).

3. The RF Did Not Offer To Arbitrate Disputes Concerning Investments Made Before January 1, 1992 Under Article 12

Article 12 states: "This Agreement shall apply to all investments … ***[starting from] 1***

January 1992."[12] Article 12 circumscribes the application of the BIT, including its arbitration provision, Article 9, and, therefore, the RF's offer to arbitrate. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶22-25, 41. Oschadbank was created from the dismantling of the unified banking system of the USSR, and, in particular, the transfer of Sberbank's banking operations located in the territory of Ukraine, including Crimea, to the newly formed "Oschadbank of Ukraine" ***on September 3, 1991***, *i.e.,* before January 1, 1992. *See* Petition, ECF 1, ¶¶22, 52; COA Judgment, ECF 1-4, ¶¶97-100. Nevertheless, the Award provided damages to Oschadbank for such assets. *See* Award, ¶410. The RF did not offer to arbitrate investments made before January 1, 1992, which, nonetheless, are the subject of the Award, preventing confirmation.

First, under international law, "a temporal restriction clause governing the application of an investment treaty creates a limitation on the offer to arbitrate and the jurisdiction of the tribunal." Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶42-43 (citing international law authorities, including *Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. Mexico*, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (2000), Ex. YN 127, ¶62 ("application of [a treaty] in terms of time defines … the jurisdiction of the Tribunal *ratione temporis*")). Accordingly, the RF's offer to arbitrate under the BIT extends only to investments made starting from January 1, 1992.

Second, the ordinary meaning of Article 12 is unambiguous: "the BIT only applies to investments made starting from January 1, 1992, ***to the exclusion of any investments made prior to that date.***" Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶45. Where the ordinary meaning of the treaty language is clear from the choice of words agreed upon by the contracting States, such interpretation must be given effect. *See Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad*), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 6,

[12] *See supra* fn. 2 concerning "starting from," the correct translation of the Russian-language BIT, instead of "as of."

Ex. YN 157, ¶41 ("Interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty.").

Third, this understanding of Article 12's language is supported by the consideration of its object and purpose. *See* VCLT Art. 31(1) ("[a] treaty shall be interpreted … in the light of its object and purpose"). The object and purpose of Article 12 was to exclude any investments made before the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, including economic operations that became located in the RF and Ukraine as a result of the USSR's dissolution and the emergence of the RF and Ukraine as sovereign States. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶46-47 & n. 9 (comparing Article 12 with similar provisions in BITs between the RF and other former USSR members).

Fourth, Ukraine agrees with this meaning of Article 12. During the arbitration, Ukraine addressed the BIT's temporal application under Article 12: "[T]he Treaty was written to protect pre-existing investments (***covering the period from 1992***, ***shortly after the dissolution of the USSR***, to 1998, when the Treaty was concluded). ***[S]o long as the investment was made after January 1, 1992***, it is irrelevant whether the Treaty applied at that time." Submission of Ukraine as Non-Disputing Party, dated November 29, 2016, Ex. YN 133, ¶32.

Fifth, this understanding is confirmed by the preparatory work (*travaux préparatoires*) and drafts of the BIT, pursuant to VCLT Art. 32 ("Recourse may be had to … preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion"). The *travaux préparatoire*s reflect that the RF and Ukraine negotiated the temporal application of the BIT, with Ukraine proposing multiple times between 1994 and 1998 to extend its protection to investments irrespective of when made, while the RF insisted on limiting the BIT to cross-border investments carried out after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶50-53; September 8, 1994 RF Ministry of Finance Letter, Ex. YN 135; April 7, 1997 Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade to the RF, Ex. YN 136; and, January 19-21, 1998 Minutes of Experts' Working meeting, Ex. YN

138. Ukraine accepted the RF's position and the BIT contains this backstop date.

Finally, Article 12's jurisdictional nature was confirmed in another Crimea-related case brought by Ukrainian claimants under the BIT: "Article 12 restricts protection to investments made 'on or after January 1, 1992.' … The Tribunal … ***only had jurisdiction to adjudicate investments made on or after 1 January 1992.***" *NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine v. Russian Federation*, PCA Case No. 2017-16 (2023), Ex. YN 131, ¶¶2, 6. In the same case, the Dutch Court annulled the tribunal's earlier Partial Award "to the extent that the arbitral tribunal ruled that it has jurisdiction to assess all claims, since it has ***jurisdiction only to rule on investments made on or after January 1, 1992***." *Russian Federation v. NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine*, Hague Court of Appeal, Civil Law Division, No. 200.274.564/01, Judgment (2022), Ex. YN 132, at 49, ¶6.

Accordingly, whereas Article 12 defines the BIT's jurisdiction *ratione temporis*, the RF's offer to arbitrate under the BIT did not apply to investments made before January 1, 1992. Thus, the Award cannot be confirmed because it awarded damages on Oschadbank's claims outside of the RF's offer to arbitrate.

4. The RF Did Not Offer To Arbitrate Investments Which Were Not In Conformity With RF Law Under Article 1(1)

The RF only offered to arbitrate disputes over investments "which are invested by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party ***in conformity with its laws*** …" Article 1(1).[13] Conformity clauses "are ***designed to prevent the treaty from protecting investments that were not made in compliance with the host state's national legislation***." J.W. Salacuse, *The Law of Investment Treaties,* at 223 (2021), Ex. YN 100. If "an

[13] The requirement that investments conform with the law of the host state appears throughout the BIT. *See*, *e.g.*, Article 2(1) (host state only needs "to admit such investments subject to its laws"); Art. 2(2) (host state only agrees to protect investments made "in conformity with its laws").

investment in an arbitration case is shown not to have been made in accordance with such law, a tribunal may conclude that it has no jurisdiction to hear the dispute." *Id.* at 263. *See also* S.W. Schill, *Illegal Investments in International Arbitration*, at 5 (2012), Ex. YN 139 ("the interpretation of explicit 'in accordance with host State law'-clauses … is one of jurisdiction *ratione materiae*"); Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶58-60 (quoting numerous treatises that arbitration panels do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes under BITs arising from non-conforming investments).

