Notice: We are currently performing maintenance to improve the italaw platform. The site remains fully accessible. Thank you for your patience.

Nachingwea v. Tanzania, Award, July 14, 2023

14 Jul 2023
Nachingwea U.K. Limited (UK), Ntaka Nickel Holdings Limited (UK) and Nachingwea Nickel Limited (Tanzania) v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/20/38  
Document provided by: IAReporter
Award
Document Details:
LISTED PARTICIPANTS
Award
Participants listed are for this document only and may not include all participants involved in the entire case. Always consult the original documents.
Claimant appointee
Respondent appointee
Tribunal/Panel chair
Sole Arbitrator
ICSID Annulment Committee president
ICSID Annulment Committee members
WTO Appellate Body members
WTO Appellate Body chair
Judges
Claimant's law firm
Respondent's law firm
Other counsel
Claimant's expert
Claimant's expert firm
Respondent's expert
Respondent's expert firm
Other witnesses
Tribunal assistant
Third-party funder
Country
Print reporter
Document Summary
Award
This summary note is machine-generated. Always consult the original materials.

Procedural Posture and Background

This document is the final Award in an ICSID arbitration brought by Nachingwea U.K. Limited, Ntaka Nickel Holdings Limited, and Nachingwea Nickel Limited (collectively, the "Claimants") against the United Republic of Tanzania ("Tanzania" or the "Respondent"). The dispute was submitted pursuant to the 1996 United Kingdom-Tanzania Bilateral Investment Treaty (the "BIT") and the ICSID Convention. The arbitration concerns the Claimants' investments in the Ntaka Hill Nickel Project (the "Project"), a nickel sulphide exploration and development enterprise in southeastern Tanzania. Following years of exploration and the discovery of commercially significant deposits, the Claimants' local subsidiary was granted a retention licence in 2015. However, in July 2017, Tanzania enacted sweeping legislative amendments under an emergency procedure that repealed the statutory basis for retention licences. Subsequently, the Mining (Mineral Rights) Regulations 2018 expressly cancelled all existing retention licences, reverting the underlying rights to the State. In December 2019, Tanzania issued a public invitation to tender the Project area to third parties.

Jurisdiction and Admissibility

Tanzania raised several jurisdictional objections, principally arguing that the Claimants lacked standing because their investment was not "actively made" and that the dispute should be heard by domestic courts. Relying heavily on the prior award in Standard Chartered Bank v. Tanzania, the Respondent contended that the BIT implicitly required an active relationship between the investor and the investment, precluding passive holding companies from treaty protection. The Tribunal unanimously dismissed these objections. Engaging in a rigorous treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Tribunal expressly departed from the Standard Chartered Bank tribunal's reasoning. The Tribunal held that the plain language of Article 8(1) and the broad definition of "investment" in Article 1(a) of the BIT did not impose any requirement that an investment be "actively made." The Tribunal further noted that even if such a standard applied, the Claimants had demonstrated active capital contributions and operational control. The Tribunal also dismissed the forum objection, confirming that the BIT provides an independent international forum without requiring the exhaustion of local remedies.

Liability and Unlawful Expropriation

On the merits, the Tribunal concluded that Tanzania's regulatory measures amounted to an unlawful expropriation in breach of Article 5 of the BIT. The Tribunal determined that the 2018 Regulations effected a substantial and permanent deprivation of the Claimants' investment by cancelling the retention licence and extinguishing their legal and economic rights. Tanzania invoked the police powers doctrine, arguing the measures were regulatory actions taken in the public interest to ensure the productive use of mineral resources. The Tribunal rejected this defense, emphasizing the absence of contemporaneous evidence demonstrating a genuine public purpose or a reasonable nexus between the cancellation of the licences and the stated regulatory goals. Furthermore, the Tribunal found the expropriation to be unlawful because it failed to satisfy the cumulative conditions of Article 5: it was executed without due process (given the rushed legislative process and lack of meaningful stakeholder consultation), it was discriminatory (targeting foreign mining companies), and it was executed without any offer of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.

Damages, Valuation, and Costs

Having established liability, the Tribunal turned to the quantification of damages, adopting the fair market value standard. Both parties agreed on the cost approach as the appropriate valuation methodology. The Tribunal endorsed the Claimants' use of the Multiple of Exploration Expenditure (MEE) method, which applies a multiplier to historical exploration costs to reflect the value added by successful exploration outcomes. After analyzing comparable historical transactions involving the Project, the Tribunal applied a Prospectivity Enhancement Multiplier (PEM) of 1.6 to the Claimants' substantiated historical costs, which included both direct exploration expenditures and management overheads. The Tribunal determined the proper valuation date to be January 10, 2018, the date the expropriatory regulations were published, as this best aligned with the principle of full reparation under customary international law. Consequently, the Tribunal awarded the Claimants USD 76,704,461.76 in damages, plus compound interest at the rate of USD Prime + 2%. Applying the "costs follow the event" principle, the Tribunal ordered Tanzania to bear the entirety of the arbitration costs and the Claimants' legal representation expenses, totaling over USD 4.1 million. However, the Tribunal declined to award the Claimants their third-party funding costs, finding insufficient justification to shift the burden of the funding arrangement to the Respondent.