"[A state has] a fundamental interest in securing respect for its law … [D]enying protection to illegally obtained investments reflects both sound public policy and sound investment practice." *Alasdair Ross Anderson v. Costa Rica*, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3 (2010), Ex. YN 142, ¶58 (declining jurisdiction where investment did not comply with host country laws). Because an offer by a state under an investment treaty does not extend to non-conforming investments, tribunals deny subject matter jurisdiction (*ratione materiae)* or consent to jurisdiction (*ratione voluntatis*) to such claims. *See*, *e.g.*, *Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines*, ICSID No. ARB/03/25 (2007), Ex. YN 144, ¶¶402, 404 (no jurisdiction *ratione materiae* because investment did not comply with Philippine law).[14] *See also* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶62-66 (quoting treatises, commentary, and arbitral decisions that BITs do not provide jurisdiction over non-conforming investments).

On March 18, 2014, the RF signed the Accession Treaty, and on March 21, 2014, the RF adopted the Accession Statute, ratifying the Accession Treaty. Assuming, *arguendo,* Oschadbank's investment made in Crimea when it was Ukrainian territory is subject to the BIT, from the time of

[14] *See also Cortec Mining Kenya Ltd. v. Kenya*, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29 (2021), Ex. YN 145, ¶212 (no jurisdiction *ratione materiae* under BIT over investment that did not comply with Kenyan regulations); *Anglo-Adriatic Group Limited v. Albania*, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/6 (2019), Ex. YN 146, ¶287 (denying jurisdiction where "subject-matter of a dispute arising out of an illegal investment falls outside the scope of Albania's consent to arbitrate").

Crimea's accension to the RF, Oschadbank was required to be in conformity with RF banking law and regulations. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶68-70; Lauts Banking Rpt., ¶¶64-68. The Accession Statute and the Transition Period Statute provided a provisional period to obtain conformity with Russian banking law. Oschadbank did not even attempt to conform, and, in fact was prohibited by Ukrainian law from conforming. *Id*. ¶¶69-82.

First, Article 17(2) of the Accession Statute provided that Ukrainian banks operating in Crimea which held Ukrainian banking licenses prior to accession could continue to operate in Crimea if they comported with RF law. The Accession Statute also required banking transactions in Crimea to be performed in rubles but allowed circulation of the national currency of Ukraine for a certain period of time. Under Russian law transactions in foreign currencies require a separate license. *See* Lauts Banking Rpt., ¶¶27, 43, 51, 70. Oschadbank's offices in Crimea, however, only conducted transactions in hryvnia, the Ukrainian currency. *Id.* ¶71.

Second, the transitional law adopted to provide Ukrainian banks such as Oschadbank with opportunity to comport with Russian banking legislation further required Ukrainian banks operating in Crimea to notify the Bank of Russia by April 17, 2014, of their intention to apply for a RF banking license prior to January 1, 2015. *See* Lauts Banking Rpt., ¶51. Oschadbank never gave notice of intention to apply for a RF banking license, and never applied for one. *Id.* ¶¶72, 73. Ukrainian banks operating in Crimea were also required to submit their corporate formation documents, information about bank management and major investors, and a report of banking activities to the Bank of Russia by May 2, 2014. *Id.* ¶51. Oschadbank did not comply with these requirements. *Id.* ¶¶74-76 .

Third, on April 15, 2014, Ukraine passed laws prohibiting banks headquartered in Ukraine from complying with RF law in Crimea. *See* Lauts Banking Rpt., ¶¶60-62. Oschadbank's

Management and Supervisory Board adopted resolutions to comply with that prohibition and to discontinue its operations in Crimea. *Id.* ¶¶79-81. As a result, Oschadbank's offices in Crimea were never in conformity with RF law as required under Article 1(1). *Id.* ¶¶12, 69.

In sum, because Oschadbank's business in Crimea was not "***in conformity with [RF] law***", Article 1(1), the RF's offer to arbitrate disputes did not apply to Oschadbank's investment. Thus, there was no agreement to arbitrate this dispute under FSIA, §1605(a)(6).

5. The RF Only Offered To Arbitrate Investments In Its Undisputed Territory Based On The Text Of Article 1(4)

The RF only offered to arbitrate disputes over investments made in its undisputed territory based on the ordinary meaning of the term "territory" and the "object and purpose" of the BIT under VCLT Art. 31. Given the dispute over Crimea's sovereignty, there is no agreement to arbitrate under FSIA, §1605(a)(6).

First, under Article 12, the RF's offer to arbitrate is limited to "investments, made by the investors of one Contracting Party in the ***territory*** of the other Contracting Party." Article 1(4) defines "Territory" as "the territory of Ukraine or the territory of the Russian Federation" and their respective EEZ and CS. In the BIT, "territory" is used to refer to territory that belongs to a party. *See* Art. 1 ("in the territory of") (three times); Arts. 2(1), 3, 4 ("in its territory"); Arts. 5(1), 6, 8 ("in the territory of"); Art. 9(2) ("in whose territory"); and Art. 12 ("in the territory of"). Moreover, the use of the disjunctive "or" in the definition of this term (i.e., "the territory of the Russian Federation ***or*** the territory of the Ukraine") further confirms that territory must either be that of the RF or Ukraine. Under international law, the repeated contextual use of possessive terms related to "territory" can only mean ***sovereign*** territory because the RF and Ukraine are each exercising ***sovereign*** authority to grant protections to investors from the other state. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶74-76.

Second, that "territory" means geographic areas as to which ***both*** parties agree concerning sovereignty can also be seen from the commonly accepted definition of "territory" in international law, where it means the state's ***sovereign*** territory. *See*, *e.g.*, *Oppenheim's International Law* (R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008), Ex. YN 117, at 1271-72 ("State territory is that defined portion of the globe which is subjected to the sovereignty of a state."). This understanding is "essential if contracting States are to have any certainty and security as to the territorial scope of each other's undertakings." H. Waldock, *Third Report on the Law of Treaties*, 1964(2) ILC YB 5, Ex. YN 149, at 13, ¶4. The converse is also true: it is "difficult to support the position that a treaty applies to territories escaping the State's sovereignty." S. Karagiannis, *The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties* (2011), Ex. YN 150, p. 752, n. 90. *See also* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶77-78 ("territory" means sovereign territory based on treatises, commentary, and cases). Thus, because Ukraine and Oschadbank (100% owned by Ukraine) dispute RF sovereignty over Crimea, the RF's offer to arbitrate does not extend to investments there.

Third, that "territory" means sovereign territory is also supported by Article 1(4) defining "Territory" as "the territory of the Russian Federation or the territory of the Ukraine, ***as well as their respective exclusive economic zone and continental shelf***..." That the RF and Ukraine expressly included the EEZ and CS in Article 1(4) means "territory of" only refers to sovereign territory and does not encompass areas where the parties only exercise *de facto* or jurisdictional control. Interpreting "territory" broadly to include other areas of control, not just areas under sovereign control, would render Article 1(4)'s inclusion of the EEZ and CS superfluous, as they would be encompassed by the term "territory". "It is a rule, in construing treaties as well as laws, to give a sensible meaning to all their provisions if that be practicable." *Geofroy v. Riggs*, 133 U.S. 258, 270 (1890).

Fourth, the BIT's very title "Agreement … on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments" demonstrates that its "object and purpose" under VCLT Art. 31(1) is to promote and protect investments of nationals of the other party. The Preamble refers to two primary goals: (a) the "intention to create and maintain favorable conditions for reciprocal investments," and (b) the "desir[e] to create favorable conditions for the promotion of economic cooperation between the Contracting Parties." *See Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic*, UNCITRAL (2006), Ex. YN 169, ¶299 ("The 'object and purpose' of the Treaty may be discerned from its title and preamble."). However, such an objective can only be achieved in geographic areas that are uncontested by the parties. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶85-86. As evidenced by Crimea, states contesting each other's sovereignty over an area cannot cooperate in that area's economic development. *Id.* Further, nothing in the BIT's title or Preamble suggests that the RF offered to arbitrate investments by Ukrainian investors in Ukrainian territory at the time of their making. For these reasons, the RF's offer ***did not*** include arbitrating investments in Crimea.

Fifth, for the RF to have offered to arbitrate disputes over Crimea, there must be a mutual agreement regarding whether Crimea is within the "territory of the Russian Federation"; otherwise, there is no jurisdiction *ratione loci* under the BIT. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶87. In order for BITs to accomplish their purposes, there must be reciprocity. *Id.,* ¶86. But there is no reciprocity here. *Id.,* ¶¶88, 89. Specifically, Ukraine's April 15, 2014, Disputed Territory Law rejects the RF's assertion that Crimea and Sevastopol are RF territory. *Id.*, Art. 1.1 ("The temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine (here and after – temporarily occupied territory) is an integral part of the territory of Ukraine. the application of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine shall extend to such territory."). Similarly, the May 6, 2014, NBU Directive prohibited Ukrainian banks such as Oschadbank from, *inter alia,* conducting banking activities in Crimea. The RF never offered to

provide protections in a territory over which Ukraine purports to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction and territory that Ukraine refuses to recognize as sovereign RF territory. Nor did the RF offer to protect Ukrainian investors prohibited by Ukrainian law from conforming with Russian law. Thus, the RF did not offer to arbitrate disputes related to Crimea. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶90. Based on this, there was no agreement under FSIA §1605(a)(6).

6. The RF Only Offered To Arbitrate Investments Which Were Cross-Border When Made Under Articles 1(1) and 1(2)

The RF only offered to arbitrate disputes with "***investor[s] of the other Contracting Party*** that arise[] in connection with the ***investments***." Article 9(1). Article 1(1) defines "investments" as assets "which are ***invested*** by an investor of one Contracting Party ***in the territory of the other Contracting Party***" (determining jurisdiction *ratione materiae*). Article 1(2) defines "investor of a Contracting Party" with respect to entities as "any legal entity, constituted under the law in force in the territory of that Contracting Party … ***to make investments in the territory of the other Contracting Party***" (determining jurisdiction *ratione personae*).

The common element of Articles 1(1) and 1(2) is that "investments" must be "invested" or "made" (an activity requirement) "in the territory of the other Contracting Party" (cross-border requirement). There is a nexus between the requirements of an action of "investing" and of such action being cross-border "in the territory of the other Contracting Party." These requirements are cumulative and must be fulfilled simultaneously to meet the definitions of "investment" and "investor" in Articles 1(1) and 1(2). *See* Ponomarev Translation Rpt., ¶¶16-17. Since an ***act*** of investing is required, the only time these requirements can be met concurrently is when such act takes place. Accordingly, an investment must be cross-border ***when made***. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶91, 92.

First, the requirement that an eligible investment must be cross-border when made is clear

from the ordinary meaning of the language of Articles 1(1) and 1(2). The words "are invested" in Article 1(1) and "to make" in Article 1(2) denote an ***action of making an investment*** as opposed to mere passive holding of an investment. *See* Ponomarev Translation Rpt., ¶¶9-15. The nexus of the ***action*** of investing being "***in***" "the territory of ***the other*** Contracting Party" means that an investor must ***transfer*** something to the territory of the other Contracting Party, *i.e.,* the action of investing must be cross-border. Since both elements can be present together only at the time of such action, an investment must be cross-border when made. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶94-97, 98-99.

Second, pursuant to VCLT Art. 31(1), the "object and purpose" of the BIT stated in its Preamble is "promotion of economic cooperation" between the RF and Ukraine by "creat[ing] and maintain[ing] favorable conditions" for investments made by investors of one State in the territory of the other State. BIT, Preamble. This can be achieved only when an investment is made cross-border in the territory of the other State. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶106. Thus, in *Sergei Viktorovich Pugachev v. The Russian Federation*, UNCITRAL (2020), Ex. YN 162, under the RF-France BIT, the tribunal reached this conclusion: "The preamble of the Treaty is clear in that its aim was the promotion of foreign investment by nationals of one State into the other State… [T]his promotion of foreign investment from one State to the other can only be accomplished if … the investor of one of the State parties to the BIT makes – not simply holds – an investment in the territory of the other State … by way of a transfer of capital or [resources] between the two States in the interest of their economic development." *Id*. ¶¶415, 416. "It is a necessary consequence of the references to investments 'made' rather than investments 'held,' that [foreign] nationality condition must be fulfilled ***at the time of the making of the investment***." *Id*. ¶418 (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). *See further* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶101, 102, 103 & n. 17, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111 & n. 20 (citing

additional cases).

Third, under VCLT Art. 31(1), a "treaty shall be interpreted … in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context." VCLT Art. 31(2) allows for consideration of other treaty provisions to provide "context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty." As discussed, Article 12, which excludes investments made prior to January 1, 1992, was based on the idea that an investment made in a domestic territory cannot become foreign by virtue of a change in sovereignty over that territory. The intention was to exclude the possibility of an investment arising from territorial changes, such as those which resulted from the dissolution of the USSR, but also other territorial changes, absent mutual consent, such as those which occurred in 2014 upon Crimea's accession to the RF. *See* Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶¶112-115. Since the object and purpose of the BIT is to stimulate foreign investments, extending the BIT's protection to an investment that was domestic at the time of its making would not fulfill the BIT's "basic underlying objectives." *See ST-AD GmbH v. Bulgaria*, PCA Case No. 2011-06 (2013), Ex. YN 121, ¶423 ("BIT mechanism does not protect investments that it was not designed to protect, that is, ***domestic investments disguised as international investments***.")

Accordingly, based on the ordinary meaning of Articles 1(1) and 1(2), viewed in the context of Article 12 and the BIT's object and purpose, the RF's offer to arbitrate did not apply to investments which were not cross-border when made. Oschadbank's investments in Crimea were not "invested" in the territory of the RF when made before 2014. *See* Petition, ¶22; Award, ¶¶63-65. Thus, because the RF's offer to arbitrate under the BIT did not apply to Oschadbank's purely domestic investment, there was no agreement under FSIA §1605(a)(6).

7. The RF's Offer To Arbitrate Under The BIT Does Not Apply To Crimea Based On The Practice Of States Refusing to Recognize Crimea as RF Territory Regarding Similar BITs Under International Law

VCLT Art. 32 allows recourse to "supplementary means of interpretation." As Nouvel

explains, "Treaties on the same subject matter concluded […] with third States can legitimately be considered as part of the supplementary means of interpretation." Nouvel BIT Rpt., ¶120 (quoting *Planet Mining Pty Ltd. v. Indonesia*, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, 12/40 (2014), Ex. YN 118, ¶182). The RF entered into numerous investment treaties with other states similar to the BIT at issue. The practice of the other states refusing to recognize Crimea as RF territory evidences that BITs with the RF are not interpreted to include Crimea as RF territory under international law because of the absence of mutual consent.

In August 2023, the RF sent diplomatic notes to 13 states and the European Union regarding the application of their bilateral investment treaties with the RF to Crimea. *See Notes Verbales* Summary Chart, Ex. 20. For example, the August 21, 2023 *Note Verbale* sent to France stated that "the Russian Federation confirms that the Agreement shall apply similarly to the Republic of Crimea and federal city of Sevastopol." August 21, 2023 RF-France, *Note Verbale*, Ex. 21. On November 23, 2023, France rejected this application, stating it "believes that the territorial scope of the Agreement … corresponds to internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation" pursuant to Resolutions 68/262 and ES-11/4 of the U.N. November 3, 2023 France-RF, *Note Verbale*, Ex. 22. France's response, citing U.N. Resolutions that Crimea is not the RF's territory, is the same as those from Austria, Belgium, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. *See Notes Verbales* Summary Chart, Ex. 20.

Based on these responses, these BITs would not protect investments from RF investors located in Crimea in the territory of these states, and, reciprocally, these BITs would not protect investments from their investors in Crimea. Based upon the understanding of these other countries with similar bilateral investment treaties with the RF on the same subject matter rejecting that

Crimea is RF territory, under international law, including the VCLT, nationals of these countries (including Ukraine) do not enjoy the protection of the investments made in Crimea, when their countries dispute that Crimea is the territory of the RF due to lack of mutual agreement.

B. FSIA'S ARBITRATION EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE AWARD DOES NOT INVOLVE A COMMERCIAL LEGAL RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION

The FSIA's arbitration exception applies to award enforcement actions only where "the award is governed by a treaty signed by the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards." *Chevron*., 795 F.3d at 204. Oschadbank relies on the NY Convention, which is subject to the United States' "commercial reservation," making it applicable only to differences "arising out of ***a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial.***" 9 U.S.C. §202. The NY Convention is inapplicable because the legal relationship between the RF and Oschadbank is sovereign in nature, not commercial.

First, Oschadbank asserts only that the "Award arose from a legal relationship between Petitioner and Respondent that is commercial within the meaning of [9 U.S.C. §202]." Petition, ECF 1, ¶63. It alleges no facts showing how this "legal relationship" is purportedly "commercial."

Second, there is no underlying contract between Oschadbank and the RF. Nor is there any "legal relationship" between the RF and Oschadbank based upon the BIT. Assuming, *arguendo*, that it applies to investments in Crimea, the BIT is between two sovereign states. It created no commercial obligations between the sovereigns and investors of the other state. Rather, it created uniquely sovereign obligations for the protection of foreign investments. Such sovereign obligations are not "commercial" in nature, because "[t]he essence of sovereignty is supremacy of authority." *Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.*, 764 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir. 1985).

Third, "[i]n the context of international arbitration, 'commercial' refers to 'matters or relationships, whether contractual or not, that ***arise out of*** or in connection with commerce.'

Restatement (Third) of U.S. Law of Int'l Comm. Arbitration § 1-1 (2012)." *Belize Social Development, Ltd., v. Belize,* 794 F.3d at 103-04 (commercial relationship because underlying agreement involved sale of real property in exchange for preferred tax treatment). In contrast, the relationship between the RF and Oschadbank did not ***arise out of*** or have any ***connection with commerce*** because Oschadbank did not engage in any purposeful investment activities into the RF. The RF did not approve Oschadbank investing in Crimea, which was then Ukrainian territory. The RF had no relationship whatsoever with Oschadbank when the investment was made before March 2014. Rather, the legal relationship arose by function of Crimea's accession into the RF, a distinctly non-commercial relationship that Ukraine has disputed.

C. OSCHADBANK IS NOT A PRIVATE PARTY UNDER §1605(A)(6)

The FSIA arbitration exception applies only where an award was rendered pursuant to "an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a *private party*." FSIA §1605(a)(6). While FSIA does not define the term "private party," it does define "foreign state" to include corporations that are majority owned by the foreign state. *Id.*, §1603(a)-(b). It is thus clear that Congress did not intend the arbitration exception to apply to actions to enforce awards rendered in an arbitration between two states. But Oschadbank is owned 100% by Ukraine. It is not a private party. Thus, the FSIA arbitration exception does not apply on its face.

II. FSIA'S §1605(A)(1) WAIVER EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY MERELY BECAUSE THE RF SIGNED THE NEW YORK CONVENTION

As an alternative rationale for jurisdiction, Oschadbank cites FSIA §1605(a)(1)'s "waiver exception" which applies when "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication." *See* Petition, ¶9. It contends that the non-precedential opinion in *Tatneft v. Ukraine*, 771 F.App'x 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2019) somehow authoritatively held that the RF and 171 other sovereign nations which signed the NY Convention all thereby ***impliedly*** waived their sovereign

immunity against lawsuits brought against them in any of the other 171 nations that have signed the Convention.[15] Neither *Tatneft* nor any other D.C. Circuit decision has precedential import on this issue, and the D.C. Circuit recently took care to avoid any endorsement of this sweeping implied waiver theory. Many factors caution against such a dangerous view.

First, in the pending appeal of *Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain*, D.C. Cir., Case No. 23-7038, the Circuit Court asked the United States to provide an *amicus curiae* brief on the subject.[16] In its brief, the United States, citing D.C. Circuit precedent requiring that any waiver by implication under FSIA must be construed narrowly, explained that a ***specific*** arbitration agreement, not mere participation by a sovereign as a party to the NY Convention, is necessary for finding a FSIA waiver.[17] The United States also explained that this reading of FSIA comports with existing D.C. Circuit precedent. *See* U.S Amicus Brief at 21-24. It is, of course, "well settled that the Executive Branch's interpretation of a treaty [like the Convention] 'is entitled to great weight.'" *Abbott v. Abbott*, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (quoting *Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano*, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)). *See also Republic of Sudan v. Harrison*, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1060-61 (2019) (same).

Second, no textual support for this argument that the RF waived immunity "explicitly or by implication" can be found in the NY Convention, which doesn't even mention sovereign immunity. As the Supreme Court noted, for a foreign state to merely sign a Convention does not

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[15] *See*: https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2.

[16] Order dated January 5, 2024, *Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain*, D.C. Cir., Case No. 23-7038, Doc. # 2034696, Ex. 15 (inviting United States to address "[w]hether, by becoming a party to the New York Convention, a state waives sovereign immunity under the FSIA waiver exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(1), from any action seeking the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award governed by the Convention").

[17] U.S. *Amicus Curiae* brief dated February 2, 2024, *Blasket,* D.C. Cir., Case No. 23-7038, Doc. # 2038663, Ex. 16 ("U.S. Amicus Brief"), at 19-21.

"create an exception to the FSIA." *Amerada Hess*, 488 U.S. at 442 (1989). "Nor do we see how a foreign state can waive its immunity under §1605(a)(1) by signing an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in United States courts." *Id*. *See also Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska*, 215 F.3d 727, 733-734 (7th Cir. 2000) (sovereign does not waive immunity by signing a treaty "that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity").

Third, it is no mystery why the NY Convention does not mention sovereign immunity. It was not crafted to address whether a sovereign waived immunity regarding arbitration of ***public law disputes***; rather, its express purpose was to facilitate "arbitration in the settlement of ***private law disputes.***" U.N. Conference Final Act ¶1, Ex. 19.

Fourth, the idea that nations that signed the NY Convention thereby "explicitly or by implication" waived sovereign immunity cannot be squared with the theory of absolute sovereignty which many significant nations, including the U.S.S.R., adhered to during that time.[18] If that was the intention, one would have expected the issue of immunity to have been explicitly addressed in the NY Convention. In the face of silence on the matter, it is unreasonable to assume that a waiver of immunity was a consequence of signing the NY Convention.

Fifth, that neither the text nor the purpose of the NY Convention supports the implied waiver theory is decisive, given that the D.C. Circuit has "followed the 'virtually unanimous' precedents construing the implied waiver provision narrowly." *World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v.*

[18] *See* Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), *reprinted in* 26 Dept. of State Bull. 984-85 (1952) (explaining that Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, and Germany adhered to an "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity), *also attached as* Appendix 2 to *Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba*, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976). *See also Gregorian v. Izvestia*, 871 F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir. 1989) (U.S.S.R. continued to adhere to the "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity for decades after signing the NY Convention).

Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1161 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "Courts rarely find that a nation has waived its sovereign immunity … without strong evidence that this is what the foreign state intended." *Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 905 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990). An "implied waiver depends upon the foreign government's having at some point indicated its amenability to suit." *Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany*, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting "intentionality requirement implicit in §1605(a)(1)") (collecting cases, citing legislative history).

Sixth, this theory, if adopted, would have disturbing implications, as warned in the U.S. Amicus Brief at 24. If the RF can be subjected to suit in the United States solely because it signed the NY Convention, then the United States can likewise be subjected to suit in the RF or other countries based on this theory. Since "some foreign states base their sovereign immunity decisions on reciprocity," Oschadbank's overbroad interpretation of the FSIA's waiver exception could create the "potential for international discord and for foreign government retaliation." *Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 729 F.2d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Indeed, this risks the United States being sued in any of the other 171 nation that signed the NY Convention, including states with which it has strained relations (e.g., Iran, Cuba) and failed states (e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti, Syria).

Seventh, confirming the destabilizing effect of this theory, after seeking the views of the United States in 2020, the D.C. Circuit declined to affirm a decision that had adopted the theory that a foreign state had so waived immunity. In *Process & Industrial Developments, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 506 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020), the District Court relied on this

theory in finding jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award against Nigeria. *Id*. at 8 & n.4.[19] After considering an earlier *amicus* brief filed by the United States expressing "significant policy concerns,"[20] the D.C. Circuit declined to affirm on this ground, and instead affirmed based on the arbitration exception. *Process & Industrial Developments, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria*, 27 F.4th 771, 775-76 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2022). *See also Blasket Renewable Invs., LLC v. Kingdom of Spain*, 665 F.Supp.3d 1, 13-14 (2023) (rejecting waiver argument as "too clever by half," declining to read D.C. Circuit precedent "as having overruled the requirement for a valid agreement to arbitrate"). The compelling U.S. Amicus Brief, as well as precedent, makes clear that merely signing the NY Convention does not constitute waiver.

III. THE RF IS A "PERSON" ENTITLED TO THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The RF objects to the exercise of personal jurisdiction on due process grounds under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to avoid any argument that it waived its right to raise this issue on appeal. *Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002), held that that foreign states do not qualify as "persons" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, the RF maintains that *Price* was wrongly decided and is

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[19] As the decision noted, the D.C. Circuit, while having "come close" in *Creighton Ltd. v. Qatar*, 181 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999), where it "opined in dicta" that the "reasoning is correct" in *Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala*, 989 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1993), it "***has not adopted*** *Seetransport's* waiver as binding Circuit law." *Process & Industrial Developments, Ltd.*, 506 F.Supp.3d at 7. The decision also noted that "[b]ecause *Tatneft* is an unpublished disposition, the Court is not bound by it." *Id*. at 7 n.3 (citing *Atlas Brew Works, LLC v. Barr*, 391 F.Supp.3d 6, 21 (D.D.C. 2019)). *See also* D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2) (unpublished disposition lacks precedential value); *United States v. Project on Gov't Oversight*, 484 F.Supp.2d 56, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing the Rule and case law).

[20] *See* U.S. *Amicus Curiae* brief in *Process & Industrial Developments, Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria* D.C. Cir., No. 21-7003, Document # 1931435 (Jan. 20, 2022), Ex. 17. Among other things, the United States noted that the waiver theory "could . . . implicate adverse reciprocity concerns were foreign courts to take a broad view of waiver in cases brought against the United States." *Id.* at 6.

subject to challenge on appeal based upon, *inter alia*, **(a)** its misplaced reasoning that *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), supports treating foreign states the same as U.S. states, which are not "persons" under the Fifth Amendment; **(b)** its inconsistency with the Supreme Court precedent recognizing foreign states are treated as "persons" for the purpose of requiring process to assert personal jurisdiction, *see*, *e.g.*, *Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India*, 434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978) (allowing foreign nations to sue as a "person" within the meaning of the Clayton Act); **(c)** its inconsistency of treatment because agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states are treated as persons under the FSIA, *see Livnat v. Palestinian Authority*, 851 F.3d 45, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("[n]othing in *Price*, other precedent, … compels us to extend the rule in *Price* to all foreign government entities"); **(d)** the intent of the drafters of the Due Process Clause; and **(e)** FSIA implicitly treats foreign states as persons for due process purposes.

IV. THE RF WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED UNDER FSIA §1608(A)(4)

For "jurisdiction over a foreign state, a plaintiff must effect service in compliance with the [FSIA]." *Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe,* 2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 159797 at *3 (D.D.C. Sep. 6, 2022) (citing *Barot v. Embassy of Zambia*, 785 F.3d 26, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). That, Oschadbank has failed to do.

A. OSCHADBANK WAS NOT PERMITTED TO EFFECT SERVICE UNDER §1608(A)(4) WITHOUT ATTEMPTING SERVICE PURSUANT TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION UNDER §1608(A)(2)

Section 1608 (a)(2) provides for service "by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents." The RF and United States are parties to such a convention: the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 ("Hague Convention"), Ex. 12.

First, when the RF acceded to the Hague Convention, it declared that "it is highly desirable

that documents intended for service upon the [RF]" should be "transmitted through diplomatic channels, i.e., by *Notes Verbales* of diplomatic missions of foreign States accredited in the [RF]." RF Hague Convention Declarations, ¶IV, Ex. 13. This is permitted under the Hague Convention Article 10(b), described below. The RF's Rejection of Service stated that it would accept service through "*notes verbales* of diplomatic missions of foreign states." *See* RF Rejection, ECF 19-1.[21]

Second, the Hague Convention "specifies certain approved methods of service." *Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon,* 581 U.S. 271, 273 (2017). *Water Splash* recognized that Articles 10(b) and 10(c) of the Hague Convention, "by their plain terms, address additional methods of service that are permitted by Convention (unless the receiving state objects)." *Water Splash*, 581 U.S. at 276. Article 10(b) states:

> Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with … the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination…

In accord with Article 10(b), the RF Declaration provides an additional means of service on the RF Government (as well as other RF government entities) by officials of the United States through diplomatic channels to the RF. Thus, service through these means is "in accordance" with the Hague Convention under FSIA §1608 (a)(2).

Third, §1608(a) sets a "hierarchy of service methods, [and] a plaintiff may not opt to serve a foreign defendant *out of order*, *i.e.*, by pursuing a *less* preferred method first, in contravention of

[21] The RF has historically insisted on service via *Note Verbale* by accredited foreign missions on its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, as evidenced by numerous rejections of service filed by the RF in U.S. courts. Recently, it did not oppose arguments that service is unavailable under §1608(a)(2) because it did not matter to the RF under which FSIA provision service was effected by *Note Verbale* on its Foreign Ministry. Prior to 2023, the U.S. State Department consistently served the RF through *Notes Verbales* on its Foreign Ministry in Moscow. *See* A. Kondakov Declaration in Support of dated October 6, 2022, case No. 1:22-cv-00798 (D.D.C), Ex. 36.

the express language of the statute … [A]n otherwise successful attempt to serve a foreign state is invalid if conducted without following the statutorily prescribed order." *Przewozman v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 628 F.Supp.3d 307, 313 (D.D.C. 2022) (italics in the original) (finding absence of personal jurisdiction for failure to comply with §1608). Oschadbank attempted service only under §1608(a)(4), skipping §1608(a)(2) because of the RF's refusal to serve letters of request from the United States for service of process presented to its designated Central Authority under the terms of the Hague Convention, Articles 2 through 6.[22] *See* Oschadbank Service Request, ECF 8, *citing* the State Department Website. However, this fails because the RF agrees to service via *Notes Verbales* from accredited missions of foreign states under the Hague Convention, Article 10(b). *See* RF Rejection, ECF 19-1. No "judicial cooperation" of the RF's Central Authority for transmission of service is implicated.

Accordingly, Oschadbank's failure to first attempt service under § 1608(a)(2) renders any purported service made under § 1608(a)(4) void. *See Azadeh v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 318 F.Supp.3d 90, 100 (D.D.C. 2018) (service under §1608(a)(4) improper without first attempting service by mail under §1608(a)(3), to which Iran had not objected).

B. ALTERNATIVELY, SERVICE ON THE RF EMBASSY UNDER §1608(A)(4) VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW

"[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." *Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy*, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). *See Weinberger v. Rossi*, 456 U.S. 25, 29-32 (1982) (construing statute in accord with "principles of international law"). This Court should set aside service on the RF Embassy in Washington, D.C., *see* Service Return, ECF 13, which the RF rejected, *see* RF Rejection, ECF 19-1, and thereby

[22] The RF's objection is based upon the imposition of fees for similar service by the United States. *See* RF Hague Convention Declarations, ¶VIII, Ex. 13; State Dept. RF Service Page, Ex. 14.

confirm that service should be effected through diplomatic channels on the RF's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. The VCDR Prohibits Service Upon Missions, Which Are Inviolable

The U.S. is party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (December 13, 1972), 23 U.S.T. 3227 ("VCDR"), Ex. 11. The VCDR "codified long-standing principles of customary international law." *767 Third Ave. Assocs.* v. *Permanent Mission of The Republic of Zaire to U.N.*, 988 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1993). *Republic of Sudan* held that to "avoid[] potential tension" with the VCDR, service could not be made on an embassy under §1608 (a)(3). *Id*., 139 S.Ct. at 1060. Prohibiting serving upon embassies should also apply to §1608(a)(4) .

First, VCDR Art. 22(2) provides: "***The premises of the mission shall be inviolable.*** The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of mission." "As signatories to the [VCDR] … [the U.S. is] obliged to hold 'inviolable' the premises of foreign missions." *Broidy Capital Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin*, 61 F.4th 984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The ICJ has held the VCDR "not only prohibits any infringements of the inviolability of the mission by the receiving State itself but also puts the receiving State under an obligation to prevent others … from doing so…." *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo* (*Congo v. Uganda*), 2005 I.C.J. 278-279, Judgment (2005), Ex. YN 26, ¶342. International law expert Professor Yves Nouvel's Service Report ("Nouvel Service Rpt."), explains how the VCDR's principle of inviolability prohibits any interference by the receiving State (U.S.) in an embassy, including service of process.[23] As the receiving State, the United States cannot assign tasks to a sending State's embassy, such as accepting service, that the sending State (RF) has not authorized. *See* Nouvel Service Rpt. at 4-8

[23] Nouvel cites to sources of international law as established by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, including "international conventions," "custom," "generalized principles of law," and "judicial decisions… and teachings." *Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 562 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir. 2009).

(discussing U.S. State Department's acknowledgement of obligations under the VCDR, and the International Court of Justice, UK, Austria, France, Germany, and Switzerland judicial decisions determining service may not be made on an embassy).[24] The U.S. State Department recognizes the intrusion created by attempted service, pointing out:

> ***The establishment by one country of a diplomatic mission in the territory of another does not implicitly or explicitly empower that mission to act as agent of the sending state for the purpose of accepting service of process.*** The Department of State, as in the case of any other foreign office, may not impute such authority to the diplomatic mission of the sending state.

August 10, 1964 Ltr. from the Acting Legal Adviser Meeker to Asst. Atty. Gen. Douglas ("Meeker Letter"), 59 Am. J. Int'l L 103, 111 (1965), Ex. YN 53.

Second, the natural reading of §1608 (a)(4) is for service to be transmitted to a foreign State's ministry of foreign affairs (*see* §1608(a)(3), protecting VCDR inviolability). 22 CFR §93.1(c)(1) sets forth steps for transmittal under §1608(a)(4) through the U.S. embassy to the foreign ministry.[25] *Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore*, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965), held that VCDR inviolability and the law of nations prohibited service on Tunisia through its ambassador, which is the same as serving an embassy. *Id.* at 980, nn.4 & 5. It observed the U.S. State Department's position that it "would not, in the absence of express statutory or treaty provision, attempt to

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[24] Scholarly publications are in accord. *See* Nouvel Service Rpt., at 5 (quoting A. L. George, 19 Int'l L.J. 49 (1985), Ex. YN 34); *id.* at 9 (quoting G.E. Do Nascimento e Silva, *Diplomacy in International Law*, Sijthoff, Leiden 1972, p. 97, Ex. YN 56, and H. Fox, *The Law of State Immunity*, Oxford University Press, pp. 179-180 (2002), Ex. YN 48).

[25] While 22 CFR §93.1(c)(2) permits service upon a mission only "if otherwise appropriate," such should be limited to when service on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be impossible. Otherwise, this language conflicts with the VCDR and international law. Further, while the 1976 House Report, 94-1487, at 24, on the FSIA, suggests service can be made through diplomatic channels to an embassy, again when otherwise impossible, this is not a clear "affirmative expression of congressional intent to abrogate the [U.S.'s] international obligations." *Weinberger v. Rossi,* 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). "[L]egislative history alone cannot be sufficient to abrogate a treaty…" *Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 333 F.3d 228, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

transmit the summons by an official diplomatic note to the embassy of a sending state, unless the embassy indicated a willingness to accept the summons." *Id.* at 980 n.3 (quoting August 10, 1964 Meeker Letter). *See* Nouvel Service Rpt. at 7-9 (service on embassy violates VCDR inviolability).

Third, Nouvel explains that the VCDR enshrines the principle of *ne impediatur legatio* (mission functions shall not be impeded). Nouvel Service Rpt. at 10-11. *Hellenic Lines* credited the U.S. State Department's position that service on embassies (a) violates diplomatic immunity; (b) obstructs diplomatic functions; (c) prejudices relations with other States; and (d) could be perceived as departing from a universally "accepted rule of international law and practice." *Id*., 345 F.2d at 980 n.5. Also, service on embassies creates a risk that U.S. missions "would be exposed to incursions that are legal under a foreign state's law." *767 Third Ave. Assocs.,* 988 F.2d at 300.

2. Service On A Mission Violates Customary International Law

The U.S. "has a vital national interest in complying with international law" and ensuring that other States comply. *Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 323 (1988). In 2004, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property ("UNCSI"), requiring service by "transmission through diplomatic channels ***to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*** of the State concerned," which is "deemed effected by receipt of the documents ***by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs***." UNCSI, Art. 22(1)(c)(ii), Ex. YN 30. "State immunity from jurisdiction is governed by customary international law, the codification of which is enshrined in [UNCSI]." *Wallishauser v. Austria*, ECHR (2012), Ex. YN 28, ¶30. While the UNCSI is not in force as to the U.S., *Wallishauser* recognized its service provision is customary international law, binding on the U.S. *Id.* ¶¶39, 62-73. *See* Nouvel Service Rpt. at 11-12 (same). The UNCSI service provision represents a strong convergence of national practices and international conventions that service must be on the ministry of foreign affairs, not on embassies. *See* Nouvel Service Rpt. at

12-18; *Republic of Sudan,* Amicus of Law Professors, 13-16, Ex. 18 (listing cases affirming international law requires service on foreign ministry); Nouvel Service Rpt. at 17-19 (discussing foreign judicial decisions prohibiting service upon embassies).[26]

3. The U.S.'s Stated Positions That Service May Not Be Made On Embassies Is Binding On It And Is Evidence Of Customary International Law

First, U.S. official statements and positions in judicial proceedings that service cannot be made on embassies are binding commitments under customary international law. *See* Nouvel Service Rpt. at 26-28 (citing, *inter alia,* August 10, 1964 Meeker Letter, Ex. YN 53 (service may not be made on embassy absent consent) and *United States v. Ms. Michèle S.-B.*, Court of Cassation, 2nd civil, no. 16-25.266 (February 21, 2019), Ex. YN 8 (French court upheld U.S. position that service may not be made on its embassy)).

Second, U.S. statements and positions against service upon embassies also constitute *opinio juris*, evidencing customary international law, obligating the U.S. to afford other States the same immunity it claims. *See* Nouvel Service Rpt. at 31-32 (citing *Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy)*, I.C.J. Reports 2012, Ex. YN 23, ¶55). For example, as discussed by Nouvel, in *United States v. Ms. Michèle S.-B.*, Paris Court of Appeal, Pôle 6, ch. 4, no. 14/07682 (September 20, 2016), Ex. YN 41, the French Court denied service on the U.S. Embassy, finding: "the United States of America formally took a position in favor of a single transmission through official diplomatic channels, *i.e.* directly by the French Embassy in Washington D.C. to the U.S. State Department." *Id*. Based on this statement, the French Court of Cassation held that service on an embassy through diplomatic channels can only be admitted with the express consent of the State concerned. It then ruled:

[26] Service on the RF Embassy was also discriminatory in violation of VCDR Article 47(1), because the U.S. serves other States on their territory, including, e.g., Turkey (2021), Germany (2017), and Tajikistan (1994), *see* Nouvel Service Rpt. at 20-21.

> [It] did not appear from any of its findings that the United States of America had consented to the notification of acts through diplomatic channels being made to its embassy in France and, secondly, that it noted that by diplomatic note of November 20, 2012, the Embassy of the United States of America in France had refused to accept the document, informing the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the official diplomatic channel had not been used to bring the case to the attention of the addressee of the document, with the result that the notification at issue could not be regarded as a regular notification made through diplomatic channels …

Nouvel Service Rpt. at 28 (quoting *United States v. Ms. Michèle S.-B.,* Court of Cassation, *supra*, Ex. YN 8).

In sum, the VCDR, numerous other sources of customary international law, the U.S.'s own statements and positions, and Nouvel's opinion establish that service on an embassy is prohibited by international customary law, absent consent of the receiving State, which the RF did not provide.

CONCLUSION

The Motion should be granted and the case dismissed for failure to effect service under FSIA §1608(a) , without prejudice, or, for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction based on Oschadbank's failure to establish an exception to sovereign immunity under FSIA §1605(a)(1) & (6), with prejudice.

Dated: March 4, 2024

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 4, 2024, the foregoing document was filed electronically and served upon all counsel of record via the Court's CM/ECF filing system in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated: March 4, 2024

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